Royal Marines

[Guest Evans of the Broke]

Hi there,

I am wondering how would you evaluate their preformance in WWI and how adequate was the training?

An example from Gallipoli:

"British Marine reinforcements sent to support the Anzacs were described by General Birdwood on their arrival as 'nearly useless ... special children of Winston Churchill, immature boys with no proper training', but they proved him wrong and won Anzac respect by scaling and re-capturing Dead Man's Ridge on the night of 2-3 May after the Australians had been forced to retreat."

Thx

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi there,

I am wondering how would you evaluate their preformance in WWI and how adequate was the training?

An example from Gallipoli:

"British Marine reinforcements sent to support the Anzacs were described by General Birdwood on their arrival as 'nearly useless ... special children of Winston Churchill, immature boys with no proper training', but they proved him wrong and won Anzac respect by scaling and re-capturing Dead Man's Ridge on the night of 2-3 May after the Australians had been forced to retreat."

Thx

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Well the new recruits that found themselves at ANZAC 28th April 1915 had very little training although there numbers were mixed with experienced NCOs - albeit past their physical best for hardship at ANZAC and the Peninsula generally. The same had been true for the Plymouth Bttn at Y Beach 3 days earlier.

Men such as the young subalterns Empson and Allcock showed remarkable personal courage, whilst the RMs were well led by men like Paris and Trotman.

I havent yet had the time to look that closely at the RM Bttns after Gallipoli but obviously they fought gallantly on the Ancre and at Gavrelle, proving their value and endurance and also that they were well led.

[michaeldr]

I am not sure that Birdwood, in the quote which you give above, is referring specifically to the ‘Royal Marines.’ The “special children of Winston Churchill, immature boys with no proper training” sounds more like the Royal Naval Division, of which of course, the Royal Marines were a vital part.

As far as the Naval Brigades of the Royal Naval Division are concerned, it is very difficult to argue with this summary. At this time they were either old reservists or new recruits, but either way their training had been very sparse, interrupted as it was by excursions to Ostend, Dunkirk and Antwerp. They sailed for the eastern Mediterranean in February-March 1915; six months preparation gross, but far, far less in net terms. In a word, inadequate.

Their situation was further hampered by a lack of proper equipment and staff – from Jerrold’s history of the RND [re October 1914] “There was, however, no trained administrative staff, no signal company, no artillery, no supply train and no field ambulances.” Most of the men landed at Gallipoli with out of date rifles and the RND did not get any divisional artillery until it became the 63rd RN Division on the Western Front in mid-1916.

I think that they did their best under the circumstances and if asked to comment on Birdwood’s remarks one might have said ‘Doen’t he know there’s a war on?’

As the concluding remarks which you quote show, they learnt fast and eventually became one of the admitted best divisions on the Western Front.

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Guest Evans of the Broke]

Thx guys.

After some research that is well known here, i found that after Gallipoli the Government pondered disbanding the RND, but it was decided to re-assemble the division, reinforce it and send the division to France for the concluding part of the Somme 1916.

Of the Royal Marines attached to RND it was said:

On the night of 8th/9th January 1916 the last of the Royal Marines crept away from the Gallipoli peninsula with the last of the British Troops. Typical of the Royal Marines they had be the first in during shore raids and amongst the first in during the main landings and the last to leave.

The division was now given an army division number and was known as the 63rd (RN) Division. There would be no longer three naval brigades, but two naval brigades 188th (1RM and 2RM attached), 189th and one brigade 190th containing army units.

This is the contrasting difference they would now face from the Peninsula to Northern France:

In France, however, there was usually a large no mans land to cross which was often swept by machine gun fire. This large gap meant that in France front lines were often not Garrisoned in strength as there was time to bring men up if needed , forces were often kept in the 2nd and 3rd lines and brought forward for counter attacking when the enemy had showed his hand. On Gallipoli as front lines were not far apart , they were packed to repel any mass charge by the Turks. If the Turks broke through the front line they could be down on the beaches behind the allies in no time, there wasn't the luxury of defence in depth and regrouping if things went pear shaped. In France the front line was leveled by tons of shells and if held in strength carnage would be the result.

They were to attack on the 13th November, north of the Ancre in front of Hamel, an area that had been assualted 5 times since July 1st with every attack failing with heavy cost (Who assaulted it exactly?) But the RND was a unique formation that had a terrific espirit de corps, especially the marine battalions. The bonding between officers and men meant that even in depleted numbers and bowed by fatigue the men were still able to mount an attack

To cut a very long story short:

The cost of this operation was great. The RND was decimated but had succeded where others had failed for months as did the 51st Division next door to it. These successes allwed Sir Douglas Haig to go to the Chantilly conference with success to report and hence were of immense political value. The events of 13th /14th November were indeed a victory and the success filled the papers for days. It was the furthest advance on the Somme in one leap. The RND had made its mark in France with a fine fighting performance. Most of the casualties of the Royal Marines occured in no mans land before the first line had been reached.

Most attacks in World War One were written off as thoughtless , unplanned and bungled, but studying contempory documents reveal that plans were painstaking and the aftermath of each action was was analysed to glean the lessons.

The attack only succeeded because of the excellent leadership displayed by the officers and NCO's , the extremely high officer casualties inthe Royal Marines demonstrated what was meant in the Royal Marines by leadership.

Casualty figures for the RM's in their sector:

War diary states the 1RM started with 490 and returned with 138, having had 47 OR's killed, 210 wounded and 85 missing. Of the 22 officers engaged only 2 returned, 6 being killed, 11 wounded and 3 missing. 2RM similar, though 1RM took the lead so would be higher.

German casualties are not known, but those that were treated by the 148 Field Ambulance say they treated 990 German other ranks and 72 officers. But this one only one of 5-7 Ambulances there. In terms of killed and wounded It could be substantial.

The units were rebuilt and went on to fight well at Gavrelle, Poelcappel, Aveluy Wood, Logeast Wood, Queant-Drocourt and across the Canal de Nord. This showed that the spirit of a sound organisation could be instilled and preserved.