Complete victory on the Somme

[T8HANTS]

A question I have often pondered.

Let us imagine the first day of the Somme offensive was a runaway success with no British casualties, thousands of Germans killed or captured and an advance of miles into the green fields of France, etc, etc. Would we have just created a bigger salient to be slaughtered in later, could the very proffesional German army have closed the neck of the bag and captured a crippling amount of men and material causing just a bigger disaster to British arms than that supplied by reality.

If there is a hint of yes to these questions does that mean that the western front was unwinable by conventional attack on limted lengths of front, and if so was it not until the political and national will to fight erroded that major movment became possible.

Even if the Germans had enjoyed equally fanciful success in the Spring of 1918, and pushed the British into the sea, was the French Army in a position to have readjusted the line and continue to hold the Germans or were they too far gone and so would have brought about the end of the war by their national collapse. Again if there is a hint of yes that would imply that our so called " Donkey" Generals (I don't subscribe to this idea) were asked to fight unwinable battles, and have been castigated ever since, because we havn't faced the truth.

I now look forward to being shot down in flames. "At one hundred yards, volly fire, PRESENT"

[PhilB]

Again if there is a hint of yes that would imply that our so called " Donkey" Generals (I don't subscribe to this idea) were asked to fight unwinable battles, and have been castigated ever since, because we havn't faced the truth. 

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Surely, only a Donkey general would choose to fight an unwinnable battle? Phil B

[T8HANTS]

Surely, only a Donkey general would choose to fight an unwinnable battle?   Phil B

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

If Haig had said I can't win, I suspect that he would have been replaced and this would have gone on until somebody had accepted the post.

[PhilB]

Very probably, T8, but a more honourable course than squandering men`s lives? I don`t think the defence that "If I hadn`t done it, someone else would" stands up well these days! Phil B

[Desmond7]

Re the 'What if scenario' ...

So the British achieve success and break though on the Somme.

My question is DID the German army (in reality) have the reserve manpower to give the jubilant but probably disorganised brits a good kicking in the counter attack?

I assume they were fairly well committed at Verdun and were still busy on the Eastern Front? Were their troop numbers up to such a job? I don't doubt their professionalism.

Hadn't thought about this sweeping scenario.

[T8HANTS]

this is just my point of thought

if these large attacks had been successful I still don't see them rolling up the whole front line, just creating salients, Yepres but on a bigger scale.

if we then look at those in command we have the two strings of thought.

1) complete idiots sending men to their deaths for nothing

2) skilled officers who were stuck fighting a type of battle none had forseen with twentieth centuary weapons, but with ninteenth centuary communications. With a monumental learning curve, that was paid for in lives.

Like many, I admire Smith-Dorrien but I am also glad he was out of it, because his reputation remains unsullied, but I doubt it would have remained so if he had stayed. I just have this feeling that the war was unwinable, by either side on the weastern front. That even now we don't want to admit it because it is more acceptable to blame the Generals. I am yet to be convinced there was some undiscovered genius passed over in the wings who would have won the war with some superbly organised battle at exceptable cost.

[Desmond7]

My view - the war was only winnable on the 'western' front. And in strategic terms that stretched from the 'blockade' in the Atlantic right through to the trenches.

Combined operation ... slow, painful with a harsh learning curve but ultimately successful?

[SOMMESOLDIER]

Hi T8,

An interesting point. I believe, and the more I read about the Somme it re-enforces my view, is that, at this point in the war, it was impossible for us to win !

I would love to believe that the 1st July had happened that way and we could have rolled the German Army up, but at this point they were still a more organised army than ours.

Our army was just not trained, experienced, or commanded well enough at this point in the war. Everyone from 'Tommy Atkins' to Haig were on a massive learning curve but by 1918 they had learnt enough to win the most impressive set of battles in our long a distingished history.

Also I think that those sarcastic comments 'Phil' are really unhelpful. If you know anything about the Somme you know that the battle had to be fought, The French demanded it ! It was a coalition war and the French were bleeding to death at Verdun, but even without Verdun the Somme Offensive was still being planned !

This continued 'Donkey' jibe, levelled at the Staff and by some people at anyone above Private, just doesn't wash anymore. It just doesn't standup in serious Historical Research.

On the Somme a great number of the Officers, weren't up to the job but this is not anything to do with the fact that they were 'DONKEYS' or 'BUTCHERS', It was down to the fact that particularly in the New Army Battalions they had absolutely no experience. Many of them loved their men and were loved in return and worried about them and tried to do all they could to keep casualties down. Duncan Lennox Martin and E T F Sandys are just two off the top of my head.

Cheers

Tim.

[armourersergeant]

Surely, only a Donkey general would choose to fight an unwinnable battle?   Phil B

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

If Haig had said I can't win,  I suspect that he would have been replaced and this would have gone on until somebody had accepted the post.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Haig did not believe that that the battle was unwinnable. He believed that it would succeed, all his planning was for an advancement.

If Haig had tried to hide behind the arguement of 'its was not my idea i was only obeying orders' (this sounds a tad familiar!) he would of course have been up for criticism. BUT Haig never did this he beleived that all his battles whilst not successful where a building block to his and the armies learning and its eventual success.

Haig always beleived he would win. Others around him may have had a different idea, but not he.

regards

Arm.

[armourersergeant]

If we had broken through the German army in July 1916 and advanced, then i think it very likely that Haig would be lionised by the nation as the man who succeeded regardless of the number of casulaties. I often wonder if it is the casualties that offends most or the casualties with no apparent success?

But there are many if's in war and these would have played a part. The army was still untrained and certainly unused to open warfare etc. How would thay have coped in open ground?

I often play what ifs with myself and often then give up as you can get into too many different scenarios!

regards

Arm.

[Chris_Baker]

I think we are in danger here of forgetting the political dimension. For those members who don't understand why the British Army attacked on the Somme in 1916, read this: http://www.1914-1918.net/bat15_strategy.htm

Had the British (and don't forget French) armies "won" in the early days of the Somme, political pressure in Germany to make d**n sure their army reacted and held on would have been huge, and I rather suspect they would have found the means to hold on. The German enconomy was in better shape in 1916 than 1918.

My own view is that such a success could not have been sustained right through to ultimate German collapse, not because the Germans could not organise a defence, but for that old and rather boring reason, logistics. Supply lines to the Somme front, and presumably a widening pocket from that area, were hopeless.

[stephen binks]

The outcome of the battle of Cambrai gives a good indication of what would of happened. With the Hidenburg line broken and German reserves 24 hours away, the Germans stlll managed to counter attack and win back the majority of ground previously lost!

And remember, this was a year after the Somme had run its course and we had the tank!

Stephen Binks

[PhilB]

Hi T8,

   

  Also I think that those sarcastic comments 'Phil' are really unhelpful. If you know anything about the Somme you know that the battle had to be fought, Cheers

Tim.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

No sarcasm intended! And I didn`t actually mention the Somme - I was generalising, although the original question was about the Somme. I appreciate that political considerations may force a commander`s hand at times. I have much sympathy with the above comments, but I do think that commanders should be judged against the highest standards - after all, they`re presumably chosen (and accept the job) because they are the very best available! Phil B

[squirrel]

An interesting scenario indeed and I am inclined to agree that the outcome of a succesful battle on the Somme would have had the same result as Cambrai because of the problems of logistics, manpower and not least communications;

creating a large salient that had to be defended on at least 3 sides.

When the way that the British Army fought battles changed in 1918 it was succesful but it was a steep learning curve that cost many lives in what was the first mass industrialised war.

The way that the war developed from 1914 put many pressures on the Generals to adapt to the sheer size of armies, the vast amount of weapons and learning how to use them effectively.

Some foresaw what would happen in a large European conflict before the war but few realised that in the end, the infantry tactics, with much improved artillery application, would be similar to those that the regular army was trained for prior to 1914.

To some extent this was helped by the way that the Germans changed their front line defences to use strong points rather than lines of trenches and gave some room for manoevre. These later battles were more soldier's battles with junior officers and nco's far more involved than everybody following a detailed set plan that stifled initiative.

Haigh was sure from start that we would win and on many occasions seemed to be the only one that did. That the battles up to 1916 had to be fought to help the French left him with no choice but to engage the enemy as not to co-operate would have allowed the Germans to atack and arguably defeat the British and French Armies individually although there is a case that if you defeated one you would defeat the other.

The politician's certainly didn't help and a lot of people did their best to salvage their reputations after the war by denigrating the Generals.

Looking at it realistically, what more could they have done?

Squirrel

[Potter]

The consensus of replies is that the outcome would have been very like Cambrai and March 1918.

This then suggests that the war would essentially not be won on the battlefield, other than by attrition. So you have to accept the losses so long as you can outlast the enemy.

The only other alternative would be to hold a defensive posture and wait for the blockade to bring the Central Powers to their knees, as arguably it did, rather than operations on the Western Front.

However, Haig's instinct was to use his armies and the Government backed him in this. My view is that Haig used the attrition argument to justify his tactics, which were actually based on his belief that he could breakthrough on the Somme and 3rd Ypres.

[Robert Dunlop]

An interesting scenario. Firstly, there are the conditions needed for a widespread breakthrough. Basically, the German front line would have had to be pierced at multiple points, with the elimination or containment of most of the defenders in the forward areas. The Battle of Cambrai indicated that a stout prolonged defence of one built-up aread can significantly retard an attack if the front is too narrow. Then the German counter-attacks would have either been non-existent or easily contained because there was not a single discernable British point of attack. Finally, the German reserves would have had to be well back. Essentially, the front line would have disintegrated with minimal resistance to the immediate rear and the middle distance.

The best examples of this happening are probably the German Spring offensives. Cambrai is not such a good example because there was a serious bottleneck on the line Bourlon Wood - La Folies les Vallées, once it was clear that the canal could not be crossed and held in force on the right. In any situation where a substantial break-through occurred then there was the risk of a break-out into the rear with destruction of troops on the flanks by 'rolling up'. The only way to contain this was to fall back, as Fifth Army did, until such time as a new line could be stabilized. Again, this is different from Cambrai where the break-in never progressed to a complete break-through - although Fontaine was captured at one time, the Wotan III Line was not reached.

I would suggest that the German reserves would have been thrown in to contain the expanding salient. This would be similar to Cambrai, where the initial German response was to shore up the gap. There were a few local counterattacks at Flesquieres for example. But the major counter-attack at Cambrai came many days after the initial break-in. In attempting to contain the salient, there might have been some reinforcement of the German flank, as this was the most ideal place to put pressure on the advance. An immeditate successful counter-attack to pinch out the salient would have been extremely unlikely IMHO, given the pressure that the Germans would have been under.

The second thing to note is that the original British attack was accompanied by the successful French attack on the right. Had the British pushed well forward on the French left, I think it highly likely the Germans would have had to give ground - attacked from the front and enfiladed from their right flank would likely have been too much. This would have facilitated a further advance of the French. So the 'salient' would have been very broad-based, very similar to that which occurred 2 years later on August 1918. Which means the German counter-response would have been very stretched. Not the situation in which flank attacks were the answer.

As the Germans fought to contain the break through, the key question would be whether to counter-attack or fall back further. Again, the situation would be analagous to Operation Michael. The initial response then was to fall back. Until Amiens. Then the line had to hold. The rail system was under severe threat. Even though Amiens was not captured, the proximity of the Germans still had a significant effect on through traffic between the British and French armies. Fox write about this in 'GHQ':

'Having arrived at some places, within range of our front lateral line, the enemy sought by continuous bombardments to stop or at least hamper traffic, at the same time constantly attacking our rear lateral railway line at its most sensitive points, the Somme and Canche crossings. Inconvenience - serious at times - and loss followed from these attacks, but there was never an actual stoppage of essential traffic. At one time during this month [June 1918] it was necessary to stop for a few days all but essential traffic north and south.'

The quote illustrates the importance of key strategic railways, and hence Rawlinson's need to recapture Villers-Bretonneux during the flare-up of fighting at the apex of the 1918 German salient on the Somme.

Turning now to the German defensive strategy in the event of a serious breakthrough in 1916, Chateris' [Haig's Head of Intelligence during 1916] comments are of interest:

'K[itchener] came to my office again [in February 1916]. "There will be no break-through [on the Somme]. You must lean against the line, press it, hit it as hard as you can, bend it. Some day you will find it is not there, going back, but you will not break through." I pointed out that if we bent back the line in Flanders a relatively small distance, the rest of the German line must go; he agreed, but said that the French would not consent to any big effort there.'

What Charteris is alluding to is that the Germans had space behind them to 'defend' with, just as the Russians did before the German advance in '42, and more significantly, Gough did in the Spring of 1918. It would probably have taken a change of German C-in-C to take this decision but this is what happened at the end of 1916.

Robert

[7:29am]

I understand that munitions factory workers where paid by piece, ie the more you make the more get paid. This would potentially lead to shell quality going down and may account for a percentage of the dud shells in the bombardment. If all of these shells had exploded would the result have been similar to Haigs original plan?

Cheers

Jim

So could private enterprise be partly responsible for what happened on the fields of war. Not unsimilar to today, and people say... no it could never happen again, we are different today!!!

[PhilB]

'K[itchener] came to my office again [in February 1916].  "There will be no break-through [on the Somme].  You must lean against the line, press it, hit it as hard as you can, bend it.  Some day you will find it is not there, going back, but you will not break through."  I pointed out that if we bent back the line in Flanders a relatively small distance, the rest of the German line must go; he agreed, but said that the French would not consent to any big effort there.'

What Charteris is alluding to is that the Germans had space behind them to 'defend' with, just as the Russians did before the German advance in '42, and more significantly, Gough did in the Spring of 1918.  It would probably have taken a change of German C-in-C to take this decision but this is what happened at the end of 1916.

Robert

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Robert, I can`t see why "a relatively small advance in Flanders would mean the rest of the German line must go". I suppose it depends how big the advance is. Is it because it accentuates the large bulge in the line from Ypres to Verdun? Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

There were two possibilities that were considered. One was driving northeast towards Ghent - the basis of Third Ypres. This would cut off the coast and unhinge the German right wing. Plumer's advance out of the Salient in September 1918 was associated with this response from the Germans, though quite what was cause-and-effect at that time was not quite clear.

I believe, however, that Charteris was referring to the alternative option. Driving east from the Salient and capturing Lille, which was a major rail hub for the German right wing/centre. It was thought that this would precipitate a major withdrawal across a much wider area.

Robert

[Justin Moretti]

On the matter of the artillery shells and their number versus reliability, Prior & Wilson's "The Somme" (which is not particularly kind to Haig; certainly not nearly as kind as, say, Terraine) says, if I recall correctly, that the person responsible for deleting quality control to allow quantity production was a certain David Lloyd George.

With no choice but to fight, in a war that demanded artillery dominance, the generals were pilloried by the same man who in his previous incarnation gave them defective ammunition with which to fight. Hmmm.....

[Muerrisch]

Haig [unlike his comparator, ACM Bomber Harris in WWII] went back to his politicians in 1916 and said, in effect, "do you really want us to go for a major attack on the Somme?".

He then fought the battle with their full support.

[PhilB]

Presumably, he gave the politicians his estimate of the gains to be achieved and the losses incurred. And those estimates would be what the politicians OK`d. How did they compare to the actuality? Phil B

[Muerrisch]

No, you cannot divorce the matter from politics: the politico-historical background is complicated but was driven, both WHERE, and WHEN and even IF by the needs of the French. Haig wanted to fight the battle mid August, and was forced to fight it 6 weeks early. No wonder he asked for a tick in the box. The people ultimately responsible [both for the fact of war and the retention of Haig and the fact of the Somme campaign] are the politicians: the buck stops.

I know of no estimates [a sort of cost/ benefit ratio] such as you describe: they may be, as far as I know, a modern construct. General Mauguin said [paraphrase] "whatever you do, you lose a lot of men". You cannot deliberately assault the main body of the enemy without incurring grievous loss: the modern truism is that you need local superiority of three to one. Whereas Monty fought Alamein when and where he wanted [and the Iron Duke in the Peninsula], Haig had no such luxury.

[egbert]

A lot of 2005 Haig's and Ludendorff's here! What if my father were a millionaire....

[PhilB]

Presumably, he gave the politicians his estimate of the gains to be achieved and the losses incurred. And those estimates would be what the politicians OK`d.  How did they compare to the actuality? Phil B

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Are we saying, then, LB, that the politicos ticked the Somme box and gave Haig the directive to attack irrespective of, or in the absence of, any gains/losses estimates? In which case, as you say, the buck stopped at No 10! Phil B