'Channel Firing' - Thomas Hardy

[MikB]

Most of us will have read the poem.

 

I have 2 questions:-

 

i) Did any incident take place around the time Hardy wrote the poem, to provoke it? I can imagine windows being broken in coastal buildings as an extreme example, but the idea of graves being exposed by muzzle blast seems beyond possibility, actual stray hits on graveyards even more so. I couldn't find a Google search that would turn anything up, in the way of a contemporary newspaper report or suchlike.

 

ii) The night actions after the main Jutland battle proved that the RN's standing orders to seek to avoid night-fighting had allowed the escape of critically-damaged German capital ships, when they had been spotted and recognised at short range and could have been sunk with little risk. Is there any evidence that Hardy's poem was instrumental in this - for example by public protest causing a reduction in night firing practice?

Edited 18 March , 2021 by MikB
typo

[Kath]

https://interestingliterature.com/2016/08/a-short-analysis-of-thomas-hardys-channel-firing/

 

" Written in April 1914 and published in May of the same year, just a few months before the outbreak of the First World War, it anticipates the conflict that would break out later that year. "

[MikB]

Thanks, but I'm trying to get at whether the effects ashore of night-firing were a matter of public consciousness at the time, and whether this caused any limitation of the the practice such as to give rise to the belief at the top of the RN that their capability and training in this respect was inferior to the HSF's. I'd expect the latter point to be unlikely, but wondered if anyone was aware of any evidence outside the poem..

[michaeldr]

I've no idea about specific naval gunnery practice in the Channel during April 1914,

but I have seen a ref to April generally being used by the navy as an opportunity to practice gunnery in rough seas [HMS Bellerophon carried out rough weather gunnery exercises in April 1911]. If there is any connection between this and wind-blown sound being carried inland to Dorset, Somerset etc., I cannot say

 

This paper may be of interest with regard to the gunnery tactics and the battle 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236794488_A_Matter_of_Timing_The_Royal_Navy_and_the_Tactics_of_Decisive_Battle_1912-1916

[kenf48]

As above I have no idea about specific gunnery practice in April 1914 but there was concern expressed in local and national newspapers over night (and day) gunnery practice in the Channel by the Home Fleet in the years preceding the war.  Most of the criticism came from the danger to fishermen and the damage to fisheries rather than noise annoyance.

 

There are many newspaper accounts of representations being made by the fishermen along the South Coast and on at least one occasion as a consequence the RN cancelling their practice, as evidenced by this example from Lloyds List in May 1910.

 

 

In 1913 the fishermen of Chichester wrote in a similar vein regarding night firing and in the same year in the North East it was claimed the herring fishery was being disrupted by naval gunfire.

 

 I doubt it had any real detrimental effect on Naval Gunnery practice or instruction.

 

In the Edwardian 'Dreadnought' era the role of the Royal Navy was high in the public consciousness and a source of national pride often to the detriment of the Army.  The Royal Navy was not necessarily in the forefront of everyday thought, but enough, for example for one jingoistic newspaper campaigned for permanent naval firing ranges to be set up.  Citizens along the South Coast, including Dorset would be well aware of the disruption caused and although there were the obvious security implications on reporting, advance notice was often given.

 

As well as the analysis posted by Kath (thank you) Hardy's poem perhaps reflects a grumpy old man, he was seventy four after all, whose sleep was disturbed along with everyone else living near the coast with noise 'enough to wake the dead'.  One can imagine at breakfast it was a topic of conversation akin to the weather but hardly a protest that would seriously influence policy.

 

 

 

[MikB]

Thanks Michaeldr, I'll take a look at that - though at first sight Sumida's suggestion of 20 - 30% accuracy looks gobsmackingly optimistic! 

[MikB]

Thanks, kenf48.

 

I read somewhere that gunnery practice in the Forth by the battlecruisers had caused window damage by concussion, but AFAIK that was by day.  Your cutting refers to night practice more likely to have been heard by Hardy or people he was in contact with. If such night practice was a regular occurrence, I wonder how it was that Jellicoe regarded RN capability as inferior. 

 

IIRC there were 4 sightings of the heavily damaged SMS Seydlitz at short range in the night after Jutland - and sme of other heavy ships - but nobody would make the decision to open fire.

 

[michaeldr]

21 hours ago, MikB said:

at first sight Sumida's suggestion of 20 - 30% accuracy looks gobsmackingly optimistic!

 

I think that you might have to find Fuller's 'Recent Gunnery Practices' to get to the bottom of that one

 

 

[ Quote from  page 95 of A Matter of Timing:

In 1912, the improvements in range-finders, when combined with the lowering of Battle Practice ranges from over nine thousand yards to less than eight thousand yards, resulted in a considerable increase in the rate of hitting. In the battle practice of 1909, the average scores of the fleet were about 20 percent; the fleet average in 1912 is not known, but it seems to have been better than in 1911, and the top eight ships scored well above 30 percent.* From 1913, ships equipped with the Dreyer table were not only able to hit with greater accuracy, but also faster because only one or at most two shots or salvos were needed to adjust the initial sight settings, and then firing could be switched to rapid independent.

* Footnote:- Sumida, “The Quest for Reach,” 67, 73, and 93 (note 175). For the use of salvo fire and an average hitting rate of 10 percent in 1912 in one group of ships, see Captain C. Fuller, “Recent Gunnery Practices” (6 June 1912), DRAX 1/9, Drax Papers.]

[MikB]

Thanks again Michaeldr. The Battle Practice ranges explain it - but of course events would prove you didn't generally get to those ranges unless or until the enemy was already unable effectively to flee or reply. Opens up some scope I'd not been very aware of.