Planned Turkish attack at Helles, 6th August 1915

[FuManchu18]

Quite a few early Gallipoli books make the claim that one reason that the attack at Helles on 6th August failed was because the Turkish trenches were full of additional men in preparation for an imminent attack. This even led some authors to conclude that if the British attack had been delayed a few hours they could have inflicted on the Turks a defeat similar to the one actually inflicted on the British. For example:

As a matter of fact they were on the point of making a general attack in Helles the very day we made one first. This must have doubled our casualties there. (Sir Compton Mackenzie, Gallipoli Memories, 1929)

The enemy's trenches and communication trenches were crowded with troops. They had been preparing for an attack. Our fellows wished for nothing more. We had the bad fortune to anticipate them by an hour or two. (William Ewing, From Gallipoli to Baghdad, 1919)

Officers' night patrols discovered that they had even designed an attack on our lines that very evening, which was the reason why their trenches were so crowded with men. (Henry Woodd Nevinson, The Dardanelles Campaign, 1919)

 

This is obviously down to Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, which numbers as the third reason for his failure at Helles:

(3) The enemy trenches selected for our attack were found to be packed with troops and so were their communication trenches, the reason being, as explained to us by prisoners, that the Turkish Commander had meant to launch from them an attack upon us. We had, in fact, by a coincidence as strange as it was unlucky, anticipated a Turkish offensive by an hour or two at most.

This claim is suspicious not only because it provides a convenient excuse for defeat but because, as I understand it, the Turks were expecting some kind of trouble at the start of August and were unlikely to imperil their position by risking an attack. So it seems quite plausible that this was just a rumour, given widespread currency by General Hamilton in his efforts to exculpate himself.

However, I haven't seen any actual evidence one way or another. Does anyone know whether Turkish/German sources address this claim, or indicate any intention to attack at the start of August?

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

A check of books of Erickson makes no mention of any increase of Ottoman numbers.

While the ottoman/German saw the build up and correctly guessed an attack was coming, if Troops did fill the trenches, as you stated,  it was at a local level not by order that I can see, but I am sure the others can give you more.

The Ottomans were getting ready for there Anafarta Muharebeler operations, but this August attack along the whole front, put pay to that, but Ottomans Troops were ready to move Troops when the direction of the attack was confirmed.

S.B

[michaeldr]

The Turkish Gen Staff Study 'A Brief History of the Canakkale Campaign' gives the following (p.184/5) 
"The Attack Plan of the Turkish Southern Group:
Southern Group Commander Vehip Pasha; has given up his characteristic attack as soon as the new reinforcement forces arrived, with the help of his past experience, in opposition to Liman von Sanders.
At last, Vice Commander in Chief Enver Pasha during his visit to the front Sanders was persuaded with a small drill demonstrated; and Vehip Pasha's decision (that the best plan would be a defensive one) was accepted.
Thus, the tactic of Southern Group was “to defend the line, and if English and French troops attack they were to be repulsed, and a counter-attack should be launched to alleviate their strength and persistence of the enemy while disintegrating their morale.” "

The original is obviously in Turkish and, it has to be said, the above is not a great translation by 
The Turkish General Staff Directorate of Military History and Strategic Studies and Directorate of Inspection Publications

Basically, as I understand it, LvS's position was something like 'the best defence, is attack'
However he was persuaded by the Ottoman Staff that in this case he should first wait for the enemy's attack, and then make a counter attack in force. 
Ed Erickson (in his Gallipoli – The Ottoman Campaign [p.140]) puts it thus:
“It was a well-balanced posture characterized by defence in depth and reserve capability (almost half of Vehip's combat power was in reserve).”
The British OH [vol.II, p.171] gives 
“... all preparations had been made to meet eventualities and the Turkish battle-front in the south was well organized and prepared.”
With regard to the attack of the 88th Brigade, the OH goes on to say 
“The strength of the Turkish defensive organization had been gravely miscalculated.”

So, no definitive signs of a Turkish attack as such, 
however definite signs of planning for a vigorous and immediate counter-attack in strength

Edited 25 January , 2023 by michaeldr

[michaeldr]

2 hours ago, FuManchu18 said:

This claim is suspicious not only because it provides a convenient excuse for defeat but because, as I understand it, the Turks were expecting some kind of trouble at the start of August and were unlikely to imperil their position by risking an attack. So it seems quite plausible that this was just a rumour, given widespread currency by General Hamilton in his efforts to exculpate himself.

Much of the blame here should go, not to Hamilton, but to the inadequate provision of artillery by The War Office in London. 
The British OH [vol.II, p.168, footnote 1] gives the available artillery as 
4  x  60-pdrs
16  x  Howitzers
84  x  18-pdrs
10  x  15-pdrs 
plus
6  x French Howitzers 
1 French Brigade 75s

However, the 91st Heavy Battery RGA (4  x  60-pdrs) were all out of action due to 'trouble with recoil springs'

General Davies (VIII Corps CO designate) watching the battle was 
“horrified at the total inadequacy of the British 'bombardment.'”

Not only was the bombardment inadequate, but the natural geography of the battlefield allowed the Turks to take shelter from the bombardment in the deep nullahs, some with banks 10-20 feet high and from which they quickly re-manned their positions.

[alantwo]

On 25/01/2023 at 11:04, michaeldr said:

However, the 91st Heavy Battery RGA (4  x  60-pdrs) were all out of action due to 'trouble with recoil springs'

Hi Michael

I hesitate to comment on the Official History but on the dates in question, 6th/7th August, 91st Heavy Battery only had one gun out of action. The Battery did progressively lose guns over the next few days and it was on the 12th when the last serviceable gun, No.1 Right Section, stopped firing. The total of four guns out of action referred to might include 90th Heavy Battery, they had at least two guns unserviceable by the 6th/7th. 

Best wishes

Alan

[michaeldr]

Hi Alan,

Good to hear from you again and thank you for pointing out the discrepancy here. 
I'm not clear as to where exactly Aspinall-Oglander has slipped-up, but he may have been caught out by the two batteries appearing under separate commands. Farndale's* OoB has the 90th Heavy Battery RGA listed under the '29th Division' and the 91st Heavy Battery RGA under 'GHQ Troops'
Or, perhaps he had previously seen Lt Col Johnson's ** book and picked up on the latter's “August 6th-12^th: All the 60 pdrs of the 91^st Heavy Battery were out of action owing to excessive recoil.”

It's impossible to say at this stage where he went astray, but good to have your clarification

Best regards
Michael

 

*   'The Forgotten Fronts & the Home Base, 1914-1918'

** '29^th Divisional Artillery War Record & Honours Book 1914-1918'

[michaeldr]

FuManchu18 – how are you? We haven't heard from you since your opening post; Are you still interested in this subject?

On 25/01/2023 at 08:11, FuManchu18 said:

it seems quite plausible that this was just a rumour, given widespread currency by General Hamilton in his efforts to exculpate himself.

 Keyes mentions this in a letter to his wife dated 16th August 1915
“At Helles, … they advanced and took 2 or 3 lines of trenches, but as bad luck would have it the Turks had accumulated new troops and were in great force; they intended to attack us that night!”
So that interpretation of events goes back to almost the time of the action itself, rather than the later period, say, when everyone was writing their memoirs. 

Edited 23 February , 2023 by michaeldr

[FuManchu18]

Thanks everyone for your very helpful replies. I've been doing a bit more digging (and have lined up a National Archives visit to examine Dardanelles Commission testimony on the battle), and I'm still inclining to the belief that the claim is most probably the result of (a) the Turkish defences being stronger and better manned than expected, as a result of reinforcements and a readiness to counterattack, and (b) a rumour that spread rapidly because everyone wanted to believe it. Even if it originated with a Turkish prisoner it would be no guarantee of its truth, given the language barrier and the unreliability of prisoner testimony generally.

Having been told that the Turks were almost beaten, and impressed by what seemed (to anyone not acquainted with France) a devastating barrage, it would be no surprise if the strength of the defences led some of the British to assume subsequently that there must have been a specific reason for it. There is little in the way of actual contemporaneous evidence, however: few of the attackers on August 6th actually reached the Turkish front line so it would not have needed a huge force of Turks to subdue them, and reconnaissance later that day would have encountered intact trenches full of alerted Turks called up from the reserve line.

Letters written immediately afterwards by privates and NCOs don't refer to finding a Turkish attack in waiting; mainly they just talk about hitting the ground and staying there when they realised how heavy the fire was. Recollections from several British soldiers captured during the battle also don't refer to any impression of the Turkish trenches being full of troops massed for an attack: Pte. Sidney Lawrence of the 4th Worcesters testified to Peter Liddle that he and three others had held out for hours in an empty trench and were only taken when some Turks got round them and jumped them from behind. Ultimately the effect of machine-gun and rifle fire on a direct charge - in the open, in daylight, and without proper artillery support - is so well documented that there may be no need to search for excuses.

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

As stated all records show the Ottomans were going to attack, but just not at that time.

As Michael shows German/Ottomans orders were to always attack and this was being done at Helles.

Divisions were put in motion and stores gathered, but that takes time on the peninsular

I could find no date for any attack but later in the month and there was no stacking the trenches that I could find any where during the first week in Aug.

Any stacking seen must have been at a local level by the local commander, as I can't find any reason to do it

If you know the area of the attack given we may find who that was

As to what Hamilton said "The enemy trenches selected for our attack were found to be packed with troops and so were their communication trenches"

This is not what happening on the ground, was Hamilton "Guilding the lilly" to explane his failure?

S.B

[michaeldr]

After hearing the evidence presented to them, The Dardanelles Commission also came to the conclusion that the trenches were “found to be occupied by a strong force of Turks collected there for the purpose of an attack” - see p.90 of 'Defeat at Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Part II – 1915-1916,' Uncovered Editions, 2000 (originally published as Cmd 371, 1918)

 

[michaeldr]

Another revealing comment from The Dardanelles Commission came from the evidence of General Sir Ian Hamilton in answer to a question by Lord Nicholson

Hamilton was not resposible for the lack of artillery support; the blame for that lies with the War Office and Kitchener in London. Hamilton was ordered to do a job, and he had to get on with it as best he could, with the resources which were provided, however modest they might have been. 

The barrage was limited and ineffective; the more so, bearing in mind the physical geography of the terrain. Turkish trenches which should have been cleared if a full compliment of artillery had been available, were not so cleared, and the attacking infantrymen paid the price.

 

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Yet there is not evidence on the Ottoman side?

I did see this that may explan it, as the Ottomans saw the attack coming and made ready for it.?

In Early Aug Vehip soldified the defence of the Southern Group using three Corps

XIV (1 and 10 Divs) V Corps (13 & 14 Divs ans II Corps (4 & 8 Divs) 

Div's placed two Regts up and one in Reserve.

The British attacked these strongly held lines and suffered heavy losses. see page 140 Gallipoli by Erickson

So what the British think was an attack by the Ottomans was in fact local commanders getting ready for the British attack.

I am still not 100% that the Ottoman did stack there trenches, but I surppose that may of happened in places.

S.B

[michaeldr]

I think that I've already covered that point, Steve

On 25/01/2023 at 10:13, michaeldr said:

The Turkish Gen Staff Study 'A Brief History of the Canakkale Campaign' gives the following (p.184/5) 
"The Attack Plan of the Turkish Southern Group:
Southern Group Commander Vehip Pasha; has given up his characteristic attack as soon as the new reinforcement forces arrived, with the help of his past experience, in opposition to Liman von Sanders.
At last, Vice Commander in Chief Enver Pasha during his visit to the front Sanders was persuaded with a small drill demonstrated; and Vehip Pasha's decision (that the best plan would be a defensive one) was accepted.
Thus, the tactic of Southern Group was “to defend the line, and if English and French troops attack they were to be repulsed, and a counter-attack should be launched to alleviate their strength and persistence of the enemy while disintegrating their morale.” "

 

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Yes agreed, but you use Hamiltion, who still makes the point that they were there to attack him.

Clearly that is not what the Ottomans/Germans were thinking when the British attacked.

While German did always counter attack, which was there standard Motis op

S.B

[FuManchu18]

25 minutes ago, michaeldr said:

After hearing the evidence presented to them, The Dardanelles Commission also came to the conclusion that the trenches were “found to be occupied by a strong force of Turks collected there for the purpose of an attack” - see p.90 of 'Defeat at Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Part II – 1915-1916,' Uncovered Editions, 2000 (originally published as Cmd 371, 1918)

I also pondered this conclusion by the Commission. Looking at the list of people who gave evidence to them, however, I note that their three key sources on the battle of 6th August at Helles would have been:

(i) Sir Ian Hamilton - who had already perpetuated the 'Turkish attack' story in his last dispatch and therefore would have stuck to it.

(ii) Colonel H. E. Street, de facto commander of VIII Corps between Hunter-Weston's departure and Sir Francis Davies' arrival - who was, according to Aspinall-Oglander, largely to blame for the attack.

(iii) General de Lisle, commander of the 29th Division - who, according to documents in the VIII Corps war diary, did much to promote the idea of the attack.

All three had excellent reasons for finding excuses for its failure; it may be no surprise that the Commission's conclusion largely repeated the existing story.

[michaeldr]

18 hours ago, FuManchu18 said:

Letters written immediately afterwards by privates and NCOs don't refer to finding a Turkish attack in waiting;

Doesn't it boil down to who has the better view of the battlefield? Is it the HQ & Staff, or is it the private and the NCO?

The latter may see only the few yards in front of them and may even be unable to comprehend fully the situation their own battalion, let alone that of the competing armies

 

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Yes, but who has the better view, the British commanders covering there bums, or the Ottoman commanders who stopped the attacks.

In this case I go with the Ottomans/Germans, as they had no reason to cover up, unlike Hamilton, who again wasted hundreds of lives

Could it also be Hamilton,  just not under standing what his men are seeing and reported back to HQ.

He's taking one plus one and coming to three 

There are many reasons for stacking your trenches, other then an attack

And as the Ottomans tell us that maybe just the local commander getting ready for the British attack, not him getting ready to attack the British.

What I remember right it was German policy to stack there trenches in France, until the Somme battles (1916) made them change there system, after suffering so many losses from Artillery fire, made them thin them out and develop a tiered system of defence.

Cheers

S.B