The evolution of the British corps dissertation

[R Bond]

Hi all,

I am currently writing my dissertation on the evolution of the British Corps throughout the First World War. I think this is a fascinating subject which apart from Simpson's book does not really have much directly written about it. I decided to try and take a structural approach and focus on the corps itself rather than the personalities that dominate it. In particular, I've decided to look at how the corps interacted with divisions and its army, how artillery control changed throughout the war, and the all-important but oft-forgotten work of the staff.

My initial thoughts are that the evolution of the Corps follows the idea of a 'learning curve'. Whilst this term is problematic and is more of a learning squiggly line, I think that what is clear from the Corps is a readiness to try new ideas and implement learning from previous battles even when they did not get it right. 

Any thoughts, disagreements, or book/document recommendations would be hugely appreciated!

Many thanks.

[Old Forge]

Hi @R Bond, this would be an immensely valuable study, so very best wishes for your researches. Initial thoughts are that the Corps level was a variable entity, some more successful than others. Published Corps-specific doctrine and instructions will be hard to find (hence not much said on the subject to date). Lt Gen Sir Ivor Maxse might be a good starting point - the IWM holds his considerable collection of documents and memorabilia (although it was still on microfiche last time I visited so hellish difficult to search and to copy). There’s a lot of material relating to his creation of XVIII Corps and its preparation for a leading role at Third Ypres. It’s an interesting question as to why one of the most successful divisional commanders of 1916 seems to struggle at Corps level in 1917. The answer probably reflects more on Gough as Comd Fifth Army, as well as on weather, ground etc. John Baynes’s biography of Maxse (Far From a Donkey) is a straightforward intro but Maxse’s own collection is a much richer source.

All the best,

Richard

[BradleyShoebottom]

The "Learning Curve" is more of a "Learning Process". A curve implies a start and end point with only a single cycle. Much like supply or demand curves. When in fact, the curve is more like a series of plateaus and units can actually regress ie lower plateaus than previously (after a battle) and require retraining. Think what battalions had to do after the Somme or after any significant engagement when battalions typically suffered 1,000 casualties per year, each year they were in the war. Modern military units go through similar cycles requiring repetitive cycles on a 1 to 3 year cycle in individual and collective training from section to platoon, to company to battalion to brigade etc.

You should consult these sources, Fox and Simpson being the most important

Fox, Aimée. Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Simpson, Andy. Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18. Stroud, UK: Spellmount, 2006.

 

Sheffield, G. D., and Daniel. Todman, eds. Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience, 1914-1918. Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2007.

Rawson, Andrew. The Learning Process: The BEF’s Art of War on the Western Front, 1914-18. Solihull, West Midlands, England: Helion & Company Limited, 2019.

Grant, P. “Learning to Manage the Army – The Army Administration Course at the London School of Economics 1907-1914.” In A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945, edited by M. LoCicero, R. Mahoney, and S. Mitchell, 99–111. Helion, 2014. 

Hogan, Brendan. “Nervous System Architecture: Staff College Graduates and the Formation of Regular, Territorial Force, New Army, and Dominion Divisions, 1914-1916.” Canadian Military History 28, no. 2 (October 2, 2019): Article 2.

Watt, Emir Patrick James. “Managing Deadlock: Organisational Development in the British First Army, 1915,” July 3, 2018. https://era.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/31530.

Cook, James. “The Transformation of the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front 1914-1918, via a Process of Learning - Lessons, Doctrine, and Training - Research Portal, King’s College, London.” PhD, King’s College, 2021. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-transformation-of-the-british-expeditionary-force-on-the-western-front-19141918-via-a-process-of-learning--lessons-doctrine-and-training(64f96088-b5fb-48d9-b3de-b76acd839351).html.

Pugsley, Christopher, Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, and Central Library. We Have Been Here before: The Evolution of the Doctrine of Decentralised Command in the British Army, 1905-1989, 2011. http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/rmas_occ_paper_09.pdf.

Samuels, Martin. Command or Control?: Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918. London ; Frank Cass, 1995.

Pratt, Michael J. “Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie: The Canadian Corps and the Manoeuverist Approach.” The Canadian Army Journal 17, no. 1 (2016): 29–38.

 

 

 

[R Bond]

Hi @Old Forge thanks very much for your help, I will certainly have a look at Lt Gen Sir Maxse and his corps.

 

Hi @BradleyShoebottom you are 100% correct with the training "curve", I agree the term is problematic, I was just using it as some shorthand! As for the structure unfortunately I am confined by the assessment criteria of the dissertation, so I most likely will only be able to look at three battles. I have chosen to look at the First Battle of Ypres, the Somme, and the breaking of the Hindenburg line. This way I can look at the state of the corps at the start of the war, the role of the corps in the middle of the war (and in failure), and the role of the corps at the end of the war (and in success).

Thank you very much for those book suggestions, they're very much appreciated!

[Marilyne]

Hi, 

I'm really looking forward to read how this work progresses... it's not my main area of research, but certainly interesting to see in terms of growth. there might be some lessons there to apply even in today's armed forces, which are obliged to grow again... just looking at the level of ambition for BE and the EU ! 

All the best with your work!

M;

[Robert Dunlop]

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This way I can look at the state of the corps at the start of the war, the role of the corps in the middle of the war (and in failure), and the role of the corps at the end of the war (and in success)

Great to see this work being planned! I have one minor caution. 'Failure' and 'success' are terms that get associated with the phases of the war and their specific battles. Be careful though. If you start with these assumptions then it may cloud how you interpret the evidence of how corps functioned. Try to set these assumptions aside completely, bearing in mind that the 'success' of the last 100 Days was predicated on the 'failure' of the Somme (and the myriad of other battles that went before).

Robert

[R Bond]

Hi @Robert Dunlop very good point for me to keep in mind. I meant more that the Somme has been called a failure as a whole, and I wanted to see whether the Corps was responsible for this or actually showed promising signs. This way I could see if it was how the Corps functioned that was responsible for the battle as a whole being a failure.

I’ve actually found great success stories. There are promising signs from documents I’ve found from X Corps during the Somme. For instance a post mortem of their actions that was disseminated along with learning points for future actions. There are clear examples of delegation down to division commanders where appropriate and there seems to be good sharing of information and plans between Corp Commander and Division commanders. They attribute their failure to being too ambitious. The 36th division kept exploiting their success instead of consolidating and assisting the division on their left to take Thiepval. 
 

Partially this was due to communication with artillery, the lifts were programmed in such a way which did not allow deviation from the plan. However when you consider the difficulty in communicating with divisions once they left the trenches you can understand why the artillery was so pre planned.

It will be interesting to see if this lesson is implemented during the 100 days offensive! But your comments are very useful and we sometimes can get too bogged down with our assumptions and selectively read the evidence!

 

Many thanks!

[Robert Dunlop]

The Somme has often been referred to as a 'failure' but you need to critique this premise first. Some historians have indicated, for example, that the Somme was a 'failure' because it failed to achieve what is regarded as an unrealistic operational plan to reach Bapaume in the first week. Others have looked at the horrendous losses on the first day of the campaign for no gains seemingly. A third (but not last) perspective is the limited amount of ground gained during the whole campaign versus the even more horrendous losses.

What if the nature of war is such that the Somme type of battle, playing out 2 years into a war between equally determined opponents, is never a 'success' in the naive way that we measure such things? 

You are right about being able to find 'success' stories. There are plenty at the corps level, as at all levels - but not always accurate if you look at the increasing evidence of what happened on the other side of the wire. 'Failure', likewise, was never one-sided. My grandfather fought in the Great War. He told me that the big issue lay not with the British and Dominion commanding officers but with the fact that the German army was highly competent and very determined. A corps might fail due to negligence perhaps but equally it may fail because the enemy succeeds. 

The German army was affected by the Somme. If you have not done so then I recommend you read Sheldon's books on the impact of the battle, specifically 'Fighting the Somme' and 'The German Army at Cambrai'.

Robert

[R Bond]

Hi @Robert Dunlop great points again thank you. Especially the fact that the German army, we too often look at battles in general from one perspective and one side. 
 

As for the Somme, my personal opinion is that the Somme was as Phillpott argues a “bloody victory”. However that is at the strategic level. I labelled the Somme as a failure at the operational level simply because the battle did not achieve the objectives it set out to. Had the objectives been more limited (a point of learning that was implemented), then I would go so far as to argue that the Somme was a victory on the operational level too. 
 

For the purpose of my dissertation it is not so much about comparing “success and failure” but examining the BEF at different stages of the war. I chose the Somme as a case study because it took place in the mid point of the war, and is commonly seen as a watershed moment. 
 

I’m not so much looking at success and failure of the BEF in battles, but more success and failure within the Corps. IE was it the structure of the Corps that can help to explain why the BEF did not achieve all its objectives at the Somme.

Thank you again for your point about the German army. I will make sure to include the fact that the Corps could’ve performed optimally, and by the book doctrinally, and this could still result in a defeat because their enemy also had the ability to think!

 

Many thanks,

[Robert Dunlop]

I understand your point about the Somme not achieving operational objectives. There is another way to look at this issue. It touches on a process known as scenario-planning. Rather than seeing operational objectives as a series of absolutes, with a binary 'tick - achieved' or 'cross - failed', you can look at them as a set of scenarios which may or may not play out. At worst, an attack would fail completely and/or be the subject of a counter-attack. Corps planned for this, with their reserves. Most large battles involved multiple tactical objective lines. Typically, each line would have a plan for holding it in case further advances were not possible.

For the Somme, there was the operational goal of reaching Bapaume. As noted in a previous thread, this objective was set by GHQ in case a scenario played out where the German front line collapsed completely and the defenders fled. Both the French and British forces had large reserves of cavalry to hand in case such a scenario played out. 

At its best, scenario planning is about holding multiple options as equally probable and planning accordingly. You will see this process played out many times by corps (and other levels of command).

Robert

[R Bond]

Hi @Robert Dunlop great points again thank you.

I think you’ve hit the nail on the head with scenario planning.

As I mentioned when initially talking about the Somme the after action review from X Corps is fascinating on this subject. The 36th division hit both of its objectives, capturing both front lines, and exploiting back to the intermediate lines of the German defence. However, the 36th were pushed back because of the failure of the division to their left to capture Thiepval. 
 

This scenario argument shows both success and failure within the Corps. First of all, the liaison between the artillery (owned by the corps) and the division commanders and artillery commanders produced a barrage program which enabled the 36th to capture the front line of trenches. However the Corps command did not consolidate this across their entire sector and let the 36th advance forwards before it’s flanks had been secured. The argument was that this would divert German resources from Thiepval. However considering the long no man’s land in front of Thiepval helped the Germans target with artillery and machine gun fire, and the fact that the 36th’s path was full of redoubts requiring less soldiers to defend, soldiers were not pulled from Thiepval, and the 36th were pushed back.

This “mistake” however I believe is forgivable. As noted in the after action report, the program of barrage lifts made it impossible to stop the attack once started, this was further compounded by communication difficulties which meant that reports from the divisions were dubious at best once they passed the German trench system. Crucially though this document shows a learning process, as the recommendations on how to coordinate artillery in the future were implemented and were successful!
 

Many thanks, your thoughts on this are appreciated!!!

[Robert Dunlop]

Quote

...the after action review from X Corps is fascinating on this subject.

Do you have the original reference number for the After Action Report please? Thanks very much.

Robert

[R Bond]

Hi @Robert Dunlop

Of course, it’s WO 95/863/13, it has been digitised on the National Archives website and is a mix of type and handwritten. The cover is labelled “Memo on part played by artillery”. Hope this helps!

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you. Yes, this helps! Apologies for the delay as I am travelling but I will post some further thoughts in the next few days.

Robert