"Independent" formations

[Hazel Basford]

I mentioned the Kent Independent Force in a topic on Home Defence that I began a few years ago, but it attracted only a few replies and not really the information I was seeking, so I am trying again but with a more specific question.

What does the word "independent" mean when applied to formations such as "The Independent Air Force", "The Kent Independent Force" and - the latest I have come across - "293rd Independent Brigade, RFA".

I hope somebody out there can enlighten me!

[Wienand Drenth]

Hello,

"Independent" might indicate that a formation is not part of a higher formation it usually forms part of. For example, an infantry brigade is usually found in a division, being the higher formation. If an infantry brigade is not part of a division, but falls directly under Army HQ for example, you might call it independent.

In the end no formation is independent, as it is the War Office that had ultimate control. So, "independent" is rather arbitrary.

Just my 2 cents.

Wienand

[PhilB]

Exactly how I understand it, Wienand. Not subject to its normal command but to a higher one. I suspect that in WW2 it might have meant a little more in that units could operate remote from command and would have to make their own tactical and possibly strategic decisions. Phil B

[Borden Battery]

The Canadian Expeditionary Force established several "Independent Forces" during the latter part of the Great War. Here are some edited excerpts from a 1926 summary of operations of units associated with the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

In this case, these "Independent Forces" were intended to exploit any breaks in the German line during the Last One Hundred Days. The forces were totally mobile and were in direct communication with both Headquarters and overhead aircraft via spark wireless communication. One might say the forefunner of a "Blitzkreig" formation.

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The formation of a mobile force for use in offensive operations had been under consideration and it was decided to organize a "Canadian Independent Force". This force came into effect on 2nd August, 1918, and was composed of the following units:-

H.Q., Canadian Machine Gun Corps.

1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

Canadian Cyclist Battalion.

5th Canadian Trench Mortar Section.

1 Corps Wireless Section.

Canadian Motor Machine Gun Mechanical Transport Co.

The force itself was sub-divided as under:-

H.Q., the Commander; two staff officers, etc.; wireless section; 10 motor cyclists.

Armoured Car Detachment: 4 armoured auto-cars (two from each M.M.G. Bde - 16 guns); 1 platoon cyclists; 10 motor cyclists.

Trench Mortar Section; 2 lorries each containing 1-6" Newton trench mortar.

No. 1 Group (1st Cdn. M.M.G.Bde.): 5 motor machine gun batteries (40 guns); 2 platoons cyclists; 20 motor cyclists.

No. 2 Group (2nd Cdn. M.M.G.Bde.): 5 motor machine gun batteries (40 guns); 2 platoons cyclists; 20 motor cyclists.

No. 3 Group (Cyclist Bn.): 2 armoured auto-cars (one each from the M.M.G. Bdes.); 4 platoons cyclists; 10 motor cyclists.

Supply Section: ration lorry; ammunition lorry; water lorry; fuel and oil lorry; first aid lorries (2); 5 motor cyclists.

For the Battle of the Drocourt-Quéant Line: 2nd - 3rd September, 1918, Brutinel's Brigade (consisting of 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion) was withdrawn into Corps Reserve on the 30th August for reorganization. Next day the following units were added to the brigade which was to be re-grouped into the Canadian Independent Force (under control of Brig. Genl. R. Brutinel, C.M.G., D.S.O.) for future operations:-

10th Royal Hussars.

Canadian Light Infantry Horse (less 1 1/2 squadrons).

Six heavy armoured cars (17th Tank Battalion).

30th Battery (8th Army Brigade, C.F.A.)

Two sections, medium trench mortars, (5th C.D.A.).

One wireless detachment.

One supply column.

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SOURCE: NARRATIVES COVERING OPERATIONS OF The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, the Canadian Independent Force, the Composite Brigade and Brutinel's Brigade During 1918:- Historical Section, General Staff. OTTAWA, Canada September, 1926. [p. 10 and p. 30]

[Steven Broomfield]

The Canadian Expeditionary Force established several "Independent Forces" during the latter part of the Great War.  Here are some edited excerpts from a 1926 summary of operations of units associated with the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade. 

In this case, these "Independent Forces" were intended to exploit any breaks in the German line during the Last One Hundred Days.  The forces were totally mobile and were in direct communication with both Headquarters and overhead aircraft via spark wireless communication.  One might say the forefunner of a "Blitzkreig" formation.

================================================

The formation of a mobile force for use in offensive operations had been under consideration and it was decided to organize a "Canadian Independent Force".  This force came into effect on 2nd August, 1918, and was composed of the following units:-

H.Q., Canadian Machine Gun Corps.

1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

Canadian Cyclist Battalion.

5th Canadian Trench Mortar Section.

1 Corps Wireless Section.

Canadian Motor Machine Gun Mechanical Transport Co.

The force itself was sub-divided as under:-

H.Q., the Commander; two staff officers, etc.; wireless section; 10 motor cyclists.

Armoured Car Detachment: 4 armoured auto-cars (two from each M.M.G. Bde - 16 guns); 1 platoon cyclists; 10 motor cyclists.

Trench Mortar Section; 2 lorries each containing 1-6" Newton trench mortar.

No. 1 Group (1st Cdn. M.M.G.Bde.): 5 motor machine gun batteries (40 guns); 2 platoons cyclists; 20 motor cyclists.

No. 2 Group (2nd Cdn. M.M.G.Bde.): 5 motor machine gun batteries (40 guns); 2 platoons cyclists; 20 motor cyclists.

No. 3 Group (Cyclist Bn.): 2 armoured auto-cars (one each from the M.M.G. Bdes.); 4 platoons cyclists; 10 motor cyclists.

Supply Section:  ration lorry; ammunition lorry; water lorry; fuel and oil lorry; first aid lorries (2); 5 motor cyclists.

For the Battle of the Drocourt-Quéant Line: 2nd - 3rd September, 1918, Brutinel's Brigade (consisting of 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion) was withdrawn into Corps Reserve on the 30th August for reorganization.  Next day the following units were added to the brigade which was to be re-grouped into the Canadian Independent Force (under control of Brig. Genl. R. Brutinel, C.M.G., D.S.O.) for future operations:-

10th Royal Hussars.

Canadian Light Infantry Horse (less 1 1/2 squadrons).

Six heavy armoured cars (17th Tank Battalion).

30th Battery (8th Army Brigade, C.F.A.)

Two sections, medium trench mortars, (5th C.D.A.).

One wireless detachment.

One supply column.

==================================================

SOURCE:  NARRATIVES COVERING OPERATIONS OF The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, the Canadian Independent Force, the Composite Brigade and Brutinel's Brigade During 1918:- Historical Section, General Staff. OTTAWA, Canada September, 1926. [p. 10 and p. 30]

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

You should also add that it is capable of acting independently. For example, the 19th Brigade, when formed from LoC troops in August 1914, had attached a Field Ambulance, ASC, RAMC, etc, so it could notionally act independently of higher formations (such as Divisions). From the look of it, this was a relatively rare occurrence in the Great War - excepting such things as 'Gater's Independent Force' formed from troops of the 21st Division after the Aisne debacle in May/June '18 - but quite common in a later war!

[Desmond7]

So was an indy formation the forerunner of the 'modern day battlegroup' ?

[Wienand Drenth]

Desmond,

I think you are quite right. When looking at the orders of battle that "Border Battery" gave, the independence of the formation was derived to a great extend from the fact they had their own communications and transport and supply units.

In WW2 the British experimented in the Western Desert with the concept of Armoured Brigade Groups. Though these were subordinate to a divisional command structure (I believe) they were much more self-supporting. However, this concept was not very satisfactory, as the normal brigade structure was adopted later again. I believe that the main problem of the group structure was that though flexible in origin, there was little room to adapt to new tactical situations. That is were the battlegroup comes in.

Wienand

[Steven Broomfield]

Generally, most of the Great War "Independent" formations were ad hoc - the 19th Brigade because, at that stage, there were 4 gash battalions when men were desperately needed in the Line; later, when all organisation had gone in the German Offensives of 1918.

In the Second War, there were various independent formations: Army Tank Brigades were used to add 'punch' to Infantry Divisions; Armoured Brigades were used to exploit the gap created; and so on. The concept of the Brigade Group -, artillery, infantry, medics and so on, really starts with the 19th Brigade (read General Jack's Diary for a good explanation of how he, as Staff Captain, had to acquire units to make up establishment, and how they ebcame 'no-one's children' with regard to supplies, ammunition, uniform, etc)

Also, I suspect Independent formations were created when to have anything larger would have been un-necessary - such as Commando Brigades.

Coming back to the Great War, I guess we have to remember that until the open fighting of the latter part of the war, there wasn't reeally a lot of scope, or need, for independent formations. Having said that, though, we should probably include Army Artillery brigades as 'Independent' formations.

[Borden Battery]

The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade [from the original "Canadian Automobile Machine Gun Brigade No. 1] began recruiting on 11 August 1914 and was formed on 2 September 1914. From its inception, it was totally mobile and hence functionally independent but always tied to higher units and therefore not "independent". However, for the majority of action on the Western Front, and given the static nature of the situation, the Brigade functioned more as a co-ordinated machine gun barrage unit and anti-air craft unit but with its own transport.

During the chaos of the Kaiserschlacht [Operation Michael], the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade [1CMMGB] was dispatched from the Vimy to the Amiens Sector on 6 hours notice and functioned independently along 3 sections of the front under the very loose direction/lack of direction of General Gough's Headquarters from 23 March 1918 until it is brought in to provide some communication, transport and firepower for Carey's Force during the final stand in front of Villers-Brettoneux. During this period the 1CMMGB suffered 50 percent casualties with some batteries such as Borden Battery suffering 93% casualties on 24 March 1918.

In Michael Holden's masters thesis [university of New Brunswick ] and a presented paper [source: http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/holden.htm] he outlined the following:

"On 14 May, the Motors received instructions, which stated that the brigades were to be engaged the following day in ‘Tactical Training carried out under Corps Orders’. The “live fire” drills were designed to teach the men of 1 and 2CMMGB to think and operate in an open warfare setting. The first day witnessed a relatively simple mobile flanking and pincer movement. The first group created a diversionary head-on attack from the north while other motor machine gun batteries paired with half squads of cavalry from the Canadian Light Horse (CLH) and the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion (CCCB) moved in on the position from the east and west. The movements were carried out efficiently and the objective taken very quickly. The following day, the Motors were engaged in another tactical training scheme that required the men to move into a position as if to fill a gap until a replacement infantry brigade could be moved into the line.

On the 21st of May the tactical scheme changed slightly. Some of the Canadians, including the Motors, now represented enemy forces on the attack against a railway line. The change was effected in order to give the men the semblance of opposition and to help the units along the learning curve, with respect to the observation of offensive operations. There were small communication and initial cooperation problems but overall the general exercise was deemed successful.

It is important to understand how the CMMGBs trained during summer 1918 because it had a direct influence on their success during the Hundred Days. In May 1CMMGB and 2CMMGB had been involved in two open warfare tactical schemes. The first, the pincer movement was relatively easy. While the assault on the railway proved a little more difficult, it must be remembered that as of 1 May, the Motors doubled in size. Naturally, the brigades felt some ‘growing pains'. Nonetheless, the exercise proved to be very useful. On the 17th of June the CMMGBs fought in a large tactical scheme, this time on the Allied side.

In this latest exercise the Canadian Corps with an attached mobile force, part of which was comprised by the 1stCMMGB, was sent to reinforce the Allied (British) line and keep the enemy from gaining high ground. The mobile force left its transports, and proceeded to dig in. The Motors used direct and overhead fire to prevent the enemy from establishing a footing in the northern side of a densely wooded area. They were also successful in moving their guns by foot to foil the enemy’s advance on the southern edge of the woods. The defence of the woods finished by mid-day, and the scheme indicated next that a gap had been created to the North and the brigade might be used to great advantage in that location. Consequently, the men quickly returned to their vehicles and prepared for action. The fictitious gap was never deemed to have required CMMGB assistance. The orders were designed to provide an opportunity for the brigade to practice preparation for re-deployment.

During July the units took time to learn tactical collaboration with the recently attached sections of 6-inch trench mortars, and practiced using autocars to draw fire and allow the accompanying troops to identify the location of machine guns and points of resistance

A number of lessons were derived from the July exercises. It was found that the use of motor cyclists for scouting and liaison was deficient. During the intra-brigade exercise, defenders did not make proper use of outposts or attached troops to screen and protect the machine gun nests; snipers and enemy patrols had encroached too easily. It was decided that future instruction would revolve around these points. However, this training never occurred. The men were ordered into GHQ reserve and were told that they might be called on to support either the French First Army or the British Fourth Army on the Amiens Front."

"During allied advances beginning on 8 August 1918 wireless became the primary communications for the Canadian Corps. The deep penetrating Canadian Independent Force (based on the Machine Gun Brigade) found that wireless was all that it required. During the 11 days of action Canadians passed 1,400 wireless messages."

[sOURCE: http://www.forces.gc.ca/commelec/brhistory/chap3_e.htm]