36th (Ulster) Division on 1 July 1916 - could things have gone better?

[DixieDivision1418]

The Ulster Division famously managed to capture the Schwaben Redoubt on 1 July, but they were unsupported, and they had to withdraw after taking heavy casualties. Could the Ulster Division have avoided the losses they took on 1 July, either by not advancing as far, or being supported?

[Justin Moretti]

Trying to take all their objectives was their job, so not advancing as far wasn't on the table.

The problem with being supported was that German counter-battery artillery fire and flanking small-arms fire from positions their neighbouring units had not been able to suppress were cutting off that support. 

I need to dig out my Prior and Wilson book on the Somme and refresh myself as to the exact reasons why the Ulsters were able to advance so far when divisions to their left and right got nowhere. 

[Dirty Harry]

Their oc general nugent took the decision to follow the bombardment closely hence the Germans did not have time to setup when the artillery shifted to the support lines, the infantry were already in the frontline. 
 

the divisions either side didn’t follow up closely and suffered horrendous casualties and left the flanks of the 36th division exposed. The enfilade fire devastated the follow up brigades of the division, leaving those men who had reached the Schwaben redoubt with no support.

 

i don’t think communication was good enough to vary from the plan. This could have meant the troops consolidating earlier.
 

maybe if the follow up brigade’s could have got across no man’s land things could have been different. I do wonder if support trench/s could have been dug across no man’s land the lead battalions could have been supported but the only instance I know of was the Hohenzollern redoubt attack in the previous year which failed to be completed and was pulverised by German artillery.

 

all if buts and maybe.

[Justin Moretti]

17 minutes ago, Dirty Harry said:

Their oc general nugent took the decision to follow the bombardment closely hence the Germans did not have time to setup when the artillery shifted to the support lines, the infantry were already in the frontline. 

Thanks for chipping in. 

I vaguely recall that one of the other determinants was how well the wire was or was not cut. My vague memory is that with the exception of the right, which had some French guns firing across the UK/French boundary, the artillery effort in the preparation phase was pretty homogenous; i.e. everyone was doing the same thing everywhere. That would imply that whether the wire was cut or not depended on the often-execrable performance of the artillery shells doing the cutting, and THAT problem leads back to the desk of the Minister of Munitions.

[Ken Lees]

44 minutes ago, Dirty Harry said:

...maybe if the follow up brigade’s could have got across no man’s land things could have been different. I do wonder if support trench/s could have been dug across no man’s land the lead battalions could have been supported but the only instance I know of was the Hohenzollern redoubt attack in the previous year which failed to be completed and was pulverised by German artillery...

Attempts were made during the 1st July to dig communication trenches from the Ulsters' front lines, across No Man's Land, but the enfilade fire from Thiepval prevented their successful completion.

[Dirty Harry]

wasnt threre an academical pub proposing 50% dud shells in the course of the somme offensive? hence poor wire cutting.

how come we predicate an answer on what we did wrong, not on what the enemy did right.  The Germans werent passively defending.

 

I can see why Haig wanted to wait until August to launch the offensive.  You could really argue it wasnt until the 1917 campaign season before the army could actually use tempo in its operations.

[Ken Lees]

Estimates of duds vary from 35-95%, depending upon the source.

The premise of the 1st July attack was that the British and French artillery would suppress the defenders and create the conditions (clear the wire sufficiently, etc) to allow the infantry to advance and take ground.

In the main, that failed, so allowing the German defensive plan to succeed.

 

[Justin Moretti]

14 hours ago, Dirty Harry said:

how come we predicate an answer on what we did wrong, not on what the enemy did right.

The ability of the enemy to do the right thing was dependent on the degree to which our shells did or did not dissuade him. 

[Jack Sheldon]

If  you are interested in this question and wish to understand why events took the turn they did that day, may I recommend that you take a look at my book, 'Fighting the Somme' (Pen and Sword 2017) pp 44 - 60? The German defenders had no choice but to fight with all their might to hold, then eject the Ulstermen who were occupying the vital ground of the entire Second Army. I should add that the Germans regarded the action of the 36th in pressing forward towards the Grandcourt line and thus being subject to considerable attrition as a significant stroke of luck.  Had they consolidated on the Schwaben Redoubt, they would have presented a far greater problem to the defence.

[Dirty Harry]

That’s weird cause ur Somme book is next on my to be read pile. Look forward to it.

[Jack Sheldon]

I hope that you find it helpful!