Trench Mortar Batteries

[dorrie]

I have now read on several occasions that officers, in particular, who were not up to commanding and who were inadequate as soldiers were dispatched to the TMB's. if this is correct why was this the case?

Dorrie

[Paul Reed]

There was another thread on this recently; I presume you have been reading 'Tommy'? Try taping 'Trench Mortars' into the search facility of the site.

[PhilB]

I suppose any CO, asked to send an officer to another unit, is going to send the one who is most dispensible. I often wonder to what extent units like TMBs and MGC were forced to rely on other people`s cast offs, or whether the powers that were saw the danger and specified which officers were to be transferred. Phil B

[Paul Reed]

In my opinion these two units (TMB and MGC) were far too specialised to rely on 'cast-offs'. As I stated on another thread, I think this is a case of a modern military mind interpreting how things were done in WW1; which is not always a wise approach. I have a copy somewhere of how they selected MGC personnel; cast-offs would have not made it past the selection.

[JulianB]

excuse me for butting in, but

Paul, I'd be particularly interested in your

"copy ... of how they selected MGC personnel"

(assuming you mean MGC rather than pre MGC mg sections in inf bns)

thanks

Julian

[PhilB]

Paul, are you implying that MGC and/or TMBs had higher standards for selection than infantry? Phil B

[Desmond7]

Having contributed to the last thread on this topic ... I am of the opinion that TMBs have been given a 'bad rep' in general terms.

Aside from the pride exhibited by men who have been attached to such a unit .. check out their obits/letters home etc for evidence of this ... I think it is also salient to examine the changing nature of combat in WW1.

OK it could be argued that their pride was an indication of 'inverted snobbery' i.e. no-one likes us, we don't care.

But the combat role of troops is something which is less easy to dismiss.

Since MGs and mortars have a much greater 'value for money' rate of killing than a soldier with his mills and enfield, surely it would make sense to use men with the technical skills (Ok they can be taught), courage and determination to serve and stay with such effective weapons? Such men , in my contention, are not found amongst the clumsy clots, windy walters of this world?

The defence rests M'lud.

[Old Tom]

Hello,

My father was a gunner in a TM battery with the 18th Division. I have thought (piecing together the few things he said about WW1) that his move from an 18 pdr battery was because he and a friend, chose to go for a swim rather than clean harness.

Another more serious thought is that in 1914 there were no mortars in the BEF. Likde many other artillery ( and infantry) weapons they were introduced piecemeal and their organisation evolved during the war. I think this is particularly the case with artillery. Manpower had to found for very many new types of units.

Old Tom

[dorrie]

Thanks to everybody for your replies. Some interesting points made again thank you

Dorrie

[Borden Battery]

During the latter part of 1918 [Last Hundred Days] the Canadian Corps formed a tactical force for open warfare. This was an elite group, including 6" Trench Mortars in the back of trucks - a form of mobile artillery. Far from being the "dregs', the trench mortar groups were an integral part of the operation. The war diary of the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade also supports the value of the mortars.

At 11.00 p.m., that night (the 27th) orders were received for the formation of a 'COMPOSITE BRIGADE' to be commanded by G.O.C., Canadian Machine Gun Corps, and to consist of the 2nd Canadian M.M.G. Brigade, the 101st Machine Gun Battalion (less one company) and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion – the brigade to be at the disposal of the 4th (British) Division, which was now part of the Canadian Corps. The brigade was to be used on the night of the 28th to form a flank south of the SCARPE. At 11.30 p.m., however, the plans were cancelled and the 2nd Canadian M.M.G. Brigade was ordered to remain concentrated at WANCOURT. In Corps reserve in ARRAS was the 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade ready to operate down the CAMBRAI Road if the opportunity occurred.

A section of 6” trench mortars reported on the 28th for attachment to the Canadian Composite Brigade.

About noon orders were issued for the concentration of the Composite Brigade. By 3.00 p.m., Headquarters of the brigade had opened at H.34.D.7.9 with units assembled in the area between FEUCHY and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. At almost the same time orders were received from the 4th (British) Division for the Brigade to relieve the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the line and to form a defensive flank south of the SCARPE, conforming to the movements of other troops in the division. To better carry out these orders the Composite Brigade was organized into three groups as follows:-

(i) No. 1 Group: 2nd Canadian M.M.G. Brigade.

5 motor machine gun batteries (40 guns).

2 platoons cyclists.

3 trench mortars

(ii) No. 2 Group: 101st Machine Gun Battalion.

101st M.G. Bn.-2 1/2 companies – (40 guns).

2 platoons cyclists.

3 trench mortars.

(iii) No. 3 Group: Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion

5 platoons cyclists.

Detachment 101st M.G. Bn. (8 guns).

Detachment armoured cars (12 guns).