Jellicoe and Haig

[PhilB]

I watched the BBC2 programme this afternoon about 3rd Ypres. It strongly gave the impression that Lloyd George was not inclined to give Haig the go-ahead until Jellicoe claimed that the British could not carry on long without Zeebrugge being neutralized as a U-boat base. This was claimed to have forced Ll-G`s hand. Zeebrugge was never subsequently threatened but Jellicoe`s dire forecast did not come to pass, which made me wonder whether might have been collusion between him and Haig to ensure that the Ypres offensive came about? Phil B

[SOMMESOLDIER]

Hi Phil,

So how were they to collude, and where did they meet to collude ?

It was a long standing fear that the channel ports, if they fell into German hands would enable them to threaten our sea lanes even more, that is well documented. That's the main reason so much fighting was done in Belgium !!!!!!

What ' The Welsh Windbag', did to the British Army in 1917 and 1918 by keeping the fighting strength down, by refusing it enough manpower is a disgrace and very nearly cost us the war !

Cheers

Tim.

[armourersergeant]

Jellicoe claimed that the British could not carry on long without Zeebrugge being neutralized as a U-boat base.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Surely this is only collusion if it was not true. If this fact was true or at the very least they beleived it to be so then they did there job.

I am sure some other pals can answer that one, i do not know enough about the subject, but i thought that the German navy had by then launched its submarine all out warfare?

I dont subscribe to the fact that Haig launched attacks for attacks sake. His judgement and skill is a different question. As for LG if he was to weak to make his own mind then I need say no more. Perhaps thats why he spent the rest of his life condeming Haig's name, to cover his own failings!

regards

Arm.

[domsim]

I suspect the idea of this'collusion' comes from L-G's post war memoirs,where he spent time trying to distance himself from what he saw as his General's incompetence and callousness with soldier's lives (typical politician!)

If I remember correctly unrestricted submarine warfare was started on the 1st January 1917 and U-boats and destroyers operating from Ostend and Zeebrugge were making serious inroads in allied shipping. If the initial 3rd Ypres had gone to plan there was of course the plan to make an amphibious landing on the coast near Middelkirke, push the German front line back and bring up large calibre guns to make Ostend and Zeebrugge unuasable as naval bases (Operation Hush, of which Robert knows most.)

The German naval threat was real (read any history of the Dover Patrol to see how hard the fighting was) and for L-G to say otherwise is just another piece of self serving, poitical back sliding!

Cheers

Dom.

[PhilB]

Not much support for Ll-G there, then!

Haig and Jellicoe wouldn`t need to meet to collude, would they? There were telegraphs, personal couriers and letter mail available!

It was the timing of J`s appeal to Ll-G that seemed fortuitous for Haig. Plus the fact that neither Jellicoe`s nor Haig`s predictions were ultimately found to be accurate. I`m not accusing anybody of collusion - just wondering! Phil B

[Chris Best]

It was the timing of J`s appeal to Ll-G that seemed fortuitous for Haig

Appreciating the mutual benefit to be had from Allied possession of Zeebrugge, it's difficult to believe that Haig and Jellico would not have discussed, in some way, the approach to and briefing of Cabinet. Those present would have received prepartory lobbying and briefings, probably via Admiralty and War Office staff (civilian and military). There are no surprises at this level of Government: the issue is to build support amongst influencers and their decision makers.

Chris

[truthergw]

The Channel ports were absolutely crucial to the British Army. This is where we were supplied from and it is where we would have retired on if need be. The commander of the British forces would always be looking to protect the ones he held and capture any he could. This is beside the fact that submarines were operating from them and posing a real threat. It would be only natural that the Royal Navy would recognise this. I don't think we need suspect collusion. Good oldfashioned common sense would be all that was needed. Although I admit that this was in very short supply at times.

[Chris Best]

I don't think we need suspect collusion. Good oldfashioned common sense would be all that was needed

If staff work is collusion, then so be it. The fact is, the two Departments of State would have discussed 'the way forward' with each other, via their Fleet and Field Commanders, in order to ensure that sound military judgement was presented to the Frocks in order to advise (and shape) political direction.

Chris

[PhilB]

One wonders then why it seemed to come as a surprise to Ll-G who, up till then, had been set against the 3rd Ypres offensive? Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

Haig's diary entries cast a little light on this episode.

Six months earlier, Haig wrote [on Friday 15th December]:

'I then proceeded to the Admiralty and saw Admiral Jellicoe... I liked very much what I saw of Jellicoe though I should not look on him as a man of great power or decision of character.'

In the following quote, the [] brackets indicate material that Haig later added to his typescript version of the original diary. His entry for 20th June, 1917 reads:

'In the afternoon I visited War Office, and also saw "Admiral" Sir Eric Geddes at the Admiralty. The latter is most anxious about the state of affairs at the Admiralty. Jellicoe, he says, is feeble to a degree and vacillating. There is no fixed policy: they dont know where the submarines are sinking our ships, or the type of ship to build.

Secret (Not to be copied)*

[A most serious and startling situation was disclosed today]. At today's conference, Admiral Jellicoe stated that owing to [the great shortage of shipping due to German submarines] it would be impossible for Great Britain to continue the war in 1918. This was a bombshell for the Cabinet [and all present] and a full enquiry is to be made as to the real facts on which this opinion [of the Naval authorities] is based. No one present shared Jellicoe's view, and all seemed satisfied that the food reserves in Great Britain are adequate. [Jellicoe's words were, "There is no good discussing plans for next Spring. We cannot go on."]'

*This was an instruction to his wife not to include any of the following material in her transcripts of the diary that were sent to the King.

Before offering an analysis of the above, it is worth observing that Haig was not averse to noting when he did discuss other controversial issues with a view to collusion.

Haig's notes, particularly about Gedde's comments, suggest that Jellicoe was capable of a sudden unexpected comment, straight from the heart. This was not Haig's style, which is why he may have made the earlier observation on first meeting Jellicoe, having picked up this tendency (pure speculation on my part).

Haig had been at the Admiralty but it seems he had not met with Jellicoe, at least not on the day in question. I think he would have said otherwise. It is important to note that LG had raised his objections to any further action in 1918 on the previous day. This may have prompted Haig's visit to the War Office and the Admiralty.

Haig's instruction to his wife is very significant. My impression is that Haig was just as taken aback with Jellicoe's remark.

Robert

[Chris Best]

Robert and Phil

This was a bombshell for the Cabinet [and all present] and a full enquiry is to be made as to the real facts on which this opinion [of the Naval authorities] is based. No one present shared Jellicoe's view

I must buy Haig's diaries!

I've made the mistake of assuming today's practice. And today, if the boss dithers, his principal subordinates give him 'a line to take'. Do we not see this, to a degree, through Haig's discussion with Geddes?

Anyway, I should have known better than to believe there was close inter-departmental co-operation. After all, it was the parochial (or tribal) approach to departmental affairs that led, eventually, to unification of the 3 departments into the MoD.

I stand corrected.

Hang on; Haig's diary note does not necessarily prove there there was no prior discussion in Whitehall; only that Haig was unaware of it and assumed others present to be similarly surprised by Jellicoe's 'outburst'.

Has anybody got Wully Robertson's diaries/autobiography to hand? Does he make any comment?

I stand, wavering!!

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

I can only add that Haig saw Robertson on the 19th before attending the first day of the meeting with the War Cabinet. There is no mention of this issue, or indeed any other, with respect to the meeting with the CIGS.

Regarding the conversation with Geddes, Haig's conclusion on this is of some interest:

'It is difficult to know how to act as Geddes means to be loyal to his colleagues. We agreed that I should do my best to arrange that Lloyd George should see Geddes [when the latter would put the whole question of affairs before him], and that the King should have an interview with him [(Geddes)].'

So Geddes' comments to Haig re Jellicoe appear to be of a general nature, raising concerns about Jellicoe's (and First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Edward Carson's) ability to run a tight ship in the Admiralty. I would guess that Geddes would have raised this lesser issue (by comparison with 'telling tales' - not really the done thing) about Jellicoe's forthcoming remark had Geddes known about it. As Controller of the Navy, you would have expected Geddes to have been in on, or have been party to the conclusions of, an internal discussion about such a precarious view of Britain's plight. But then stranger things have happened at sea.

I can therefore only address the issue of a prior collusion between Jellicoe and Haig. I would suggest there is no evidence for this. As for Robertson, Haig records:

'[LG] criticised Robertson and tried to get a more definite statement of his views out of him as to the result which he expected. Robertson would not budge! All he would say was that my plan was the only thing to do.'

Robert