Turkish supply line

[PhilB]

I was wondering why the British decided to land on the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula and fight their way up, when a landing at Bulair threatened to nip off the whole. I assume this is because the Turks on the cut off portion would be easily supplied across the Dardanelles. This would mean that the British would be fighting on two fronts, both well supplied, even if they got right across. Landing on the tip at least reduces the fighting to one front. Is that the thinking? Was a landing in force on the Asiatic side ever considered or was that out of the question? Phil B

[bob lembke]

Was a landing in force on the Asiatic side ever considered or was that out of the question? Phil B

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Phil;

No great expert here, but I have some generalities.

There were a number of other landings before and during the real landings, mostly or all on the Asiatic side. They were, I believe, planned as diversions to mask the real focus of the attack as long as possible, and also to blow up some fixed shore batteries.

Some supply and transfers across from Aisa were possible and carried out, but they were not "easy", and I doubt that a large Turkish force could have been supplied that way. British submarines were sometimes operating in the Sea of Mamara, and if memory serves the British managed to torpedo a supply ship from an airplane, possibly a first. The Turks did bring troops and materiel up from Istanbul by water, but suffered losses.

Also, I think that the land connections from, say, Istanbul, to the Asiatic side were even more miserable than on the Gallipoli side, so the supply problem would have been much more than just getting across the straits at night. Once the form of the landings became apparent assets were transferred over from Asia.

The good news and bad news for the Turks was that they didn't need as much stuff that a "western" army would need; the men got along on little, they had little artillery ammunition (and what they had would usually fire, but also usually not explode on impact; when good German ammunition began to arrive late in the battle things rapidly got a lot worse for the allies.

Although Kannengeisser said that the two blessings that the Turks had (he commanded a division there) was lots of good water and lots of small arms ammunition. However, my father, who fought there, told me that their water had spent days in goat skins on camel-back, and was black and foul, and the Germans could only drink it if it was heavily laced with oil of peppermint. My father rated the typical Turkish soldier the best that he encountered in the whole war, vs. the average German, French, and British soldier; not technically, of course, but in bravery, etc. He was delighted when in the 1920's he could have a small role in running guns to Turkey when the Greeks were invading deeply into Anatolia, and no one would sell the Turks arms.

One has to keep in mind that at almost every stage of the battle the Turks were outnumbered by the British, French, and ANZACs, as well as out-gunned, out-supplied, out-ammoed, etc.

Bob Lembke

[The Plummed Goose]

Dear Phil,

First of all a landing on the Asian shore was still on the agenda in March but a number of points ruled against a landing there :

1. The size of the area would mean a large continental campaign was necessary. Not enough troops were thought to be available for such a campaign.

2. The right flank would be exposed to possible (probable) attacks from Anatolia.

3. Some of the country towards the right Besika Bay & Yukyeri was considered difficult. The country near Kumkale had a network of rivers and a broad marsh which were considered serious obstacles.

4. When moving inland, the guns of the fleet could not be of any help on the Asian shore.

5. Also it was considered that the Narrows could not be dominated from the Asian Shore as the principal defences were on the European side.

And way not Bulair :

1. Bulair was extremely well defended and considered difficult to take.

2. There is always the risk of an exposed flank and an attack from Thrace. (It was also taken into consideration that the Bulgarian border was dangerously close-just in case B would enter the war on the Turkish side-)

3. The main communications to the Peninsula were by water, so taking the Bulair lines would not mean the surrender of the Çanakkale garrison. They would still have to fight their way to Kilitbahir ....

eric

[PhilB]

Thank you gents. Are we saying, then, that landing at the tip and fighting all the way up to Bulair was the only way? Was that realistic? Had they done that, would the Dardenelles then have been navigable for big ships (the whole point of the operation) even though the Asiatic shore was still in Turco/German hands? Phil B

[bob lembke]

Thank you gents. Are we saying, then, that landing at the tip and fighting all the way up to Bulair was the only way? Was that realistic? Had they done that, would the Dardenelles then have been navigable for big ships (the whole point of the operation) even though the Asiatic shore was still in Turco/German hands? Phil B

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Phil;

IMO the plan was realistic, if the Turks and the defense were as hapless as the Allied leadership probably assumed they were. If they had known that the defense would be as vigorous as it was, it was a poor plan indeed. I can't imagine that the Allies expected such an effective defense.

There were three major defensive factors barring the joint fleet from cruising thru. There were the old forts, armed with obsolecent to obsolete guns with little ammunition. These could be overcome by the large fleet, but not as effectively or quickly as the allies thought. Churchill had been at Antwerp, where the German and Austrian 12 inch mortars and 16.5 inch howitzers rapidly wrecked the modern Belgian forts (My grand-father was the Id of the Generalkommando there and, an old artilleryman, spent time with these guns during these reductions) and I think that Churchill, not a detail man in my opinion, assumed that his naval guns, especially the 15 inch guns of the Queen Elisabeth, would quickly demolish the forts. They were very different guns than the German siege guns, and were not that effective.

Additionally Liman von Sanders Pascha set up mobile batteries of medium caliber guns, partially officered by Germans, on both banks, who shelled the ships and then moved to new positions. These damaged the allied ships but were hard to counter.

Finally, the Turkish mines were a serious problem, especially as guns shelled the attempts to sweep them. The brilliant move by a Turkish major, observing the patterns that the allied battleships moved in when turning back from attacking, and then sneaking down with an old tub at night and laid a row of mines before their main lines of mines, parallel with the Asiatic shore, was a killer. Several battleships in succession struck the mines.

If the allies took over the penninsula they should have been able to get through, even if the Turks held the Asiatic shore.

Bob Lembke

[PhilB]

Was there reason to believe that the Turks wouldn`t put up stiff resistance? Did they have "previous form" or was it simply that they weren`t European? Would the experience of Africa, where Local troops had German help, be any guide? Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, the poor performance in the Balkans War of 1912. This prompted several reforms in the Ottoman Army.

Robert

[PhilB]

So the forecast was for a campaign fighting its way up a 60k long, narrow peninsula with a mountainous spine. One could only expect repeated lines of entrenched resistance which would have to be stormed without heavy artillery assistance other than from ships. And the Turks would have German guidance in setting up their lines. Either the estimate of Turkish prowess was exceedingly low or there was unfounded British optimism? Or both! Phil B

[bob lembke]

So the forecast was for a campaign fighting its way up a 60k long, narrow peninsula with a mountainous spine. One could only expect repeated lines of entrenched resistance which would have to be stormed without heavy artillery assistance other than from ships. And the Turks would have German guidance in setting up their lines. Either the estimate of Turkish prowess was exceedingly low or there was unfounded British optimism? Or both! Phil B

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Phil;

Probably both of your estimated reasons in your last sentence were correct. And the observation of the poor showing in the recent Balkan wars is also apt. However, all of those people in the Balkans (maybe a bit less for the Romanians, sorry) were, and are, tough, aggresive people, and had been fighting each other for centuries.

Another factor may have been that the British were rating the Turks on the fighting going on elsewhere (I may be off here, this was too early); but in Iraq and in Arabia the "Turkish" Army was largely Arabs, war-like, or bandit-like, but not acculturated to serving in a regular army, and not well motivated to fight for the Turks, probably. Generally, true Turk soldiers, Anatolians, fought much better, certainly for Turkish interests, than subject people. In fact they often used the latter for labor battalions. The true Turkish soldier, especially when defending Turkish soil, was tough indeed. These distinctions might have been lost on the British as they planned this mess.

Kannengeisser told a telling story. He was visiting the trenches of his division, and a few Turkish soldiers, not seeing him, had just drawn their mid-day meal, probably a few pieces of k'ubils arabie, or pita bread, a handful of olives, a cucumber, etc. As you know, they like to eat at a low table, sitting on the ground or on a cushion, in posh surroundings. They looked about, and pried the bodies of a few fellow Turks out of the parapet of their trench, and formed them into an improvised table, and happily sat down, put their food down, and began eating. (Of course the bodies had been in the parapet for two weeks or two months, enough said.) Kannengeisser, peeking around the corner of the trench, said to himself: "I knew that these guys are tough. But, this is rediculous!" As I said, my father fought with these guys, and loved them, something he did not extend to most German soldiers.

Bob Lembke

[michaeldr]

Quote: Was a landing in force on the Asiatic side ever considered or was that out of the question? Phil B

A landing on the Asiatic side was proposed by Col Maucorps to Sir John Maxwell;

the French colonel had spent 5 years in Turkey as military attaché at Constantinople before joining their military mission in Egypt

Maxwell forwarded the info on to Kitchener [26 Feb 1915] but K neglected to advise Ian Hamilton of this expert advice.

K was dead against any ops on the Asiatic side, as he foresaw that the wide open spaces of Asia-minor would be a bottomless pit requiring ever increasing British reinforcements. He much preferred the limited confines of the peninsula whose scale he thought better suited his limited resources

see the excellent and inexpensive 'Defeat at Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Part II 1915-16' Uncovered Editions, The Stationery Office

Regards

Michael D.R.