Battle of Imbros, 20 January 1918

[michaeldr]

SORTIE OF “GOEBEN” AND “BRESLAU.”

[From the 'Mitchell Report' – SECTION III – p. 411]

In January, 1918, “Goeben” and “Breslau” determined to make a sortie from the Dardanelles with the view of destroying the monitors at Kusu Bay and then attacking Mudros, mainly with the object of raising morale. The Germans were fully aware of the presence of mines at the entrance of the Straits and had a good idea of their positions; this they had obtained from a chart taken from some small craft off Rabbit Island, and also from watching our minelayers and patrols and by aeroplane observation. 
The Germans were confident that the “Goeben” would not, owing to her construction, sustain any serious damage from striking a mine, and therefore decided to pass right over one of the British lines of mines; this, Lieut-Commander Baltzer stated, enabled them to keep out of sight of the look-out station on Mavro Island. In point of fact, the “Goeben” did hit a mine at this point, but being well forward, the hole made did not affect her at all. After sinking the two monitors in Kuşu Bay and when proceeding for Mudros, the “Breslau” struck a mine and had her stern blown off. Later, she struck more mines and sank. “Goeben” herself struck a second mine, and this being abreast the boiler room and causing the bulkhead to buckle badly, "Goeben” decided to return. When doing so she hit a third mine. This mine struck abreast the engine room and had a very similar effect to the second mine. Proceeding up the Straits at 18 knots, “Goeben” made a mistake as to the buoys and ran aground at Nagara Point. 

(A) German Account of Sortie. 

A full account of these operations was obtained from Lieut.-Commander Baltzer, German Navy, who was on board “Goeben,” by the Naval Attaché to the High Commissioner at Constantinople, as follows :— 
“The following account of the sortie of the “Yawuz Sultan Selim” (Goeben) Captain Stoelzel, “Midilli” (Breslau) Captain von Hippel, and four torpedo boat destroyers, 'Muavanet-i-Millet,' 'Noumoune-i-Hamiyet,’ ‘Basra' and 'Samsoun,' on 20th January, 1918, has been compiled from conversation with a German Naval officer who commanded No. 3 turret and kept the morning watch on board the “Goeben” on that day. 
“Note.—Although, strictly speaking, the two large vessels engaged were the 'Yawuz Sultan Selim’ (the grim 'Sultan Selim’) and 'Midilli' their former and better known German names, 'Goeben’ and 'Breslau,' have been retained in the following account.
“The destruction of the Zagouldak coalfields by Russian warships had seriously affected the coal supply of Turkey in general and Constantinople in particular. 
“Some coal was brought by rail from Germany, but this was mostly required for working the Anatolian railway system and the needs of the city, and it was not until January, 1918, that, thanks to the withdrawal of Russian Naval power in the Black Sea, sufficient coal became available for large Naval operations. 
“In the early days of January, 1918, a chart was obtained from some small craft in the neighbourhood of Rabbit Island, on which were drawn certain lines which the German Intelligence Staff believed to represent the position of various lines of mines. This information, coupled with the reconnaissance reports received from their aircraft, made them confident that they were acquainted with the position of all minefields. 
“Hitherto the presence of a British submarine in Kephalo Bay had exercised considerable influence on any question of operations outside the Dardanelles, but it was known that she had apparently been withdrawn, and consequently it was considered that a sortie could now be made with little risk. “The question of risk had an important bearing on the objective, since because the ships were Turkish vessels, it was necessary to obtain the sanction of the Turkish authorities to any operations in which they might take part, which would not have been the case had they been considered to be German ships. 
“One objective which had been considered by the German Staff was to block the Suez Canal by sinking the 'Goeben' in it, but as this would have entailed the loss of the ship, it was thought unlikely the Turks would agree. ‘‘The objective on 20th January was twofold (a) To destroy the British monitors and other craft watching the entrance of the Dardanelles and to do as much damage as possible to the Naval base in Port Mudros; (b) to raise the morale of the Navy, especially the German crews. 
“As regards Mudros, it was arranged that a German submarine, U.C.23, would be watching the entrance and at once report by wireless the exit of any British vessels. It was also intended to bombard the Naval base inside Port Mudros from a position outside to the south-eastward of the Island with aircraft spotting; or, if conditions were favourable, to enter the harbour itself. 
“U.C.23 saw nothing and consequently made no reports. 
"Great secrecy was maintained about this operation, the crew of 'Goeben’ were only informed of what was to happen on the morning after leaving Stenia, and the captains of the torpedo boat destroyers had no instructions until they reached Princes' Island, so much so that no special preparations for action had been made on board. 
"The ‘Goeben,' 'Breslau,' ‘Muavanet-i-Millet,’ 'Noumoune-i-Hamiyet,’ ‘Basra’ and ‘Samsoun,’ left Constantinople at noon on the 19th, and, after exercising manœuvres off Princes’ Island, proceeded through the Dardanelles under Vice Admiral von Rebeur-Paschwitz, the successor of Rear-Admiral Souchon, passing the Nagara Net about 4 a.m. and Seddel Bahr at about 5 a.m. 
"All six vessels wore Turkish colours; the officers and crews of 'Goeben’ and 'Breslau’ were German, but each carried a small number of Turkish officers and men, about three officers and 100 men on board 'Goeben,’ and two officers and 40 men on board 'Breslau.’ The four torpedo boat destroyers were under the command of a German, Lieut.-Commander Kagerah, Liaison Officer, who more or less took charge according to circumstances and personality, with a few German specialists. 
"Mavro Island was passed on a course S. 37 deg. W. at a distance of about four to five miles, and a light observed on the Island. When passing Mavro a British patrol vessel was sighted about one mile to starboard proceeding slowly, who did not appear to observe the passing ships; her first sight was due to a light, believed to be in her chart house, but subsequently her hull and deck could be clearly distinguished. 
"When to the westward of Mavro and steaming at 15 knots, 'Goeben' struck a mine abreast the bridge the port side, but no alteration in the programme was made. 
“At about 6.30 a.m. course was altered to the northward, and, steering on an approximate N.N.E. course, with ‘Breslau’ stationed about a mile ahead, Cape Kephalo was passed abeam about 7 a.m., four to five miles distant, and a few rounds were fired at the signal station on the point. 
"At about 8a.m., with  'Breslau’ some two miles ahead, fire was opened by 'Breslau’ on the monitors in Kusu Bay and on patrol vessels to the north-westward, and by ‘Goeben' on the monitors in Kusu Bay. About six or seven salvos were fired by 'Goeben' from her turrets at a range of about 7,000 yds. 'Raglan’ was seen to fire a few rounds towards ‘Breslau'; ‘Goeben’ was not struck at all. During this engagement the torpedo boat destroyers, whose speed was insufficient to enable them to accompany ' Goeben,’ remained waiting off the entrance to the Dardanelles, in readiness to answer a call in case of attack by submarine, but in any case it was not intended that they would accompany the large ships to Mudros. 
“The monitors having been sunk, course was altered to the southward, with the intention of proceeding to Mudros to complete the programme. 
"Soon after turning, ‘Breslau' being astern, they were attacked by aircraft, and as the shells from 'Goeben's' anti-aircraft guns were falling about 'Breslau,' the latter was ordered to take station ahead. Whilst overhauling ‘Goeben,’ ‘Breslau' struck a mine and ‘Goeben’ turned to take her in tow. Hawsers were passed, but whilst passing them many mines were seen and were only avoided by 'Goeben,’ thanks to an officer on 'Breslau's’ forecastle hailing and pointing out their direction. The mine appears to have struck 'Breslau’ under her stern as both screws and rudder and the stern of the ship were blow off, and the officers on board ‘Goeben’ could see right into the interior of the ship. It was soon apparent that ‘Breslau' could not float, and so hawsers were cast off and 'Goeben’ proceeded alone, still with the intention of attacking Mudros. 
"About 9 a.m., when steering to the south-south-westward for Mudros, 'Goeben’ struck a second mine on the port side a little before No. 3 turret, after which the Admiral decided to abandon the attack on Mudros and to return to Constantinople. 
"During this time the ‘Breslau’ struck three more mines and sank, whilst the torpedo boat destroyers were going to her assistance. 'Goeben’ followed the same route on the homeward journey as on the outwards, with the intention of passing through the gap in the minefield which she had made on the outward journey and whose position had been marked by throwing over a small black buoy. This buoy could not be found, and when 'Goeben’ arrived at about the position where it was supposed to be, she struck her third mine on her starboard side abreast of No. 3 turret, but continuing her course without stopping and the aircraft continuing their attacks, eventually passed Seddel Bahr about 11 a.m. 
“The torpedo boat destroyers which had gone to the assistance of ‘Breslau' had been engaged by the British torpedo boat destroyers, and after 'Basra' had received two hits, which did not explode, they were recalled by W/T from ‘Goeben'. 
“On approaching Nagara Point, the Captain noticed, but too late, that there was a mistake on the chart with regard to the net buoys. The Captain believed the easternmost buoy to be the end buoy of the net and was unaware that an additional buoy, not shown on the chart, had been laid to mark the shoal off the point, with the result that when endeavouring to pass eastward of the mark buoy, 'Goeben’ took the ground at about 12.30 p.m. 
"Salvage operations were at once commenced, including the removal of coal, ammunition, etc., to the extent of the lighters available. 
"Acting on experience gained during some salvage operations at Zagouldak, it was decided to try to cut away the sand bank from under 'Goeben's’ port side. For this purpose the battleship 'Toorgood-Reiss,' 9,901 tons displacement, was secured to the port side, stern to bow, with her stern close up to the sand bank and her engines worked ahead. By this means the sand was loosened and washed away by the current constantly flowing southward through the Straits. As the work proceeded the  'Toorgood-Reiss’ was moved bit by bit towards the bows of 'Goeben' and the stern hawsers shortened up until eventually with the assistance of tugs, 'Toorgood-Reiss’ succeeded in towing her off on the 26th, and the 'Goeben’ arrived at Constantinople on the morning of the Kaiser’s birthday, 27th January; but, probably on account of the loss of 'Breslau,’ there was no great demonstration.  “She was berthed at Stenia and preparations put in hand for the repair of one of the mine holes by means of a coffer-dam. At the end of April, 'Goeben' went to Sebastopol and into dry dock in June. 
"Owing to mistrust of Russian Bolshevik-infected workmen, whom it was feared might take advantage of the situation, none but German were employed in the dry dock, and those were not able to carry out the necessary repairs; consequently, the ship returned to Constantinople in July unrepaired. 
“Repairs to one mine hole on the port side were eventually completed in October, but the other two remain unrepaired to this day, and the buckled though water-tight fore and aft bulkheads of engine room and stokehold bear testimony to the structural strength of the hull. 
"The night of 19th/20th January, when ‘Goeben’ passed through the Dardanelles, was remarkable as being the only really clear night during a period of about 10 days, and it was considered that the failure of the British aircraft to obtain better results with their bombs must have been largely due to the misty weather. 
"At first, so I have been informed by a Turkish officer, they were much alarmed by the British bombing operations, and all hands took cover on the approach of the aircraft, but the poor results of the first attacks encouraged them, so that subsequently, on the approach of aircraft, boats were manned to collect the fish. 
"Of about 250 bombs dropped, only two small ones struck the ship, one on the net shelf and one on the funnel casing, both causing but little damage.”

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 

 

British casualties from the monitors M.28 and Raglan, and from the RNAS, can be seen here: https://www.naval-history.net/xDKCas1918-01Jan.htm  One Greek airman also died in this action
When the Breslau sank, 336 German crewmen died and a list can be found in Appendix 3 [p.328-33] of Klaus Wolf's book 'Victory at Gallipoli 1915' translated by Thomas P. Iredale, published by Pen & Sword Military and the Gallipoli Association, 2020 [ISBN 978 1 52676 816 2]

Edited 28 January , 2023 by michaeldr

[michaeldr]

On 20/01/2023 at 07:58, michaeldr said:

“On approaching Nagara Point, the Captain noticed, but too late, that there was a mistake on the chart with regard to the net buoys. The Captain believed the easternmost buoy to be the end buoy of the net and was unaware that an additional buoy, not shown on the chart, had been laid to mark the shoal off the point, with the result that when endeavouring to pass eastward of the mark buoy, 'Goeben’ took the ground at about 12.30 p.m. 
"Salvage operations were at once commenced, including the removal of coal, ammunition, etc., to the extent of the lighters available. 
"Acting on experience gained during some salvage operations at Zagouldak, it was decided to try to cut away the sand bank from under 'Goeben's’ port side. For this purpose the battleship 'Toorgood-Reiss,' 9,901 tons displacement, was secured to the port side, stern to bow, with her stern close up to the sand bank and her engines worked ahead. By this means the sand was loosened and washed away by the current constantly flowing southward through the Straits. As the work proceeded the  'Toorgood-Reiss’ was moved bit by bit towards the bows of 'Goeben' and the stern hawsers shortened up until eventually with the assistance of tugs, 'Toorgood-Reiss’ succeeded in towing her off on the 26th,

Today, 26th January, is the anniversary of the epilogue or postscript, to the Battle of Imbros, when the retreating Goeben (Yawuz Sultan Selim) was finally freed from the sandbank at Nağara and able to proceed to Istanbul.

During the period of her grounding, the battlecruiser was subjected to multiple allied bombing raids. Alas, aerial bombing was an art as yet in its infancy and none were successful in causing meaningful damage. 

Two hundred and seventy flights were made and 15 tons of bombs dropped. Apparently only one bomb hit the Goeben and did damage to a funnel. 

The allied losses in aircraft were given as:—Blackburn Baby seaplane was shot down in flames, 0800, 20th January; a Greek R.N.A.S. machine was shot down by anti-aircraft gun fire, 23rd sometime after noon. It is thought that the Greek pilot is buried in the Consular Cemetery at Çanakkale. 

(from Goeben by Matti E. Mäkelä)

 

Commander Assaf Bey of the Turkish navy provided an account of the grounding of the Goeben and gave the following details of her refloating from the sandbank [from the 'Mitchell Report']

“... Assaf from his office at Nağara, saw Goeben returning at 17 knots. She seemed to be keeping too close to the Asiatic shore all the way and he expected trouble when she got to Nağara. 
She left the red and white striped buoy on the port instead of the starboard hand and consequently ran up on Nağara Spit at 17 knots. 
She then had only 1ft. of water up to the second funnel, but further aft it became rapidly deeper; it was consequently possible to work the propellers. Goeben heeled over to the port side, due to the damage previously sustained by mines; to bring her upright, most of the work was therefore done on the starboard side. 
The following vessels were placed alongside Goeben with their propellers working in the sand to dredge out a bed for her:— 
Toorgood-Reiss — Battleship, port side. 
Kelkireh
Gerasin — Mine carrier. 
Nousret — Minelayer, specially built as such. 
Intibah — Converted minelayer (salvage steamer). 
Alemdar — Salvage steamer (crane ship). 
All coal and ammunition was removed. 
Assaf said 220 bombs were dropped, which gave them ‘plenty of fish.’ No one was killed. After evacuation by the above means, Goeben began to move. Then with Intibah port side, Alemdar starboard side, Toorgood-Reiss towing from stem, anchors laid out astern from either bow at an angle of 45 deg., and Goeben herself working her propellers, the ship came off. Later, Goeben proceeded at night under her own steam to Constantinople. 
Whilst Goeben was aground, a 250 metre (820 ft.) torpedo net, small mesh, was laid out astern to protect her from submarine attack. 
E.14 arrived too late.” 

(from Goeben by Matti E. Mäkelä)

 

 The British submarine E.14 was sent into the Dardanelles to attack the stranded Goeben, but it was indeed too late as the quarry had already escaped.

Commander Assaf Bey of the Turkish Navy, was in charge of the anti-submarine net at Nağara and he gave this account of the British submarine's attempted attack and her fate [from the Mitchell Report]
“E.14 got as far as the sunken Scutari, south of Nağara, and was finally herself sunk off Kum Kale by torpedo craft and guns. 
There were two hydrophones, one at Hamidieh and one in the duty motor boat at the net at Nagara. These hydrophones had six microphones in them and gave good results. 
Hamidieh Fort sighted and reported a periscope. 
The gunboat Kemal Reis was lying at Coal Place, near Nağara, without steam, waiting for the German Admiral Usedom Pasha to return to Constantinople. Intibah was embarking ammunition at the pier. 
A dredger had arrived that day. 
Kemal Reis, Intibah and all the batteries were warned of the approach of the submarine. 
The net motor boat soon reported hearing the submarine approaching on his hydrophone. Assaf Bey embarked on another motor boat. Suddenly, between Scutari and the Gharb, another sunken vessel, and nearer to the latter, an explosion took place. The submarine then broke surface and the guns opened fire on her. 
Kemal Reis and a battery hit the conning tower of the submarine. 
Assaf then approached submarine, which disappeared. Air bubbles, however, were coming to the surface and she was apparently making for Kilia on the north shore. The sea was quite calm. Assaf, allowing for current, dropped a depth charge with five minutes' delay and set for 30 metres (98 ft.) close to her. When this exploded the submarine’s stem appeared on surface, but she disappeared immediately. She then made her way to Kum Kale, but there had to come to the surface and was sunk. Her helm was apparently put out of order by the depth charge.”

Lieutenant Commander Geoffrey White RN received a posthumous VC – see https://www.naval-history.net/WW1MedalsBr-VC.htm
and a list of the E.14's casualties and PoWs can be found here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKCas1918-01Jan.htm

 

Edited 26 January , 2023 by michaeldr

[michaeldr]

On 26/01/2023 at 17:51, michaeldr said:

Lieutenant Commander Geoffrey White RN received a posthumous VC – see https://www.naval-history.net/WW1MedalsBr-VC.htm
and a list of the E.14's casualties and PoWs can be found here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKCas1918-01Jan.htm

Today, 28th January, is the anniversary of the sinking of E.14 in 1918. Some 11 years ago her wreck was discovered off Kum Kale and a report of that finding can be seen here https://divers24.pl/en/782-hms-e14-wreck-found/

 

[michaeldr]

On this page http://kaanaltin.com/e-14subeng.html you will find the text of a letter written by one of the crew of E.14. It is addressed to his parents and dated 19th December 1918 (after his release from captivity), and gives a first hand account of the last voyage of the E.14.  
The webpage has the writer as a Lieutenant with the name Reuben, however looking at the list of PoWs from E.14, this letter must have been written by AB Reuben Joseph Edwin Mitchell, DSM [https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/R1545271]

[award to Mitchell corrected as per H2's post below - With thanks to H2]

 

Edited 28 January , 2023 by michaeldr

[horatio2]

21 minutes ago, michaeldr said:

AB Reuben Joseph Edwin Mitchell, DCM

DSM Honours for Miscellaneous Services., LG 3 May 1919 A.B. Reuben Joseph Edwin Mitchell, R.A.N., O.N. 7476. 

Edited 28 January , 2023 by horatio2

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

On going through my records I could find not one German lost (killed or wounded) during this action from the SMS Goeben (Yavuz)

While we have the many lost from the SMS Breslau (Midilli)

I find that I must have missed someone, but no?

I do have a few that transfered to SMS Breslau (Midilli) from Goeben

Are you a where of any casualties?

S.B

[michaeldr]

Steve,

 

Unlikely as it may seem, none of the sources which I have access to mention casualty figures for the Goeben either.

Although she was damaged by three mines, it is possible that during the action off Imbros she was not hit by allied fire [see post No1 above - “'Raglan’ was seen to fire a few rounds towards ‘Breslau'; ‘Goeben’ was not struck at all.”]

The Goeben was a well built and well armoured ship, in addition to which her coal bunkers seem to have been strategically placed to lessen any damage from mines and in this respect they were successful. Even after three strikes, she was still making 14 - 17 knots into the Dardanelles.

As already mentioned above, the aerial bombardment was unsuccessful (to a large extent no doubt due to bad weather and poor visibility) except for 1 confirmed hit which was against the casing of one funnel.

Casualties apart, this was the last naval action of this battlecruiser in the Great War; see post No.1 above “Repairs to one mine hole on the port side were eventually completed in October (1918) but the other two remain unrepaired to this day (1919), and the buckled though water-tight fore and aft bulkheads of engine room and stokehold bear testimony to the structural strength of the hull.”

In fact the vessel was not fully repaired and able to re-join the Turkish fleet until 1930.

[from Die Kreuzerfahrten der Goeben und Breslau by Korvettenkapitans Kraus & Donitz]

 

 

Edited 30 January , 2023 by michaeldr
to add pic.

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

I was rereading this and looking into where reports came for the Fleet to sortie, and the reason for sortieing?

Clearly the mention here of doing it " for the object of morale" looks like the best answer I can also find.

To engage or clear the Monitors, does not seam a likely answer either?

The defences as stated were mostly known, but still up to date details, were limited by the loss of aircraft doing this job

The fight on the 17 Jan 1918 and the loss of two planes and four men of the GNSG on a recee of the Islands

And the loss of another GNSG plane on the 18 Jan 1918 helping in the Mine clearing operation before hand

I am still think it was the new commander (Rebeur-Paschwitz) pushing the action, but why 

With Russian now out of the war, glory could only be found in the Med 

Consider he sent time as Commander of the Reconnaissance Ships and Inspector of Training Affairs of the Navy and commander of the 2nd Crusier Sqn in the Baltic

So why didn't he spend more time receeing the area and confirming the mine fields, just at say, because the ship could take mine hits, seams a bit silly

Why didn't he have the GNSG fly over head protection or at lest cover and recee.

Since he arrived at the Island without mishap, why didn't he use the same lanes back, instead of going throw the mine fields?

While the Mitchell report you give sounds Interesting, what did the Germans write about this is there something in the German Offical war History, or a report by Paschwitz on his sortie?

[michaeldr]

12 hours ago, stevenbecker said:

what did the Germans write about this is there something in the German Offical war History, or a report by Paschwitz on his sortie?

I can't help you with that one Steve, however this link will take you to another interesting read on this action - Chapter 19 – The Last Sortie, from the book Superior Force by Geoffrey Miller https://www.flamboroughmanor.co.uk/superiorforce/chapter19.htm 

You may get some help there

[michaeldr]

Another good read on this subject is available here from page 285 onwards 

https://www.google.co.il/books/edition/Seas_of_Adventures/Ck0yAQAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA13&printsec=frontcover

[stevenbecker]

Michael,

As always mate great.

Confirms most of what I thought about the sortie and the Commander Paschwitz

It was a fool's mission from start to finish, from the replaning, to the sortie and to the grounding.

I am surprised he kept his job for so long after the sortie?