FORTRESS AQABA? - November 1914 - July 1917

[Holger Kotthaus]

FORTRESS AQABA? - November 1914 - July 1917

 

Last year I was in Aqaba because I was interested in the surroundings and the condition of the old castle.

Unfortunately, the renovation of the facility was not yet completed and only parts of it were accessible. The

main gate, which faces north-west, could not be photographed because there was a large scaffolding there.

[Holger Kotthaus]

The very helpful information from the following GWF-Topics about Aqaba has been tried to be taken into account.

Since this topic relates more to the land side of Aqaba, I have not classified it under “Sailors, Navy and War at Sea”.

 

 

 

 

Akaba, cartographic from a series of aircraft photographs by H.M.S."Raven II", August 1916

https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/5811205 - https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ab/Akaba.png

 

Using this nice map, I tried to compare this representation to the lower sections of the film.

Of course, I also tried to look for the remains of artillery technology visible in the film; - as

Vickers 6" or 8" Coastal Guns. Perhaps these would still exist as a memorial within the town?

Original Source: “Lawrence of Arabia“ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9boARnzvG8 (By: 1:39:36)

 

However, I couldn't find any similarities because these scenes in the 1962 film were shot neither

in Jordan nor in other Arab countries, but in what was then a remote bay in southern Spain.

Lawrence of Arabia - David Lean - 1962 - Playa del Algarrobico, Carboneras, Almería, Spain

https://filmap.tumblr.com/post/123877877809/lawrence-of-arabia-david-lean-1962-aqaba-playa

Lawrence of Arabia on the coast of Almeria. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6fKgWp1IVdQ

 

Fortress Aqaba? “In the century preceding the First World War, it was used to a larger degree as a military stronghold. In July 1917, the fortress was witness to a victory of the Arab Revolt, when this heavily defended Turkish stronghold fell to an Arab camel charge.“ Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aqaba

 

“Ottoman Defence You might wonder why such a powerful Navy as the British Empire is, requires such an orthodox attack on a coastal port like Aqaba. The problem is that the city stands on the end of the narrow gulf of the Red Sea, which is surrounded by heavily defended mountains. Most of the Ottomans defence was prepared for an attack from the sea because it was thought that the eastside was protected by the natural barrier of the vast sands of the Nefud desert. A simple cheap naval mine could sink an expensive British naval ship and it is very hard for smaller vessels to do a scouting mission defusing the mines in this heavily guarded area from the land. During the First World War, clearing out defences on the land proved to be close to impossible even for professional armies, not to mention the naval forces, who historically were decimated during such attempts.“ Source: https://ctdots.eu/places/jordan/history-of-aqaba-jordan/

Certainly Aqaba had a strategic position; - but only on the map. The maritime importance was also emphasized in some essays, Aqaba was the last port of the Ottoman forces in the spring of 1917, after all ports on the entire east coast of the Red Sea had already been lost. But what should the Ottoman Navy doing with a port? There was no Ottoman Navy in the Red Sea throughout World War I; - not even on paper since 1911. And for the Royal Navy, the benefits after the conquest of Aqaba in the summer of 1917 were probably no longer worth mentioning. Undoubtedly it was a great moral victory; - but surely not more!? In my opinion, the large Turkish troop concentration at Medina, deep in the rear of the insurgent, posed a much greater risk.

 

The background of the 'Aqaba Fortress' has now become established as a historical fact in the world of model builders.

Coastal Gun Aqaba 1917 – Lawrence of Arabia

https://wargamescratch.wordpress.com/2017/07/24/coastal-gun-aqaba-1917-lawrence-of-arabia/

 

The after-effects of this `post-war propaganda´ continue up to day. Just 15 years ago, naval experts were listing realistic alternatives in which Admiral Graf Spee could sail his squadron to Aqaba, land there to reinforce this "fortress" with dismantled ship's guns, or transport these from there by train to Gallipoli.

“Options of the squadron from Graf Spee after Coronel - Your representation of the strength of the Ottoman Troops in front of Aqaba cannot stand still like this. There were no ottoman military until February 1917, but only two reinforced companies of the Seyyar Jandarma.  There were no field fortifications, machine guns or even artillery at all. Not before 1914 and not after 1914. This means that no military was involved during the two shellings of the place (October 14th and November 6th, 1914). It was not until February 1917, half a year before the Arabs took the place, that the 11th IR 161 was relocated to Aqaba. It is more than questionable whether it even had a machine gun platoon.

The Turkish General Staff Work on the War in Arabia ( Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri / Ankara 1978 ) provides no information about this at all and runs over 1000 pages. In general, the place played in the Great War doesn't matter. He became known through Hollywood, well and there the Arabs of course storm against a huge, armed enemy with lots of machine guns and big cannons; - Bernd Langensiepen" Source: https://forum-marinearchiv.de/smf/index.php?topic=1146.msg53965#msg53965

 

This information is proven in the Turkish General Staff Works mentioned above.

Aqaba is mentioned textually on the following pages: 61, 137, 319, 321, 323, 326, 327, 349

Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, Hicaz, Asır, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekâtı, 1914-1918,

https://www.msb.gov.tr/Content/Upload/Docs/askeritariharsiv/113-Birinci_Dunya_Harbinde_Yemen_Cephesi.pdf

 

This Turkish map shows, for the first time for me, the exact route of the insurgents. 14.-16. February 1917 on Page 1.037

 

I have the following questions about this:

1.) Is there any evidence of the strength and equipment of the Turkish garrison in July 1917 in other sources?

 

2.) Were the Turks really so surprised to be attacked from the north-east, even though there were Turkish outposts at Guveyra, Kethira and Hufre, and they withdrew in stages towards Aqaba? Is there any evidence of combat at these positions? There was a telegraph connection between Maan and Aqaba to transmit messages over these 120 km.

 

3.) To what extent (Material & Units?) was Aqaba used by the British Navy after July 6, 1917?

“Once Lawrence brought word of the capture of Aqaba, the British Navy supported the Arab Army through Aqaba.”

https://www.cliohistory.org/thomas-lawrence/akaba

 

(These questions are certainly not new among experts; - I, on the other hand, am still new to this area)

Regards Holger

Edited 22 March by Holger Kotthaus

[stevenbecker]

Surpisingly No

I could not find any details of the Garrision of the port of Akaba/Aqaba

I did notice this in Wiki (as much as you can believe it) 

"By 1917, the Ottoman garrison had grown to 300 – mainly Ottoman-Arab gendarmerie – up from 100 in 1914. According to Neil Faulkner, "The British high command had long been anxious about Aqaba." The British feared that an Ottoman Aqaba would threaten Archibald Murray's flank, or Ottoman raids could develop into the Sinai, or that it could be used as a base for German submarines in the Red Sea"

That would appear to make sense, as I can find no formation of the Ottoman Army there. The 161st Regt is strange, as the 53rd Div arrived in March 1917 around Gaza not Maan?

I could find no named Jandarma at Akaba, while the closest I could find is the Maan paramilitary Jandarma Bn

So the Seyyar Jandarma is new to me and needs more research as to what Seyyar is only Moblie, not a named unit?

I could find no strength states for this unit, other then the Garrison at Maan, then could a Company or two have been sent down to Akaba?

It would appear so?

As to the 11Co 3Bn 161st Regt, I am unsure about that even to the map shows May to July 1917 which shows the relief force sent to open the road to Akaba

But was held up by Arab forces not under TEL's command

But like wise I am in the dark here as little is given on this so its mostly new ground for me

I did notice the relief Force under Lt Niaz Bey commanding the 3Bn/161st Regt was stopped in July 1917 so that makes sense if the 11Co was sent into Akaba as Garrison. But again limited details of that Force other with the map you show with part of the 29th Cav Regt and 130th Regt, which were part of the 22nd Div in that Area

The 29th Cav Regt was split up amoung many units

1 Sqn with 25th Div

2nd Sqn with 23rd Div but shown later with the 44th Div

3rd Sqn with 27th Div

4th Sqn with 43rd Div 

5th Sqn with 53rd Div

As to the 53rd Div and its work here

British reports show for this period

 April 1917 2nd Gaza 161st and 163rd Regts + Sqn/29th Cav Regt (100 men) + 165th Regt (54th Div) + 125th Regt T/att (16th Div) -

shown Jun 1917 Allied reports 79th Regt (2700 men 8 Mgs) 161st Regt (1800 men 12 Mgs) 163rd Regt (2100 men 12 Mgs) -

shown July 1917 Allied reports 79th Regt (2100 men 12 Mgs) 161st Regt (1800 men 12 Mgs) 163rd Regt (2100 men 12 Mgs) Div Cav Sqn/29th Cav Regt (150 cav) 

So the Regts were strong but no where does they said they were in the Hejaz?
 

Edited 23 March by stevenbecker

[Holger Kotthaus]

13 hours ago, stevenbecker said:

Surpisingly No

. . . but surprisingly still lots of details from you!  (- -)

2. November 1914 Kreß von Kressenstein describes in his book that at the beginning of the war there were only 20 gendarmes (customs protection?).

 

1915 / 1916 H.-E. Tzschirner describes in his book that before his arrival in 1916 (?) 60 gendarmes were stationed in the fort in Aqaba. Apparently his unit, consisting of three infantry battalions and several field guns, was stopped near Maan?!?

 

For late 1916-early 1917 For the end of 1916-beginning of 1917, the Turks describe on their own map the presence of the 11th Company of the 161st Infantry Regiment in Aqaba. Furthermore, a unit, without size information, which is called “Akabe Müf. (Urban)”. At about: 240 rifles?

 

Before 6. July 1917, as shown on the map above, there was still one infantry company of the 161st Regiment and another company, of which the Turks themselves did not know anything and only marked it with a question mark. There is also a third infantry company, which is called “Milli”. Aqaba was probably so insignificant for the Turks that they didn't even keep records of it. At about 360 rifles?

 

The following picture emerges for me at the moment:

·         Aqaba was never a fortress; - neither planned, nor on paper and certainly not in reality.

·         The settlement was never prepared against a sea or land attack.

·         Apart from a few trenches, there were no other defense positions.

·         There was no coastal artillery during the entire war, nor was there ever a field gun.

·         Garrison strength increased from 20 rifles to nearly 360 rifles (three companies)

Regards Holger

Edited 23 March by Holger Kotthaus

[michaeldr]

On 22/03/2024 at 07:06, Holger Kotthaus said:

In my opinion, the large Turkish troop concentration at Medina, deep in the rear of the insurgent, posed a much greater risk.

Medina and the Turkish forces there posed no risk whatsoever. They were totally isolated, with only one supply route; the Hejaz railway line.
Writing in his 'Guerrilla Leader – T E Lawrence & the Arab Revolt' James J. Schneider quotes TEL
“We must not take Medina. The Turks are harmless there. If we imprison them all – say, in Egypt – they will cost us in food, water, and guards. We want them right where they are, at Medina and at every other distant place in the largest numbers. Our goal (the Arab revolt) must be to keep the railroad working, but just barely while inflicting maximum loss and discomfort on the Turks. That simple factor and water will confine him to the railways; and let him have them all: the Hejaz Railway, the Trans-Jordan and the Palestine and the Syrian lines. He can have them for the whole of the war, while we take the rest of the Arab world.”

[without checking, that sounds more like a paraphrase of TEL, rather than the man himself, nevertheless you will get the gist]
 

[Holger Kotthaus]

On 22/03/2024 at 08:06, Holger Kotthaus said:

1.) Is there any evidence of the strength and equipment of the Turkish garrison in July 1917 in other sources?

 

2.) Were the Turks really so surprised to be attacked from the north-east, even though there were Turkish outposts at Guveyra, Kethira and Hufre, and they withdrew in stages towards Aqaba? Is there any evidence of combat at these positions? There was a telegraph connection between Maan and Aqaba to transmit messages over these 120 km.

Here are the translated text passages from the Turkish General Staff, which sound quite plausible and credible:

“Before the operation was announced, the situation of the forces of both sides around Maan and Aqaba in May 1917 was as follows:

Turkish Armed Forces:

• In Aqaba: A protection force of 300 men (two companies of the 161st Regiment, Aqaba National Urban Company);

• In Maan: 161st Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion (two companies missing)

• An infantry company (from 2nd Battalion, 130th Regiment)

• A cavalry company (from the 29th Regiment)

• 7th Mountain Battery (from the 44th Regiment)
  

• A medical platoon

These forces were generally deployed gradually in three sectors between Maan and Aqaba (to protect Aqaba from land attacks).

Arab Armed Forces:

The Arab forces involved in the Aqaba operation consisted of a 50-man convoy that went into action from Wech on May 9, the 500-man Avuda force that joined Lawrence in Nabek, and the Duhmaniye tribal force, who took part in the Battle of Ebillesen. This Arab force under the command of Avuda and Nasser was considered the most warlike force in the desert. In terms of numbers, both sides could be considered equal.

After returning from his trip to Syria and some destruction on the Hejaz Railway, Lawrence returned to Nabek and fought with the 500-man Avud forces that joined him. Although they set off towards Ber, which was chosen as the first target, it turned out that the wells along the way were destroyed by the Turks and so it was decided to start the operation towards Aqaba by heading south of the Maan Railway crossed. According to the plan drawn up, the first step was to capture the Ennekap Strait on the road to Maan and Aqaba, and by preventing the Turks from receiving reinforcements from Maan, they could easily jump to Aqaba from there. The plan also involved spreading false news in the region (men were sent north claiming that the Lawrence Group was an important vanguard force) in order to divert the attention of Turkish forces in Maan away from Aqaba and towards the north. Furthermore, Sheikh Zaal and his force of 100 men were mobilized in this direction as if to operate in the Dera area.

[ . . . ]

After all these plans to surprise the Turks with deception tactics, Arab forces finally crossed the railway line from southern Maan to the west on June 28, 1917. With its advanced elements it first captured and neutralized a Turkish gendarmerie station between Maan and Aqaba and on the hills near Maan. Thereafter, the main force under the command of Avuda and Nasser occupied the hills above the road in Ebillesen (a body of water). Apparently the Turkish command in Maan received news of this and moved a force consisting of a mountain cannon and a reinforced infantry battalion from Maan to these hills. On July 2, a firefight began between the enemy forces that had previously held this place and the Turkish battalion. Although a mountain cannon also took part in this battle, the fire from this cannon, which had very little ammunition, was ineffective. The distance between Turkish positions and the enemy was less than 200 meters. Towards evening, Avuda attacked the Turkish forces in a raiding style with a strike force of 50 horsemen, which he prepared in a valley in the region that was not easily visible from the Turkish positions.

[ . . . ]

The Turkish troops were amazed and began to disperse. Meanwhile, the remaining Arab forces holding the hill jumped down from the slopes and threw themselves on the camels in the valley. Thus the attack became effective and the battle ended after five minutes. It was widely assumed that the road to Aqaba had been opened. According to British sources, in this battle the Turks lost 300 dead and 160 prisoners, while the Arabs lost two dead and a few wounded. This result increased the morale of the Arabs, and other tribes in the region, hearing this, began to join them (it was a characteristic of the Arabs to join the side they considered strong only for the sake of plunder and not out of faith). The force of Sheikh Ibni Yad, one of these groups that joined Lawrence, advanced from here to Guwayra (between Maan and Aqaba) the very next day. The 120-strong Turkish guard force here surrendered without resistance.

[ . . . ]

The Arab forces continued their movements towards Aqaba, initially taking control of Kethera by road (driving off the Turkish force of 50 horsemen and capturing most of them). When the Arabs saw that the road to Aqaba was open, they advanced from here to Hafre, the last outpost protecting Aqaba from land (towards Maan). The Turkish guard unit in Aqaba had withdrawn here to protect itself from a possible landing from the sea. The Arabs sent a delegation to the Turkish defenders and offered them surrender. This proposal was initially rejected. However, hearing of the Arab success, the Arabs in the region surrounded the fortified outpost, and on the other hand, Lawrence contacted the Turkish officer there and told him: "All bases have been taken and there is no possibility of reinforcements from Maan." Aqaba base handed over to the enemy. This date is given as July 16 in some British sources.

[ . . . ]

British sources write that in these operations the Arabs captured 20 officers, one German officer and more than 6,000 Turkish soldiers and killed as many Turks. However, apart from a misprint, there is no truth to it. Because, as explained in the article, the total number of Turkish forces in the Maan and Aqaba garrisons only exceeded five or six companies, and one of these companies consisted of Urban (Aqaba National Urban Company). Since the personnel strength of the infantry companies in the Hejaz is generally not more than 100, it is obvious to what extent these figures on Turkish losses are related to reality. The same official British source writes that in the battles between Maan and Aqaba Turkish troops were captured or killed en masse, almost without showing resistance to the Arab attacks, and tries to overstate the success of the Arab forces led by Lawrence.

[ . . . ]

In fact, the next day there were 100 fighters; He reinforced the Duhmaniye tribe and took measures to attack Ebillesin. However, the inhabitants of Duhmaniye initially attacked very strong Turkish positions here, and the Arabs, surprised by this difficult encounter, retreated completely defeated and settled on the hills behind. Then the situation changed. A Turkish cavalry detachment made a raid on the Arabs, who were taking shelter in some tents on the edge of the plateau. And they killed 13 Arabs here. The people of Duhmaniye, angry about this, went after this detachment and slaughtered them all. And then they stormed into Ebillesen and occupied it. This opened the way to Aqaba.“

Source: https://www.msb.gov.tr/Content/Upload/Docs/askeritariharsiv/113-Birinci_Dunya_Harbinde_Yemen_Cephesi.pdf page 319 - 324

Edited 23 March by Holger Kotthaus

[stevenbecker]

Strange they say 2nd Bn, when other records show, the 3rd Bn?

Purhaps there was a rotation system?

The 2Bn/130th Regt was the Garrison at Mecca and was slaughtered when captured by Arab forces in Sept 1916

Was that Bn rebuilt, not that I can find, by Feb 1917 the 130th Regt had only 800 men, so if rebuilt was very small in numbers?

Surrendering to Arab forces was like surrendering to the Japs, they tended to kill everyone after 

It would appear these small Ottoman forces with little to no support, were over whelmed by larger Arab forces, and slaughter for there trouble.

One has to question some of the reporting here, what German was captured?

I have seen accounts that mention a Ottoman Bn of over 600 men destroyed in Akaba, but also of around 300 men with 160 captured

Clearly Ottomans forces were small, both in Akaba and in Maan, but using the rail link they could increase. But during the war it was a back area keep under Ottoman control for politics and religion

During 1918, larger Ottoman Forces arrived in the Area to contest with Arab forces, and many battles played out

[Holger Kotthaus]

16 hours ago, michaeldr said:

Medina and the Turkish forces there posed no risk whatsoever. They were totally isolated, with only one supply route; the Hejaz railway line.
Writing in his 'Guerrilla Leader – T E Lawrence & the Arab Revolt' James J. Schneider quotes TEL
“We must not take Medina. The Turks are harmless there. If we imprison them all – say, in Egypt – they will cost us in food, water, and guards. We want them right where they are, at Medina and at every other distant place in the largest numbers. Our goal (the Arab revolt) must be to keep the railroad working, but just barely while inflicting maximum loss and discomfort on the Turks. That simple factor and water will confine him to the railways; and let him have them all: the Hejaz Railway, the Trans-Jordan and the Palestine and the Syrian lines. He can have them for the whole of the war, while we take the rest of the Arab world.”

[without checking, that sounds more like a paraphrase of TEL, rather than the man himself, nevertheless you will get the gist]
 

Some arguments may have been plausible from the perspective at this time. In this way, of course, a complete division of the Turks was tied up in Medina. But the same also applied to significant parts of the rebellious Arabs who were later missing from the march on Damascus!? (Feisal only had 4,000 men left when he entered Damascus?!)

Hopefully I'm not one of those desk strategists who know everything better after the fact. But the fact is that the 12,000-strong garrison was only able to hold out until long after the end of the war because the Hejass railway was never really interrupted and thus (I don't know until when?) supplies were ensured.

If there had been a real interruption in the supply, Fahreddin Pasha would have had to capitulate quickly and without further fighting, which would have averted this danger. The same applies, of course, to Aqaba, which is what happened. Some sources say that Aqaba was handed over peacefully without firing a shot.

[michaeldr]

14 minutes ago, Holger Kotthaus said:

If there had been a real interruption in the supply, Fahreddin Pasha would have had to capitulate quickly and without further fighting,

But then what?  Lawrence's point was that you would then have to house/feed/water/guard them as PoWs, wasting manpower and incurring expense 

16 hours ago, michaeldr said:

The Turks are harmless there. If we imprison them all – say, in Egypt – they will cost us in food, water, and guards. We want them right where they are, at Medina and at every other distant place in the largest numbers

Disrupt their only communications route just enough to make life uncertain for them. They were then unsure of their supplies and reinforcements, or even their own route out. You had them exactly where you wanted them; where they could do no harm and cost you so little.

[michaeldr]

Edward Erickson describes in his 'Palestine – the Ottoman Campaigns of 1914-1918';

“The loss of Aqaba to Lawrence and the Arabs on 6 July 1917 seriously damaged the Ottoman operational posture in the Arabian Peninsula by creating a direct threat to Ma'an. … … … [it] forced Cemal (Ahmet Cemâl Paşa) and Fahrettin (Ömer Fahrettin Türkkan Paşa) to revise the Ottoman command architecture in lower Palestine.”

[Ma'an was the northern terminus of the Medina railway and Fahrettin, as commander of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, was charged with the defence of Medina.]

[michaeldr]

In 'Lawrence in Arabia' by Scott Anderson (2013 [Anchor Books 2014]) there's mention of a couple of interesting Turkish aspects to the Medina/Aqaba/Gaza question. 
1] The 10,000 (?) Turkish troops there were good and led by a very able officer. In early 1917 German/Turkish intelligence could see that the British were getting close to Gaza and threatening the 20,000(?) defenders there. Therefore Enver and the German high command in Istanbul urged Djemal to give up Medina and move this valuable force to the Gaza front. 
Djemal complied, but was swiftly persuaded to withdraw the order by the new mufti, or religious head (replacing the rebellious Hussein) Ali Haidar, who protested that “deserting the Holy Tomb was utterly shameful, and that it should be protected to the last man, if necessary.”
2] The British intercepted and decoded Djemal's first order, but they failed to get hold of the counter-order.

[Holger Kotthaus]

14 hours ago, stevenbecker said:

One has to question some of the reporting here, what German was captured?

 

Steven, as you already know, 17 years agao there was mentioned a German officer `on the other side´

 

Albay Tägert 1915-1917 Türk Deniz kuvvetleri Kurmay Başkanı ...

Akabe bölgesinin komutanı Yarbay Mansfeld'dir. ... Osmanlı orduları geri hizmetler ...

 

Colonel Tägert 1915-1917 Chief of Staff of the Turkish Naval Forces...

The commander of the Aqaba region is Lieutenant Colonel Mansfeld. ... Ottoman armies back services ... (???)

 

Source: https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=107127

Edited 24 March by Holger Kotthaus

[michaeldr]

3 hours ago, Holger Kotthaus said:

the 12,000-strong garrison was only able to hold out until long after the end of the war because the Hejass railway was never really interrupted and thus (I don't know until when?) supplies were ensured.

If there had been a real interruption in the supply, Fahreddin Pasha would have had to capitulate quickly and without further fighting,

See "MEMORIES OF THE BELOVED": ORAL HISTORIES FROM THE 1916-19 SIEGE OF MEDINA, by Alia El Bakri [November 2014, International Journal of Middle East Studies] for details of the famine caused by the interruption of the rail supply route 

In April 1917, Fakhri Pasha made the decision to deport most of Medina's civilian population in order to better sustain the Ottoman defense of the city. Kiciman argues that the deportation was necessary to conserve supplies for the Ottoman troops. He quotes a declaration by Fakhri Pasha that reaffirmed the commander's resolution to continue the defense of Medina to the end, and asked those who wished to participate in defending the Prophet's city to remain, on the condition that they not demand provisions for a year. Everyone else, he stated, must leave to avoid the inevitable hardships of the war and famine, especially since the limited food supplies coming from Damascus could not support the whole population. As a result, the residents of the city began to depart by train; they, along with their household items, were provided free transport to Damascus.

Examples are also given of people who were reduced to eating cats and buying bread for pieces of gold

[Holger Kotthaus]

3 hours ago, michaeldr said:

But then what?  Lawrence's point was that you would then have to house/feed/water/guard them as PoWs, wasting manpower and incurring expense 

Disrupt their only communications route just enough to make life uncertain for them. They were then unsure of their supplies and reinforcements, or even their own route out. You had them exactly where you wanted them; where they could do no harm and cost you so little.

I believe that the British Empire was thinking ahead to the entire First World War in completely different dimensions than the accommodation and care of a few thousand more Turkish prisoners (... if this could exclude a military risk).

Since I lived and worked in KSA alone for four years, I am not prejudiced when I assume that the Arab mentality has other advantages than strategic forward thinking. I can't think of a more competent source off the top of my head; - but I'm not the first to raise this argument. With the conquest of Medina, at least a much greater (... and more real) moral victory would have been achieved with Akaba.

Regarding the statement of T.E. Lawrence; - I consider this to be a subsequent justification, precisely because others also made the questions mentioned above. But this is just my opinion.

Edited 24 March by Holger Kotthaus

[stevenbecker]

The Ottoman Forces in the Hejaz had been reduced to a small size, due to down sizing or losses, but they were slow to reinforce the Forces there, and only on  a temperory basis

By Feb 1917 the 21st Div had only two Regts

shown Feb 1917 Allied reports 121st Regt 122nd Regt - shown Feb 1917 123rd Regt to 42nd Div where it was broken up around April 1918

the 22nd Div

shown Feb 1917 Allied reports - 128th Regt (shown destroyed) 129th Regt (being reformed) 130th Regt (800 men per Bn) (with Hejaz EF) 

Sept 1916 was a bad month for this Division

1& 3xBns/129th Regt + 1xArty Bn (3000 men) captured at Taif 22-9-16 & 3Bn/128th Regt & 1xArty Bn 22nd FAR captured after the fall of Mecca Sept 1916 by arab forces & 2Bn/130th Regt killed by arabs at Mecca 

reports say the 130th Regt was sent to the 23rd Div around this time, but it appears this didn't happen

This is the last strength state I have for the Forces in the Hejaz, until more arrive in late 1917 early 1918

This British report gives some idea of the mixed forces here

Battle on Yanbu 12-16 shown Dec 1916 British report - Medina 4/131st Regt + Gendamerie unit from Aleppo province (600 turks) 1/129th Regt (700 men) + 79th MG Co 4xMgs 3xCo's of engineers from 47th, 48th & 49th Div's + Camel Regt (500 men) - Bir Derwish district 1,2,3/55th Regt 2,3/42nd Regt 3/130th Regt  + 2xCo's Mule Mounted Infantry + Camel Regt Shammar Arabs & Bty/22nd FAR - Bir Raha district 1,2/130th Regt (700 men) + Camel Regt (300 men) + 1xCo Mule Mounted Infantry - Mohafiz Alai 1xCo Camel Corps regt - 1xCo at Abu el-Naam and 1xCo at Bowat - El-Ula 1/42nd Regt + Ageyl camel corps (arabs) - El-Wejh 1Bn Jendames (800) + Ageyl camel corps (arabs) - shown July 1918 Allied reports 42nd Regt 55th Regt Mule Mounted Inf Co + 3xCos Camel Regt 
 

Most of these were to form a new Division, 58th Division (Medina)

sent to 58th Div-  42nd Regt and 55th Regt 6-16 - Oct 1917- 42nd Regt 55th Regt 1-3/130th Regt 4/134th Regt (1-2/120th Regt ex 22nd Div) - shown 1918 1-3/130th Regt 130th MG Co att in Hejez (Esters Bn) Mule Mounted Infantry Regt + MG Co - shown orbat July 1918 Comp Regt (1Bn/178th Regt 3Bn/21st Regt 4xMGs) 162nd Regt 40th MG Co 10 Mgs + Mule Mounted Infantry Regt 7 Mgs - shown Oct 1918 Allied reports 162nd Regt 178th Regt  3Bn/21st Regt + 79th MG Co 42nd Regt 55th Regt + Camel Regt - Medan - shown July 1918 Allied reports 162nd Regt + 40th MG Co (10 Mgs) + Comp Regt (1Bn/178th Regt 3Bn/21st Regt 4 Mgs) + Mule Mounted Infantry Regt 7 Mgs shown Oct 1918 Allied reports 162nd Regt 2 Comp Force (1Bn&2Bn/178th Regt 3Bn/21st Regt) Mule Mounted Co + Gend Co + 79 MG Co (1420 men 26 Mgs 30 guns) around Mushim + 42nd Regt 55th Regt Camel Regt 2xCo's Mule Mounted Regt 2xCos Arabs (2590 men 23 Mgs 34 guns) around Medina
 

How important was the Hejaz is what you both appear to be saying?

Clearly both sides took a differant view,

For what I see they (Ottomans) only stayed there for politics and religion, no other reason they kept the smallest forces there, happy to keep to the major cities/towns which they could defend, limited mounted Forces meant they couldn't control the country side and only did so by payment to the local Arabs

That's why I don't see the so called Arab revolt worried the Ottomans to much, as once they finished with the British, they could retake what little had been lost to the Arabs during the war

Ottoman Force were left in the Hejaz at the end of the war, because why go down there to get them?

 

Edited 24 March by stevenbecker

[michaeldr]

Allenby took onboard all of TEL's advice given in his briefing following the fall of Aqaba and eagerly relayed it to Robertson (CIGS) in London on 16th July 1917; see below

 

To Allenby, what was important was protecting his right flank; 
i.e. the Ottoman forces should not have freedom of movement in the territory beyond the line of the (south to north) Dead Sea/Jordan River/Sea of Galilee. They should be kept busy trying to defend their only communications route, the rail line. And they should be distracted from what was going on to the west of the Jordan River.  

After discussing the matter with Wingate (British High Commissioner to Egypt) Allenby followed up with another telegram to Robertson (19th July *) where he expands on what he sees as the assistance and advantages to the EEF of the activity of Lawrence and the Arabs irregulars at his disposal.
*see first five points below

 

Robertson (ever cautious in theatres other than the WF) welcomed Allenby's plan in his reply letter of 1st August: 
“Lawrence's scheme seems to be a good one and I hope that we shall be able to take advantage of it.”

I think that at as far at the General Staff were concerned, the Hedjaz and what later became Syria and Transjordan, represented a sideshow to a sideshow. The two generals  Robertson and Allenby, were quite happy to devolve their military authority in those areas onto a mere (hostilities only) Captain.

 

[Details from 'Allenby in Palestine - the Middle East Correspondence of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby June 1917-October 1919, edited & selected by Matthew Hughes, Army Records Society Vol.22, Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2004]

Edited 25 March by michaeldr

[Holger Kotthaus]

On 24/03/2024 at 10:38, michaeldr said:

Edward Erickson describes in his 'Palestine – the Ottoman Campaigns of 1914-1918';

“The loss of Aqaba to Lawrence and the Arabs on 6 July 1917 seriously damaged the Ottoman operational posture in the Arabian Peninsula by creating a direct threat to Ma'an. … … … [it] forced Cemal (Ahmet Cemâl Paşa) and Fahrettin (Ömer Fahrettin Türkkan Paşa) to revise the Ottoman command architecture in lower Palestine.”

[Ma'an was the northern terminus of the Medina railway and Fahrettin, as commander of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, was charged with the defence of Medina.]

 

On 24/03/2024 at 12:09, michaeldr said:

In 'Lawrence in Arabia' by Scott Anderson (2013 [Anchor Books 2014]) there's mention of a couple of interesting Turkish aspects to the Medina/Aqaba/Gaza question. 
1] The 10,000 (?) Turkish troops there were good and led by a very able officer. In early 1917 German/Turkish intelligence could see that the British were getting close to Gaza and threatening the 20,000(?) defenders there. Therefore Enver and the German high command in Istanbul urged Djemal to give up Medina and move this valuable force to the Gaza front. 
Djemal complied, but was swiftly persuaded to withdraw the order by the new mufti, or religious head (replacing the rebellious Hussein) Ali Haidar, who protested that “deserting the Holy Tomb was utterly shameful, and that it should be protected to the last man, if necessary.”
2] The British intercepted and decoded Djemal's first order, but they failed to get hold of the counter-order.

Interesting info; - new for me.

The Ottoman Empire had a secular form of government. This means that the state (therefore also the military) and religion were not separated. Mehmed V Reşad, in his capacity as Caliph, also held the title of “Patron of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina”. After the last garrison surrendered on July 9, 1916 and Mecca was finally lost, the Ottomans naturally attached particular importance to the preservation of Medina. Although military reasons were not necessary, the political ones outweighed the need to not abandon the city of Medina to military motives.

Also interesting; - Lieutenant T. E. Lawrence paid 20,000 pounds sterling in gold for his 200 Huwaitat mercenaries. (today's equivalent £ 232,000!) “No money; - no honey“

Comming back to the third question; - does anybody know maybee ships and mateial which have been landed in Akaba?

3.) To what extent (Material & Units?) was Aqaba used by the British Navy after July 6, 1917?

Regards Holger

[domsim]

Just my pennys worth -I did a bit of research on this after working around Ma'an in the mid-1990's and came to my own conclusions. Ma'an is not a terminus on the railway but part of the Hejaz railway all the way from Aleppo to Medina. It had significant engineering workshop capability, an airfield and was well defended with trench systems and artillery. Although significant damage was done by the Arabs to the railway it continued to be used right up to abandonment by the Ottomans in September 1918-due to the crossing of the Jordan by allied forces. It was used by the Ottomans to move troops against the Arabs when they attacked Tafileh in 1918. The Turks dropped troops at different stations and pincered the Arabs from the area. Also in September 1918 the Ottomans were planning a concentration against Arab troops using the railway to push them away from the Ma'an area using the same strategy. Arab Army troops became bogged down around Ma'an in what was effectively trench warfare. It then becomes an academic arguement as to who was tying down who!  

The Aqaba operation is dominated by the Lawrence narrative. Aqaba was never fortified or protected and only ever had light troop defence. The Royal Navy could land anytime they wanted and did frequently.The only defended position was a high ridge to the south-east which can be seen on the HMS Raven survey. The real hub of defence and movement in the area was Ma'an and this is why it was so well defended and was HQ for forces in the area. IMHO the planned concentration would push the pressure away from Ma'an and develop into a possible rout of arab forces down to Aqaba-more great armchair opinion! 

The Turks were always skilled troops and used their resources quite skillfully and kept going until significant allied forces crossed the Jordan and finally cut off the troops south of Damascus in September 1918.

Dom.

 

[michaeldr]

On 26/03/2024 at 13:08, Holger Kotthaus said:

Also interesting; - Lieutenant T. E. Lawrence paid 20,000 pounds sterling in gold for his 200 Huwaitat mercenaries. (today's equivalent £ 232,000!)

Indeed! A lot of money went into this campaign: see Allenby to Robertson, telegram 26 July 1917 [No. CMQT3824]

"Authority is requested for expenditure of up to 200,000l. in connection with Lawrence's proposed operations east of the Jordan. Amount required in gold/
Will you please ask treasury to instruct Egyptian Government to supply."

[NA – WO33/935, p.203] from 'Allenby in Palestine' selected & edited by Matthew Hughes, Army Records Society 

..................................................................................

20 hours ago, domsim said:

Ma'an is not a terminus on the railway but part of the Hejaz railway all the way from Aleppo to Medina.

Thanks Dom; that has puzzled me for a while, as the ref to "terminus" is made in several works.

I was wondering if its usage came about because from Ma'an south the line entered a different Ottoman command area?

[domsim]

Hi Michael

Yes that probably  is a matter of jurisdiction for different  command areas.

I do think the lack of defences at Aqaba & concentration  at Ma'an speaks volumes about the Ottoman assessment  of strategic priorities in the area.

Ma'an is a great place with beautiful walled gardens on the south side of the town-lots of archaeology & an interesting  museum in the Old railway  station 

D.

[michaeldr]

14 minutes ago, domsim said:

Ma'an is a great place with beautiful walled gardens on the south side of the town-lots of archaeology & an interesting  museum in the Old railway  station 

Thanks Dom. It is my understanding that Battle Honours may have a tour going out to this battlefield in 2025 (the general/local situation permitting)

......................................................................................... 

Summary of the Hejaz Revolt; General Staff, War Office, 31st August 1918 is available on line via the Qatar National Library & well worth perusing -https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100000000833.0x0002b1

 

[Holger Kotthaus]

Thanks Dom and Michael for your interesting additions

On 02/04/2024 at 11:09, michaeldr said:

Thanks Dom. It is my understanding that Battle Honours may have a tour going out to this battlefield in 2025 (the general/local situation permitting)

Jordan is not a problem. In January 2023 I entered KSA for the first time as a tourist.

 

This is now much easier with such a tourist visa; - Inshallah

New Tourist Visa Options for Those Traveling to Saudi Arabia https://visa.visitsaudi.com/

 

Regards Holger