Infantry in the attack 1915

[delta]

Have recently been reading Lynne MacDonald's "1915" = excellent descriptions of individual actions but I am slightly puzzled as to the overall tactics used by the infantry in the assault.

It seems to indicate that the infantry used fire and movement until 200 yards from the enemy position and then it was one long charge.

Have I got it right?

[paul guthrie]

There were so many variables and variations the question may be unanswerable. There is a book however that will be quite helpful since I think you are interested in British tactics, by Paddy Griffith something like British Infantry Tactics of the Great War.

It's Battle Tactics on the Western Front 1916 1918 but will explain what was used earlier.

[6th Shropshires]

Hi delta

Evan in 1915 tactics were developing, as the Generals learnt from mistakes. I am not sure when the creeping barrage was first used but the 6th Division used a creeping barrage for their attack on Hooge on 9th August 1915.

Annette

[Robert Dunlop]

Delta, not quite right. On the Western Front, the lines of trenches had been extended from Switzerland to the sea. Basically, British offensives were faced with the difficulty of getting across a no-man's land that was wired, with opposing trenches. The Germans would always have defenders outflanking the British attackers. So the key issues were: destruction of the wire, destruction of German defenses and defenders opposite the attack, suppression of the defenders outside the flanks, then get across the gap as quickly as possible. As Paul said, there were a number of variables. Typically, there would be a bombardment. At Neuve Chapelle, this was a 'hurricane' bombardment - sudden onset, intense, short duration. Nowhere near as intense as the 1916-1918 barrages but then the German defences were not as well-prepared either. A limited number of artillery pieces were used in direct fire mode. Once the barrage lifted, it was a mad dash. In those sectors where wire survived, for example opposite the Jägers, the attackers were cut down by machine gun and rifle fire. It was rarely possible in these situations for there to be any kind of fire suppression then movement. The attackers were decimated and the survivors were themselves suppressed.

After Neuve Chapelle, the bombardments lasted for longer periods but were less effective - partly through relative lack of shells, partly through the significant improvements that the Germans made. At Aubers Ridge, some units attacked at night. One such unit was exposed when their supports opened suppressing fire too soon, which alerted the Germans. At Loos, gas and smoke were used - the former as an adjunct to the known deficiencies in the artillery preparation. Both provided some degree of protection from observation but only in those areas where the clouds drifted into the German lines. Otherwise, the soldier would be highlighted against the smoke as they came out of it before reaching the German lines.

British units that adjoined the attacking units would often be involved in providing fire suppression with both rifle and machine gun fire. This was typically directed at the flanking German units, particularly where the Germans would enfilade the British attack, ie shoot from the one side of the attack, aiming across the width of the attack. This type of fire from the flanks was devastating. Sadly, rifle and machine gun fire from the British units seems to have little effect in suppressing the German flanks, partly because the location of the German MG nests was rarely known and could not easily be picked up in the heat of battle.

The Old Contemptibles were very good at fire and movement tactics, particularly in the battles of the early months when such tactics were still feasible. I have just read Aylmer Haldane's account of the British 10th Brigade ('Brigade of the Old Army 1914' ISBN 1845740912) and there are some great examples, particularly in the lead up to the First Battle of Ypres. By 1915, most of these men were gone. It would take the advent of the Lewis gun, the mortar, rifle grenades, and the immensely powerful British barrages to open up the German defensives and enable the resumption of fire and movement, within the limits of British 'bite and hold' or limited objective attacks. Paddy Griffiths deals with this era in his book.

Robert

[the gunners dream]

If you hold on I can give you an account of the 8th Buffs at Loos. However, I'm at work at the moment so you'll have to wait until later on.

[Alan_J]

However, at Neuve Chapelle (March 1915 and the first set-piece British offensive of the trench warfare period) the lifting barrage was used for the first time - the bombarment was on a set line (German frontline trenches) for 35 minutes, then lifted to the next set of targets (mainly the village itself) whilst the infantry attacked the German front line from which the barrage had just lifted.

Some advanced positions (i.e. just beyond the British front line) were prepared, but put simplistically, yes, the guns lifted and the infantry charged across No Mans Land to try and take the German positions.

This ac tually worked fairly well in most parts of the battle front, except where the artillery effort was not sufficient and where one battalion lost direction as it attacked and ended up storming a section of the line that had not been bombarded.

After a promising start, issues with communication plus ambitious objectives led to a less satisfactory conclusion to the battle.

The Official History states that all future British offensives were based to a large extent on Neuve Chapelle, with many variations of course.

Alan

[7:29am]

Hi Alan

A question re artillery. Once an attack was underway, ie the barrages lifted off their primary targets how rigid was this. I ask because if troops came underfire from hidden machine gun nests or of enemy fire wouldn't it have been helpful to use field guns to assist in taking out these "hidden" targets once they had been spotted instead of leaving infantry to their fate. It is a topic that i find fascinating and i cannot believe the army would have been so rigid in their planning.

Cheers

Jim

[the gunners dream]

I have been carrying out a lot of research recently about my Great Grandfather Private G/5203 Frank Smith who served in the 8th and the 7th Buffs in WWI.

The excerpt below comes from the war diary of the 8th Buffs The East Kent Regiment). They were part of the ill fated 24th Division one of 2 Kitchener divisions that went into the line on the 26th September 1915. The other Kitchener division being the 21st.

This details their participation at Loos and gives reference to the way they advanced on the German front line.

‘At 10.30 a.m. verbal orders arrived to prepare for an attack at 11 o’clock a.m. Almost at once the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of our trenches. At 11 a.m. an attack across open country commenced, the objective being a German position about a mile away. Artillery formation was adopted on leaving the trenches, but long distance rifle fire caused us to extend our lines almost immediately. The Buffs were supporting the West Kents. The advance was carried forward rapidly and by 11.30 a.m. the leading lines of the Buffs had arrived within 25 yards of the German barbed wire. No gaps could be observed in the wire entanglements. During the advance a heavy fire from machine guns on both flanks was encountered. At 1155 a.m. an order came down the line from the right to withdraw. The enemy’s fire especially from our left flank became heavier and very considerable losses occurred. The Buffs were relieved during the night 26/27th 1915. Rested in a field close by SAILLY LA BOURSE.’

The other account is from a soldier from the Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment. They advanced with the 8th Buffs.

As the advance swept up the long slope towards the main German trenches the machine-gun fire increased in intensity, being very severe from both flanks. Shelling directed from behind hill 70 and from the south-eastern part of Hulluch was also very heavy, and two field guns were brought up to a position from which they took the attack first from the flank and later from the left rear, firing practically over open sights. In spite of the very heavy casualties which were being sustained, the Battalion continued its advance up the slope with the utmost gallantry, but it was found on reaching the enemy's main position that the barbed wire protecting it was absolutely intact. What more hopeless situation could possibly have arisen? When the orders for the attack had been issued, it had been assumed that all the enemy's wire had been cut by our bombardment, but here, after a most gallant advance of about 2,100 yards in face of murderous fire, not only from the from the front but from both flanks, the Battalion, and in fact the whole Brigade were faced with a thick belt of uncut wire, swept by artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire from three different directions. With assistance from our flanks to keep the enemy occupied and to draw a proportion of his fire, it would perhaps still have been possible to force a way through the wire and capture the trench. We wish to make it quite clear that we are not blaming our comrades on either flank for their failure to help us. The facts appear to be that at the time fixed for our attack the enemy himself launched a counter-attack against the troops on our right, who were consequently pinned to their ground, while the orders did not reach those on our left in time, with the consequence that the 72nd brigade had both its flanks exposed, and the enemy was able to concentrate on the one brigade the fire of the artillery and small arms which would normally have been used on the front of three divisions. Many men made gallant attempts to get through the wire, 2nd. Lieut. Don being killed when half-way through. The remainder dropped to the ground where they were and returned the heavy fire from the enemy's trench. The situation, however, was hopeless. In front was an impenetrable belt of wire, and the line, such as what was left of it, raked with rifle and machine-gun fire from the front and both flanks, and enfiladed by an equally deadly artillery fire. What were the men to do? Turn to their officers for orders? Out of the twenty-five officers who had left our trench little more than an hour before, only one was un hit. To stay where they were, outflanked on both sides was impossible, and the poor remnant of that gallant Battalion was forced to make is way back to the line of German trenches from which it had started

The Buffs lost 24 Officers and 530 men in this advance. All tolled the 24th Division lost around 8,000 officers and men at Loos and they did not see any major offensive action until August 1916.

[Alan_J]

Hi Alan

A question re artillery. Once an attack was underway, ie the barrages lifted off their primary targets how rigid was this. I ask because if troops came underfire from hidden machine gun nests or of enemy fire wouldn't it have been helpful to use field guns to assist in taking out these "hidden" targets once they had been spotted instead of leaving infantry to their fate. It is a topic that i find fascinating and i cannot believe the army would have been so rigid in their planning.

Cheers

Jim

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Jim,

For Neuve Chapelle (can't speak for others) the artillery timetable was extremely rigid. Somewhere I have a list of the exact firing directions for each of the batteries and this makes it clear that they lift at 8.05 to the next target.

I agree, in retrospect it seems odd that there wasn't more flexibility, but the idea was that the German front line trenches would have been so pulverised after 35 minutes of bombardment with around 500 guns on a three mile front or so, that there would be little opposition left. In some parts, this was obviously not the case.

However, the same argument was used at the Somme 15 months later - the German lines would be destroyed and no opposition left. Of course the bombardment there was a lot longer.

The issues with communication was one of the big problems at Neuve Chapelle. Once the battle started, it became difficult for the attacking forces to call for artillery on a particular spot if there was a problem. Messages were often by runner, and were sometimes confused.

Neuve Chapelle was the start of a big learning process for the British - they tried many variants on the barrage later, including lifting as though the infantry were about to attack, then coming back to catch any Germans who had come out to man the line, long barrages, short barrages, etc.

Alan

[squirrel]

For some good reading on this and the development of artillery during the war try the following books from Pen & Sword Military Classics;

Command on The Western Front - Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson

Firepower -Shelford Bidwell & Dominic Graham

The former covers the 1915 and 1916 battles and later and the latter the improvement of artillery techniques.

[BMoorhouse]

Evan in 1915 tactics were developing, as the Generals learnt from mistakes. I am not sure when the creeping barrage was first used but the 6th Division used a creeping barrage for their attack on Hooge on 9th August 1915.

Annette,

That must have been a very early experiment with creeping barrages, as most division's artillery were taught the method during the Somme offensive.

Part of the problem was a lack of ammunition (creeping barrages used a lot) which was not readily available until 1916. Also - to be effective the shells needed to be batched carefully and gun barrel wear had to be taken into account so that there were not too many 'shorts' - ie shells that land on the closely following infantry. Again, this was not being done properly until 1916.

Brendon.

[Michael]

The excerpt below comes from the war diary of the 8th Buffs The East Kent Regiment).

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I would be careful with the 8th Buffs diary for their baptism of fire at Loos. Due to the high number of officer casualties it is not known who wrote it and when.

Mick

[the gunners dream]

I would be careful with the 8th Buffs diary for their baptism of fire at Loos. Due to the high number of officer casualties it is not known who wrote it and when.

Mick

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

From what I have researched.

The entry was written on the 27th September 1915 at Noeux Les Mines and from what I have gleaned from histories etc there is a possibility that Major A P H Trueman was acting C.O. after Colonel Romer was killed leading his men.

This is even though the diary mentions him taking command of the battalion on the 7th October 1915. He remained the C.O. until FEB 1916 when he became ill and was relieved by a staff officer called Major Cunningham.

Whoever wrote the entries did so from the 25th Sep onwards as the writing style from then on is the same.

The diary entry, I feel, is backed up by the RWK account.

[6th Shropshires]

Hi Brendon

That must have been a very early experiment with creeping barrages, as most division's artillery were taught the method during the Somme offensive.

I may be wrong about it being a creeping barrage, as I can not fined a referance to it being a creeping barrage, I will have to have a good look. The Shropshires History records that the signal success of the action won great praise for the Division, and the attack was for some time afterwards regarded as a model of the effective use of close co-operation between infantry and artillery.

The 6th Div. diary records an intense bombardment from 2.45 am until 3.15. Ten minutes before it finished the infantry got and of their trenches and worked slowly forward towards the enemies trenches. It records the artillery fire was very accurate, and only 8 men were hit by it. At 3.15 am the men jumped up and dashed into the German lines. It does not meantion it creeping forward, so I may have jumped to the wrong conclusion ? I will have to look at other souces.

Annette

[Michael]

Gunners Dream

Trueman was attached to the Royal Military College and didn't arrive in France until 7/10/1915. He died of pneumonia after the armistice (on the same day as his wife). Vaughan was the only officer who was left unscathed from the 8th Bn.

Annette

Bidwell and Graham in Firepower suggest that the creeping barrage was a natural development of linear concentrations of fire that had been used since the beginning of trench fighting. Horne argued that he'd used it at Loos but not in the traditional sense. He had used it to sweep the area behind the German front line.

Edited 21 July , 2005 by Michael

[the gunners dream]

Gunners Dream

Trueman was attached to the Royal Military College and didn't arrive in France until 7/10/1915. He died of pneumonia after the armistice (on the same day as his wife). Vaughan was the only officer who was left unscathed from the 8th Bn.

Annette

Bidwell and Graham in Firepower suggest that the creeping barrage was a natural development of linear concentrations of fire that had been used since the beginning of trench fighting. Horne argued that he'd used it at Loos but not in the traditional sense. He had used it to sweep the area behind the German front line.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Then it must be Vaughan who wrote the diary entry. Which helps me out so thanks for the info.

The info on Vaughan came from a veteran who was spoken to by another relative of mine in 1979, with that info they must have got crossed wires as to who took over where and when.

[Michael]

Vaughan was a junior officer and would have been heavily involved in the attack (and won an MC). I doubt whether he would have had much idea of the 'bigger picture' and I reckon that the diary was probably cobbled together from a few sources.

Apologies to everyone for taking this off topic. I'll contact you off forum Gunners Dream and we can talk about the 8th to our hearts content

[the gunners dream]

Vaughan was a junior officer and would have been heavily involved in the attack (and won an MC). I doubt whether he would have had much idea of the 'bigger picture' and I reckon that the diary was probably cobbled together from a few sources.

Apologies to everyone for taking this off topic. I'll contact you off forum Gunners Dream and we can talk about the 8th to our hearts content

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

No probs, although I don't agree with that, but we'll just have to chat about that later!

Steve

[Robert Dunlop]

A question re artillery. Once an attack was underway, ie the barrages lifted off their primary targets how rigid was this. I ask because if troops came underfire from hidden machine gun nests or of enemy fire wouldn't it have been helpful to use field guns to assist in taking out these "hidden" targets once they had been spotted instead of leaving infantry to their fate. It is a topic that i find fascinating and i cannot believe the army would have been so rigid in their planning.

Jim, the problem of planning was based on the extremely serious problems of communication (ie control) once an attack got underway. Unless the attacker's counter-battery fire was perfect, the defenders would get off a counter-preparatory barrage. Even if this missed the attackers who had left the forward trenches, it would take out newly laid telephone wires, which had to be on the surface of the ground, and slow up or kill runners. The barrages from both sides threw up huge quantities of dust and smoke that made visual signalling difficult, quite apart from the problem of trying to find somewhere to signal from. This also made aerial observation of troop movements difficult. Even if messages got through, they then had to be forwarded up the command chain, who would be struggling to make sense of the information coming in. These were MAJOR problems in 1915.

Samuels argued that the British response was to create order out of this chaos by planning the choas away. By contrast, the Germans planned for chaos, giving commanders at the front greater initiative and training in dealing with uncertainty. There is some element of truth in this but it was not so clear-cut. For example, the German counter-attack response was often exploited against them during the Somme and later battles.

Field guns were used in direct fire mode. The problem was that hidden machine gun nests were... hidden. The guns that did the most damage were not immediately in front of the British attackers. They were off to the sides, sometimes quite a long way back, though not so far back in 1915 in the flat countryside of Flanders around the British battlefields - in this case, they would be firing from the point at which the trench line angled forward giving a view along the length of a trench line from side-on. The Germans took to building MG nests inside the parapets of the front lines at ground level, with the opening set back and protected. No gun flash would be visible and in the heat of battle the direction of the bullets, which would cut across the ground at roughly knee-height, was hard to pick up, especially to an observer. Please note that MG nests were even more difficult to pick up in the terrain of the Somme or in villages. 'Obvious' MG nests might be built as dummy installations to distract from the actually sites.

Note that the comments above apply specifically to the use of German MGs in Flanders in 1915. There were differences in the way the MGs were used elsewhere and at other times in the war.

The other point about field guns is that they were very exposed if used in direct fire mode. So imagine trying to find some hole in a parapet that was deliberately built in a higgeldy piggeldy manner, with multiple 'holes', hollows, etc and sandbags in different colours, all designed to break up the appearance of the parapet and camoflague sniper and MG nests. The imagine being under fire while this is happening. The smoke, noise, etc, etc - no wonder that MG nests often remained hidden.

Robert

[7:29am]

That is a very clear and concise answer, and clears up some of my questions. I shall give it some thought and come back. (just on the off chance do you now anything about the "C" Bty. 34th Army Bde).

Cheers

Jim

[Alan_J]

As an example of communication issues, I was coincidentally just looking at the War Diary of the 25th Brigade. Their battalions had advanced well on the first day, but their left flank was left exposed as the 23rd Brigade on their left had not done so well. The diary entry reads "At 9.05 a.m. I had sent an officer forward to report on the position of the right flank of the 23rd Bde, and he had reported about 9.30 a.m. that the Scottish Rifles had reached [map ref] but I had no news of their further progress".

This neatly sums it up; it took 25 minutes or so to get a simple answer on another unit's position, and by then the answer would have been out of date! This backs up as an actual example what Robert has said above.

Also, back to the question of the flexibility of artillery - some battalions (such as the 1/RIR) actually did so well in their advance that they ended up having to retreat back as they were in danger from their own artillery, which had not yet lifted to the next objective acording to the timetable - and there was no way they could ask for it to. They just had to wait until the next scheduled "lift" before they could continue their advance.

Alan

[bob lembke]

I know more about the German situation. They started working on effective close support direct fire artillery early in 1915, and in fact Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr) was originally formed to test a new 37 mm Krupp close-support gun and an improved gun shield in actual combat. They always had such guns; the 37 mm were not too good; they tried 76.4 mm Russian parapet guns, modified, they were good; they tried 77 mm German field guns, modified (smaller wheels, for example, shorter barrel (?); mountain guns; and finally, 105 mm howitzers. My father fought with them several times at Verdun, loved them (many German troops would bolt when the flame throwers were turned on, not Rohr), but the thing he stressed about them was the close support gun battery; he said to me: "One, two, three shots, and the MG nest was destroyed!"

The Germans formed (I believe, 50 Infanterie=Geschuetz=Batterien, and when they were not sufficient, some field gun batteries were classified as "accompaining battery", usually at least one or two per assaulting regiment. By 1918 this was standard. No horses, at least not at the front. Wheels were cut down, and the men had hauling harnesses and traces to pull the guns across the battlefield.

Right now reading and writing about Feb. 1916, battle of Verdun; a French source, a sergeant, is with the famous Lt.-Col. Driant; shells exploded over them, coming from the rear, Driant thought they were French shorts, but his MG gunners told him that there was a German 77 mm field gun behind him. Driant convinced his machine gunners to take the gun out of the position and fire on the gun, to kill the crew. They complied, opened fire, but the gun fired and the first shot directly hit, blowing up the gun and the crew.

Sources from the German side described how a field gun battalion commander ordered two 77 mm dragged thru the entire French defenses (one pioneer company assigned to get them thru wire, over trenches, etc.), have three descriptions of different engagements, one a 20 minute duel with two fortified MG nests, at one point all the EM gunners were hit, and three officers, including the Battalion adjutant and the battery commander, crewed the gun. Finally a direct hit on one pill-box, destroying it, and the crew of the second fled.

Finally, Driant is in his CP, position R2, and one of the two 77s was pulled up and fired at R2 over open sights, and Lt. Simon, already driven out of his R position, saw a flame thrower squad also opening up on R2. Driant burned his papers and took off with his men, but they had to flee out of the Boise de Caures south across open land, and they were shot down (Driant and his two battalion commanders) in a short time by German infantry arriving at the edge of the woods.

This was all improvised on the spot by the German officers on the spot. The guns were dragged thru about 1500 meters or 2 km. of successive French positions in about four hours. At each described engagement there only seemed to be one gun in action.

I know less about the details of Allied efforts like this, but it seems that there was less of it.

Bob Lembke