Air Power and the Great War

[mahross]

This is a paper I handed in for my university course. Just wondering what you guys think?

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The advent of powered flight(1) in the early years of the twentieth century led to a revolution in military affairs. It did this by adding a third dimension to the battlefield, thus adding a new instrument in the hands of the commander. The question of whether air power had any significant effect upon the outcome of the Great War has been debated ever since the end of the war. With this in mind there has been a vast amount of work written upon the effects of air power, these range from the general work for the layman to more in depth academic studies such as John Morrow’s 'The Great War in the Air.'(2)

The prevalent view most people have of the Great War in the air is of the ‘aces’, the so called ‘…Knights of the Air…’(3) This view is promulgated by the amount of books that are produced on the ‘aces’ of the Great War, for example Peter Kilduff’s 'The Red Baron: Beyond the Legend.'(4) The ‘aces’ have taken centre stage in the history of the war in the air, but a proper look at their tactics at gaining these scores show that they were often praying on slower flying planes. For example, Baron Von Richtofen gained his score of 80 by typically attacking slow flying scout planes. Richtofen himself typically hated the position he was given as a hero as he was a firm believer of formation flying in order to gain air superiority. To this point, he produced an air combat operation manual, which was eventually submitted to the German Supreme Headquarters in 1918 to be used as the basis for all aerial combat operations. This manual made formation flying one of its singular tenants and was based on Richtofen’s own success.(5)

The effect of air power upon the course of the Great War is hard to measure and can only really be taken from the opinions of those who fought it. To this extent the opinion varies between the army generals and the airmen. For example, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), commented that ‘Though Aircraft…proved of enormous value, their true value is as ancillaries of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.’(6) Haig obviously realised that war could now no longer be fought without the aid of air power but that in his opinion it was subsidiary to the ‘real’ fighting and that its main role was to provide support to the army on the ground. This was an opinion shared by Marshal Foch and General Pershing, the Allied Generalissimo and commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) respectively. The opposite view as to whether air power was subsidiary can be seen in an article by Squadron Leader Sutton D.S.O. O.B.E. M.C. in the 1922 edition of the Royal United Service Institution Journal.(7) In this article, Sutton, an officer in the fledgling Royal Air Force (RAF), observed nine areas were he believes air power has played a significant role in the success of the BEF in 1918. This varied from artillery observation, reconnaissance, fighting in the air, bombing and co-operation with cavalry and tanks. In these areas, Sutton considers the Royal Flying Corps (RFC)/RAF as vitally important to the BEF’s success in 1918 as he comments on fighting in the air, the gaining of air superiority, ‘Fighting in the air vitally concerns the armies in the field. All other activities depend upon its success.’(8) So for Sutton and other airmen of the period, air power was vital important in wining the Great War and that its effect would be considerable for the years to come.

If one looks at some of the areas in which Sutton identifies as important we start to see that air power certainly did add a new aspect to warfare and one, which led to bringing war right to the doorstep of the civilian population. The first area to look at is the attempts to gain air superiority. This is one area, which Sutton claims is singularly important to all areas of fighting and many theorists before and since the war have claimed that gaining air superiority has been important to the co-ordination of ground operations.

At the start of the war, aircraft were flimsy and not armed with anything more than what the pilots carried as private arms. Despite this, the pilots attempted, by various means, to fight in duels in the sky and eventually scores were recorded. While in the first years these were private affairs eventually, they came to dominate the skies. Initially they were held back by the lack or armament but with the advent of the Hotchkiss and Lewis machine guns this changed as they could be mounted on to an airframe. The next problem to be solved was that of how to fire through the propeller and the Frenchmen Roland Garros came up with a solution by fitting deflector plates to the propellers, though this was not always successful as on more than one occasion bullets were deflected back and in the process killed the pilot.(9) Anthony Fokker, working upon ideas by Franz Schneider, then introduced an interrupter gear, which allowed bullets to fire through the propellers, and then subsequently his designs were improved upon on.(10) These improvements in firing mechanisms led to the Fokker Scourge of 1915 and for the rest of the war the attempts to gain air superiority swung back and forth and thus the battle for the command of the air were linked to the introduction of new airframes. It was also linked periods of ground offensives as the armies began to realise that to have air superiority enabled them to use other forms of aircraft in support of the ground forces.

Attempts to gain ‘command of the air’ led to each of the combatant nations to introduce methods of formation flying which would aid them in their fighting. An example of the theory behind these has already been mentioned with the production Richtofen’s Air Operations Manual.(11) Both the French and Germans went one stage further with the development of specific units whose role was simply that of the interceptor or air superiority fighter. These were for the French the Groupes de Chasse and for the Germans the Jagdstaffeln. The role of these units was simply aerial denial, an attempt to keep their airspace clear of enemy aircraft.

The British also created the idea of seeking air superiority by taking the fight over the enemies’ lines. Colonel Trenchard,(12) Commandant of the RFC in France, laid these ideas down in 1915. As Trenchard argued the ‘…aeroplane is an offensive and not a defensive weapon.’(13) These operations took the form of interdiction style missions and involved taking the fight to the enemy something that was indicative of the allies’ preparations for the invasion of Europe in 1944 twenty years later.(14) The operations involved launching Battlefield Interdiction missions against targets inside enemy held territory. These missions would be supported by fighter units in the hope that these interdiction missions would bring the enemy Jagdstaffeln up to fight and thus the RFC could attempt to whittle down enemy fighter strength and gain command of the air. As such, it can be seen that this laid the foundation for the theory that any major land operation could not be undertaken unless ‘command of the skies’ was gained.

The first areas were the aeroplane made any contribution to the course of the war on the ground was in the field of reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Aircraft now became the eyes of the army and replaced the light cavalry in this role as they could see much further into an enemies’ rear area. It also managed to give the commander on the ground a three dimensional image of what was happening around him Both the French and British saw this heavily in 1914 at both the battles of the Marne and Mons. By the end of the war, aerial reconnaissance was providing two-thirds of intelligence related to the enemies’ disposition(15) and as one notable historian has commented, ‘…photo-reconnaissance henceforth became the basis of all offensive planning.’(16)It was the use of the aeroplane for reconnaissance, which eventually led to the need for air combat as discussed above as these planes, as well as ground attack aircraft, needed defending from roaming enemy fighters.

The aeroplane also gave aid to the artillery as well by spotting the fall of their shots. This was a role originally done by the balloons but was eventually done by aircraft as it was noted that balloons were more vulnerable as they were tethered to the ground. The major problem that faced the pilots who flew in this role was that of technology versus theory, a problem that dogged air power throughout the Great War. There was plenty of theory about the aeroplanes implementation but the technology was lacking and in the case of artillery spotting the problem was the lack of an effective wireless set. This led to missions taking a long time and as has commented been commented by one historian, ‘Communication posed obstacles…and made the process air-artillery difficult…’(17) However, eventually both the introduction of more effective wireless sets and the coming of age of the aerial reconnaissance led to more effective artillery spotting. For example, during the Battle of Messines Ridge in 1917 General Plumer’s 2nd Army operated 280 wireless stations for counter-battery work, receiving information from artillery spotting aircraft overhead.(18)

From their first use, the dropping of bombs became linked to the innovation flight. The first recorded use of bombs was by the Italians in the Italo-Turkish war of 1911.(19) The use of the aeroplane as such an offensive weapon was also linked to some nations thoughts on the methods of warfare, for example, the French general staff had a blind faith in the outdated doctrine of offensive a outrance, in this the aeroplane offered a way in which to carry out this doctrine.(20) Ground attack operations can be split into two distinct areas. The first is Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), which is the attempt to hinder the enemies’ lines of communication with the front and to paralyse their logistics system. The British first used this operationally during the Battle of Loos in 1915. The second area is Close Air Support (CAS), which is the attempt to aid the front line troops and to attack forces that are in direct contact with friendly forces.(21) It was the allies who forced the development of aircraft and techniques for these types of operation as it was inherently linked with their strategy of taking the war to Germany, whereas the German strategy was defensive in nature and as such their aerial strategy was to defend their airspace, a case of aerial denial.

The allies quickly started to convert their single seat fighter in order to carry bombs and were first used to some effect during the Somme offensive. For example, on the first day of the offensive eighteen planes were armed for what was termed as ‘armed reconnaissance’ and were to undertake attacks as and when they arose. This was the root of CAS operation on the western front. These early attacks unnerved the German soldier in the trench and it was noted that,

‘Infantry lacked schooling in defence against low flying aircraft and did not have the confidence that they could shoot them down. The result was a condition akin to panic…’(22)

This early success eventually led to further research into CAS/BAI operations not just by the allies but also eventually by the Germans as well.

With the development of CAS/BAI operations there was a coming together of operational zones on the battlefield. Artillery with the aid of spotter aircraft and CAS aircraft could now hit the frontline and the use of BAI with the support of air superiority fighters led to the taking of the war into the enemies’ rear zones in an attempt to cause disruption to the war effort. As one historian points out this revolution in tactics both on the ground and in the air led to the formation ‘…of a whole new combat zone, as the ‘deep battle’ joined the ‘close battle…’(23) These developments along with the introduction of more modern weaponry such as the Tank would lead to the evolution of an all arms doctrine that would eventually become the basis of warfare for the rest of the twentieth century and as can be argued it was ‘…predating aspects of blitzkrieg by little over twenty years.’(24) Though it must be pointed out that operations such as this could not succeed with some degree of air superiority and as such these operations became heavily linked with the operations of fighters.

The next evolution for aircraft that dropped ordnance was the attempt to take them further into the enemies’ heartlands, and as such bring the war home to the public. This development of strategic bombing first started with raids by German Zeppelins in 1915. These raids were instigated by Grand Admiral Tirpitz who noted in a letter that Schrechlichkeit (frightfulness) could damage civilian morale and engage with the enemies’ capacity to wage war.(25) This would be the basis of the development of strategic bombing theory during the inter-war years, the ability to damage enemies’ morale. For example, Trenchard, the commander of Britain’s Independent Air Force, its strategic bombing force, and one the most notable strategic bombing theorists, noted in his final dispatch that ‘…the moral effect of bombing stands to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1…’(26) As such we see the development of an argument as to the effectiveness of strategic air power that was to have a long lasting effect upon the nature of war. While the Germans began the development of strategic bombing with their Zeppelin raid and eventually by the raid of their multi engine Gotha bombers it was the allies who took it most seriously and developed ideas about it that would be put to the test twenty years later.

The development of a strategic bombing theory also showed up a significant gap within in the defence doctrine of the air forces of the Great War, this was the place of strategic air defence. While air superiority doctrine had been in its infancy not much thought had been given to the defence of the homeland against enemy aircraft and after the death of the Victorian cricketer W.G. Grace after a Zeppelin raid in 1915 a public outcry led to some thought being given of how to defend the homeland against this new menace. The roots of strategic air defence in the Second World War can be seen during the Great War as the theory was distinctly similar in nature.(27) For example, the defence of London was made up of belts of fighter aircraft combined with anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight. Growing British success led to the Germans adopting night time raids, which in turn led to the British developing a response to it. By early 1918 a true defensive scheme had developed and on a raid on the 19-20 May 1918 six out of twenty-eight attacking German Gotha bombers were shot down, a twenty percent loss rate, a rate the German High Command considered unacceptable. After this the German scaled down their efforts.(28)

Before the outbreak of war some experimentation had occurred with maritime air power and there was a series of differing views on what form maritime air power should take. The Germans favoured the use of airships whereas the allies, especially Britain, preferred the use of aircraft. Before the development of an adequate launching platform, ship based aircraft took the form of seaplanes which could be lifted on and off from parent ships. These early experiments were intended to give the fleet a set of eyes and ears over the horizon and initially not much thought was given to how these aircraft could be used offensively. This was to significantly change with the anti-submarine campaign that was to be launched with the advent of Germany’s U-Boat campaign against Britain’s maritime trade.(29) While other methods were introduced to combat the U-Boat menace, most notable the convoy system, the use of air power helped make convoys virtually invulnerable to the menace. While they could not attack U-Boats they could provide what was known as a ‘scarecrow’ effect. With this they forced the U-Boats to stay submerged and given that at this time U-Boats had to attack surfaced it provide a noticeable deterrent to merchantmen and as one expert on the subject of maritime air power has commented ‘This was a role Allied aircraft were to play in the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II…’(30) Therefore, gain the roots of combat and doctrine in the Second World War can be seen the Great War.

The Great War also saw the development of the aircraft carrier as a way to support the main battlefleet in its operations. The introduction of the aircraft carrier provided a revolution in military affairs (RMA) on the waves and this new type of capital ship was to replace the battleship as the main ship in the major fleets of the world’s battle line. This new ship tied with the aircraft was to give the worlds navies a genuine over the horizon capability and meant that naval battles could be fought over great distances. While the carriers developed in the Great War did not see much action, mainly because of the nature of the naval war, they did provide the basis of how they would be used in the future.(31)

In the end it can be seen that air power did have an effect on the nature of warfare during the Great War, most notable the introduction of CAS/BAI operations and other new technologies led to the evolution of all-arms battle doctrines in most armies, and provided a RMA that would be felt for years after the armistice and the end of the war. Though it must be considered that the opinion of the generals, such as that shown earlier by Field Marshal The Earl Haig, must be considered much more fully, as while their interpretation is polemic, their opinion does have some truth in it. This lies more in the implementation of air power than in its actual effect. Air power in the Great War suffered from a technological failure, there existed during the war what can only be described as a technology Vs theory gap. That is that there was lots of theory of how implement aircraft into the battlefield but unfortunately the aircraft to do it with did not exist. This can be seen in various aspects of the air war. For example, the strategic bombing campaigns, while attempting to bring the enemy to its knees, did not see significant success because the airframes being used were both slow and cumbersome as well as carrying a negligible bomb load. When compared to the bombers that existed twenty years later this show up the gap between technology and theory and as such as one historian has observed ‘…the embryonic nature of aerial operations in 1914-18 ensured that they were only partly effective at best, and in no case had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war.’(32) Though to this interpretation can be added that air power at the outbreak of the war was only in its second decade and that once the technology existed, as it did in the Second World War, its decisiveness would be increased as its technological capability had grown to come in line with the theory that existed.

Notes:

1. The first powered flight took place on December 17 1903 at Kitty hawk, North Carolina by the Wright Flyers built by the Wright brothers. For an introduction on their success see Buckley J (1999) Air Power in the Age of Total War, pp. 25-27

2. Morrow J (1993) The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921. This book is a through study in the rise and effect of military aviation during the period of the Great War.

3. Buckley J (1999) Op Cit, p. 42

4. Kilduff P (1999) The Red Baron: Beyond the Legend. While a very good biography of Richtofen’s life, Kilduff has the tendency to place Richtofen as a singularly important person in the German military hierarchy. This was a position, which Richtofen never sought or wanted.

5. A copy of this Manual with its covering letter by General Hoeppner can be seen in Killduff P (1999) The Red Baron, pp. 231-240

6. Cited in Biddle T ‘Learning in Real Time: The Development and Implementation of Air Power in the First World War’ in Cox S and Gray P (Eds.) (2002) Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo

7. Sutton B E, Squadron-Leader, DSO, OBE, MC, ‘Some Aspects of the Work of the Royal Air Force with the B.E.F. in 1918’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 67 (1922:Feb/Nov), pp. 336-348

8. Sutton B E, Squadron-Leader, DSO, OBE, MC, Op Cit, Vol. 67 (1922:Feb/Nov), p. 342

9. Morrow J (1993) Op Cit, pp. 91-92 and Terraine J (1982) The White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-18, p. 196

10. Morrow J (1993) Op Cit, p. 105 and Terraine J (1982) Ibid

11. See Killduff P (1999) Op Cit, pp. 231-240

12. Later Marshal of the RAF Trenchard often termed the father of the RAF.

13. Cited in Terraine J (1982) Op Cit, p. 200

14. Hallion R P (1989) Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945, pp. 188-191

15. Haythornthwaite P J (1996) The First World War Sourcebook, p. 112

16. Terraine J (1982) Op Cit, p. 194

17. Biddle T ‘Learning in Real Time’ in Cox S and Gray P (Eds.) (2002) Op Cit, p. 5

18. Griffith P (1994) Battle Tactics of the Western Front: British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1918, p. 156

19. 2nd Lieutenant Gavotti of the Squadriglia di Tripoli, who dropped four small bombs on Libyan towns, recorded this on The 30th October. See Hallion (1989) Op Cit, p.11

20. The unlimited offensive – the idea that what enemy intends to do is irrelevant and that an offensive would always win.

21. Modern definitions of these two terms can be found in Hallion R P (1989) Op Cit, pp. 1-2

22. Neumann G P (Ed.) (1920) Die Deutschen Luftsteitkrafte im Weltkriege, p. 472 Cited in Hallion R P (1989) Op Cit, p. 19

23. Griffith P (1994) Op Cit, p. 157

24. Buckley J (1999) Op Cit, p. 55

25. This letter is cited in Murray W (1999) The War in the Air 1914-1945, p. 72. The letter reads that ‘frightfulness…single bombs from flying machines are wrong; they are odious when they hit and kill old women, and one gets used to them. If [however] one could set fire to London in thirty places, then what in a small way is odious would retire before something fine and powerful.’

26. Biddle T D ‘British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive’ in Gooch J (Ed.) (1995) Airpower: Theory and Practice, p. 92

27. For a discussion of the roots of British strategic air defence see Ferris J ‘Achieving Air Ascendancy: Challenge and Response in British Strategic Air Defence, 1915-40’ in Cox S and Gray P (2002) Op Cit, pp. 21-50

28. Murray W (1999) Op Cit, pp. 73-74

29. For probably the best discussion of Germany’s U-Boat campaign against Britain and the responses developed see Terraine J (1989) Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars 1916-1945.

30. Buckley J (1999) Op Cit, p. 58

31. An interesting discussion of the introduction of the aircraft carrier can be seen in Till G ‘Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American and Japanese case studies’ in Murray W and Millett A R (Eds.) (1996) Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

32. Biddle T ‘Learning in Real Time’ in Cox S and Gray P (Eds.) (2002) Op Cit, p. 14

Bibliography:

Books:

Black J (Ed.) (2003) War in the Modern World since 1815, Routledge, London

Buckley J (1995) The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945: Constant Endeavour, Keele University Press, Keele

Buckley J (1999) Air Power in the Age of Total War, UCL Press, London

Cox S and Gray P (Eds.) (2002) Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, Frank Cass, London

Gooch J (Ed.) (1995) Airpower: Theory and Practice, Frank Cass, London

Griffith P (1994) Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18, Yale University Press, New Haven

Hallion R P (1989) Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington

Haythornthwaite P J (1996) The World War One Sourcebook, Arms and Armour Press, London

Kilduff P (1999) The Red Baron: Beyond the Legend, Cassell, London

Meilinger P S (2003) Airwar: Theory and Practice, Frank Cass, London

Morrow J H (1982) German Air Power in World War One, University of Nebraska Press, Nebraska

Morrow J H (1993) The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington

Murray W (1999) The War in the Air 1914-1945, Cassell, London

Murray W and Millett A R (Eds.) (1996) Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Sheffield G (2002) Forgotten Victory, The First World War: Myths and Realities, Headline Book Publishing, London

Journals:

Paris M ‘Air Power and Imperial Defence 1880-1919’, Journal of Contemporary History, 24:2 (1989)

Slessor Sir J, GCB, DSO, MC (Marshal of the Royal Air Force) ‘Trenchard and the Birth of the Royal Air Force’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 107 (1962: Aug)

Stamper G L ‘The Sikorsky S-16 and Russian Aviation during the Great War’, War in History, 7:1 (2000)

Sutton B E, Squadron-Leader, DSO, OBE, MC, ‘Some Aspects of the Work of the Royal Air Force with the B.E.F. in 1918’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 67 (1922: Feb/Nov)

Sweetman J ‘Crucial Months for Survival: The Royal Air Force. 1918-19’, Journal of Contemporary History, 19:3 (1984)

[Adrian Roberts]

Mahross

This is a good, well researched article and I hope you do well from it. In my own university course many moons ago, the General Studies module had an optional question on ww1 aircraft development and I passed this, and probably the whole course, by answering the question off the top of my head!

As to the decisiveness of air power:

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), commented that ‘Though Aircraft…proved of enormous value, their true value is as ancillaries of infantry, artillery, and cavalry

So for Sutton and other airmen of the period, air power was vitally important in winning the Great War

I still think Haig was right and remains so! Prior to the current Iraq war, there were warnings that the US and its allies could not hope to have a casualty-free war [from their point of view] by bombing from the air alone: ground forces were going to have to go in and take the territory and be prepared for casualties. Clinton had tried air power alone in Kosovo, with dubious results and he wasn't even trying to take the territory. Theoretically WW1 could have run its course without air warfare just as the Napoleonic wars had - if only one side had air power they would have been at a disadvantage, but would it have been a fatal one? Whereas by WW2, aircratft were much more deadly and air superiority more decisive. Theoretically, we could have taken Iraq without air superiority (given that there was no air oppostion) but it would have been much more costly for us. And with air superiority, we won the war but not the peace - aircraft are a fat lot of good against suicide bombers!

Between the wars, Trenchard, Salmond etc were anxious to prove Sutton's theory of the decisiveness of air power in order to justify the RAF's existence, and it has been argued that in doing so they caused unjustifiable civilian casualties in places like Afghanstan, and indeed Iraq.

Other than that I have only minor comments.

Baron Von Richtofen gained his score of 80 by typically attacking slow flying scout planes. Richtofen himself typically hated the position he was given as a hero as he was a firm believer of formation flying in order to gain air superiority.

As you imply, MVR was only doing his job - his job was to knock down the artillery spotters, not primarily to fight other single-seaters.

The second area is Close Air Support (CAS), which is the attempt to aid the front line troops and to attack forces that are in direct contact with friendly forces.(21) It was the allies who forced the development of aircraft and techniques for these types of operation as it was inherently linked with their strategy of taking the war to Germany, whereas the German strategy was defensive in nature and as such their aerial strategy was to defend their airspace, a case of aerial denial.

The Germans had battlefield attack aircraft units as well as us - the Schlactstaffeln Using aricraft such as the Halberstadt and Hannoveranna CL types and the Junkers J1 armour-plated two-seater, they used wireless contact with their own troops to carry out highly successful attacks on us in conjunction with ground troops. The successful German counterattack at Cambrai in Nov 1917 is considered to be largely due to this.

on what form maritime air power should take.The Germans favoured the use of airships whereas the allies, especially Britain, preferred the use of aircraft.

The British used airships very effectively in maritime patrol, operating with destroyers in convoy protection. Our small non rigid types were far more cost-effective than the German Zeppelins (see my avatar).

And if you don't mind me nit-picking, in your sentence above you need to say "Britain preferred the use of aeroplanes" The term "aircraft" includes all flying machines - aeroplanes, airships, helicopters, gliders etc

Best wishes in your studies. Surely you should have this years' results by now?

Adrian

[Dolphin]

Mahross

You wrote a good paper, and certainly got your points across. I agree with Adrian's remarks, and would like to add some minor comments as well.

I know I'm a nitpicker, but the Red Baron spelt his surname 'von Richthofen'. Also, he earned his living preying, rather than 'praying' on enemy reconnaisance and bombing aeroplanes. The enemy aircraft in question probably shouldn't be referred to as 'scouts' as this was 1914-1919 terminology for fighters, eg the SE 5a was the Scouting Experimental type 5a.

I wonder if Sutton's theories had something to do with his trying to retain a career in the new RAF at a time when the Admiralty and War Office were attempting to kill off and carve up the new service?

I'm not sure about the Allies forcing the development of ground attack aircraft. As Adrian says, the Germans really pioneered the area with their CL and J class aircraft. The Allies were catching up with the development of specialist machines such as the Sopwith Salamander and Buffalo.

You suggest that Kite Balloons were replaced as artillery spotters by aeroplanes, but they actually remained in service up to the Armistice.

You state that the Germans originated the idea of strategic bombing in 1915. Should you have mentioned the RNAS raid on Friedrichshafen on 21 November 1914? I think the Russians deserve some credit for their efforts with their Il'ya Mourometz bombers, some of which were ordered before the outbreak of War.

The units commanded by Trenchard were the Independent Force, RAF, not the Independent Air Force.

As I said, these are minor comments, but perhaps you might like to consider them if you ever need to write the paper again. You might also like to read R D Layman's Naval Aviation in the First World War, ISBN 1 55750 617 5.

Cheers

Gareth

[mahross]

Cheers for the replies guys. Your point on CAS are valid but there was a distinct difference in what both sides were attempting to achieve with these kinds of operations. The british, and this is where my interest lies, tended to go in for more intruder style operations and the aircraft used tended to back this up. Both air forces tended to be a representation of each sides of national strategy. The German operations tended to be defensive in nature, whereas the British, as with the ground war, were seeking an offensive strategy in order to win a decicive victory over Germany. The design of aircraft represented this. The Germans tended to use two seater dedicated aircraft whereas the british tended to use aircraft that could also be used as fighters, thus a dual role fighter, which could be used in the interdiction role. Also British policy was an extension of its air superiority campaign that was being conducted over the western front at the time. Admittedly both types of aircraft had there advantages and disadvantages, this is a debte which is still being debated today. As to the origins laying with the Allies my sources are as follows:

Buckley J Air Power in the Age of Total War p. 53-56

Griffith P Battle Tactics of the Western Front p. 156-157

Griffith offers a discussion of the initial use of British aircraft at the Battle of Loos, and then subsequently at the Somme after which the Germans react to these British developments.

As to strategic bombing, I have to admit when I wrote this I forgot about the role of the RNAS, but this has been rectified in n further paper, based on this one, which is currently under consideration for publication, As to the Russian development, I feel they are of minimal importance in the development of strtaegic bombing, Yes they were large aircraft and proved the fesabililty of such aircraft but i feel it added little to the theory of strategic bombing compared to the Germans and the RNAS/RFC.

Thanks for the book reference Gareth. Maritime air power is an area I am in the process of beginning so research on.

Ross

[Adrian Roberts]

Ross

Don't forget the role of the airship in maritime air power. It is claimed that only one convoy that was escorted by RNAS/RAF airships ever lost ships to U-boats

The definitive work is probably Ces Mowthorpes Battlebags: British Airships of the first World War (Wrens Park Publishing, ISBN 0905 778 138). Or for a quicker overview, www.airshipsonline.com

Adrian

[Old Tom]

Hello,

Many thanks for the opportunity to read an interesting, well informed paper.

Old Tom

[mahross]

Thanks for the replies guys.

Adrian - Thanks for the book title. Like i've said I am in the process of starting some research on maritime aviation and this can go on my literature search.

Ross