Germans firing on own trenches

[Nathan Greenfield]

Friendly fire is not, of course, a new problem.

During the battle of for Mauser's Ridge, the Germans fired both explosive and T-Shells on the front lines of the RIR 239.

Does anyone know where I can find a good description. by a German, of the panic and disorder such events caused?

thanks,

Nathan

[bob lembke]

Nathan;

There is an interesting account in Das Ehrenbuch der deutschen Pioniere, in an article by Hauptmann Theune describing an attack at Cailette Woods at Verdun on 6/1/16. I can thumbnail it from memory.

Theune was going to conduct an attack by his 10th Company of Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer), about a company of Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr), and an infantry regiment (IR 66) at 9:30 AM, after about two hours' conventional barrage. (Flame attacks were often conducted after only two minutes barrage, or none at all.) He was waiting, say 8 AM (this is all from memory) when he got word that his men at the rear were in disarray. Most of his men, and the infantry, were lined up in a ravine running up to the front line. Some German "shorts" had fallen on them. Unfortunately, they were 42 cm (16.5 inch) rounds; those guns were used so much that they shot their barrels out at Verdun and were never re-barrelled, at that stage 21 cm and 28 cm guns were more practical.

Theune crawled back and found his men and the infantry in disarray and shock. He worked on getting his men focused and led them forward to the assualt positions. The regular infantry were still a mess.

When the artillery preparation was drawing to a close he was faced with a dillema. The barrage, aside from the shorts, had been very effective. But the infantry seemed to be a "no-show". Should they waste the barrage and not attack, or should the companies of shock troops attack thousands of French in prepared positions, many of them concrete? (150 30.5 cm and 42 cm shells had been fired in the barrage.) He decided to attack anyway, although only Rohr's company of storm troopers seemed to be fit to advance with them. The barrage lifted, and Theune opened up with his 24 FW and the two companies charged.

The regular infantry, seeing the 100 foot long jets of thick smoke and flame open up, and the small number of men charging, took heart and charged forward themselves. The French defense, after an effective barrage and the flame attack, collapsed. Theune only lost a few men, I have the death roll of S=B Rohr and should figure out their losses also.)

A good deal (for Verdun) of territory was taken, 2300 POWs, 24 MGs, and 3 field-guns.

I am sure that getting shelled by your own guns often did not end up this happily.

Bob Lembke

PS: At the last minute I did a quick look-up in a couple of my resources and got a bit more detail.

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

I have come across a number of sources where friendly fire was involved. Overall there was little panic, just an attempt to advise the artillery to change ranges and to take whatever cover was available.

In one case, in October 1914, the 99th Reserve had just taken Beaumont or Beaucourt, I cannot recall which, they came under heavy German fire because the artillery did not know they had taken the village. The fire lasted 2 1/2 hours and ther were losses but not that many. The men took whatever cover they could find and one group moved to a nearby farm and went under cover.

Ralph

[uncle bill]

There is also a description of such an event in Jack Sheldon's book, The German army on the Somme 1914-1916.

[Nathan Greenfield]

Thanks.

My InterLibraryLoan Librarian will have work tomorrow.

Cheers,

N.

[bob lembke]

Nathan;

A curious related story.

On the second day of Verdun, the famous Lt.-Col. Driant of the French Chasseurs was directing the defense of his sector from his command post when shells of small caliber were coming from the rear and bursting about his CP. He assumed they were French shorts, but then his machine gunners pointed out that the attacking Germans had somehow managed to roll a 77 mm field gun past his position and was firing from his rear and right directly into his command post, firing over open sights. His men were not happy, but Driant calmly told the machine gunners that the solution was for them to set up a MG and to fire on the field gun; he assured them that in seconds they would shoot down the crew.

The MG crew seemed sceptical of this plan, but another officer had grabbed their MG and was carrying it out of the CP. So they joined him and quickly set it up about 100' from the CP. They opened up on the gun, but almost at the same time the field gun fired again and the shell actually hit the MG, destroying it and the crew. (This is from a primary source, a Frenchman in the CP with them.)

Driant was forced out and fell back to his main CP, a concrete structure in his third and last line of positions. But a little while later, the same or another field gun was rolled up and opened direct fire on this CP, while a flame thrower team was also opening up in the vicinity. Driant and his staff scrambled out and headed south, but they had to leave the woods and start crossing an open field toward a fortified village about 1/2 mile south. But the pursuing Jaegers reached the edge of the wood and opened fire on the party. Driant and his two battalion commanders fell, Driant and one of the majors being killed.

The Germans, when they launched this six-hour attack, started rolling two 77 mm guns down a road, assigning a company of pioneers to help them along, over trenches, etc. In six hours they traveled about 3-4 km., and at one point being ahead (but on the flank) of their own first infantry line. At one point all of the Other Ranks manning one of them were dropped and the gun was crewed for a while by three officers. I have not found out yet if both guns "went all the way" or if at some point they gave up on one gun and kept one going.

Of course something like this was only possible before the fixed positional warfare set in. In this case Colonel Driant probably wished that he had been shelled by his own guns.

Bob Lembke

[Nathan Greenfield]

Bob:

Thanks for that story. Would that we had some words from the prisoners who were foced to move the guns. I wonder if they schemed of ways of stopping the delivery of the guns. They must have been extremely well guarded.

During both World Wars there were many German POW who worked on Canadian farms and in lumber camps in the north. Few tried to escape -- mainly b/c they were out in the middle of nowhere. But in the heat of battle being made to work for the enemy...that is something else.

Nathan

[bob lembke]

Nathan;

You missed a crucial word. A company of Pioniere were assigned to move the gun along, i.e., a company of German combat engineers, not a company of prisoners. First of all, I have been reading sources on WW I, mostly primary sources, and probably mostly in German, probably five hours a day for four years, and I have never heard of such a thing. (One exception, see below.) One could not expect POWs to participate in such a venture, nor would it be possible to get POWs to perform such a really amazing feat. The POWs taken in this area were in a really bad state; they had been shelled for a day and a half, including being shelled by 30.5 cm (12") mortars and 42 cm (16.5") howitzers, and then taken in flame thrower attacks. A French source stated that the attacking troops found the French defenders "asleep"; shell-schocked and exhausted would probably be a more accurate description.

Rolling two 77 mm field guns (the Model 1916 weighed 2921 pounds in combat trim) three or four kilometers across a battlefield by hand during a battle that lasted the whole six hours of the feat , periodically stopping (at least three times) and engaging French strong points, would require the labor of men with the enthusiasm and skills of combat engineers, not a herd of exhausted, shell-shocked POWs.

The one exception to the Germans not using POWs on the battlefield, to my knowledge, was in Fismette on August 27, 1918. The American 28th Division was ordered to hold a tiny village called Fismette as a bridgehead on the north side of the Vesle, just north of Fismes. They only managed to hold about 200 yards of the one street in the village, were thrown out twice in night-time flame thrower attacks, and had about 5000 casualties in three weeks. For example, a regiment with 2000 effectives was inserted and came out two days later with 1000 effectives. (The official history of the regiment described this fighting in one low-key sentence, not saying a word about losing half its strength in two days.)

Finally on the night of August 27th the little bridgehead was assaulted by storm troops and flame throwers of 9. Komp. Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) at 4 AM and was totally overwhelmed. Three companies and odds and ends of other units were killed or captured. At dawn the American observers south of the Vesle saw the Germans form up about 250 POWs and march them north up a hill out of the village. Then they saw German stretcher bearers form up on this road and head down the hill into the village. (I have a letter written to his family by an observer who observed this and participated in calling in artillery fire.)

As mentioned above, artillery fire was called in on the stretcher bearers (who were probably going to take out more American than German wounded) and the stretcher bearers scattered. Then the observer (one Walter Lockard) saw the American POWs form up on the road with stretchers and head south into the village. Of course artillery fire was not called in on them, and they extracted the American and German wounded.

I have particular interest in this engagement because at one point I thought that my father was involved in these flame thrower attacks, but I have since learned that he was fighting about 15 miles east of this position with 11. Komp. G=R=P=R, not the 9th Company, getting wounded twice in a month.

Bob Lembke