Harper and Tanks

[Jim Gordon]

It was disappoining to read in a previous thread the following comment “....I often wonder whether this experience fuelled Harper's mistrust of tanks.....” It was doubly disappointing as it was made by a gentleman whose vast knowledge of the Western Front far exceeds my own and whose opinions on WW1 matters is valued.

Why am I disapointed ? - because it demonstrates that the unfair vilification of Major-General Harper, originating in Baker-Carr’s book “From Chauffeur to Brigadier” and carried on by Liddell Hart et al, lives on to the present day.

Harper’s mistrust of tanks may have arisen from his Division’s inauspicious experience with them before Cambrai but I think it was their mechanical unreliabilty that concerned him most - after all he was a Royal Engineer himself and presumably knew a thing or two about things mechanical.

It may be of interest to know that in the Defence Industry of modern times it was invariably our experience that only 10 to 15% of the design reliability would be realised in Development and early Production Models of new equipment where reliability is defined as the quantitative probability of an equipment succesfully fulfilling the function for which it was designed.

Furthermore I consider the term “mistrust” to be rather over the top. Relations between Tank Corps and Harper’s Division were extremely cordial throughout the conflict and, as I said above, it was the unreliability of the tanks that concerned Harper and not the concept or the troops who had to carry it out.

[Paul Reed]

As it was me who made that comment, then I'd better reply!

I quite agree with what you write - and I have always believed Harper was a good divisional commander. I interviewed several HD vets who fought on the Somme and at Arras, and they all loved 'Uncle'.

As you suggest, his 'mistrust' or reservations over tanks went back to his own division's experience of them on the Somme in November 1916, and at Arras on 9/12 April 1917; on both occasions the tanks failed the infantry, and at Arras didn't even make the start line. It certainly would be interesting to read Harper's papers as to what he thought of both events - if indeed they have survived?

There is no doubt that the Somme and Arras influenced Harper's approach to tanks at Cambrai; whether this affected the whole outcome of what happened at Flesquieres is, I think, a matter of some debate. Personally I think it more complicated than that.

[Bryn_Hammond]

Have just posted a response to another thread saying 'Never trust Baker-Carr'. It holds especially good for his comments on Harper.

I have been unable to find any trace of any 'Harper Papers' - but that doesn't mean I've given up. I know where his medals are - which doesn't augur well for any collection of papers being kept together as they aren't with a Harper descendant. He had no children and although his wife survived him I have yet to find out when she died. Anyone know?

As for Harper & tanks, the 51st Division DID work with tanks on 31 July and they worked well together. So why didn't this remove Uncle's prejudices?

Jim, you always mount a stout defence of both Harper and the 51st Division but I think you are going 'out on a limb' about Harper's RE background giving him an appreciation of things mechanical.

[Jim Gordon]

Paul & Bryn

Thank you both for your responses to this thread.

It was a decent gesture for Paul to point the figure at himself. I took great care to make the original posting as impersonal as possible. However I appreciate your response Paul and, of course, agree with its content. It is indeed a pity that Harper, apparently, left no papers. As you mention Flesquieres may I commend to you a paper by John Hussey, published in "“The British Army Review Number 117" entitled “Uncle Harper at Cambrai. A Reconsideration” You probably have read it !

Bryn - 51st. did indeed work effectively with 8 tanks on 31st. July, 1917 (8 Tanks alloted to the two attacking Brigades) and without as far as I can make out without any prior training in such co-operation. It is a telling point that if Harper “mistrusted” tanks then this experience should have allayed his fears. However you omit any reference to the experience of the 51st. at the Battle of Poelcappelle on 20th. Sept., 1917 where of the 12 Tanks allotted to the Division only one, D44, was able to take part in the action. It could be argued that this experience would have dented any optimism that tanks were mechanically sound and capable of doing the job for which they were designed. (There is room on that limb for two).

I do concede that my knowledge, or rather lack of knowledge, of the pre-1914 R.E. probably led me to the naive assumption that Harper was mechanically literate. Maybe you will stop sawing at the base of that limb now.

As far as my defence work on behalf of the 51st. is concerned it is only right that one should support the Home Team. Anyway the 51st. does not need any support from the likes of me and I do realise that even the amateur historian should be free of prejudice. I do have qualms sometimes re this matter and hope I am not displaying symptoms of incipient paranoia.

As Paul, quite innocently, raised the subject of Flesquieres which I was studiously trying to avoid, I have referred him to John Hussy’s paper on that matter.

Good luck in your present project and when is that book on Harper going to materialise. (Did you get the WD I sent you ?)

Regards to both

Jim Gordon.

[Bryn_Hammond]

Jim

Thank you, I did indeed get the War Diary and I am grateful. I have had IT problems at work and been "up to my neck in 'it'" at home. I apologise for not having replied sooner.

I must clarify so that we get back on the right footing.

Firstly, your support for 51HD is not criticised but admired. It is at least based on research. I think that balance is important - but so do you as you've written.

31/July: 51 HD PROBABLY did train with tanks (or at the very least worked on getting to know each other) from what the Fifth Army Report on Operations says. It also says:-

"51st Division operated successfully with Tanks on the 23rd April and the result of this was very evident. Many signals were made by their Infantry with Tanks and these were at once responded to with great success."

The report (which I saw at the Tank Museum but which is probably in WO 95 at the PRO aka National Archives) details the steps in liaison & training for 39th & 51st Divs.

20/Sep/17: That one tank "which did excellent service in an advanced position" (Divisional AAR) was appreciated but the other 11 demonstrated the mechanical unreliability of the Mark IV. Heavy rain the night before didn't help. I'm happy to be furthest from the trunk along that particular limb!

The RE & Harper: I think my point was open to misinterpretation as it was rapidly expressed in the 'shorthand' I always regret using on this forum. Harper had been serving in a staff capacity for some time before the war. I think we need to look at what his awareness of, and attitude towards, new technology was in that period. He certainly was at several key general staff conferences, etc so he was 'in the know' at a senior level. I suppose what I was trying to say was his 'engineer experience' was a good while ago... Yes, even more of a limb, eh?

John Hussey's article: I disagree with certain points of detail - in particular his theory about attacking a Wellingtonian position. In 1918, with Mark V tanks it was possible to get across the Canal du Nord, but the axis of attack was different and I don't think Mark IVs would have been able to make it (otherwise 'they' would have tried). Otherwise, Mr Hussey and I are largely 'of a mind' on Harper.

Finally, a book on Harper is a project I'd like to do but I have to finish my thesis first - it's already been going longer than the war! It would have been nice to have a set of papers to draw on for a balanced representation of Harper.

Do we all agree on Baker-Carr?! Swinton ridicules Harper a bit too in 'Eyewitness'. Is it a 'tank thing'?!!!

Bryn

[Jim Gordon]

Bryn

Thank you for those kind words in your last posting.

Tanks definitely did good work with the 51st. at Roeux Chemical Works but the limited documentation at my disposal does give the impression of, perhaps, a Tank ambling past and being invited by the infantry to join in the mayhem rather than suggest that tanks and infantry were co-operating to a preconceived plan.

Can I bring to your attention a book called "A New Excalibur, The Development of the Tank 1909 - 1939" by A. J. Smithers. If you already have the book stop reading here.

It is a reasonably good book on the subject matter identified in the title and does contain quite a few references to "obscure" Tank actions in WW1. However, the book is permeated, virtually from cover to cover, with idolatrous references to Baker-Carr whom Smithers sets on a pedestal while trying to elevate "From Chauffeur to Brigadier" (I just typed that round the wrong way--probably more apt !) to the same status as the Bible. He is particularly poisonous in his references to Harper and his Division culminating in virtually accusing Harper of murder. The book does contain a lot of very good photographs my favourite being one which epitomises the difficulty in communications all Commanders had to contend with---a close up view of a hand protruding from a circular hole in the side of a tank , normally covered by an off-centred pivoted flap, with the hand holding a pigeon. A brief smile is suppressed when the full import of the picture is realised.

Regards

Jim Gordon