RM Museum Gallipoli Conference 28/4/2005

[Jonathan Saunders]

For those that couldnt make the Conference but asked for some feedback herewith a run down of the morning session. If I get time I will try and write up something on the excellent afternoon session that was dominated by the underwater warfare waged by the Allies in the Dardanelles.

Nigel Steel - Tragedy of Gallipoli

Nigel gave a list of reasons why in his opinion the Gallipoli campaign was destined not to succeed. Some of these were:

* Dardanelles decided upon on 2 Jan as the most suitable area where the RN should demonstrate a show of force - plan was subsequently developed into full scale Naval assualt to force passage to Sea of Marmara but only minimal period was available for planning.

* Hamilton arrived day before Naval assualt and following its failure decided an amphibious invasion was necessary - later planned for 23 April and again minimal time for preparation and also concept was not fully analysed.

* Britian were already commited to launching an offensive in 1915 on the WF and did not have resource for two offensives, hence Gallipoli was starved of resource without adequate reserves of men, artillery or munitions.

Peter Chasseud - Grasping Gallipoli

This is the title of Peter's new book and he blew away some of the intelligence myths surrounding Gallipoli.

* Dardanelles had been an area of much attention to Britain in the ten years immediately before the outbreak of war.

* Evidence still exists that Hamilton and his Staff were unindated with intelligence reports that had been gathered in the previous ten years.

* Maps & Intellgence:

1) Detailed French 1854 Crimean maps were still accurate due to same topography in 1915.

2) 1877 Capt Grocer made full recon on ANZAC COVE area and on terrain across to Khalid Bahr.

3) 1912 Major Earl-Sampson (?) spent time specifically on the Peninsula gathering intelligence.

4) 1909 Turkey had made detailed maps of Peninsula and these could probably have been obtained through bribery or from the Greeks, who had copies and were our Allies going into the Campaign.

5) 1909 War Office Report on appropriateness of Suvla Bay as a landing area in event of a future war against Turkey.

6) Up to date plans detailing each fort and gun emplacement on the Peninsula.

7) Some (but minimal) intelligence on minefields in the Narrows.

8) Offer by Cunliffe-Owen to assist/report on intelligence. He had been sending back intelligence reports on the Peninsula immediatley prior to the outbreak of war. His offer was curiously rejected by the War Office.

Chris Page gave an account of the RND and their background since Ostend and Antwerp. They had been derided by the army in 1914 and again in 1915 but by the end of the war they were recognised as one of the best fighting divisions. During WW1 the RND made up 4% of RN personnel but represented 40% of all RN casualties.

Julian Thompson gave an account from a Command viewpoint, making the point that the Gallipoli campaign was hampered by their being no Joint Staff Committee. Also the RN and army acted independently and reported back to the Admiralty and War Office separately. Julian also outlined difficulty of a large scale amphibious landing - Gallipoli was the first for over 100 years - and that the landing craft were unsuitable including the River Clyde when troops were caught in a log-jam. Julian suggested four River Clyde's would have been effective. Also he gave an overview of the lessons learnt from Gallipoli and how this impacted future development of command and control.

One reoccuring theme was that as well as no thought-out invasion plan, neither had any thought been given to what would happen once the objective (Constantinople) had been obtained. A final and well known trend through all the speeches was that the British under-estimated the Turks and the fact they were fighting on their homeland and to protect their homeland.

Hopefully a report on the afternoon session will follow.

If I mis-interpreted anything I would appreciate if other delegates would correct me.

[MartinWills]

Jon,

Even if you have misquoted anyone I don't think there is anything here that is not valid comment - it's a fine list of points for anyone interested in the campaign to consider. I have always found the decisions not to use the wealth of pre war information absolutely astounding. The best excuse I have heard suggested was that it was not thought to be "playing the game" to use information collected with the co-operation of the Turks (eg Crimean material or by people visiting with Turkish support).

The lack of resource, both in numbers of men and equipment coupled with the lack of first rate commanders for the Suvla landing much count high amongst the reasons for failure. At the same time we must not forget the bombardments of the forts from late 1914 onwards must have served as some sort of warning ...... There were still perhaps moments on which the campaign could have turned, but didn't.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Martin ... many thanks for reminding me that the important element of surprise had been lost for numerous reasons and the fact the Turks were ready, waiting and resourced by German munitions was mentioned once or twice!