Big push poll

[Desmond7]

July 1 1916 - everyone has an opinion.

Could the historical result have been changed?

You are the person charged with planning this massive offensive to be carried out - in the main - by Kitchener's New Army. With the benefit of hindsight what ONE - repeat ONE - tactical change would you make which might have led to a 'First Day' success?

It could be the artillery plan ... was it too long/too short? Would a March 21 style 'sudden firestorm' make a difference?

Was Rawlinson too wary of the abilities of the New Army i.e. 'stand up and walk over towards the enemy' ... would a hell for leather assault have made a difference.

Was the front too wide? Would it have been better to utilise resources to assault smaller portions and then gobble up adjacent sectors?

I fully realise these are simplistic options each of which can be demolished ...

Therefore should you not wish to vote, that's fine. But please give your thoughts.

Des

[John_Hartley]

Not easy this one.

A "big push" has to have a wide front , otherwise it ain't a "big push".

In terms of the other two options (perhaps, a "no change" option would have been an idea), I assume we are not to use the exact science of hindsight. On that basis, I am unsure what practical changes I would have made to the artillery plan. Of course, it proved not to be adequate, but the ordnance simply wasnt there in sufficient number or sufficient quality.

So, I've gone for the infantry option. Apart from 30th Division's success, those sectors where troops "walked over" had a bad time of it. In the few recorded instances of the men "legging it" over to the enemy, they got there quickly and with reduced casualties. Common sense prevailed over orders.

John

[Ali Hollington]

I've gone for the infantry plan, no expert but a faster initial assault with follow up waves bringing the required stores etc.

Just my instant reaction.

Regards

Ali

[armourersergeant]

now this is a good question but hard to answer.

I am inclined to think infantry tatics is the least one but i am stuck between the Artillery and front

I ask myself if the front had been less would the artillery have been better concentrated and more effective? To which the answer is yes to concentration and possibly to more effective.

I deally i would like to go for a combination of these two but i realsie i can't. Sooooo!!!!

Umh

Let me think and i will get back to ya

regards

Arm

[Desmond7]

Armchair general Des puts forward his hypothesis .. which is now officially UP for demolition!!

My choice of ONE tactic to change would be the extent of front attacked.

By making this decision I would hope that the other two categories (arty/infantry) would fall into place.

Reasoning: Focus on a smaller sector of front would concentrate resources. With the concentration of force being a generally 'good' rule in war I would argue that:-

The artillery plan would thus be one of major barrage on the selected point of assault with harrassing fire to the enemy flanks.

And with a shorter/carefully selected attack 'zone' there would have been, I believe, a change to the 'walk slowly' infantry tactics ... I.E. to swift assault by parties who have moved into NML ... which seems to have paid dividends where actually implemented in the real battle.

Now we can get into whether this would have worked.

I think it might have .. WITH hindsight of course!!

Thus, having consolidated a sector and reinforced it due to the new artillery plan keeping the enemy's heads down on the flanks, another sector .. not necessarily adjacent .. is attacked in the same manner.

And so on.. and so on.

A-ha .. I hear you say .. that's not a big push! That's a bite and hold, too slow and too footery to aid the French who are under pressure at Verdun! They require a 'big bang' offensive to relieve that pressure.

But did they? Were not the Germans just as worn out as the French at this stage of THAT battle.

Now rambling ..discuss.

Des

[John_Hartley]

They require a 'big bang' offensive to relieve that pressure.

But did they?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Yes.

As always with strategy on this scale and at this level, there are political as well as military considerations. The political side simply cannot be ignored.

IMO

John

[John_Hartley]

One of the problems with "walk slowly" at Montauban was that the artillery had generally done a pretty good job (as had the first wave of attacking troops). Because there was no practical way to speed up the creeping barrage, it meant 90th brigade was stalled waiting for it to lift

Lt Callan-MacArdle (17/Manc) wrote “The ground was so rough and broken with shell holes that when I lay down under our barrage, I found myself ahead of the first line – I had four men left. The 17th had advanced too quickly. We had done it all at the slowest walk and been quite unchecked – so we lay down for forty minutes, under the shells, waiting. Waiting is hard. We were to rush the village at 9:56."

Can we really imagine the effect on the men having to lie out in the middle of the battlefield for 40 minutes - and then attack!

[Desmond7]

Bonjour Mon Ami ... Would a two corps wide frontage attack on July 1 ; followed by similar size attacks on the following days on nearby/adjacent sectors qualify as a 'release valve' offensive which would have been remotely acceptable (politically) to the French?

Bearing in mind we are what iffing.

I take your point about the 'lying out in NML waiting to attack' .. but I reckon such a tactic of 'hide/rush/assault' would be far easier controlled if the offensive had been launched on a sector by sector basis.

Of course, my hypothesis is dependent on excellent communications, vast amounts of pre-planning, little or no DUD ammo etc.

Swing that sledgehammer guys.

[7:29am]

I like it.. my feeling is that given the army on hand and the training they had perhaps changing the infantry plan for better tactics etc would have taken time in training and given the limited communications would probably have changed little.

The extent of the front.........if the front was attacked on smaller front and got to their first positions they would have wheeled left or right as oppossed to punching through to Berlin so this would have extended the front. Logistics would have been even more complex. If they attacked on a larger front would it have made any impact at all!!!

but artillery.......... there was a lot more they could have done there i feel and they had time before the initial attack to modify effect before the troops went over. The rigidity of artillery concerns me, the effectiveness of the bombardments, communications etc.. Wasn't it decided in the previous century that artillery will win you a battle if deployed well.

I GO FOR ARTILLERY..and not because my great grandfather died at the foot of an 18lbr!!

[truthergw]

July 1 1916 - everyone has an opinion.

Could the historical result have been changed?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I believe that the reason for some commanders employing walking waves, was the lack of confidence in New Army forces to reach their objective. This fear was justified given the experiences of Loos. Men were led across no-mans land by junior subalterns who had demonstrated just how easy it was to lose all sense of direction under intense fire. So the infantry tactics were possibly the best we had at the time. Shrink the front but not too much. We wouldn't want a deep pocket to get nipped off by a counterattack. Shorten the bombardment to save some of the damage to terrain which caused problems with mud. Was the artillery good enough to provide an effective creeping barrage? I have my doubts. I know thats not one choice . I plumped for artillery but I believe that they all hang together.

[squirrel]

Interesting point comes to mind with the mention of Loos and the infantry attack formations. In Forgotten Voices or Battleground Europe series on Loos, I can't remember which, there is a comment by an infantry serjeant about losing direction during the advance and not having a "Navigating Officer" as they had on exercises and training.

On the Somme battle have voted for the Artillery as it was another year before they got it right using proper survey methods, flash spotting and sound ranging as well as deciding whether to use creeping or hurricane bombardments etc.

[griffy]

This may count as two changes but as has been suggested above, and would have occurred under my enlightened command, the infantry would be ordered to rush the German trenches and the attack would be made at night, as occurred on 13th July with some success.

I appreciate the arguments around untrained troops, keeping discipline etc in the belief that the shelling would have neutralised enemy opposition. However I do not believe it is hindsight to suggest this belief was criminally naive. Surely the experience of Verdun would indicate that no matter how heavy the bombardment there would still be men and machine guns that had survived the shelling and which could reek havoc.

Nor is it hindsight to not take into consideration reconnaissance reports of uncut wire. Not sure it counts as a tactical change but instructing Brigades to not walk towards uncut wire might have kept the casualties down.

Griffy

[mcderms]

Definitely the infantry tactics! Even though not enough heavy/dodgy shells scuppered the whole 'demolish bunkers' idea, the artillery did a good job of pinning the Germans down and restriciting movement of men and suppliers. On narrow fronts, wave #1 gets caught on the wire whilst Gerry sets up his guns and hammers waves #2, #3, #4. On the wider fronts, he's up and shooting before we're even at the wire.

Also Rawlinson had seen the big barrage tactic work superbly on day one at Verdun. He also pressed for the storming tactics used by the Germans here but was shouted down if memory serves me correctly, for a variety of reasons to which Haig acquiesced.

[mcderms]

... and on the one front where the infantry crept right up to the wire, ignored orders and stormed in, the Leipzig redoubt fell to the 17th and elements of the 16th HLI. The 16th followed orders and were wiped out at the Wunderwerk. The only ones who saw the inside of a German trench were the few who got a bit lost and ended up fighting with the 17th at Leipzig (Granatloch).

[Desmond7]

I have always found the discipline of the 29th Div at Beaumont Hamel amazing. Despite being a 'premier regular formation' they adhered (mainly) to the Rawlinson 'walk over' plan and paid a terrible price.

What if these regulars had opted for the tactics of 'swift assault' as they had actually been well trained to do?

Keep 'em coming.

Des

[SPotter]

... and on the one front where the infantry crept right up to the wire, ignored orders and stormed in, the Leipzig redoubt fell to the 17th and elements of the 16th HLI. The 16th followed orders and were wiped out at the Wunderwerk. The only ones who saw the inside of a German trench were the few who got a bit lost and ended up fighting with the 17th at Leipzig (Granatloch).

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Agree totally, and not just 'cos this is also the 14th Bde (1/Dorsets) sector. A single machine gun (or two) in the Nordwerk (8th Divn front) was able to hold up and/or decimate the 14th Bde , which was supposed to pass through the two leading brigades and take Mouquet Farm. Had the troops been able to get into the front line trenches before the Germans emerged from their bunkers then I believe the picture of the first day would have been radically different - at the very least as far as the casualty count is concerned, which is, afterall, what everyone focuses on.

Regards

Steve

[spike10764]

For me it's the infantry tactics to change also. The GHQ men did not have enough faith in the abilities of the New Armies. The lack of faith was shown by the idea that rather than let the New Armies do battle like

regular troops, they could somehow produce a barrage that could kill all the Germans, dug in, in front of the attack. A far fetched idea even today(without nukes obviously) and a classic case of wishful thinking.