Austria vs Serbia 1914

[RodB]

I've been wondering how a security dispute between Austria and Serbia led to a World war. it seems to me Austria did have a legitimate grievance with Serbia, in that certain elements like "Apis" were destabilizing Bosnia, which Austria logically felt could lead to instability within its own borders. Hence something needed to be done.

However.. the evidence is that nobody else wanted a war, or even had any major grievances against their neighbours. So.. why couldn't Russia have just sent a few divisions to Serbia (like the US sent troops to Saudi Arabia to defend it against Saddam in 1990) and said to Austria "Look, we don't want war, but we will defend our friend Serbia if you try to destroy it" and at the same time Russia could have put heavy pressure on Serbia to compromise, in exchange for a guarantee of purely defensive support.

The problem I can see here is that Russia had no common border with Serbia, it would have had to send troops through Rumania or Bulgaria, as I understand it didn't have free access to the Dardanelles. So was this a major factor - Russia had no way of coming to the aid of Serbia without directly threatening Austria and Germany ?

[armourersergeant]

I have read a book by George Malcolm Thomson called 'The twelve days'. It is a fascinating read of the build up to war in the 12 days before it broke out.

Serbia was the excuse that Austro-Hungary was looking for to start war. The ultimatium given by them to Serbia was so hard that it was almost impossible for Serbia to comply but they did anyway, yet Austro-Hungary still invaded.

There were people in all states that wanted war and worked hard to get it. Working behind the scenes to contrive the outcome. The book gives an impression of a train out of control with all on board unable to stop it.

Yes many could have stopped the war, but it seems it was easier to do nothing!

The book is a great read and i recommend it as a background to this fascinating topic.

regards

Arm.

[RodB]

Thanks for the response Arm.. I suppose what I was tring to ask was - was there any military possibility for Russia to defend Serbia, without being seen to threaten anybody else ?

It just seems to me that Russia had got themselves into a very difficult position with Serbia - since they were committed to Serbia's survival, while being several years away from being able to face another major war.. Serbia just didn't have the manpower to survive unaided.

I can see 3 possibilities, none satisfactory :-

1. It was strategically impossible for Russia to defend Serbia. Russia would have to start a major war to save Serbia.

2. The concept of contingency planning to prop up your friends militarily was unknown in those days. When I look at how carefully Britain had planned its naval and land options to help France in case of invasion, this was obviously not a new idea.

3. Russia was negligent in not providing Serbia with the wherewithal to defend iself, meaning men and weapons, so that any troubles could be localised. The problem I can see if Russia had done this would have been that Serbia would have appeared Too powerful to Austria, and capability of expansion - something like the US military support for Israel over the yaers - it localised any disputes, but ended with Israel appearing threatening to the Arabs. i.e. at what point is a country more powerful than it really needs to be to guarantee its own survval ?

[historydavid]

It is a tad unfair to blame Russia for not preventing the FWW.

Russia did the only thing it was able to, ie, point out to A-H that it would have trouble in the north if it invaded Serbia. It couldn’t send troops etc to Serbia because they would have had to go from the Archangel area in the north or from Vladivostok in the east all the way round by sea. Air transport was only an asperation in the minds of the committed in 1914.

The real problem had been caused by the governments of Germany and A-H on the one side and by France, Russia and UK on the other.

Germany and A-H had a treaty of self-defence if either was attacked (or threatened by attack)

France and Russia had a treaty of self-defence if either was attacked by Germany.

Britain had the Entente Cordiale with France for mutual support against Germany.

These treaties were established in the belief that they would prevent war! Whereas they led to it.

France had been thirsting for revenge against Germany since 1870 when it was heavily defeated and lost Alsace and most of Lorraine.

Germany felt encircled and threatened by the French and the Russian treaty and had been preparing militarily to sort out the situation to their advantage when the opportunity arose. The Schliefen plan for invasion of France through Belgium was in existence before 1900. The German Kaiser was also aggrieved by Germanies lack of major overseas colonies and the Royal Navy.

Before A-H issued its demands on Serbia it consulted with the German Kaiser who advised that Germany would back them.

Whilst it is true that A-H had a seemingly legimate complaint against the Serbian government, it has be accepted that the Black Hand organisation was not an official Serbian instrument but one that was organised by a fanatical anti-Austrian and its members were similarly fanatical. It was also incredibly amateurish judging by the fisco that developed during the Ferdinand assination episode.

As already mentioned A-H sent a set of totally unreasonable demands to the Serbian government, which it largely accepted, only asking for discussions on one point I believe. A-H was determined to teach Serbia a lesson, one that would be understood by all the other ethnic minorities in the Empire, of which there were many. It also felt secure in the knowledge that it would be backed by Germany and that this would probably keep others out of it.

When A-H declared war on Serbia, Russia started to mobilise. The Germans seized this opportunity to declare war on Russia, which brought in France.

Britain only became involved after Germany invaded Belgium, because it had undertaken to defend Belgian sovereignty, as I think, had Germany.

The big game was on!

It is interesting to note that Russia’s attempt to scare off A-H from Serbia is remarkably similar to Britain’s response when Germany invaded Poland in 1919. And they claim that history does not teach lessons.

Best wishes

David

[zooloo]

I believe with Russian mobilisation that it was an all-or-nothing affair.

The way it was set up there couldn't be partial mobilisation.

It was much the same accross the continent, for example Germany's two front plan, one thing led to another and escalated.

Politically, Europe was geared towards war and only awaited opportunity.

This is a somewhat simplified view.

zoo

[carninyj]

Rodb et al

Russia had also been humiliated in 1908 at the time of the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina by A-H.

Serbia also wanted the area - it was ethnically diverse and Serbia wanted to incorporate it because of the Bosnian Serbs - but Russia refused to back her Slavic friend against A-H because her entente/alliance partners would not help her in event of a wider war. Russia's position as a Great Power could not allow her to refuse help a second time.

To some degree, though it hard to judge precisely, Germany was also looking for war with Russia by 1914. After her defeat in the Balkan Wars, Turkey had asked the Germans for asssistance in rebuilding/updating their forces. Germany agreed, but Russia protested and said Turkey was passing under German military control, a development they said was threatening Russia's interests in the Straits. Thereafter Russia rearmed to ensure she would never be threatened by Germany. Kaiser William II allegedly said, 'Russo-Prussian relations are dead once and for all. We have become enemies'. The German press were also discussing the coming war with the Slavs by summer 1914, especially after Russia scored a diplomatic triumph by offering Romania Transylvannia in exchange for a promise of neutrality in any coming conflict. It was against this background that William II's government told the Austrians, Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relations with Serbia. But whatever Austria's decision, she could count with certainty ... that Germany would stand behind her as an ally.'

That said, the Germans probably did think war could be localised. They believed that Russia and France were too weak to intervene, that Germany's good relations with Britain would keep Britain out of the war (Bt was unlikely to go to war over an obscure Balkan issue), and Serbia, if Germany & Austria stood firm, might come to heel without a war. Even if war did break out, it wasn't seen as a disaster: Bethmann Hollweg told the Austrian ambassador, 'If war must break out, it is better now than in one or two year's time, when the Entente will be stronger.'

Bethmann Hollweg later tried to restrain William II. When he saw the Russians order a partial mobilisation to help Serbia he warned them that failure to stop this would result in a full German mobilisation - he wanted them to stop. However, the Russians had either to face yet another humiliation or order a full mobilisation. They chose the latter & the rest is History.

Austria's position reflected these developments: if she wanted to stop her own decline and keep Germany as an ally, she felt she had to use force against Serbia, hence the uncompromising stance on her ultimatum to Serbia.

Does that help? I'm not sure, but it should give others something to chew over!

Regards

Carninyj

[TD60]

Hello

Seen from France, I thought that Great Britain entered in war mainly because German Navy was more and more powerfull and create a competitor, a danger for the UK.

It was not realy to help Belgium, it was a way to stop this growing power which need an empire in Africa, Asia or Pacific.

Belgium gave to British leader a "nice" reason to enter war: fight to liberate a country.

Is that false ?

Regards

[zooloo]

Hello

Seen from France, I thought that Great Britain entered in war mainly because German Navy was more and more powerfull and create a competitor,  a danger for the UK.

It was not realy to help Belgium, it was a way to stop this growing power which need an empire in Africa, Asia or Pacific.

Belgium gave to British leader a "nice" reason to enter war: fight to liberate a country.

Is that false ?

Regards

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

False... er... not really.

It is a considered opinion that the invasion of Belgium was a respectable reason to declare war, not the "real" reason.

zoo

[carninyj]

I always believed that we entered the war to help France, to support a partner in the Entente Cordiale, 1904. We had, I believe, agreed in secret in a naval agreement of 1912, to guard the French Channel Coast with our ships, vessels increasingly kept in British bases at Scapa Flow, Invergordon & Rosyth. The other side of the deal was that the French would guard British interests in the Mediterranean with their ships, increasingly concentrated at Toulon. Both parties agreed to this to counter the growing threat from the German Kriegsmarine. Belgium, whose neutrality we and others had guaranteed, was the pretext for war.

Regards

Carninyj

[carninyj]

I recently came across something written by Hew Strachan on this. He says - regarding the Entente Cordiale - that in July 1911 Delcassé, Naval Minister in France after March 1911, was appalled that there were no naval talks. These began and the Anglo-French naval agreement of 1912 emerged and followed the logic which had underpinned the original Entente. 'It gave France suzerainty in the western Mediterranean, between Marseilles and North Africa, and it confirmed what the British Admiralty was already doing, withdrawing its battleships to the North Sea to focus on Germany. The security of France’s northern coast now lay largely in British hands, and the two navies adopted a joint naval code to prove it.'

Sir Edward Grey later reassured the French on 22 November 1912 that, "if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other, whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so what measures they would be prepared to take in common".

At the end of July 1914, the two powers confronted just such a crisis and both Grey and Asquith were inclined to agree that we had agreed to defend the French Channel Coast. However, our commitment remained primarily one at sea. We sent only a small military force in August 1914.

Regards

Carninyj

[RodB]

So - what were the other 2 members of the Entente, Britain and France, doing to stop Russia starting something they would be dragged into ? If Rusia ended up at war, France would be and Britain knew it could not let France and the Nth sea coast be lost. Yet as far as I am aware the British government tried to ignore the Balkans.

It's like knowing that if your kid brother (Russia) beats up the neighbourhood big guy's kid brother (Austria) , then the neighbourhood big guy (Germany) will come round to deal with you. Either you talk to your kid brother about peaceful coexistence or you prepare for aggro.

I realize this is a trivial example compared to the dreadful reality of what happened, but it seems to me the countries involved did not display due dilligence in thinking through and discussing strategic issues before they got out of hand. Didn't Britain and France know that Russia was prepared to risk a continental war to support Serbia ? Or didn't they realize that Serbia was threatened at all ? From what I read now of Conrad's pathological determination to nullify Serbia, everybody in the region at the time must have realized what the score was. So I can only assume that Britain and France both assumed that Russia would back down again if things heated up, as they took no preventive action. So why did they assume this ? What did Russia tell them about its strategic interest in Serbia ? Seems to me if Russia had told Britain and France beforehand where they stood with Serbia, either Serbia would have been given the means to defend itself (between the 3 of them they could have organized something) and Russia could have been told to pull its head in. The other alternatives are that Russia lied about its real policy or in fact had no policy until it was forced to have one; second alternative is that France said nudge nudge wink wink go for it. Same for Britain - I can't believe that they could have sat back and done nothing if they'd known that Russia would risk war over Serbia.

[carninyj]

Rod, I'm not sufficiently knowledgeable on the subject to argue your valid points with you. I'm sure Britain and France did know what lengths Russia would go to to help Serbia, and I take your point about them having a vested interest in making 'Russia .... pull its head in'. However, John Keegan says, 'Britain had, throughout the crisis, pursued the idea that, as so often before, direct talks between the involved parties would dissolve the difficulties' and so I think she was perhaps less forceful than she should have been, maybe because 'as a power apart, bound by treaties with none' she felt it wasn't of immediate import to her. Keegan certainly says that as late as Sunday 1 August, 'the French ambassador, Paul Cambon, was thrown into despair by the British refusal to declare their position'.

France, an ally of Russia, was in a different position and the role played by her ambassador, 'a patriot' who seemed to have 'accepted the inevitability of war', seems to have hindered a peaceful resolution of the situation. The roles of individuals like Conrad, Janushkevich and Moltke seem equally to have created similar difficulties, as did the timings of partial and full mobilisations.

Carninyj