Byng...Teflon man?

[armourersergeant]

I have recently read a bit about the battle of Cambrai and the subsequent German counterattack and i am wondering if any one else thinks like me. i am beggining to wonder if General Byng should be called teflon man because nothing seems to stick.

Well known for the success of the actions around Cambrai he does seem to brilliantly blend into the background when blame is atributed to those responsible for letting theGerman counterattack happen. It seems reprehensible to me that a man can take the credit for the initial success then shy away from responsibility and, however subtely, let others take the blame for the reversal. Especially as some of those even gave him warning that it was going to happen.

Does anyone agree or disagree with this post, i am trying to stay impartial in my researching of General Snow, one of those who takes some blame for the reversal and on occasions i find myself becoming non neutral as i maybe in this case.

Comments please.

Arm.

[Guest Hussar]

I tend to agree with your assertion, and in "The Kaisers Battle" Martin Middlebrook alludes to this when he says " ...only to risk removal from command because of the German counter-attack which caught his army unawares.....Byng survived this crisis; a corps commander was sacked instead."

I have begun to wonder, not so much about Byng per se, but rather about the relationship between him and Haig.

Prior to the Cambrai attack, when the plans where put before him for approval, Haig is alleged to have suggested that Byng should have a couple more Divisions for the attack he was envisaging, but acceeded to Byng's assertions that he would manage perfectly well with the planned manpower - which,as we all now know, he didn't and Haigs extra Divisions may have made all the difference.

Secondly, in the German Offensive of 1918, Haig had wanted Byng to withdraw from his position, thereby shortening the line by 3 miles, but Byng was unwilling to do so and Haig did not press the point. If the line had been reduced in this manner, a complete division could have been pulled out of the line at this point and sent farther south.

Haig then told him that the salient was only to be lightly held and given up if attacked. Instead, Byng ordered his men to stand and fight, throwing in (wasting!) his reserves unecesserilly.. as Middlebrook says "...Haig must have urged him several times to pull out of this exposed position; it's a pity that he didn't issue a direct order"

It appears as if Haig was in awe of Byng and unwilling to overrule his decisions??

[armourersergeant]

Hussar,

I have often found that Haig suggested rather than ordered his army commanders to do things and then on occasions when he did put his foot down he was often wrong. He probably prefered to bow to there 'better' knowledge of the men and ground around them which i suppose would be a wise decision being that they should know better than any whats happening in their 'yard'.

I remember in Farrar-Hockley's book about Gough, that Goughie did not care for Byng whom he thought too eager for the lime light not that Gough himself didnt suffer that as well but i also seem to remember that Gough blamed Byng for some of the 5th army problems in march 1918 in that Byng made his job harder by the lines he kept. I think i am right in thinking that 5th army had more front to protect and less men with which to do it with. this maybe the extra division you alure to.

Arm.

[Guest Hussar]

Arm,

You are correct about Goughs situation. He had few reserve to call on, whilst Byng had, not only the extra Division but also 4 out of 5 of the reserves. Gough was initially criticised for his tactical withdrawal, despite the fact it was done with the permission of GCHQ. However, the withdrawal was done

a ) to minimise casualties to his, already understrength, force and

b ) to put his men into a tactically better defensive position

whereas Byng's stand and hold position on an exposed salient resulted in the needless waste of many lives and, when he did finally withdraw, the extent was so limited that more men were killed as a result.

[Staffsyeoman]

Byng's no favourite of the Machine Gun Corps; in his testimony to the Cambrai enquiry (as related in 'A Wood Called Bourlon' by William Moore) he described the MGC as lacking discipline, and could do with the attentions of drill instructors. I wonder if he felt even a tinge of shame over saying that when tales came in of Emma Gees staying to the very last to cover the infantry less than six months later...

[Terry_Reeves]

Perhaps Byng had this man in mind. In 1917 the RE Special Brigade asked the AG's department to trawl for officers to fill the gaps in their ranks. LT CV White of the Machine Gun Corps was offered , however a note in the Special Brigade records says "Refused on account of a report on his inability to enforce authority or command respect."

Terry Reeves

[Martin B]

It is my opinion that Byng was a fine soldier who earned the respect of fellow officers and of the men under him from the beginning of his career with the 10th Hussars through until his time as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. His popularity with the Canadian Corp and later with the Canadian people who he served as GG is well documented.

[paul guthrie]

Byng lost a contest with Mackenzie King. I presuem it was over power of GG V. PM but know no details.

No doubt he was popular with all ranks of Canadian Corps.