HM Submarine C33

[NWR]

Hi

A bit of a follow on from my post regarding the loss of the submarine E22. I am researching Royal Navy submarine losses off the Norfolk coast, UK. To date I have found five such registered losses, these being the C11, D5, C33, E22 and the Umpire. To date the C11, D5 and the Umpire have all been positively identified. A position is given for the E22, but no formal identification has been made of the site, though very likely to be the E22. This in turn leaves the C33 unlocated. The C33 was lost off Great Yarmouth in 1915 whilst employing a U boat trap tactic with the HM trawler Malta. It is thought that the C33 may have well hit a mine? If anyone has any information on the loss and a more precise loss position / area it would be very much appreciated.

Many thanks

 

Paul

Edited 19 February by NWR
additional information

[Michael Lowrey]

From the Naval Staff Monograph 14, page 133:
 

Quote

 

The cruise with C.33 was carried out as arranged, without any hostile vessels being seen, and at 8.15 p.m., August 4, C.33, Lieutenant Gerald E. B. Carter, slipped the tow and started for home from the position 5 miles east of Jim Howe Bank Buoy.1 Nothing more was heard of the submarine except a few wireless signals: “ Have nothing to communicate,” which ceased at 9.50 p.m.

Note: 1. This buoy was in 52-58 N, 2.19 E

The NSM does suggest a mine as a possibility, but operational loss is certainly possible. I'll look into the mine possibility later today.

Edited 19 February by Michael Lowrey

[The Treasurer]

5 hours ago, NWR said:

any information on the loss and a more precise loss position

Not much to add to Michael's quote from the Monograph. An investigation of signal traffic in archives confirm that the last routine signal was received from C.33 at 9.50pm by the depot ship Alecto. Since reception was noted as being extremely weak there is no guarantee that this was the last signal made. This was a general issue with signals from both C.33 and C.34 that evening. The loss cause of mine was simply speculation based on her non-arrival at Harwich, where she was expected next morning. Given that she would have been proceeding on the surface it is a reasonable assumption.

Edited 19 February by The Treasurer

[NWR]

Michael and Treasurer

Thank you for the information. Doing some quick calculations in my head. If we assumed the C33 was running on the surface from 8.15pm to 9.50pm, say at an average speed of 10 knots for 1 hour and 35 minutes she could have covered  somewhere in the region of 16 - 17 miles on a heading to Harwich? Obviously this would be further until such time of her loss, but just a rough calculation based on the known times of communication. This in turn would bring the C33 closer in to the Norfolk coastline, mined shipping lanes? All just theory of course on my part as there was never any claim made on her loss.

Edited 19 February by NWR

[Michael Lowrey]

I might go with a little slower speed, say 8 knots. Attached is a different map from the NSM showing the minefield situation (it's a screen shot of a portion of the map of the hunt for SMS Meteor). C 33, if she wanted, could easily have run to the west of the British defensive minefield. Also, early war British mines were of questionable quality.

[The Treasurer]

2 hours ago, Michael Lowrey said:

C 33, if she wanted, could easily have run to the west of the British defensive minefield.

Indeed. I havn't gone into 1915 patrols in detail, but I believe the standard route in from Jim Howe to Harwich would be down the Smiths Knoll channel to the Cross Sands LV, into Yarmouth Roads, then down the swept coastal channel (the left hand dots). The big minefields were well defined and channels regularly swept by this time, so if it was a mine, only a drifter is possible, as I don't think this channel was ever fouled by the UC boats from Brugge before 8/15. However, if C.33 had compass problems and went off course, this could have led her into one of the various minefields to the south of the Smiths Knoll swept channel. In the absence of evidence, there is only speculation. Worth adding that the channel through the middle of the minefields from Harwich was for outgoing use only. (Marked at western entry only).

Edited 19 February by The Treasurer

[NWR]

18 hours ago, The Treasurer said:

Not much to add to Michael's quote from the Monograph. An investigation of signal traffic in archives confirm that the last routine signal was received from C.33 at 9.50pm by the depot ship Alecto. Since reception was noted as being extremely weak there is no guarantee that this was the last signal made. This was a general issue with signals from both C.33 and C.34 that evening. The loss cause of mine was simply speculation based on her non-arrival at Harwich, where she was expected next morning. Given that she would have been proceeding on the surface it is a reasonable assumption.

When you say routine signal, were these signals at set intervals? ie signal at 9.50pm, next signal say set for two hours later, or something along those lines?

[The Treasurer]

54 minutes ago, NWR said:

When you say routine signal, were these signals at set intervals? ie signal at 9.50pm, next signal say set for two hours later, or something along those lines?

By routine I meant that there was no indication of anything happening. The signals logged were the routine exchanges of information at the beginning and end of a patrol between C.34, C.33 and Alecto. in this case 'I have nothing to communicate' was finally received from C.33 after numerous attempts at contact by C.34 and Alecto. Since signal strength was very weak and C.33 could barely be heard, subsequent signals could have been made for another reason, but not picked up.

[NWR]

44 minutes ago, The Treasurer said:

By routine I meant that there was no indication of anything happening. The signals logged were the routine exchanges of information at the beginning and end of a patrol between C.34, C.33 and Alecto. in this case 'I have nothing to communicate' was finally received from C.33 after numerous attempts at contact by C.34 and Alecto. Since signal strength was very weak and C.33 could barely be heard, subsequent signals could have been made for another reason, but not picked up.

Great, thanks for clearing that up for me. Also thank you to Michael and yourself for all the information you have both offered. It has been very much appreciated. I guess the thing to say is that we will never know what happened to the C33 until she is one day located. This in turn should hopefully offer some insight as to her fate.

Paul

Edited 20 February by NWR
additional information

[The Treasurer]

12 minutes ago, NWR said:

Great, thanks for clearing that up for me. Also thank you to Michael and yourself for all the information you have both offered. It has been very much appreciated. I guess the thing to say is that we will never know what happened to the C33 until she is one day located. This in turn should hopefully offer some insight as the her fate.

Paul

Yes, hopefully the lost boat and crew will one day be found to complete their story. Disappearing without a trace was an all too frequent occurrence for submariners of all navies and was an extra burden for the bereaved to carry.

[Michael Lowrey]

Lockhart Leith’s unpublished official of British minelaying gives the minelaying as:

On October 19, 1914, Apollo, Andomache, and Intrepid, 100 service mines each set at 20 feet from 52°05'30"N, 2°13'E to 51°58', 2°12'E

On October 21, 1914, Apollo, Andomache, and Intrepid, 100 service mines each at 20 feet from 52°27'30"N, 2°08'20"E to 52°520', 2°08'E

The large areas on the map are likely areas to be avoided areas because of potential drifting mines. Note that C 33 only drew about 11 feet 2 to 11 feet 6 inches, so should easily have sailed over the top of properly functioning British mines.

[NWR]

On 25/02/2024 at 16:54, Michael Lowrey said:

Lockhart Leith’s unpublished official of British minelaying gives the minelaying as:

On October 19, 1914, Apollo, Andomache, and Intrepid, 100 service mines each set at 20 feet from 52°05'30"N, 2°13'E to 51°58', 2°12'E

On October 21, 1914, Apollo, Andomache, and Intrepid, 100 service mines each at 20 feet from 52°27'30"N, 2°08'20"E to 52°520', 2°08'E

The large areas on the map are likely areas to be avoided areas because of potential drifting mines. Note that C 33 only drew about 11 feet 2 to 11 feet 6 inches, so should easily have sailed over the top of properly functioning British mines.

Thank you very much Michael, much appreciated.