Attack on Yser Bridgehead 7/10/17

[bob lembke]

Guys and Gals;

Does anyone have a particular interest in the attack of the German Marines on the British beachhead on the Yser River near the Flemish coast on July 10-11, 1917?

I appreciate that this forum is focused on the British Army of WW I. My major focus is the German Army of WW I, and within that, more narrowly, on German flame thrower troops of the Imperial Army. However, if there is particular interest in this interesting battle, I would be happy to share some specifics on this attack, particularily in the employment of flame throwers, based on sources that seem largely unknown in the English-speaking world. I myself am interested in information and sources on this battle; I am weak on the sources for the British Army of the period. On the other hand, I have a fairly good reference library on the other side, and welcome requests for lookups, advice for sources, etc.

This is a very impressive forum, I must say, with many exceptionally knowledgable participants.

Anyone interested in this battle?

Bob Lembke

[Chris_Baker]

Hello Bob

Have you seen these excellent articles by forum member Robert Dunlop? http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/hush/hush.htm

[bob lembke]

Hello Bob

Have you seen these excellent articles by forum member Robert Dunlop? http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/hush/hush.htm

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Hello Chris;

Yes, I have, and I found the outline of Operation Strandfest very informative.

As I promised, I will give the information I have about the flame component of the attack. The 6. und 12. Kompagnien, Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer), under the command of a captain battalion commander, attacked with four large and 26 light (Model Wex) flame throwers. On July 10th 6th Company lost a sergeant and two flame pioneers. On the 11th the 6th Company lost a reserve lieutenant and a pioneer. (I suspect the latter were killed by artillery fire on the captured terrain, or behind it, as I think that the flame assault only lasted a half hour on the 10th.) I have the names of the battalion CO and the men that fell. I assume that the reader may find these losses surprisingly light, but these were fairly heavy for the flame pioneers, who averaged about one man killed per flame attack over the whole war. (I have a letter from my father, a flame pioneer, to his father, a staff officer, describing an attack in which 2-3 men fell and 12 were wounded as a "catastrophe".) The flame attacks tended to be either very small, stealthy attacks, without supporting infantry to attract attention and artillery fire, or quite large attacks that produced their own cover and often simply overwhelmed the first defensive line. (The largest flame attack utilized 154 flame throwers.)

These attacks were very carefully planned and were only attempted when the conditions were considered ideal. The troops were allocated to attacks directly by the Supreme Command, and in theory, at least, a platoon sergeant commanding a flame platoon could refuse a direct order from a lieutenant general commanding a division or army corps to attack, if the sergeant thought that the tactical situation was not favorable. And the sergeant was backed up by a written order from the Supreme Command (i.e., Hindenburg and Ludendorff) giving him that right. I am sure that you find this arraingement quite extraordinary, but they allowed the flame pioneers to avoid being squandered in ill-advised attacks by officers not familiar with the special flame equipment and tactics, many of which were counter-intuitive.

I hope you find this information interesting. My sources are authorative, but I must be a bit coy until my book on this topic is out, hopefully fairly soon.

Bob Lembke

[domsim]

I hope you find this information interesting. My sources are authorative, but I must be a bit coy until my book on this topic is out, hopefully fairly soon.

Bob Lembke

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Bob

Is you book going to be on the German perspective of the Strandfest (I know it was a German attck but we only usually see things from the allied perspective here) and is it going to be published in English?

Thanks

Dominic

[bob lembke]

Bob

Is you book going to be on the German perspective of the Strandfest (I know it was a German attck but we only usually see things from the allied perspective here) and is it going to be published in English?

Thanks

Dominic

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Hi Dominic;

The book will be on german flame thrower (FW) troops in WW I. It will cover the equipment and the tactical engagements (the good old "shoot-em-up" we all love) but a lot more, including overviews of the FW equipment and activities of the other armies in the war. It will be based almost entirely on primary sources, the majority of them in German and French. I have found important materials that do not seem to be known in the English-speaking world.

It will be in English. Allow me to observe that 85% of what you see written in English, either in 1917 or in 1997, is either uncorrect or wildly incorrect. This is not just due to the fog of war and history, two generals, one English, one American, conducted an elaborate and successful disinformation campaign that actively lasted into the 1930's that has twisted the available history to the present time. I have gotten access to not only their distorted (English) or grossly distorted (American guy) public writings, but also their private correspondence. There also were reasons why the German record is obscure. These include war-time secrecy and a possibility of post-war prosecution by the Allies.

The Yser attack was a large-scale one, a successful one, and also included other high-tech aspects, including major air-to-ground support. One thing I have not determined is whether the flame troops were directed from the air, as was done in the largest FW attack ever, in Russia, where the flame regiment's CO used observation planes equipped with two-way radios to inform him of progress and to drop relay tactical orders to the storming flame pioneers. This was the attack that used 154 FWs. I will feature the Yser attack as it was an important one. I don't have many allied primary sources on it yet, and I always want to go back to the original sources myself. So anyone with specific sources, please advise, and gratefully received.

Pardon the blurb. I don't know what the conventions are here.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

Allow me to observe that 85% of what you see written in English, either in 1917 or in 1997, is either uncorrect or wildly incorrect.

Bob, I think this might be a tad on the high side - though I appreciate the general point you are making. There are several examples in the British Official History where quotes have been taken from numerous German sources. I have been most interested in (but by no means confined to) the First Battle of the Marne. From all the German sources I have read, the British translations have been remarkably accurate.

Furthermore, I have seen examples where German accounts may not be altogether accurate. It is enormously important to collate information from a variety of sources. Even then the 'truth' is not guaranteed. You will find several members of the Forum who contribute on the German 'perspective', just as we are able to learn from French, Belgian, Turkish and other nationals represented here. It has been a GREAT feature of the group. Your input to this process will be very valuable.

Please feel free to stay in contact off-group for more sources on the British (non-German to be correct) component of Operation Strandfest.

Robert

[bob lembke]

Bob, I think this might be a tad on the high side - though I appreciate the general point you are making.  There are several examples in the British Official History where quotes have been taken from numerous German sources.  I have been most interested in (but by no means confined to) the First Battle of the Marne.  From all the German sources I have read, the British translations have been remarkably accurate.

Furthermore, I have seen examples where German accounts may not be altogether accurate.  It is enormously important to collate information from a variety of sources.  Even then the 'truth' is not guaranteed.  You will find several members of the Forum who contribute on the German 'perspective', just as we are able to learn from French, Belgian, Turkish and other nationals represented here.  It has been a GREAT feature of the group.  Your input to this process will be very valuable.

Please feel free to stay in contact off-group for more sources on the British (non-German to be correct) component of Operation Strandfest.

Robert

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[bob lembke]

Sorry about that fragmentary "Reply", I just messed up with features I only half understand.

Bob

[bob lembke]

Robert;

I know that those are strong statements; how the bulk of stuff in the English language literature is wrong, and, perhaps implicitly, I have sources that are rare and really reliable.

As I said, two Allied generals wrote about this stuff up till the mid 1930's. They had, in my opinion, good reason to distort the history of the German flame effort. For example, US General Amos Fries wrote that the flame thrower (FW) was perhaps the most hapless weapon ever conceived by the mind of man. (This is an exaggeration, but not a big one.) He said that after its utter failure as a weapon the flame units were retained only as a means of executing soldiers that they, for morale purposes, did not want to stand against a wall and simply shoot. In other words, the flame units were not "punishment battalions", they were "execution battalions". (Allow me to observe that the IWM Book of the Western Front {2001 edition, p. 174} states that the German Army executed 18 men in the entire 4 1/2 years of WW I.)

The reality was that the final flame unit, Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Bataillon (Flammenwerfer) (GRPR), was, within several months of its formation in early 1916, awarded the honor of wearing the Death's Head (Totenkopf) on their sleeve, by a decree of the Kaiser, upon the recommendation of the Crown Prince. The latter not only sponsored its formation and the adoption of the new weapon, it seems that he personally initially bankrolled the formation of the unit out of his private purse. I have a photo of the Crown Prince walking into a military church with the ex-CO of the GRPR in the early 1930's to attend a service in honor of the unit. My father told me that the Crown Prince frequently visited his company, that he caged a packet of cigarettes from him on several occasions, and that at least once the CP dragged his father in to review the company, and a funny incident when the Kaiser spoke with a frightened private asked him a question about how many Frenchmen he has recently incinerated; the frightened private responded: "Not many, your Highness, thew French usually run away when we turn the FW on."; this response was not what the Kaiser had wanted to hear, and the private got not only a fishy stare from the Emperor, but also a chewing down from his sergeant, who said, when the Kaiser had left: "Idiot! The Kaiser does not want to hear about Frenchmen running away. He wants to hear about them fighting bravely and being burned to a crisp! Dummkopf!!!.

The GRPR was the only unit in the entire enormous German Army to receive this honor during WW I. A few very old regiments, some from the 18th century, had the honor. And it was a reserve unit! The Totenkopf was also the personal emblem of the Crown Prince, who served in and later commanded the famous Death's Head Hussars.

The idea that a unit like this, so closely connected to the Prussian royal family, was an "execution battalion" is astonishing and deeply insulting. I have, from US Army Military Intelligence, a translation of a 18 page letter written by the ex-CO of GRPR to General Fries protesting and carefully refuting many of the astonishing things that he wrote.

On the topic of my special sources; I have two major sources, privately published well after the war, that I until recently had not heard of a single person in the English speaking world possessing. However, I recently found a German immigrant to the US who has these sources, but seems to have lost interest in the topic. I have a writing partner, who is as private as I am a blabber-mouth, and we have an agreement not to specifically reveal these sources till we publish our book. However, these sources were prepared well after the war by an officer who was in the very midst of these matters, who was a scientist (during the war, in addition to his many military responsibilities, he edited two scientific journals for the duration of the war), and who prepared, during the war, a written report on each flame attack performed by the German Army, with the exception of a few by pioneer battalions who still had, at the beginning of the war, their own FW equipment of an old pattern. These reports were sent to the Highest Command monthly, and they had better be accurate, or he would have been toast. When my sources were written many years later he still had copies of all of these reports in his possession. Additionally, these sources were subject to "peer review" by the members of the GRPR's veteran's association.

These two sources contain five or ten times as many hard facts about the flame units than the other 200-300 sources I have read over the last three years put together. I have in my library about 60 German official histories, and these two sources contain 20 times as much info as all of these histories do combined. They of course would not have been available to anyone, of any nation, during the period when most official histories were written; I have never seen them cited in any source of any nature.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

Bob, forgive me. I thought you were commenting on the general issue of German sources, rather than the specific of flammenwerfer. I have had a long interest in the German use of flame throwers. Personally, I have never accepted the sweeping statements made about their effectiveness or otherwise. So I have constantly watched out for comments about their use in personal anecdotes and unit histories/war diaries of British units.

I am interested in the information that you will bring to light. It is great that you have access to these unique sources. The information about the author of this material is interesting, though it reminds me of another scientist who played a major role in developing and reporting on a new weapons system (well several actually). He kept meticulous records and reports, then published a definitive book on the subject. It was Foulkes, who wrote 'Gas! The story of the Special Brigade'. His work has to be read with a degree of caution. Even scientists are human

Rock on, Bob. I look forward to the final product!

Robert

[bob lembke]

Bob, forgive me.  I thought you were commenting on the general issue of German sources, rather than the specific of flammenwerfer.  I have had a long interest in the German use of flame throwers.  Personally, I have never accepted the sweeping statements made about their effectiveness or otherwise.  So I have constantly watched out for comments about their use in personal anecdotes and unit histories/war diaries of British units. 

I am interested in the information that you will bring to light.  It is great that you have access to these unique sources.  The information about the author of this material is interesting, though it reminds me of another scientist who played a major role in developing and reporting on a new weapons system (well several actually).  He kept meticulous records and reports, then published a definitive book on the subject.  It was Foulkes, who wrote 'Gas! The story of the Special Brigade'.  His work has to be read with a degree of caution.  Even scientists are human 

Rock on, Bob.  I look forward to the final product!

Robert

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I just wrote a second post on this, and the connection with the GWF dropped and I lost it. Rats! I wrote about two specific supposed "universal truths" about FW that are not only wrong, but also based at least in part by the writings of the two gentlemen I mentioned. One I identified as General Amos Fries, who was a complete snake. I have been able to read some of his private correspondence, in manuscript form (its great having a "super-librarian" as a wife). Gave specifics. I would love to see what you came across on FW from "the other side". I will PM you on this.

Two comments on Foulkes. He is the other "master of disinformation". While Fries was a real snake (examples on request), Foulkes was quite complex, very energetic, but often a complete knucklehead. (This will be corroborated.) I am in correspondence with an academic who has spent a lot of time going thru Foulke's papers, war diaries, etc. and will try to get him to add his insight.

I have to correct one thing. Foulkes was no scientist. I will quote something from memory that he wrote. He was called to HQ when he was a RE field officer, and someone, perhaps the BEF's chief of staff, said: "Foulkes, what do you know about gas?" Foulkes, according to himself: "Nothing!" The general: "Well, it doesn't matter. I want you to take command of the new gas weapon."

In contrast, in the first German gas unit; Pionier Regiment Nr. 35 (I think, from memory) six of the men later got the Nobel Prize! But you do not have to have, or be in line for, a Nobel Prize to be a good gas officer. But that sort of mind does help make good technical decisions. Foulkes was intelligent and very energetic, but once he got an idea in his head no force on earth could make him change his mind. And he was very good at energetically selectively conjuring up "evidence" to support his beliefs. By force of personality and energy he was able to force some really bad technical decisions (like continuing to prefer cylinder release for gas attacks) long after all other armies dropped it and most of his men thought he was wrong.

I will present at least one example of an eminent military historian who recently wrote stuff about FW, and he put in stuff word for word from Foulkes, which was dead wrong if not bizarre. (And there was no citation. Shame on you. Egg on your face.)

Foulkes and Fries were in charge of the Brit and Yank FW effort, and they both screwed it up big time. Actually Foulkes did, and Fries went along. So they have a good reason to wildly misrepresent the success of the German flame arm. I will also present solid statistics on the success of the flame weapon which will seem almost unbelievable. But the point is that it was very successful because it was almost always used under optimal conditions (Remember that stuff about a NCO saying "No!" to a general). Therefore, it was used sparingly, and could not win the war, or anything remotely like it.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

Two comments on Foulkes. He is the other "master of disinformation". While Fries was a real snake (examples on request), Foulkes was quite complex, very energetic, but often a complete knucklehead. (This will be corroborated.) I am in correspondence with an academic who has spent a lot of time going thru Foulke's papers, war diaries, etc. and will try to get him to add his insight.

Bob, I would urge a modicum of caution in the way you describe Foulkes. I am no supporter of the man. But his name crops up in several accounts of the British actions in the first months of the war, when he was working as an RE field officer. Foulkes was always highly regarded in these accounts. He appears to have been a dynamic and effective RE in these accounts, which were not written by him.

I am not sure if you are referring to Albert Palazzo's work, some of which appeared in his book 'Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I'?

Foulkes oversaw the development of the Special Brigade. This was not an inconsequential unit. You could rightly argue that it might have developed along different lines, that Foulkes stiffled initiative in individuals like Livens, that he made less than adequate use of the brain-power that he recruited. And there are other issues that have been identified. This should not distract from the significant contribution that the Special Brigade made.

I have to correct one thing. Foulkes was no scientist. I will quote something from memory that he wrote. He was called to HQ when he was a RE field officer, and someone, perhaps the BEF's chief of staff, said: "Foulkes, what do you know about gas?" Foulkes, according to himself: "Nothing!" The general: "Well, it doesn't matter. I want you to take command of the new gas weapon."

Again, I would suggest caution in interpreting what Foulkes is saying. He was not an industrial chemist, that's true. He did adopt a systematic approach, albeit biased, to the task he was assigned. And something made him stand out to General Robertson, with whom he had the conversation.

Robert

[bob lembke]

Robert;

I just was finishing a lengthy response when my connection dropped. I will try to re-create it.

I largely agree with your assessment of Foulkes, and my criticism (e.g., "knuckle-headed", a probably unfortunate adjective) is largely based on my assessment of his performance in the area of flame warfare, which I did not make clear at all.

Bob, I would urge a modicum of caution in the way you describe Foulkes.  I am no supporter of the man.  But his name crops up in several accounts of the British actions in the first months of the war, when he was working as an RE field officer.  Foulkes was always highly regarded in these accounts.  He appears to have been a dynamic and effective RE in these accounts, which were not written by him.

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Foulkes clearly was an exceptional RE field officer, energenic, intense, intelligent, which is why he was tapped for the vital task of building the British gas arm. A remarkable man.

I am not sure if you are referring to Albert Palazzo's work, some of which appeared in his book 'Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I'?

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No, I have not heard of that work, but I will try to get it in hand and see if it says anything about the British flame effort. My assessment of Foulkes is based on having read and taken notes from Gas! two or three years ago, but in particular Donald Richter's Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I, University Press of Kansas, 1992, ISBN 0-7006-0544-4 (hardcover). Professor Richter worked mostly from the papers of dozens of men of the Special Brigade, including Foulkes, of course. (Seemingly Livens did not leave a collected hoard of papers, but many letters from him were found at the Public Records Office, Kews.) Richter also approached the families of veterans and got access to papers not found in the usual repositories. He also used sources such as many war diaries, of course. Seems like a remarkable book, a model of scholarship.

Foulkes oversaw the development of the Special Brigade.  This was not an inconsequential unit.  You could rightly argue that it might have developed along different lines, that Foulkes stiffled initiative in individuals like Livens, that he made less than adequate use of the brain-power that he recruited.  And there are other issues that have been identified.  This should not distract from the significant contribution that the Special Brigade made.

Again, I would suggest caution in interpreting what Foulkes is saying.  He was not an industrial chemist, that's true.  He did adopt a systematic approach, albeit biased, to the task he was assigned.  And something made him stand out to General Robertson, with whom he had the conversation.

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I think that Foulkes pursued the development of the Special Brigade with remarkable energy. He seemed to have two major quirks. If he had an idea, say a technical opinion, he often was totally incapable of changing his mind, or being convinced to do so, either by the facts or his co-workers. Probably the major example was his insistance to try to use gas cylinders as the principal gas delivery system, as opposed to, for example, gas shells (which would have disminished his empire) or the Livens Projector, long after other armies had dropped the cylinder system as a bad deal. He also was tireless at selectively fudging evidence, for example arrainging to have not only German war dead autopsied, but also German trench rats, but was likely to bury the results if they did not go the way he wanted. As time went on, divisional and corps commanders, tired of the dangerous, troublesome, and sometimes ineffective cylinder attacks, simply forbid their use in their sectors, forcing him to use Projectors more, but also to try to develop even more extreme cylinder delivery systems. Foulkes was the original "Energizer bunny". But he was overall remarkably effective in pushing and developing the arm.

In contrast, in my opinion (he also was put in charge of developing flame weapons), he made a series of really amazingly bad decisions in the area of flame warfare. The principal one was, having seen a demonstration of a one-man flame thrower that might have weighed 65 pounds, and deciding that it was too heavy and cumbersome to be used in the miserable conditions of flame warfare, he then decided to put all his chips on a 4600 pound beast. This creature had to be broken down into 200 to 300 man-carries, and even so four components could only be broken down to 212 lbs. The device would be dis-assembled, carried forward into the front line, and reassembled. A single enemy shell could cause the destruction, damaging, or burying in mud of a single part, making the entire device useless. It seemed to have worked effectively the first time (on the first day of the Somme they were able to get two of four devices to work), and after that they never seemed to be able to do so, and suffered some amazing disasters, such as managing to blow up one of these monsters in their own front line. (In contrast the German light FW, the Wex, weighed two pounds less than the standard German infantry backpack. The commander of the German flame regiment was proud of a photo of one of his men carrying two of them.)

Actually the basic problem which sunk the British FW was putting it and gas warfare under the same roof, which probably was not Foulke's decision. Superficially they would seem to be compatable (pressurized tanks, techie stuff, chemicals) but in practice they were very different, in particular requiring a very different sort of soldier. The Germans, basically, took storm troopers and trained them to use the equipment and charge the enemy trenches; the Brits took chemists and pharmacists, had them effectively use gas equipment from their trenches, and then assigned some to FW, which they clearly did not relish. So they got the weird idea of advancing against the enemy underground with these monster devices. Won't beat it to death, but the flame effort was a fiasco. Then Foulkes, quite a politician, wrote Gas!, which has some pretty odd stuff about FW in it. But his disinformation was not malevant, like Fries's was, and might have simply been not knowing what actually was true. But even that suggests a negligent attitude toward the possibilities of the flame weapon. But he was preoccupied with the vital gas work he was doing with amazing energy. So the large flame throwers were retained for a while to wow visiting big-wigs, and finally dropped almost entirely, the equipment being allowed to rust away in the open, only being used once again, in Belgium in late October 1917, seemingly to little effect.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Bob. This has made your things much clearer. I enjoyed Richter's book. Albert Palazzo's book is 'Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I.' (ISBN 0 8032 8774 7).

Robert

[bob lembke]

Guys;

If there is still any interest in this attack.

As previously mentioned, the German attack here was a spoiler attack to derail a suspected British attack.

Today, reading the official history Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Band 11, looking for stuff on other topics, I found mention that the Germans had realized that the British were planning to attack here as far back as January 1917. It was from observing the British pulling up or moving mine barrages and wire netting barriers in the Channel offshore, allowing an attack from the sea, and also in a major build-up of the railroad network behind this sector.

So I guess they watched and prepared plans, and when the British had the French/Belgians (?) pull out of the bridgehead to move their own forces in they knew that it was time to attack, especially before the British settled into the sector.

In line with a discussion on command doctrine elsewhere on this forum, this also underlines the utility of leaving the corps headquarters in place even when the divisions are sent off for refit or other duties.

Bob Lembke