Use of artillery in the Middle East

[Nick]

Can any pals help me get a better understanding of the use of artillery in the Middle Eastern theatres (ie Palestine and Mesopotamia)?

I understand that creeping barrages were used at second Gaza and before the attacks on Hill 1070 in November to give two instances, but to what extent were creeping barrages generally used in the Middle Eastern theatres ? Was direct fire more common? Were good maps available for barrage planning? Were detailed fire plans established as they were in Flanders? What heavy artillery could the turks draw on?

I'm thinking that outside the 'set piece' actions the emphasis fell on direct fire by field guns. At fluid actions like Romani, for instance, I am guessing that much artillery was direct fire provided by brigade artillery. Likewise after the initial breakthroughs at Beersheba, Gaza and at Megiddo I am guessing that only the more mobile batteries were able to keep pace with the advance and that therefore, again, more direct fire was seen.

I am assuming that at Ctesiphon and other Mespot actions, that the weakness (in terms of numbers) of guns dictated that they be used in a different way than was seen in the very different campaign on the Western Front.

I think my question is, how was artillery best deployed in these theatres?

Nick

[John_Hartley]

I am guessing that only the more mobile batteries were able to keep pace with the advance and that therefore, again, more direct fire was seen.

Nick

I've recently been reading Cheshire Rgt war diaries and they seem to sort of support what you are saying. In fact, the inference from several of the comments is that the artillery simply could not keep up with the infantry advance so, there was no (or minimal) covering fire.

John

[Guest steveb21]

Mate,

To add also there were not the amount of guns used on targets either.

Guns were few and far bewteen during most battles particularly form the mounted units, as I was told the 13 Pdrs were replaced with 18 Pdrs early in the war in the desert.

So the weight of shells falling on any target to help any attack by either the infantry or Cavalry could not be anything like the Western Front.

Corps or Army Heavy Artilley at first were not around and only arrived to take part a few batties by 1917 and later.

This I belive was because of the defences at Gaza were they were needed but not before. From late 1917 a number of batteries began to arrive to boost the weight of shells on target.

These did help at 3rd Gaza to break the defences as later in Sept 1918.

S.B

[Robert Dunlop]

There was a gradual improvement in the numbers and use of artillery, particularly in Palestine. It should also be noted that naval gunfire support played an important role in some of the attacks near the coast, such as the breakthrough towards Megiddo.

In the relatively fast moving episodes, and in the opening phases of the campaigns in Egypt and Mesopotamia, direct fire was often used. However, at the battle of Shaiba for example, there are also accounts of indirect fire directed by observers.

I am not sure I have any barrage maps for late war attacks in Palestine. I will check. Farndale's book 'The Royal Regiment of Artillery: The Forgotten Fronts and Home Base, 1914-1918' gives an excellent review of the artillery involvement in all theatres in the Middle East. I will try and post some summary information for you.

Robert

[Nick]

Chaps,

Thanks for your prompt and very interesting responses. I did not know that the 13pdrs were replaced with 18pdrs, I would have thought the 13pdrs would have fared better.

I wonder how responsive the indirect firing was in this theatre, and how was it 'called up'? Presumably support from the BGRA was requested by Brigade commanders, and ranging shots directed by field telephone/signal??

Robert, I would love to read more if you have it.

Nick

[Robert Dunlop]

Nick

I will try and post further details when I get back from this forthcoming trip.

I have read several detailed accounts of artillery actions in these theatres. By-and-large, if the observer could see the target then look out. The relatively open terrain meant that shrapnel was very effective against unprotected troops - sufficiently so that artillery could prevent infantry from reaching rifle range of their opponents. Trenches and strong points could be just as resistant to destructive fire, as opposed to suppressing fire, as on the Western Front.

The other big problem was the relative paucity of heavy and super-heavy artillery, particularly for the all-important counter-battery work. Sound-ranging units were set up in Palestine.

Aerial reconnaisance was used to control fire in some actions. The other technique was the use of special observer posts. Basically, a limber would be used with a long pole that the observer stood on, sometimes behind a shield. The big problem in the desert seems to have been the mirage effect, which made the judgement of distant very difficult.

The techniques for co-ordinating the fire of the larger numbers of batteries in the latter part of the war were the same as on the Western Front, so far as I can tell.

Robert

[Guest steveb21]

Mate,

I am unsure about the use of the guns by British Infanrty but the ALH/Camel Corps was always asking for gun suport from its British Batteries (not the RHA but FAB's) but it was seldom availible.

As for calling fire as above mentioned all the nomal ways were in use in the desert. But because of the direct suport by the RHA Batteries these could provide quick switching of targets.

The problem was a six gun battery dosn't have the wieght of shell either using Shap or HE as would a twelve or eighteen gun FAB would have.

At a number of early battles (Magdhaba and Rafa) a number of RHA batteries were grouped together at different times (late in the day) to incress the firepower on target, these in both cases allowed the attacking troops to either take the works or force the Turks to surender before the men crossed bayonets.

This didn't work during the early Gaza battles where there shell weight was no problem to well entrenched Turkish troops. Again with all brigades (FAB) engaged at targets for there own Division there appears little in the way of using a number of Divisional Arty brigades against a single target as in the Western front. What I mean is grouping say the 52, 53 and 54 Div Arty in a nine FAB attack against a single target.

And to add to the Arty problem the lack of few or any heavy guns in any number to be a help. I could say that a times Turkish/Austrian/German firepower was heavyer then the British guns trying to attack.

Just to finish have you heard of any books written by soldiers from the Artillery during the war in the desert, I was wondering about counter battery fire and how much there was? Most accounts of troops don't mention any CBF (counter battery fire) other then fire dropped on the HK&S Bty during the start of the 2nd Gaza battle puting it out of action for some time.

S.B

[Nick]

Steve,

Thanks,

I have no accounts by individual artillerymen, but do remember reading that the Turkish artillery that provided support on the attack on Suez was driven off by CBF, and also remember accounts where infantrymen/historians have stated "our gunners soon saw off their guns" or something similar. I also read a piece on CBF somewhere only last night but as far as my memory is concerned it might as well have been six years ago. I'll look again this evening.

Incidentally, what gun were the HKSB equipped with, and can you recommend a text on them?

Nick

[Guest steveb21]

Yes Mate,

The Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery was a camel mounted battery of Indians with six x 9 pdr Mountain guns.

This was attached almost all the time with the Camel Brigade. But due to the small weight of shell it was used for AAA (Flak) against enemy aircraft.

Of cause its use as AAA was not all the time at 2nd Gaza one section was used as AAA on the first day while the other two sections were on the move when Turkish guns found them and shelled them scattering them. Over the next few days the battery was mostly used for AAA work as the weapon was to light to damage the Turkish Reboudts.

S.B

[Geoff S]

Steve,

It just so happens the next book on my reading list is 'With our Army in Palestine'

published in 1919 by Anthony Bluett.

It is an individuals account of his service with 'A' Battery HAC & the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps. 1915-1918.

I have been interested in this book for quite a while, as its author was in a position to make some interesting observations about tactics employed by artillery to support the ALH/Camel Corp troops.

I will let you know if I find anything that I think might be of interest.

Cheers

Geoff S