Hunter-Weston and the Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt Mine, 1.7.16

[Ken Wayman]

Does anyone know of any written explanation for Hunter-Weston's insistence (and ceded by Haig) on the early detonation of the Hawthorn Ridge redoubt mine on 1st July 1916? 

It was a decision of such momentous consequence that there must be some apparent justification offered by the man responsible. 

Many thanks

Ken

[Old Forge]

Hi Ken,

OH 1916 Vol I (pp429-431) says: 'The G.O.C. VIII Corps originally wished to fire it [the mine - 42,000lbs of ammonal prepared and charged by 252nd Tunnelling Coy] four hours before zero, so that the redoubt, which flanked No Man's Land, should be blown up and the crater consolidated and occupied before the assault [of 29th and 4th Divs], but long enough before the latter to ensure that any general alarm on the enemy's side should have died down. G.H.Q., on the advice of the Inspector of Mines, forbade this, on the grounds that British troops had never yet 'made a good show' at occupying a crater, whereas the Germans were extremely proficient in that art, and would therefore at zero probably be found in possession of the crater. The Inspector of Mines insisted that zero was the proper time. On the 15th June 1916 the Fourth Army had issued an order that all mines were to be blown between zero and eight minutes before zero, and, as a kind of compromise, the VIII Corps suggested ten minutes before zero, and this was agreed to and sanctioned by G.H.Q., although eight or ten minutes would equally give the enemy warning.  It seems to have been in the minds of both Sir Douglas Haig and General Rawlinson that, even if the mine - the only one north of the Ancre - did give the alarm, it might be to the advantage of the attacks of XIII and XV Corps on the right [...] it might be helpful if the attention of the enemy could be drawn to the situation north of the Ancre before they were launched. It is said that some apprehension was felt in 29th Div that if the mine were fired at zero the attacking infantry might be injured by falling fragments.'

There then follows an explanation that it had already been established that all fragments fall within 20 seconds of a mine detonation, which had shaped an earlier operation at St Eloi, and would be used for planning for Messines in 1917. The OH notes that to ten minute interval between detonation at 7.20 and zero at 7.30am 'still allowed arrangements to be made in accordance with the original idea of occupying the crater before the main assault, but the decision to do so at once created difficulties [...] the heavy artillery barrage could not be continued on the Hawthorn Redoubt and the neighbouring trenches whilst the infantry was seizing the crater [...] thus on [29th Div's] front not only would there be for ten minutes no heavy artillery fire, but for three minutes only half the 18-pdr fire [the rest having lifted onto the 2nd line].

There's a footnote stating that the VIII Corps orders to the artillery were issued 'to the artillery only', and no copy survives - 'That the barrage lifted before the time expected was noted by a number of infantry officers.'

Hopefully this gives enough of a clue without digging into the VIII Corps and Fourth Army WD's.

All the best,

Richard

Edited 17 April , 2023 by Old Forge
Adding page numbers

[Ken Wayman]

I really appreciate this insight, Richard. It suggests a bit of 'fuzzy' thinking at a high level, where clarity was needed. I've always had the feeling that the Germans took the detonation of the Hawthorn Mine as the start of the assault, especially as the barrage eased in that area. If that was the point at which the machine-gunners raced up the steps of their deep dugouts then it is little surprise that they won the race to the parapet. Especially when Rawlinson/Haig had insisted that there need be no 'rush for the parapet'! And it would also explain the horrendous casualty figures for 1 July. 

Once again, thank you.

Ken

[JeffMcN]

It would seem that Hunter-Bunter had an enthusiasm for starting things early. In the 1917 Battle of Messines VIII Corps was on the left flank of the attacking X Corps and was to provide supporting artillery and a feint attack. In the planning, H-B brightly suggested that his Corps' barrage start 10 minutes early. Plumer squashed that one. Given everyone would have been very aware of what happened at Hawthorn, I can imagine the rolled eyes around the table when he made the suggestion and a very curt response from Plumer! Extrapolation from two points (Hawthorn and Messines) is a bit risky, but you do sense of a trend emerging. I wonder what bright ideas he dreamt up in 1918?

[Ken Wayman]

Shame that Plumer was not running the show in summer 1916!

Ken