Information about Left Flank Signal Station, ANZAC

[HMSWATERWITCH]

Hi,

I am studying naval gunfire support at ANZAC. I found a map online of ANZAC area showing, among many other things, the "Left-Flank Signal Station" and I cannot now re-locate it.

Does anyone have a map showing this naval observation post, or have any information about what went on there, how signals were sent to the Naval Base Station on the beach, specific details of working there, a photograph or anything else that might be of interest?

I'd be interested in any related maps showing how the Army artillery observation posts were connected up to the naval fire support network. Things like that.

I have all Admiral Robeck's reports from ADM 137, I am digging deeper than what's in there.

Many thanks,

Arthur

[WhiteStarLine]

Hi Arthur,

If you happen to have access to Chris Robert's work The Artillery at ANZAC: Adaptation, Innovation and Education, then he covers both land-based and NGS.  The whole book is on artillery adaptation, so naval gunfire comes into it a bit.

From memory, I've seen some of the diagrams in the unit war diaries.  A quick refresher of the 1st Australian Divisional Signal Company diary from April 1915 diary shows 3 or 4 diagrams in 11 pages, with a reasonable text explanation in the diary narrative of what they did and how they connected.  This is from page 11:

You can follow the months and by the time they got to November, it certainly was a sophisticated network and some of the locations are named as well.  My apologies if you've already consulted these references. 

The 2nd AIF Divisional Signals Company only has 1 diagram in the November 1915 diary.  Very comprehensive & sophisticated but more of an internal diagram. 

 

[HMSWATERWITCH]

Many thanks for your quick reply, WSL. I have discovered and downloaded the book you recommended and shall read it.

In that book there is a picture of "ANZAC Cove at around 10:30am 25 April showing the mast of the left flank wireless station established at the northern end of the cove" (p.72 of the Kindle version, towards the end of Chapter 2). However I think that is quite likely to be the naval "Base Station" which I know had wireless and Orders required that the mast be erected soon after the initial landings, on April 25th.

This is tricky because I think that the terms used to describe some of these posts may be inconsistent between Army and Navy (and later) sources. From the reports filed with de Robeck's material (ADM 137/38, 39 and 40) I understand that the Army Forward Observation Officers were to have portable wireless sets, they would identify targets on their gridded maps, ring up the naval signal station (which was under "Military" - Army - control) and request a shoot. There were, I understand, two naval signal stations forward of the beach at ANZAC (a "left-flank" and a "right-flank" station) equipped in the first instance with at least flags for "morse signalling". These two posts therefore had to be in sight of the "Base Station" on the beach. I don't know if the forward signal posts were equipped later in the campaign with wireless sets. The Base Station had a wireless and was in communication with ships on station (on the gun line) offshore. They used the 300m wavelength to avoid getting mixed up with the 600m wavelength employed at the Southern Landings. Failing wireless contact, the Base Station could also use flag or heliograph to communicate target information. 

Those war diaries you point at are interesting since one of them notes that, on 7th July; 

 

"ANZAC reported that the left-flank signal station had been removed to No.2 outpost (North)"  ***

 

No.2 Outpost is clearly marked on several online and readily discoverable maps. This does mean the Post was moved *from* somewhere. And if it was moved once, did it stay at No.2 Outpost till evacuation? (Where is that map which I saw that had left- and right-flank signal stations marked on it? Why didn't I grab it when I saw it !

Arthur

*** General Staff, Headquarters 1st Australian Division, July 1915 war diary. Item number 1/42/6 Part 1.

https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/awm-media/collection/RCDIG1008163/bundled/RCDIG1008163.pdf

 

 

[michaeldr]

 

quote:-

At landing covered by 2nd Squadron stations work on 300 metres (P wave). 
Call signs.—W 4 .... Base station. 
                     W 5 .... Right flanking station. 
                     W 6 .... Left          “            “
Flanking stations are operated by the military, base stations by naval ratings. 
[from Enclosure No. 3 to Memorandum No. 49 L of 12th April, 1915] 

NB: The sketch below shows the position of 'W 6' as at 28 July 1915 :  (correction)  6th July 1915

 

Edited 4 January by michaeldr
correction to date of sketch

[HMSWATERWITCH]

Very nice, Michael, thank you very much for this. 

(Naval records are clear that although "operated by the Military", the flanking signal stations were manned by naval signalmen working under control of the Army. They sat at the join between the two Services).

Arthur

[michaeldr]

32 minutes ago, HMSWATERWITCH said:

(Naval records are clear that although "operated by the Military", the flanking signal stations were manned by naval signalmen working under control of the Army. They sat at the join between the two Services).

Details from Enclosure No. 2 to Memorandum No. 49 L of I2th April, 1915 confirm your above

quote -

2. Flanking stations being under military orders, great care must be taken to conform with all instructions given to them by the military. Their chief duty will be to ensure rapid transmission of fire directing, etc., signals, using special table provided whenever possible. Signals from this table to be repeated back unless answered by blue affirmative. 
These stations must be prepared to shift position at short notice, but must endeavour to maintain touch continuously. A short staff and small military pendant will be taken by each party and used to denote its position. 
Signals are to be filed and must be burnt after 24 hours. Stations are to co-operate closely with military W/T sets attached and assist them by information of movements of ships. 

[alantwo]

On 03/01/2024 at 10:51, HMSWATERWITCH said:

Hi,

I am studying naval gunfire support at ANZAC. I found a map online of ANZAC area showing, among many other things, the "Left-Flank Signal Station" and I cannot now re-locate it.

Does anyone have a map showing this naval observation post, or have any information about what went on there, how signals were sent to the Naval Base Station on the beach, specific details of working there, a photograph or anything else that might be of interest?

I'd be interested in any related maps showing how the Army artillery observation posts were connected up to the naval fire support network. Things like that.

I have all Admiral Robeck's reports from ADM 137, I am digging deeper than what's in there.

Many thanks,

Arthur

Hi Arthur

An Anzac communication diagram from the CRA (GHQ) file which may be of interest.

Regards

Alan

Reference my photographs of the National Archive file at Kew. 

 

Communication diagram W Beach

Edited 6 January by alantwo
Arthur thanks for comments, second image re-titled

[HMSWATERWITCH]

Excellent, thanks, these maps confirm a few things I was after. The network of Forward Observation Officers, Artillery, plus telephones with many of the front line infantry units, linking to naval observation* and signalling posts forward of the beach. Also the Naval Observation Station on Hill 138 forward of W-Beach (that's what your second diagram is showing).

*note - on your first map the labels, "Left flank observing station" and "Right flank observing station". These are forward of the beach and are NOT W4, W5 (W6 not shown) since these are labelled at the bottom of the map. (Your second map appears to be W-Beach setup rather than ANZAC, which is fine, this is of great interest and as I say confirms several things I did not have).

VERY nice. 

I was at Kew yesterday photographing material and I will update this thread with pertinent information - for the benefit of the thread - in coming days.

Arthur   

Edited 6 January by HMSWATERWITCH

[alantwo]

Arthur

Thanks for your comments, I’ve re-titled the second image in my previous post to avoid confusion.

Alan

[HMSWATERWITCH]

A lot of reading and writing up later, I now summarise a little of it in the following posts, mainly so that those coming along later can find information without having to go through what I have:

Transcribed from ADM 137/40 p.36-46 - 

"A party of naval signalmen will land at each beach with the military covering force to maintain communication with the covering ships and will be separate from those for communication from beach parties to transports.  These parties will be increased as necessary and, when military are established ashore, will be organized in one or two flanking signal parties as necessary, and a Base Signal Station will also be formed in the vicinity of the landing place. The flanking stations will deal with all matters referring to fire direction, etc., the Base Station with all other messages. Messages from shore addressed to military headquarters (while afloat) are to be passed to local flagship for delivery.

Alongside each naval base station will be a military base station and messages between them will be passed by hand.  Messages received from ships are to be handed to military base station, who will be responsible for their delivery.  Visual messages from flanking stations are to be passed direct to ship addressed, if possible, otherwise to the ship in best visual touch.

It is essential that messages concerning direction of fire should reach their destination with the least possible delay and that the Admiral commanding covering ships and local flagship should be kept fully informed. It is the duty of the ship receiving messages from flanking stations to ensure that this is fully carried out.

The flanking stations are under orders of the military and consequently the position they will take up will be decided by the military, subject to good visual touch with the ship or ships being maintained.  The military will establish and work the wireless sets which will cooperate with naval flanking stations. The transmission of messages between the military in the field and flanking stations will be carried out by the military independent of naval ratings". (End ADM 137/40)

In the front line, battalions had telephones (marked ‘T’ on map Figure 2) which gave them rapid access to Brigade Headquarters. The left-flank signal station was situated sufficiently close to the army Brigade Headquarters to receive messages by hand. In addition, artillery Forward Observation Officers, also equipped with field telephones, were in positions overlooking the enemy and in direct communication with both artillery and infantry Brigade Headquarters. Artillery FOOs could therefore call down field artillery fire via artillery Brigade HQ or request a heavier weight of fire by means of a call to Brigade HQ and a message passed to the naval left-flank signal station. The naval flank station would then either telephone the naval Base Wireless Station on the beach or use flag / heliograph signalling to communicate. A system of Call Signs was in operation to enable the naval signallers to speak to a particular ship, and vice-versa.

A buzzer (vibrator) network, separate from the telephone network, was in place to allow the various Brigade Headquarters to communicate with each other, using morse, and with the two Divisional Headquarters, in isolation from the telephone system. A submarine cable connected General Birdwood at ANZAC HQ on the beach to G.H.Q. and W-Beach for broader inter-communication.

Cabled communications were considered very much more secure than W/T transmissions which could be intercepted by the Turks.

Transcribed from ADM 137/2166, p.243:

"Directions Concerning “Observation Officers” for observing fire of H.M. Ships in combined operations

1.       On shore after landing, three signal stations for communicating with fleet will be established

a.       A central station for messages to General Headquarters

b.       Two flank signal stations for communicating with ships supporting the movements on shore with their fire

2.       The ships referred to in 1 (b) will be placed at the disposal of the military and for the commencement of operations are allotted suitable positions to assist in bringing fire to bear on certain land areas.

3.       Divisional Artillery Commanders will detail “Observation Officers” and have them posted in suitable observing stations to watch areas which must include, particularly, ground on which these ships cannot observe their own fire.

4.       The “Observation Officers” will be employed in observing fire from ships only. They will be connected by telephone or visual signalling with military signal stations placed in close proximity to the nearest flank signal station to which messages can be handed. These officers will only send messages concerning observation of fire, but if the fire becomes dangerous to our troops they must order firing to cease.

5.       Divisional Artillery Commanders will report to Headquarters the area which their “observation officers” have been detailed to watch so that Headquarters will know in whose area any particular objective may be and such objective will be described to ships and to “observation officers” by squares. Headquarters may be General Headquarters, Army Corps Headquarters or Divisional Headquarters as indicated by operational orders.

6.       It will often be possible for Headquarters to make arrangements on previous day for co-operation with ships, thus enabling fire to be opened promptly without confusion, and early.

7.       Each observing station (O.S.) must be given a distinct designation (a letter and the name of its division) to be used as an address in all messages, e.g., O.S. “A”. 29th Division.

8.       The exact position and address of each observing station must be reported to Headquarters.

(End ADM 137/2166)

[HMSWATERWITCH]

The Left-Flank Signal Station at ANZAC Beachhead

This naval signal station was a small but crucial part of ship’s fire support at ANZAC. The field artillery landed was insufficient to support the bridgehead and gunfire support from ships was a major part of the planned artillery firepower available. The Left-Flank naval Signal Station was situated for a part of the time at No.2 Outpost which was based behind and upon a small hill with good views of the ridge occupied by the Turks including the Baby, Battleship Hill and south western parts of Sari Bair ridge. The post had unobstructed views of the sea for signalling to ships.

Closer to the front line, two Naval Observing Stations, left and right flank, contained a spotting officer and possibly also a naval signals rating. These posts, and the numerous military O.P’s fed information back to the Flanking Signal Stations for onward transmission to ships. There was a Naval Observing Station (N.O.S.) supporting the 29th Division at Cape Helles and two at ANZAC. Those at ANZAC were overlooked by the Turks on the Sari-Bair ridge.

At the Signal Station the kind of work done may be envisaged by looking at how Signals were sent to and from the ships. When the forward Observation Officer (or a Brigade or Divisional HQ) called up the Flanking Station on the field telephone, he identified the target in terms of the square, and the part of the square, he estimated the target was positioned in. He requested fire from the duty battleship or destroyer waiting offshore. The signalmen receiving the request would then signal by flag using the call sign of the ship, and, using the codebook letters, communicate the request to fire. The ship would then train and lay guns before firing a shot which would be observed by the forward Observation Officer. He then called up the flanking station to provide his estimate of the required correction for range and direction. A second shot would follow, and perhaps a third before the Observation Officer would signal “O.K.” meaning target hit. At this point the firing ship would perform a “plastering” shoot by broadside or rapid fire and await the damage assessment from the Observation Officer.

Whereas at first the squared off map was used to signal target locations to ships, this was eventually found to be unreliable, “owing to the map being incorrect and to the difficulty that the observing officers have of fixing the exact square on which the objective lies”[1]. During May 1915, an experiment was conducted whereby the observing officer would communicate to the ship the angle between his station and the objective, and this ship knowing the exact location of the observing station, could work out the direction. The observing officer would follow the angle value with a range (from ship to objective) and subsequently provide spotting corrections as required. This dispensed with the need for the squared map by using actual measurements.

[1] This quote from ADM 137/2166, p.576

[HMSWATERWITCH]

Some examples of naval gunfire support on the Gallipoli Peninsula are now given:

HMS Queen Elizabeth often had Manica’s balloon up to spot for her but also used shore spotting by the O.P.s. This ship could reach any target on the Peninsula from any mooring with its 15-inch guns, firing Lyddite or shrapnel and also used its secondary 6-inch armament for closer targets. For example, between 3pm to 4:30pm on April 26th;

“Bombarded troops on crest of hills above Anzac Cove with 15-in and 6-in. – apparently most successful. Signal from Australians: O.K. Give them another dose”[1].

The diary continues;

“27th April, 9am to 11:30am. 15-inch and 6-inch firing shrapnel…. All this forenoon enemy delivered a big counter-attack on our Anzac troops, and appeared to get very close to our trenches. Attack was driven off by help of guns of Queen Elizabeth and other supporting ships…. Signal from Australian Colonel: yesterday one of your 15-inch shrapnel wiped out a whole Turkish regiment. This may not have been literally true, but it shows how our fire put new heart into the troops on shore”.

A similar incident is reported for the 28th April when spotting from shore station was used:

“1.5pm. Turks advancing in swarms on our left flank, who are falling back. Opened fire with 6-inch shrapnel and got in amongst them. 1.8pm. Fired one 15-inch shrapnel from ‘X’-Turret at advancing Turks. This shell burst in exactly the right place and completely wiped out the attack. The shrapnel bullets appeared to cover a very wide area, and for two minutes nothing but dust could be seen. When the dust cleared away the whole attacking battalion had been completely cut up, and we saw nothing more for five minutes, when a few Turks were seen crawling back wounded”.

Spotting difficulties grew as the Turks recognised the meaning and danger of the spotting balloon and of aeroplanes. As soon as either went up, their guns ceased fire and kept their heads down, making target identification almost impossible. The utility of shore-based observation grew, although it was discovered that one of the best methods of suppressing enemy field gun fire was to send an aeroplane up. This worked even during allied attacks, the danger to Turkish guns being so great. If there was ever a positive indication of the success of, and fear of, naval gunfire support at Gallipoli, this must be it; no matter that some authors have stated the contrary on technical grounds (poor maps, flat trajectories of naval guns etc).

During the first two weeks of May, Queen Elizabeth fired on Turkish batteries, troops gathered in gullies, woods and houses as well as plastering trenches with 6-inch. Most of these shoots were spotted by balloon, sometimes by aeroplane but also, no doubt, by shore O.P.s.  Targets were spread across most of the beachheads, the ship operating on a roving basis around the peninsula until May 12^th when she was ordered home (likely due to unacceptable risk to a newly built modern capital ship posed by the arrival of German submarines in the area).

[1] The above extracts are from the book: “Diary of HMS Queen Elizabeth. January to May 1915”. Printed by permission of the Admiralty, for private circulation to officers and men. 1919. 50pp.

Gunfire support continued on a daily basis through the Summer of 1915; artillery and naval observation posts, the flanking signal stations and ships being kept busy throughout. Once capital ships had been replaced by more specialist – and cheaper – monitors, a new bombardment flotilla became operational around the coast. Some of these ships, the cruiser HMS Grafton and the small M-Class monitors, would become hard worked on NGS throughout the remainder of the Gallipoli campaign and into the Palestine operations, particularly at Gaza in the Autumn of 1917.

As an example, HMS Cornwall’s report illustrates the increasing effectiveness of NGS during 1915:

“Friday 8^th October. M19 went out with “Abercrombie” and fired on a Turkish redoubt in square 23 X 2-3 5-6, spotted by observers on shore. M19 fired 13 rounds and obtained 9 direct hits”.[2]

Summing up, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes notes in his memoirs[3]:

“By that time the co-operation of ships’ guns with the Army was far ahead of anything contemplated at home. The enemy’s batteries, trenches, bivouacs, etc., were fixed by aerial photography and other means, and excellent maps were issued to the firing ships. Indirect fire was developed to a high degree of accuracy, with the aid of aerial and shore observation. Mark buoys were laid, and aiming points, ranges and deflections were registered on to any position on which fire was required by the Army; indirect fire could then be opened at short notice without waiting for aerial observation. At Helles the ships had the great advantage of being able to engage the enemy from the front, both flanks, and from the rear, and were able to deny them many favourable positions for their batteries and continually forced them to change their positions. As I have mentioned. General Davies had expressed warm appreciation of the value of naval gunfire in co-operation with a military offensive; his letter to Admiral de Robeck on the subject ran thus:

“16th November, 1915.

The excellent shooting of the cruiser and monitors yesterday undoubtedly contributed very largely to the ease with which our troops seized two important positions in the enemy’s lines and added enormously to the moral effect and material damage done to the enemy. All who saw it agree as to the accuracy and value of the monitors’ fire, but the chief point is that it has been established that co-operation in an attack has now become a practical reality and that a system has been established which, with further development, will prove a powerful factor both in attack and defence. As regards the fire of the batteries, there is, of course, no record as to the actual damage done, but the fact that the Turkish artillery, though they fired more ammunition than they have done since our big attacks some months ago, have never fired more wildly and their fire did practically no damage and did not hinder either the capture of the trenches or the consolidation of them afterwards, is sufficient evidence of the success achieved”.

 

---

[2] Source: ADM 137/177 p.222

[3] The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes; The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 1910-1915. Thornton Butterworth Ltd, 1954, pp.491-492