"Mud Blood and Poppycock" by Gordon Corrigan

[Kathie]

I am in the process of reading this book. I am finidng it clearly written, very informative andinteresting. BUT - is this how the army rule book hoped it would be or is this how it actually was? Eg the well fed troops, the buried bodies not left unburied, the trains and trucks at the ready to obviate long marches and so on. This is not what I have read in first hand accounts. Any thoughts from other readers?

Kathie

[Ste]

Kathie,

as you might have spotted in the 'worst' thread, Corrigan's book annoys as many people as it pleases. I don't think it is the worst book on the Great War, not by a long way, but it does have a number of serious limitations - including the one you identify.

Corrigan is perhaps trying to point out that the British Army was not officered by incomparable nincompoops who couldn't care a jot about the lives of their men. They did lay amazingly detailed plans to cover many aspects of life, including food, medicine, transport, sanitation, transport and welfare. However, as you point out, real life was rarely like that, and in focussing on the book without sufficient caveats and explanations Corrigan can mislead the novice reader and infuriate those who have read more widely.

Beyond this, I think the author is needlessly sensationalist is some respects. It is perfectly legitimate of him to explain how the regimental aid post / casualty cleaing station system worked; however, suggesting that Noel Chavasse (double VC) should have been court martialled for quitting his post, yet not explaining the specific circumstances, smacks of simply trying to shock.

Best regards,

Ste

[Justin Moretti]

I wonder if Corrigan having been an ex-soldier himself has some bearing on his fierce (over-fierce?) defence of the British Army. He is certainly the Devil's advocate.

I have to admit, the book does not 'wash' as well on the third or fourth reading, but it is good for re-educating those with genuine misunderstandings. The British Army did its best, and if its best was not good enough (as it wasn't), then neither was anyone else's.

If I were to lose my copy, I would replace it.

[Arnie]

Corrigan's is not the worst commentary on the Great war I have read, but it cannot be far off. he sets out to defend the indefensible and my opinion make a poor 'fist of it.

When I see rubbish like this endorsed by such leading 'revisionists' as Correlli Barnet, Gary Sheffield and Andrew Roberts, leads me to believe that they all feed off one and others half truths.

His attack on Liddel Hart does not prevent him from using is work as reference. How a 'passed over Major' can possible attack a man of Harts quality, would seem the man has no shame!

Arnie

PS If you lose your copy let me know and I'll send you mine

[Muerrisch]

When I see rubbish like this endorsed by such leading 'revisionists' as Correlli Barnet, Gary Sheffield and Andrew Roberts, leads me to believe that they all feed off one and others half truths.

I seem to have missed these endorsements: could you quote a few please, if you have time.

[KONDOA]

Chums,

I have this book and have no major qualms concerning its content and angle.

It is written by a military man which is evident and I think was a timely publication but should not be read in isolation

However, I find, and as I believe LB has stated before, some references could be construed as tenuous and of a secondary nature.

Otherwise a useful insight into the army that won.

Roop

[P.B.]

I agree with pretty much all of what Roop has said above.

To be fair, Corrigan's comments about Chevasse take up a mere two or three paragraphs of a large book, so I don't think he included them with the intention of being sensationalist. He has nothing but praise for Chevasse's personal bravery, but does seem to make a valid point -that is, who would run the RAP if Chevasse became a fatal casualty.

To me his comments are similar to those sometimes make about "H" Jones in regards to his Falklands VC -Jones was certainly a brave and agressive CO, but even some of his fellow officer's raised questions about the wisdom of a battalion commander attacking enemy emplacements single-handedly and armed only with a SMG. A book on Goose Green by a former Parachute Regiment officer which raised these points was attacked in the media not because they thought it was inaccurate, but because it was considered to be reducing the reputation of a brave man.

Neither Corrigan or the other author were doing this, in my opinion. Chevasse's bravery and commitment to the soldiers in his care was of the highest standards and totally without question.

Yes, Corrigan had an agenda, but then most history books published these days seem to. I found bits of it valuable, timely and important -the chapter on the "Shot at Dawn" issue for example, and his realistic appraisal of the effectiveness of the "mad minute". The key, as Roop says, is not to read it in isolation. I tend to get something out of most WWI books I read, even the ones I disagree with or don't like -"The Donkeys" entertains me to this day, even though it takes a stance I really don't agree with.

Just my opinions, and in no way meant to upset anyone who disagrees.

All the best

Paul.

[David Seymour]

On the back of the paperback copy:

Correlli Barnett: "A clear, crisp, highly readable narrative" - Daily Mail

Gary Sheffield: "Corrigan is a combative, persuasive and very readable historian" - Independent

Who says what on the cover of the hardback? Does anyone know?

Regards,

David

[Kate Wills]

To be fair, short bites such as these, which appear on rear blurbs, are usually extracted from far longer reviews, and often taken out of context. Their sole purpose is to sell the book. It would be more illuminating to find the original reviews which contained these comments, and read them in their entirety.

[David Seymour]

Kate,

Absolutely agree - full texts are best. However, LB sought an "if you have time" response, and the book was to hand! Perhaps someone will have more detailed offerings for us.

Regards,

David

[David Seymour]

I notice that there is a review by Peter Simkins on English Historical Review online: Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War

Simkins English Historical Review.2004; 119: 734-736.

Does anyone have access?

Also, some slightly longer newspaper reviews:

'Corrigan brings a mass of evidence coupled with an ability to write clear, crisp, highly readable narrative...Mud, Blood and Poppycock should be in every school library' Correlli Barnett, DAILY MAIL

'A fascinating read because he sets it up as a trial by jury. Each chapter takes a specific 'myth' of the Great War and subjects it to a test of evidence. The result - even if you want to disagree with Corrigan's overall thesis - is gripping' George Kerevan, SCOTSMAN

Regards,

David

[AGWR]

I vaguely recall in a previous thread that reference was made to numerous inaccuracies in the book. Could someone list some examples?

Regards,

AGWR

[Arnie]

Langley

here are all the endorsement from the inside cover of Corrigans Book.

'Gordon Corrigan has set out to expose this popular view, or myth, as quite simply not in accordance with fact. To this task he brings a mass of evidence, coupled with an ability to write clear, crisp, highly readable narrative ... Mud, Blood and Poppycock should be in every school library - and studied with an open mind by all who teach the young about the Great War' Correlli Barnett, Daily Mail

"This is no mere hagiography or turgid, blow-by-blow account of battles which, frankly, often seem repetitive. Corrigan's book is a fascinating read because he sets it up as a trial by jury. Each chapter (and they can be read in what order you please) takes a specific "myth" of the Great War and subjects it to a test of evidence. The result - even if you want to disagree with Corrigan's overall thesis - is gripping' George Kerevan, Scotsman

'Corrigan peppers his book with statements that read outrageously at first but which he then backs up with devastating statistics' Andrew Roberts, Mail on Sunday

'

Corrigan has fashioned a pugnacious case, stripping away many of the misunderstandings and falsehoods that have settled as if they were established truths in the popular imagination' Graham Stewart, Spectator

A welcome addition to the revisionist view of World War One . . . Corrigan shows how the British embraced new military technology and developed dynamic new tactics to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare. A good argumentative tone is struck throughout the book'

Tim Newark, Military Illustrated

'Corrigan is a combative, persuasive and very readable historian'

GARY SHEFFIELD, INDEPENDENT

[AndyHollinger]

For a generation we get the "Donkeys" story - and MB&P gives us another view. I found it refreshing ... but goes over-board in showing us how profecient the army leaders were ... Historians argue ... it's the nature of the beast.

I read the book and then viewed the discussions here to temper my enthusiasm.

[Guest webbhead]

I agree with much that is written here, that Corrigan writes from a decidedly military perspective and sometimes goes overboard in his defensive posture against other historians. However, I think Corrigan's book is a useful reminder to those of us who judge practices and conducts in the First World War which we can read about but perhaps never truly understand, being so far from the war in time and given the fact that the tactics of war having changed so drastically since.

Corrigan reminds us to weigh evidence carefully and approach the history of the war with caution, rather than automatically slagging off Haig and other supposed "donkeys" who, after all, were facing a war of an unprecedented magnitude.

I thought, for instance, that his comparing the death rate on the Somme relative to Normandy (the former being considered "a slaughter," the latter "a triumph" despite a statistically higher death rate) gave some useful perspective on the tendency to interpret/ mythologize history on ideological rather than factual grounds.

That said, I agree with others who have said Corrigan should not be read in isolation or taken as definitive.

[Yves Le Cuziat, MBE]

Good Day

I have just finished to read it..I shall not recommend it..I am not used to criticize books as..but I have been very astonished by how it is written

I feel that it is a restricted study of the Great War..it was an experience for me to have read such book.. and will not recommend it.I feel to be disappointed by Gordon Corrigan very limited way to understand and to comment the Great War.

For sure he does not like the Australians and others . ..(.as he was with the Gurkhas he of course prefers the Indhous ( he has already written a book about the Sephoys in 1915)..he is unfair in many ways about several topics... I feel that such kind of author is the kind of revisionist one.. he has not enough opened minds or knowledge or will to write well about the Great War;

For instance the way of study the 1st July and to forget for instance the casualties of some British units is interesting..or the way to just mentioned the KIAs..forgetting the wounded men..and the disabled

nothing about the Tyneside scottish brigades heavy casualties..or the 2nd Middlesex losses..

When he is speaking about Gallipoli no words are told about Sir Ian Hamilton weakness and how London HQ let him down..

Page 47 the Chemin des Dames is wrongly put it on the map. Then the explaination of French mutinies is the one given in the 70ies& 80ies.. French Historians are today showing and giving now more better explainations and informations about the reality and the motivations which lead to mutinies..the figures given are wrong ones.. and nothing told about the mutineers sent to unités disciplinaires and jails..

The chapter about Kangaroo court and firing squad is a little bite disgusting ..

Corrigan as an ex army officer is of course on the military High ranking side.... but not very fair..AND BLIND;;.. even if I agree about the fact that generals had to get experience about trench war and that this war had to be won.

strangely nothing about Monash.. Curry and others

strangely the Australian casualties at Fromelles or Pozières are not mentionned ..nor the losses of the South African brigade.. nothing about the New Zealand rifle brigade which was likely one of the best "colonial" unit..

Nothing about the Canadian losses on the Somme

Corrigan doesn't like also the Italians .. he forgets that they lost more than 650.000 KIAs.. he is not aware that the 2nd Army of general Albricci helped the French army to retake the Chemin des Dames in september and october 1918.. The arditti and bersaglieris were crack troops..

critics about Jacka at Pozières...I know well the story ..one more time Corrigan tells what he wants..nothing about the Heavy german bombardment and the fact that Jacka believed to be in second line..that most of his men where shell shocked..

The critics against Capt Chavasse VC p106 is sad..I do not agree which such way to think.. a medical officer in the first line.. was very important.. Corrigan has forgotten that for instance penicillin did not exist it took 6 hours to a wound to became infected..Stretcher bearers were so few sometimes that they were not able to bring back wounded men

If you want I keep going my critics.; so easy

Black French troops were looting.. Does Corrigan knows what was the life condition of these Africans?

The critics about French officers is a shame.. many were used to stay with their men after attacks..Corrigan's knowledge of French army is too light

Corrigan forgets the role played with 27th and 30th US inf Div by the Australians and the British to break the Hindenburg line..

...I stop here

Hope that his next book will be better

Yves

[Muerrisch]

You mean after that diatribe you are going to buy his next book? Some people never learn!

[Yves Le Cuziat, MBE]

Good Day

Yes why not..I know too well the difficulty to write books...the next book of Corrigan can be a good one.. who knows ?.. doing research about such topic.. you need to keep opened minds.. .. from the shadow comes sometimes the light

Cheers

Yves

[SOMMESOLDIER]

Hi Yves,

Could you please expand on this statement ?

The chapter about Kangaroo court and firing squad is a little bite disgusting ..

Also you keep making specific statements, about him not acknowledging different units achievements at different times. Well I don't recall him suggesting that this was a definitive account of the war, just an overview.

Also your statements about him not liking the Australians and the Italians, you're far too sensitive !! He just questions some views. Are these groups beyond question ?

Cheers

Tim.

[John_Hartley]

I've just finished this.

Disappointed? Erm, yes - somewhat.

The front cover runs "This will overturn everything you thought you knew about Britain and the First World War". No, it didnt. Now that might be because my very membership of the Forum means I know a little about the War. In comparison with the general population, we are all experts here.

The back cover reads that in examining the facts "he overturns the myths and legends to get at the truth". So I expected a fairly analytical dissection of, say "senseless slaughter", "lost generation", "lions and donkeys" and the like. And I think that is certainly what the ordinary punter would expect to read.

I found the first three chapters went well. A particularly good use of statistics debunks the lost generation view - with only just over 1.5% of the UK population being fatalities. Similarly a briefish but cogent description of the system of troop reliefs evidences the fact that men did not spend endless weeks under continual shellfire.

But it fast goes downhill after that. And it is, at times, difficult to follow exactly what "myth", Corrigan is trying to debunk let alone trying to pick out some relevent facts from amongst his opinions. Comments on other threads about the book point to inaccuracies. Unfortunately I'm not sufficiently knowledgable about the War to have spotted these (or, at least, to have realised they were, actually, inaccuracies).

An example of my problem with this book is in the chapter "Too little , too late". The intent is to debunk the "myth" that America "entered the war at the last minute, contributed nothing and became the only power to to make money out of it". Yet there is nothing really in the chapter to debunk or, indeed, to support this view. The whole chapter is little more than a potted history of US involvement - not uninteresting in itself, but not the alleged point of the book.

To paraphrase the TV advert, this book "does not do exactly what it says on the tin".

John

[DMcNay]

In response ot the criticism that the colonial troops get no mention. I think in the foreword he mentions that this book is about the British Army, that is the men from Britain. I think he mentions that while he will occasionally mention Australians, Canadians etc, they are not the focus of the book.

I don't have the book to hand right now so I can't confirm that this is correct.

I wil also reserve judgement on the book as I am only partway through it at the moment.

[PhilB]

Not having been commissioned myself, so not being aware of the freemasonry of the officer class, might I ask - would an ex-officer (particularly one proud enough to use his retired rank freely) feel obliged to support, in print, the doings of his "brother officers" or don`t the obligations of the brotherhood stretch that far? Phil B

[ianw]

Quite agree with John that this is an unsatisfactory book. It strikes me that it is a contractual obligation book or the chap was offered a contract and then cobbled together a few bits and pieces, odd chapters etc into a book which just does't hang together. Very pleased that I sold this book on after reading it.

[Roxy]

Sorry to disappoint, but I enjoyed it. However, as has been said, it should not be take as a sole reference, and some of it is obviously written to promote debate; I doubt that Corrigan would have actually had Chavasse before a CM! Personally, I think that it is no more one-sided than, say, 'The Donkeys'. I prefer to read a variety of differing views available and make up my own mind. If that was not the case then we would become bored with the lack of Haig/butchers v heroes/SAD debate.

Roxy

[RodB]

I notice that there is a review by Peter Simkins on English Historical Review online: Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War

Simkins English Historical Review.2004; 119: 734-736.

Does anyone have access?

Also, some slightly longer newspaper reviews:

'Corrigan brings a mass of evidence coupled with an ability to write clear, crisp, highly readable narrative...Mud, Blood and Poppycock should be in every school library' Correlli Barnett, DAILY MAIL

'A fascinating read because he sets it up as a trial by jury. Each chapter takes a specific 'myth' of the Great War and subjects it to a test of evidence. The result - even if you want to disagree with Corrigan's overall thesis - is gripping' George Kerevan, SCOTSMAN

Regards,

David

Here's the text of Peter Simkins's review : -

Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War. By GORDON

CORRIGAN (London: Cassell, 2003; pp. 431. £18.99).

THANKS to much excellent research by British and Commonwealth scholars

since the early 1980s, few serious historians would surely now support the

long-established popular belief that the British armies in France and Belgium

during the First World War were, almost without exception, commanded by

butchers, bunglers and ‘donkeys’ who, learning nothing, uncaringly sacrificed

their men in a series of ill-planned and futile offensives. While a handful of

writers – such as Denis Winter, John Laffin, Dr Martin Samuels and Professor

John Mosier – have resolutely swum against the turning tide of historical

opinion during these two decades, the work of revisionist historians, based

principally at King’s College London, the University of Birmingham, the

Imperial War Museum, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, has done a

great deal to restore the individual and collective reputations of Field-Marshal

Sir Douglas Haig and his senior commanders. In some key respects, the

revisionists have merely reoccupied the positions which the late John Terraine

first stormed, virtually alone, forty years ago. Yet, as Professor Brian Bond

recently observed, a growing number of historians would today probably

EHR, cxix. 482 (June 2004)

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subscribe to a positive interpretation of the British Army’s role in the Great War

and are more concerned with apportioning credit for the BEF’s ‘learning curve’

than with seeking to deny its existence. Bond has also pointed out that, because

a vast amount of new documentary evidence has become available, the British

Army’s part in the First World War, and Haig’s performance in particular,

should ‘at last be placed in a full historical context where there will be less need

for emotional partisanship on either side. . .’

Given the outstanding scholarship of Dr Gary Sheffield, Dr Paddy Griffith,

Professor Bill Rawling, Dr John Bourne, Dr Robin Prior, Professor Trevor

Wilson, and several others who have been working so assiduously in this field

for twenty years or more, one finds it hard to swallow the claim on the

dustjacket of Mud, Blood and Poppycock that Gordon Corrigan’s latest book

‘will overturn everything you thought you knew about Britain and the First

World War’. Nevertheless, this book does possess some solid virtues. As a

former regular officer of the Royal Gurkha Rifles, Gordon Corrigan is well

qualified to discuss and describe the realities of army life and he is at his best in

the early chapters of the book, which are primarily concerned with the

practicalities of soldiering on the Western Front. These chapters contain

eminently sensible analyses and fascinating facts in equal measure. Corrigan

informs us, for instance, that a British infantry division on the march occupied

fifteen miles of road and took over seven hours to pass a fixed point, and that the

average infantry company produced one ton of human waste per week. The

writer is also candid and pragmatic when discussing the importance of

discipline and the application of military law in the British Army of the First

World War, leaving the reader in no doubt where he stands on the emotive issue

of capital courts martial. Corrigan firmly opposes the idea of a blanket pardon

for all executed soldiers, adding that the existence of a memorial, in the national

arboretum near Lichfield, to those ‘shot at dawn’ during the Great War, ‘is an

insult to the millions of men who did their duty, frightened and inexperienced

as most of them must have been’. He similarly offers a useful corrective to the

popular perception of the ‘lost generation’ of the First World War, though this

myth too was largely exploded by Dr Jay Winter in 1986.

Corrigan is less convincing when dealing with matters of politics and

strategy. Even relatively uncritical admirers of Haig might be obliged to

concede that the chapter devoted to the complex question of civil-military

relations, and especially to the disputes between Lloyd George and the

Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, presents a somewhat one-dimensional

picture of the Prime Minister in 1917 and 1918. The author’s treatment of British

strategy in general certainly lacks the scholarly substance of the work of

Professor David French and Dr William Philpott. Corrigan’s argument that all

that happened to the British in the Third Battle of Ypres was ‘directly

attributable’ to the state of the French Army after April 1917 is more than a little

misleading. Nursed carefully by Pétain, the French Army had recovered

sufficiently from its wave of mutinies to mount successful minor offensives at

Verdun in August and at Malmaison in October, and Corrigan seems to be

unaware of the part played by General Anthoine’s French First Army in

operations on the northern flank of Haig’s Ypres offensive between 31 July and

26 October 1917. On the other hand, Corrigan is justified in his overall emphasis

on the decisive importance of the Western Front. One of the longest quotations

EHR, cxix. 482 (June 2004)

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in the book is from a letter which ‘Wully Robertson’, the Chief of the Imperial

General Staff, wrote to Lord Curzon in July 1917, complaining that those – not

least Lloyd George – who advocated an ‘Eastern’ strategy appeared quite unable

to grasp the immense scale of the problems of logistics posed by major

operations in theatres such as Salonika.

Since the author’s main aim in Mud, Blood and Poppycock is to reveal the

nature and extent of the improvements in the command, tactics and technology

of the BEF on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918, it is strange indeed that

he chooses to cover, in some detail, the operations of the Americans in 1918 but

pays scant attention to those of the British and Dominion forces in France from

August to November that year – what John Terraine called ‘the greatest

succession of victories in the British Army’s whole history’. This is rather like

charting the progress of England’s rugby team through all the preliminary stages

of the 2003 World Cup but then electing not to describe its triumph in the final

match. There are also several sloppy minor errors. For example, the author gives

Generals Gough and Horne the wrong Christian names, identifies the 10th

(Irish) Division as a regular rather than a New Army formation, and states that

the 74th Division (and not the 74th Brigade) captured Westhoek in August

1917.

Judging from the author’s footnotes and bibliography, Corrigan has relied

chiefly upon published secondary sources in the preparation of this book. It

must be said, however, that the growing body of weighty academic studies by

revisionists in this field has, to date, barely dented the hard shell of popular

perceptions of the Western Front, which unfortunately remain dominated by

the images of Oh, What a Lovely War and Blackadder. Corrigan’s book, though

sometimes flawed, is at least highly readable, cogently argued and sprinkled

with flashes of wry humour, and may well appeal to that wider readership which

archive-based scholarly monographs have largely failed to attract. It is thus a

welcome addition to the historiography of Britain’s effort in the ‘war to end all

wars’.

University of Birmingham PETER SIMKINS