Detonation of the Hawthorn Ridge Mine

[Garethll]

Hello all. Can anyone out there shed any light on why Hunter-Weston demanded the Hawthorn Ridge mine detonated 10 minutes early? The theory he wanted to protect the infantry from falling debris doesn't make much sense, especially as (please correct me if I'm misinformed) he originally wanted the mine detonated even earlier.

[Gunner 87]

30 minutes ago, Garethll said:

Hello all. Can anyone out there shed any light on why Hunter-Weston demanded the Hawthorn Ridge mine detonated 10 minutes early? The theory he wanted to protect the infantry from falling debris doesn't make much sense, especially as (please correct me if I'm misinformed) he originally wanted the mine detonated even earlier.

Hi GarethII

My understanding is Lt General Hunter-Weston commanding VIII Corps was to attack Beaumont-Hamel as well as against Serre slightly to the North. The General felt that if his mine was detonated well before the attack it would allow his men to gain the crater and be ready to support the main attack when it eventually went in.

Hunter-Weston was not supported by his other officers and eventually a compromise was decided upon. His mine would be detonated at 0720 hours, eight minutes before the others.

I'm sure one of our experts will be able to correct or clarify these points.

Gunner

Edited 1 February by Gunner 87

[Terry_Reeves]

P

31 minutes ago, Garethll said:

Hello all. Can anyone out there shed any light on why Hunter-Weston demanded the Hawthorn Ridge mine detonated 10 minutes early? The theory he wanted to protect the infantry from falling debris doesn't make much sense, especially as (please correct me if I'm misinformed) he originally wanted the mine detonated even earlier.

Perhaps you can give the source for your information please with a quotation ?

 

Edited 1 February by Terry_Reeves

[Garethll]

Sorry Terry, I dont have quotations or direct sources in particular, just a general accumulation of information.

[Garethll]

Thanks Gunner, if that is the case, it seems the compromise was the worst option.

[bmac]

From my book about the attack of the VIII Corps:

"Discussions about the best time to explode the mine had been lengthy and, to this day, the final decision causes controversy.  It had been decided to fire the mine at 7.20 a.m., ten minutes before the infantry were due to go over the top.  This time was a compromise.  Originally, Hunter-Weston had wanted to blow the mine at 3.30 a.m.  It would have been followed up by a swift infantry assault which would take the near lip.  Then things would go quiet, or so the thinking went, and the all-out attack at 7.30 a.m. would come as a surprise to defenders convinced the blowing of the mine was a small scale local action.  It is a fairly implausible scenario given that the Germans had been subjected to a seven day bombardment and would have been on the alert for anything suggestive of the launch of the offensive.  In addition, British infantry had a rather lousy track record when it came to crater fighting and this was pointed out by the Inspector of Mines.  In his view, the likely outcome was that the Germans would occupy the entire crater giving them almost as strong a position as had previously existed and significant notice of an imminent attack.  As all of the other mines on the Somme front were due to be fired at just before 7.30 a.m. it was suggested that H3 should go at the same time but someone either at VIII Corps or in 29^th Division apparently expressed concerns about the possible damage done by debris falling on the advancing men of the 2^nd Royal Fusiliers.  As experience showed that all heavy rocks and stones came back to earth within 20 seconds of a mine explosion this view, if expressed, should have been given short shrift.  Instead, and against all experience and logic, it was agreed to fire the mine at 7.20 a.m.  At this point, the attacking elements of the 2^nd Royal Fusiliers would rush the crater lip, followed, ten minutes later, by the attack of the rest of the Division.  Rather more significantly, it was also concluded that, in order to protect the onrushing Royal Fusiliers from possible ‘friendly fire’, the heavy artillery should lift off the German front line at the same time as the mine went up.  And not just on Hawthorn Ridge – along the whole Corps front! 

It is impossible to find an officer writing after the war, from Gen. de Lisle down to the lowly subalterns, who does not blame in some way the blowing of the Hawthorn Redoubt mine at 7.20 a.m. for the utter defeat of the 29^th Division on 1^st July.  The timing had, apparently, been known about for some days and was a constant topic of conversation amongst those involved in the attack.  It was only the widespread, though inexplicable, belief that the bombardment had crushed German resistance that persuaded participants that all would be well.  Otherwise, the decision appears to have been absurd bordering on the insane.

Or was it?

Lt. Col. C G Fuller, RE, was GSO 1, 29^th Division.  He was the senior Staff Officer of the Division.  One feels he was in a position to know about such affairs as this and, indeed, he contributed some illuminating comments about the initial draft of the British Official History in January 1930.  He expressed views about a number of aspects of the attack but his most significant, and previously completely ignored comment, is about the timing of the firing of the H3, Hawthorn Redoubt, mine.  The compilers of the Official History chose to ignore Fuller’s remarks in spite of the fact that his explanation makes definite sense.  Hunter-Weston has tended to shoulder the blame for the decision.  Some have even suggested 29^th Division requested the 7.20 a.m. explosion.  The answer, as given by Fuller, is rather more mundane:

“The explosion of the mine ten minutes before the assault was only agreed to at the express request of the OC Tunnelling Company who was in charge of the tunnels and mine.  He stated he must have ten minutes grace in which to ensure that the mine exploded so as, if necessary, to remedy defects.  The Inspector of Mines when he made his report was probably unaware of the action of the OC Tunnelling Company.”

[Garethll]

bmac, that's excellent,  thanks. Very interesting. The common suggestion that the mine was blown early on an arbitrary decision by Hunter Weston always seemed simplistic and lazy. Thanks for shedding some light.

[Fattyowls]

Can I add my thanks for that too Bill, it's the clearest explanation I have ever read, and I've wondered about it often, especially when I have been in situ. And welcome back.

Pete.

P.S. I've now got Sol Caliente as my earworm. Nothing wrong with that.......

[bmac]

15 hours ago, Fattyowls said:

P.S. I've now got Sol Caliente as my earworm. Nothing wrong with that.......

Good to hear. And thanks for the 'welcome back'. Been a while. There is, of course, an ulterior motive. 

I plan on publishing seven (!*?!) books this year. Six about WW1 and one about my time in the music biz. The last mentioned comes first. Entitled 'Making it up as you along: Notes from a bass impostor' (and written under my real name), it should be available in the coming weeks from a brand spanking new web site.

In April, and as Alan MacDonald, will come 'The Affair at Lagarde, 10th-11th August 1914'. The story of an absurd little action in German-held Lorraine. Has everything: incompetent generals, stupid tactics, ludicrously heavy casualties (more or less two entire French battalions wiped out), scapegoating, political and military repercussions. It even has an absurd and costly Bavarian Uhlan cavalry charge! What more do you want?

To be followed at intervals by: two very big books which try to explain the different tactical and technical positions the British and French armies found  themselves in on 30th June 1916. Starts with the Franco-Prussian War and progresses via the 2nd Boer war, Russo-Japanese War, First Balkans War,... up to 7:29 a.m., 1st July 1916.   

Then: Liberating Elsass: The French Invasions of the Haut Rhin, August 1914. French troops with their red trousers. German officers going into battle on horseback, Precious little understanding of the use of heavy artillery. Unfit reservists on long route marches literally dropping dead at the side of the road in 90 degree heat. All the fun of the fair. Hot(ish) on its heels a book called Profits without Honour about the British armaments industries contribution to the start of the war. And finally The Almanac of the First Day on the Somme: OOB for all three armies, biogs of all important British, German and French officers (mainly Brigadiers upwards), brief descriptions and maps for the actions of every British, French and German division on the day, and whatever else I can think of.

So, been a bit busy since I was here last. 

 

Edited 21 March by bmac

[Fattyowls]

11 hours ago, bmac said:

it should be available in the coming weeks from a brand spanking new web site.

If Gareth will forgive the digression from his original question can you post a link to the brand spanking new web site when it goes live? Alternatively drop me a PM maybe. You have one sale guaranteed.

Pete.

[bmac]

Will do.

[Fattyowls]

Thanks Bill.

Pete.

P.S. My earworm is now Miss Shapiro. Nothing wrong with that either.

[bmac]