Royal Field Artillery Book 1914

[Simon Birch]

Does anyone know if there is, or ever was, an account of the RFA in December 1914 - ideally in the Ypres sector. Any diaries or papers written about those days..?

Many thanks for any help / ideas,

Simon

[charlie962]

Martin Farndale's History should cover this. You have asked rather a broad question. Is there a particular Division you are following? Some Div histories are very good on gunner participation and others poor .

I wonder whether Becke ever produced anything. He made a lot of notes.

Charlie

[jay dubaya]

Wasn’t December 1914 relatively quiet for the RFA? Farndale only goes as far a 1st Ypres, although the winter of 1914/1915 was the birth of artillery map shooting.

[charlie962]

32 minutes ago, jay dubaya said:

Wasn’t December 1914 relatively quiet for the RFA?

Probably used up their ammo ration for 1914 and had to wait until the following year for the new budget?

[Simon Birch]

2 hours ago, charlie962 said:

Martin Farndale's History should cover this. You have asked rather a broad question. Is there a particular Division you are following? Some Div histories are very good on gunner participation and others poor .

I wonder whether Becke ever produced anything. He made a lot of notes.

Charlie

Thanks for your inputs.

I am interested in the artillery support for the actions at Petit Bois and Maedelstraede Farm on 14.12.1914. Both battalions involved belonged to 3 Division 

Simon

[charlie962]

Not having a copy of Farndale I am suprised that it doesn't cover this period. There doesn't appear to be a 3 Div History.

Looking at the War Diary of CRA 3 Div (WO95 -1390-1) for that day I see that the two Bns of 8th Inf Bde were supported by artillery of 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions.

14th Dec
Two battalions of the 8th Inf Bde supported by artillery of 3rd, 5th and 4th division and in conjunction with the French made an attack on the wood W of WYTSCHAETE. The attack was preceeded by a preliminary bombardment lasting from 9am to 9.45am on the PETIT BOI, BOIS DE WYTSCAETE and the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge. The 42nd Bde RFA was under the orders of GOC 8th Inf Bde, the 23rd Bde, 30th Bde group and 48th Heavy Battery under CRA. The bombardment consisted of bursts of rapid fire with intervals. At 9.45 the attack commenced and guns increased their range so as to fire at WYTSCHAETE and the ridge to the S.keeping up a steady rate of fire during the day. As the right battalion was held up by machine gun fire and a second bombardment was organised from 3.30pm to 4.15pm. The battalion however was unable to advance owing to machine gun fire so withdrew to their former trenches. All guns in action remained in action during the night and telephone communication was maintained to the CRA.
The trench howitzer was placed in action to shell PETIT BOIS but owing to the muddy nature of the ground it was found impossible to fire it.
6.30am, 3rd Div Arty HQ were moved to SCHERPENBERG.
This evening the Corps Commander sent a complimentary message to the 3rd Divisional Artillery.

15th Dec
Infantry was in occupation of W edge of PETIT BOIS- otherwise in original trenches. Artillery grouped as for the 14th but a second battery 30th Bde came in to action. Bombardment of BOIS DE WYTSCHAETE and FME MARDELSTEDE and German trenches in vicinity began at 9am in view of infantry attack at dusk. At noon all idea of further attack was dismissed as the French were unable to push forward on our left. The bombardment was stopped and artillery reverted to their normal employment as before the special operation.

 

 

It might be worth looking at Diaries of 4th and 5th Div CRAs for further detail ? Profit from the free downloads from National Archives as your money is not wasted if there is nothing helpful.

Have you read Chris Baker touches on this period in extracts from his book, here on LongLongTrail

I extract below from his article a few items re Artillery but there is a lot more (plus a nice little map)

The attack at Wytschaete, 14 December

The British part in the offensive whittles down to two single-battalion attacks

...........it was placed under temporary command of II Corps for the operation, as was a portion of the artillery of III Corps’ 4th Division and a single 4.5-inch howitzer battery from I Corps. Spotting work for the artillery would be carried out by 6 Squadron of the Royal Flying Corps, two machines being allotted to each of the 3rd and 5th Divisional artillery........

.............The supply of artillery ammunition gave cause for anxiety. British GHQ had given sanction for a certain amount of expenditure of shells, with II Corps orders adding that if more was required for the tasks allotted, then it was to be used. The supply officers reported the numbers of shells that were in the forward area (between the divisional railheads and the gun positions): at the sanctioned rate of fire of 150 shells per day for each 18-pounder there was enough shrapnel shell for sustained action lasting 2.7 days, but for the 4.5-inch howitzers firing at 60 per day there was less than a day of Lyddite high explosive shell although there was also 2.6 days of shrapnel. The paucity of ammunition, especially the threadbare stocks of high-explosive, was the critical factor. II Corps had to limit its attack to a single infantry brigade front while the rest of the Corps in effect would stand by and watch to see what happened.................

........Seeds of disaster

These terrible statistics tell a moving tale of disaster, which stemmed from what proved to be a wholly insufficient artillery bombardment and an unjustifiably optimistic view that it would clear the way for the infantry. Simple calculations reveal the terrible truth. II Corps arranged for a total of 143 field guns and howitzers from the artillery of 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions to fire on targets on the front to be attacked by 3rd Division. Of these, 96 were 18-pounder field guns firing shrapnel, and the rest were 4.5- and 6-inch howitzers firing high explosive and shrapnel. This resource was spread to fire onto a number of different targets, with only 72 of the 18-pounders, 18 of the 4.5-inch and 13 6-inch howitzers aiming at the trenches to be assaulted. There does not appear to have been a specific task for reduction and clearance of the enemy’s barbed wire defences.............

 

Charlie

@Chris_Baker may be the one to direct you to more detailed RA texts?

 

Edited 22 February , 2022 by charlie962

[David Filsell]

My view, for what it's worth,  of Farndale's book is that it is extremely disappointing all round. I have copy wasting valuable library space which I am happy to sell if anyone is anxious to obtain a copy.

Regards

David

Edited 23 February , 2022 by David Filsell

[charlie962]

35 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

My view, for what it's worth,  of Farndale's book is that it is extremely disappointing all round. I have copy wasting valuable library space which I am happy to sell if anyone is anxious to obtain a copy.

Your view is obviously of value given your experience as a reviewer etc.

Is it because it contains errors, has omissions or doesn't try to tackle potentially contentious issues? Please don't say all three!

Can you recommend a book for Simon?

Charlie

[David Filsell]

My view is that, in truth,  it seems little more in places than an overview. As my grandfather would have said "it lacks ballast". That said I cannot thing of any worthwhile alternative works. It's one of the few books in my collection I would be truly happy to dispose of if anyone is interested

regards

David

Edited 26 February , 2022 by David Filsell