General Morland - GOC Xth Corps

[Robert Dunlop]

I have been re-reading Martin Samuels' book 'Command or Control?'. He recounts Xth Corps' attack on Thiepval as an example of the restrictive form of British command. 36th Division's successful penetration of the front line went largely unsupported as General Morland (GOC Xth Corps) chose to reinforce the 32nd Division who had failed in their attempt on Thiepval. It was interesting that his divisional commanders had pressed to reinforce 36th Division's initial success. Does anyone have background material on General Morland? Where did he learn his craft? Are there any other clues as to his character and command style?

Thanks

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

Robert,

In Sheffield and Todman's "Command and Control on the Western Front" there are two notes about Morland. In the first (page 85) there is a comment that Gough, when in command of reserve Army, replaced X Corps with II Corps because he had a low opinion of Morland, who had not performed particularly well on 1st July, or subsequently. (However, in the note accompanying this, the author of this essay (Sheffield) comments that the reader can see a more positive view of Morland in Anthony Eden's memoir).

On page 132, John Lee's essay paints a more supportive picture - Morland and Babington (23rd Division), when discussing that division's attack on the Gheluvelt Plateau in September 1917 discussed the deployment and use of counter-counter attack troops, using the exchange to illustrate the tactical awareness of British generals.

I appreciate that this is a very small amount of information, but it is possible (likely?) that Morland was like quite a few other British generals - he learned as time passed.

Maybe this will kick-start a discussion.

regards

Steven

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Steven

I also came across this:

http://www.hants.gov.uk/museum/aldershot/b...hy/morland.html

The association with Aldershot would have meant contact with Haig, I presume.

Do any KRRC experts have information about Morland or any significant actions that KRRC were involved in that might have included Morland soon after he was commissioned?

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

Should have done this last night! DSO: Gazetted April 1902 "Expedition against the Emir of Yola" - he served with the West African Frontier Force 1895-1904, and won his DSO commanding the Kaduma Expedition (of which I know absolutely nothing). He was then Inspector-General of the WAFF until 1909, and appeared at Aldershot as GOC 2nd Bde 1910-1913. Noy much else there, I'm afraid. Steven

[Desmond7]

Robert -

A forthright view from Tom Johnstone in 'Orange Green and Khaki' in relation to the specific action.

Cheers

Des

[Simon Jones]

Are there any other clues as to his character and command style?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Isn't he supposed to have climbed a tree on 1st July to get a view of the attack?

Regards

Simon

[Desmond7]

See post above

[Simon Jones]

See post above

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Thank you!

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Steven. There are snippets of information about the expedition against the Emir of Yola scattered on the Internet. Nothing too detailed. It appears that he attacked a trading post in Nigeria. But no details of the expedition against him.

Thanks Des. This information corresponds to what I have in the British Official History. You have presented the event that I am interested in. I am really keen to find out what past experiences might have prompted Morland's decision He probably had the best view of the local battle but not the best overview.

I wonder if there are more clues from his time in command of 14th and 5th Divisions?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I have picked up the following details from Sheffield and Bourne's book on Haig's diaires:

Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Lethbridge Napier Morland (1865 - 1925), GOC 5th Division, 1914-1915; GOC X Corps, 1915-18; GOC XIII Corps, 1918-19.

Haig notes on 29 June, 1916:

'After lunch I motored to HQ X Corps at Senlis and saw General Morland. He is quietly confident of success.'

On 22 July:

'General [Hubert] Gough does not think very much of General Morland commanding X Corps. This is no time for having 'doubts'; so I told him that I will arrange to withdraw Morland into Reserve and give him General Jacob in his place.'

After the war, Haig added the following note to this entry: 'Personally, I found Morland one of our best brigadiers at Aldershot.' This is very interesting because, of course, Morland would not have exercised the battlefield role of brigadier during this time. So 'best' must have applied to other factors.

On 22 May, 1917:

'HQ X Corps at Abeele. Sir T Morland seems greatly improved since July last year on Somme. He has now more knowledge and more confidence. I spent over an hour with him...'

Morland was p.s.c.. Bond notes that he succeeded Fergusson as GOC 5th Division on 18 October.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The related question is what experience had Major-General Perceval had that made him no only consider a different approach but actually make the journey to Morland and press for the opportunity for his division to support the 36th?

From Sheffield and Bourne's book:

Brigadier General (1915 - later Major General Sir) Edward Maxwell Perceval ("Perks") (1861-1955), BGGS (Sub-chief of the General Staff [took over from Henry Wilson]) GHQ, 1915; GOC 49th Division, 1915-17.

Purely speculative but I wonder if Perceval's time as BGGS GHQ may have influenced Morland's view of him/his suggestion, given that Perceval was now 'just' a divisional commander.

Bourne has posted the following information on 'Perks' at http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/nicknames/perceval.htm

'Major-General Edward Maxwell Perceval (1861-1955) was a gunner who had passed Staff College and, evidently, a ‘thinking’ soldier. He was Professor at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (1903-4), DAAG (Staff Duties) War Office (1904-5), Assistant Director of Movements War Office (1912-14), CRA 2nd Division (1914-15) and GOC 49th (West Riding) Division (1915-17). One of his more unusual claims to fame is that he translated from the French a book on Confucius in 1897.'

There is no mention of the time as BGGS GHQ in this snippet.

Robert

[Terry_Reeves]

Morland's pre-war service record:

West Africa 1897-98, operations in the Niger, Lagos, employed in the Hinterland. Despatches LG 23 May 1899. Brevet of Major.

West Africa (Northern Nigeria) 1900. Kaduna Expedition, in command. Despatches LG 16 April 1901.

West Africa 1900. Operations in Ashanti. Despatches LG 4 Dec 1900. Brevet of Lt Col.

West Africa (Northern Nigeria) 1901. Operations against the Emir of Yola. In command. (slightly wounded) Despatches LG 18 April 1902. DSO.

West Africa 1902. Bornu Expedition. In command. Despatches 24 April 1903.

West Africa 1903. Kano-Sakoto Campaign. Despatches LG 31 July 1903. CB.

Terry Reeves

[Robert Dunlop]

Brilliant. Thanks very much Terry.

Robert

[Desmond7]

Am I over simplifying his reaction by saying he couldn't see the wood for the trees?

It has been said that the Schwaben could not be held or reinforced if Thiepval did not fall? Therefore Morland sought to capture Thiepval ...

However, I suppose the counter argument would be .. reinforce the troops on the Schwaben (probably at the risk of even more excessive casualties) and perform a flanking move on Thiepval?

I understand the Mouquet Switch trench leading towards the defences at Thiepval was scouted by troops of the 36th and found undefended (or certainly lightly defended) at one stage. Perhaps this window of opportunity could have turned the battle in this sector?

Des

[Robert Dunlop]

Des, no surprise that Thiepval couldn't be taken with a repeated frontal assault. With the 36th having made a reasonable hole, the only sensible option would have been to get more men forward and then push on the German flanks - what the Germans called aufrollen. Pushing more deeply into the German lines might also have been possible but without simultaneously widening the break-in, this was fraught with danger. At least there might have been a chance of unlocking Thiepval from the flank.

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

On 22 May, 1917:

'HQ X Corps at Abeele.  Sir T Morland seems greatly improved since July last year on Somme.  He has now more knowledge and more confidence.  I spent over an hour with him...'

Morland was p.s.c..  Bond notes that he succeeded Fergusson as GOC 5th Division on 18 October.

Robert

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Doesn't this reinforce what I commented on earlier? During the course of the war, Morland (in common with many other commanders) improved his command abilities. On the Somme, controlling a Corps in a battle which was certainly not going according to plan he 'failed'. Later, when given much more latitude by Higher Command, he appears to have done much better.

[Desmond7]

Steven and Robert ...

Any opinions on the 'what if' scenario?

What if Morland had pushed more men into Schwaben sector?

How big an effect on the overall 'first day' performance would this have had?

Des

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Keep in mind several points regarding Thiepval and the Schwaben Redoubt. After the Ulster Division entered the German lines the following waves and later support troops were facing a virtually impenetrable wall of artillery fire and machine gun fire that swept every approach to the redoubt. Many men who tried to get across were killed or wounded and those that made it had to spend hours getting across in bits and pieces.

Thiepval could not be taken without the flank falling after the initial 32nd Division advnace failed and the MG's around Thiepval were part of the defensive screen protecting the redoubt by firing into the flanks of the Ulster division and supports as well as blanketing Thiepval wood with heavy fire.

The only success along the 32nd Div front was at the Leipzig Redoubt and that foothold was small, crowded and difficult to hold. The area between the two original lines was also being constantly shelled and machine gunned making it very difficult to get any supports across, most who tried became casualties.

The Thiepval area and the makeup of the line made it possible for the Thiepval South defenders to flank any attack against the redoubt and the maze of trenches at the Leipzig Redoubt made any swift advance impossible.

Ralph

[Robert Dunlop]

Ralph, you are quite right. The only reasonable chance would have been to smother Thiepval in smoke and HE - sufficient to keep heads down. Then the British forces would have had to cross into Schwaben Redoubt and execute a right-hand 90 degree turn to attack the trench blocks set up in response to the 36th Division. Thence into the rear of Thiepval and its supporting trenches, particularly Moquet Switch. All of this would have required a degree of tactical sophisitication that would have been nigh on impossible.

In answer to your question, Des, the impact would have depended on what was achieved. Unless the Thiepval re-entrant could be reduced on day one, then the British would have been squeezed in a really nasty salient between Thiepval and the Ancre. Even with more men, I doubt the gains of 36th Division could have been held if the base of the penetration had not been significantly widened.

Robert

[Desmond7]

Agreed.

Des