Any "forgotten" tactics and plans from early in the war?

[Marscaleb]

Whenever people speak of or depict World War One, it tends to be a focus on later in the war, when all of the latest advancements were already employed.  Use of tanks, aerial dogfights, etc etc.

But most of that stuff didn't come about until halfway through the war.  Yet with the stalemate they were facing, surely the commanders had thought of something else to try, some other tactics to try to turn the tide.  Obviously they didn't really work, but I'm curious about things that were tried.

Any new ways to bolster defenses?  Experiments with how they formed or laid out their trenches?  Before we get to the famous uses of tanks and stormtroopers, what were people trying to break the lines with?  What were the forgotten tactics that just didn't work as well?

[squirrel]

All included in the not forgotten Field Service Regulations for a starting point but obviously not based on a European war engaging huge, for the time, forces and large numbers of weapons with industrial killing power. Fighting a war with both sides strongly entrenched to a stalemate from one coast to a neutral border had not been considered.

[Old Forge]

Hi @Marscaleb,

Good question. Some thoughts:

As Kitchener put it, ‘we make war not as we should like to, but as we must.’ The BEF wasn’t ready for a continental war in 1914. The big ticket reforms were largely complete - French had reorganised the cavalry, Maxse and French had driven through the 4 company structure for battalions. There were Corps and Divisional staffs, and Haig had created a mechanism to grow the BEF through the territorial force (which Kitchener ignored). The rifles, field guns and howitzers were good, the RFC was soon able to conduct rudimentary artillery shoots over wireless.

BUT - it was all the little things that they lacked. Only two MGs per battalion and no Lewis Guns. No grenades, trench mortars, sniper rifles, flares, respirators, gas, HE shells etc etc etc. if we’d given the infantry a reasonable scale of trench stores (barbed wire, revetting materials etc) it could’ve halved the losses in 1914.

From the moment the line stabilised in 1914, everything the BEF did was driven by Joffre’s demands: “attack to pin down German reserves … can’t attack? Well then, take over more of the front from us so we can attack.”

1915 was the year of extemporisation, with many officers coming from school and university OTCs. The BEF attacked whenever Joffre insisted, which was often. In the autumn, FM French and Haig both resisted Joffre’s plan for the BEF to attack through the slagheaps around Lens and Loos, but had little choice but to comply.

There was no lack of initiative or innovation, and lessons were swiftly disseminated. But home made grenades and mortars don’t make up for artillery with severely rationed stocks of shells. Innovation cuts both ways, and the BEF learned the hard way in 1915 about dealing with gas, flamethrowers, mine warfare etc.

All too often in 1915, once battle had been joined and the limited stocks of bombs, shells etc was expended, all the BEF had left in its locker was the courage and endurance of its soldiers, including first the TF individual battalions sent to reinforce the regulars and, (from March) formed TF divisions and from July) the first of the Kitchener divisions. All this whilst those back home half-starved the BEF in order to try miracle cures (or quack remedies) elsewhere.

It’s worth looking at how Haig quickly reorganised the defence of Ypres in 1914, when his First Corps reinforced the 7th Division. 7 Div had been holding 8 miles of front against the initial German assault, and conducting offensive moves towards Menin. Haig saw that Capper (GOC 7 Div) had too often deployed his battalions on forward slopes. Haig recced and prepared a line along reverse slopes where possible. He sighted platoon (+) strongpoints to provide depth, and to anchor the defence (acting as pivots for manoeuvre). These worked (eg at Black Watch Corner), so too the arrangements between 1st and 2nd Divs for mutual support (eg the Worcester’s counter attack on 31st October).

it’s also worth looking at the attack against the Bellewaarde Ridge on 16th June 1915. Michael McLaren’s book For what we Have Done is excellent on this, and the War Diaries are available (free) for all those units involved. Lots of learning was absorbed into the planning at Bellewaarde … but, once the stock of shells was exhausted and the comms gone by the board, it came down to small groups of determined men. As the French general Charles Mangin observed: ‘whatever you do, you lose a lot of men.’

As an example of the lack of suitable kit in 1915, it’s worth looking at 7 Div at Givenchy, also in June 1915. In the fortnight prior to their attack on 15th June, they assaulted and captured a critical German strongpoint several times, only to lose it each night when the Germans counterattacked with strong bombing parties. With none of their own to throw back, the British troops couldn’t maintain their position. That strongpoint was only 50 yards from the trenches which the 2/Yorks attacked from on 15th June. However, the German line turned 90 degrees around the strongpoint, ran east for 450 yards, then turned north again. 2/Wilts attacked on the left of 2/Yorks, advancing past the German strongpoint and then continuing another 450 yards under enfilade fire all the way, from both the strong point and a maze of trenches beyond it.

The Givenchy attack was a limited operation. It involved 3 divisions (1 Cdn, 7 and 51), but they each used only one of their brigades, which only attacked with a quarter of their infantry (2 coys from 2 battalions per brigade). Both this and the larger operation at Bellewaarde the next day were part of a number of BEF operations to pin German reserves to their front, whilst the French 10th Army attacked Arras.

The more I’ve looked at 1914/15, the more in awe I am of the BEF’s achievements. There were bad days and bad decisions, but overall a monumentally poisoned chalice was grasped and strong foundations laid for future success. Arguments against this must always address one difficult question - ‘so what would you have done differently?’ Many answers to that question would likely be ruled straight out - that isn’t your decision to make. Many answers will amount to little more than waving a magic wand - you can’t use weapons you haven’t got. The few good answers remaining will all benefit from hindsight, which can be a misleading luxury. And, in the end - whatever you do, you lose a lot of men…

All the best,

Richard

 

 

[BradleyShoebottom]

Here is a Canadian Lesson Learned Report on battalion tactics from Courcelette, 15 Sep 1916. 5th Infantry Brigade was part of 2nd Cdn Division which had been in France since the fall of 1915.RG9_III-C-3_vol_4089_folder_20_file_11_2Div_Somme_Lsns_Learned_CRE_Workload_minimized.pdf

See also 

Paddy. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0715/93042656.html.

Paddy. Griffith, British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London ; F. Cass, 1996), http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0715/95047978.html.

Second Lessons Learned from Canadians at Somee in Sept-OctRG9_III-C-5_vol_4397_folder_8_file_4_1FdCo_LsnsFromSomme_Inf_Tactics_Sept-Oct1916_reduced.pdf 1916

[Stereoview Paul]

Not so much forgotten but quick learning required:-

Makeshift gas masks

Make our own trench mortars

Make our own hand grenades and learn how to 'bomb' trenches without harming own troops who enter the enemy trench at another point.

 

It is easy to forget that none of these were available to us at the start of the war

[Justin Moretti]

On 01/03/2024 at 12:45, Marscaleb said:

Before we get to the famous uses of tanks and stormtroopers, what were people trying to break the lines with? 

Artillery, and later gas, of which the British never really had enough until 1918, or maybe late 1917. 

 

By late 1917, the British had shown that they could consistently and repeatably blast their way into a German position, take (and consolidate on) its front line and grind any counter-attack into the dust - at least when the weather wasn't being the worst and wettest in 75 years. But it wasn't until mid-1918 that they had enough guns and shells to kick off a second attack the minute the first one started getting bogged down, without giving the Germans time to catch their breath or shift reserves.