German atrocities 1914 a history of denial Horne & Kramer

[ilkley remembers]

2 hours ago, AOK4 said:

Just a few remarks:

 

Hi Jan thanks for sharing your observations and indeed you are correct to highlight the fact that the atrocities have not been forgotten in either Belgium and France and I will make efforts to access via Academia the research that you kindly suggested.

 

I suppose the point that I was trying to make was that at least here in the Uk and similarly (apparently) in the US, rigorous study of the atrocities is fairly recent. Given their significant propaganda value and use during the war, subsequent neglect seems perplexing. As I suggested in my previous post this may be a reflection of Anglo-American unwillingness for a variety of reasons, to pursue the matter as a war crime. The message that this neglect telegraphed perhaps explains how revisionist in the 1920 and indeed the post war German Government were able to control the narrative.

 

Looking at point one in post #23 of this thread, it will be interesting to see how you prove the idea of predestination as far as the rise of Nazi Germany is concerned. I would observe that the Germans did in fact have a choice and to suggest otherwise rather absolves them of any collective guilt. 

 

Regards IR

[yperman]

On 12/04/2020 at 17:04, ilkley remembers said:

 

 In this case it seems that he wants to throw into the melting pot a bit of mass killing, architectural barbarism, literary and artistic interpretation along with a smidgen of Italian Modernism and hey presto we have Fascism. 

We see similar fear of partisans (and both teachers and  priests)  in the Austrian Army's  2nd invasion of Serbia. There they used  initially large scale ill treatment and execution without cause of civilians  and the punishment of villages as a means to discourage further resistance. (Though they did  not use civilians as human shields as practised by the German army in Belgium).

 

Gumz argues in 'The resurrection and collapse of Hapsburg Empire in Serbia 1914-18' there was a clear policy of destroying Serbian nationalism with a view to incorporating Serbia into the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that with stability, the widespread use of Serbs in the administration and paying handsomely for agricultural produce the Austrians  made their occupation relatively popular by 1918.

 

On the other hand the German occupation of Belgium with its systematic looting and  "requisitioning" of food and resources  from Belgium  and the use of starvation against the civilian population to divert food supplies from the allies produced a negative reaction. Especially amongst those Flemings who in 1914 tended towards Germany .Perhaps the difference was the Austrians saw the  Serbs as future fellow subjects whilst the German atrocities were not just panicking green conscripts being "trigger happy"  but a German High Command  policy of intimidation of civilian resistance and attacks on railways and communications by terror. Such a policy  might be part of a cultural  drift to Fascism.

[AOK4]

18 minutes ago, yperman said:

On the other hand the German occupation of Belgium with its systematic looting and  "requisitioning" of food and resources  from Belgium  and the use of starvation against the civilian population to divert food supplies from the allies produced a negative reaction. Especially amongst those Flemings who in 1914 tended towards Germany .Perhaps the difference was the Austrians saw the  Serbs as future fellow subjects whilst the German atrocities were not just panicking green conscripts being "trigger happy"  but a German High Command  policy of intimidation of civilian resistance and attacks on railways and communications by terror. Such a policy  might be part of a cultural  drift to Fascism.

 

This is of course not immediately related to the atrocities of 1914, but let me say this about the looting and requisitions: they were directly related to the economic blockade of Germany (which cost more than 500,000 lives directly, according to some researchers). Requisitioning was allowed by the Conventions of the Hague at the time (an army was allowed to live of the land which they occupied).

I strongly recommend also to read Pöhlmann's articles to put things in perspective (to give just one example: more German civilians were killed or deported during the Russian invasion in the East in 1914/15 than Belgians during the German invasion of Belgium in 1914, even though East Prussia was less densely populated).

[Hedley Malloch]

In reply to Jan:

1. Most of the research is done with a goal: to prove that Germany was predestined to become the all-evil national social state it was in 1933-1945.

 

Where is the evidence to support this quite remarkable statement? Much of the information in German atrocities in the occupied territories was collected before the War was over, long before the 3rd Reich was a glimmer in Hitler’s eye.
 
2. Most of the research is done without any serious investigation into German military sources and without proper knowledge of the German army and how it was structured (therefor not understanding which units were involved where and their background about being for the first time in the front).

 

This is simply not the case. The principal guides as to how the occupying German army would behave are contained in Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (The War Book of the German General Staff), with its sinister statement that ‘Certain severities are indispensable in war; nay, that the only true humanity lies in the ruthless application of them’; and Felddienst-Ordnung, German Army Field Service Pocket Book. Both were both translated into English well before the War began. A third, Kriegs-Etappen-Ordnung, the principal guide on how to run an occupied area, appeared only a few months before war was declared. All three told the serving German soldier to ignore The Hague conventions irrespective of the fact that it has been agreed by The Kaiser. 

 

3. The same is valid for research about the occupation. There were huge differences in the application of the rules in different areas. These differences come from the fact that certain commanders were less strict and because other rules applied to the different areas (Operationsgebiet - Etappengebiet - Generalgouvernement).

 

I can agree with you here. This was the doctrine of Aufstragstaktik which stressed decentralised, rapid decision making and forgiveness of for anyone who made mistakes. There were huge variations in decision making – what was a capital offence in one village was punished with a fine in neighbouring communes. Aufstragstaktik was a piece of misapplied learning from the 1870-71 War. The German victory here was widely attributed to this doctrine. But occupation was not a military problem – it was a civilian occupation which required some political, civilian and diplomatic oversight, if only to placate international opinion. That it did not have these indispensable ingredients was a German choice. This was the way they wanted to run things.

 

4. The investigation reports are never neutral, neither the German report nor the French and Belgian ones. Both serve a very important main or side goal: propaganda, something which can't be denied and should be taken into account when studying them.

 

Of course the reports were used as propaganda. The point is that they were also evidence. And there is such a great deal of it. It is worth pointing out that many Germans thought that their war leaders should have stood trial after the War.
 
5. I think it is time to make comparative studies about the different aspects: war crimes against civilians and occupation policies (WWI, Rhine occupation, WWII, post-war Europe, Southeast Asia, Middle East, ...) and the different actors (both sides!). I think that a lot of similarities would be found over time and among all sides.

 

I simply refuse to go down this road. The topic under discussion is how the Germans managed the occupied territories in Western Europe between 1914-18. Period. Let’s stick to that. Attempts to ‘broaden’ the discussion inevitably disappear into a miasma of obfuscation and a blizzard of pointed fingers which enables the guilty to walk free. I suggest that if you want to discuss occupations in general, then you should open a separate thread.
 
6. The 1914 atrocities were neither forgotten nor denied by any serious person who was interested in the First World War when Horne and Kramer wrote their book. Only Anglo Saxon historians without knowledge of local publications in Dutch and French can have gotten that idea. The stories about atrocities and occupation policies are and have been very well documented.

 

They were not just ‘1914 atrocities’. They went on throughout the war. The time to do something about this was between the wars. In the 1920s, the British and the French were concerned to prop up the Weimar Republic; in the 1930s it was appeasement and Hitler. In 1938, a US researcher applied to the UK government for access to the diaries found on the bodies of dead German soldiers which were held by the Foreign Office. He was initially refused, being told in so many words that the UK government had concerns other than the truth. 

[ilkley remembers]

On 14/04/2020 at 05:55, AOK4 said:

May I also refer to the paper by Markus Pöhlmann: Habent sua fata libelli. Zur Auseinandersetzung um das Buch „German Atrocities 1914“, in: Portal Militärgeschichte, 16. November 2017

 

Had a look at Pohlmanns work as that of well as other researchers such as Gerd Krumeich and Gunter Spraul who have criticized the Kramer and Horne book for the reasons which you have outlined. Whilst I can to some degree accept that their analysis as mitigation I don’t think that it can absolve some units of the German Army in Belgium of far exceeding reasonable and measured reaction to any hint Belgian insurgency. In response some authorities have questioned a reliance on German accounts which date from the post war period in explaining brutality towards civilians and property.

 

Yperman makes legitimate point in referencing the actions of the Austro-Hungarians who had a long history of resorting to the rope when dealing with truculent Slavs, many of whom were in fact their own nationals. Likewise the action of the Russians in East Prussia during 1914 and 1915 targeting the ethnic German population left much to be desired. Indeed it is probable that far more Germans succumbed to ‘bestial Cossaks’ than died in Belgium. I’m not suggesting that there should be a league of atrocity but it is important to offer comparison of events across the continent.

 

Violence towards civilian populations in time of war was hardly new in 1914, it had been going on for centuries and the Hague Conventions had expressly sought to limit the impact on non combatants. However, German military and civilian leaders were wont to use the word necessity when describing actions whose legitimacy was questionable, including the invasion of Belgium.

 

It is quite reasonable to maintain that the German Army was not uniquely predisposed to use violence and cruelty to repress already cowed populations and I cannot see that, as some have suggested, that there is a direct line from Windhoek to Auschwitz.

 

The issue of calling to account for atrocities committed is an interesting one. The French and Belgians for example were rather more malevolent towards the vanquished than either the British or Americans. The upshot of this neglect being that war crimes were largely ignored and criminals escaped justice. The anti-Imperial American administration seems to have been pleased enough with the destruction of an Empire or two whilst the British response slightly more nuanced. Criticism of the Treaty of Versailles notably by Keynes must have stung a British Government more interested in returning to a pre war status quo and limiting the Red Hordes from Russia. I also wonder if British Governments were reluctant to encourage scrutiny of the events in Belgium in 1914 given their use of the atrocities to encourage men to volunteer for service. One could imagine a certain amount of disquiet amongst those who had believed the exaggerations of the British propaganda if it were subsequently found to be full of falsehoods.

[James A Pratt III]

On the KUK Armee in Serbia see:

"The Surrection and Collapse of Habsberg Serbia 1914-1918" a good account of the Austrian occupation of Serbia

the KUK Armee had a habit of taking photos of people they executed see on youtube "Krieg Dem Bilder and the book "A Mad Catastrophe"

in archive.org there is the "Kingdom of Serbia Austro-Hungarian Atrocities report

 

Russians behaving badly:

archive.org "Jews in The Eastern War Zone"

archive.org "The Slaughter of the jews in The Ukraine"

 

books

Nationalizing the Russian Empire

Imperial Apocalypse

Pogrom Anti-Jewish violence in modern Russian History

Civil War in South Russia

The Russian Revolution Richard Pipes

Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime R Pipes

 

British behaving badly in Mespot

In The Clouds Above Baghdad on archive.org

Leachman OC Desert

 

 

[James A Pratt III]

Americans behaving badly

books

Red Summer 1919 (also see on youtube the National WW I Museum and Memorial)

The Texas Rangers and the Mexican Revolution The Bloodiest Decade"

wiki

The Bandit War (of Texas)

Porvinir Massacre

PBS Porvinir Texas (also see on youtube)

[yperman]

11 hours ago, James A Pratt III said:

Americans behaving badly

The point is not whether other armies and navies committed war crimes. The question is was the German mistreatment of the Belgian people from a day or so  after their invasion merely green, poorly led,  trigger happy conscripts shooting imaginary franc tireurs or was it a pre-war policy decision to so terrify the Belgian population they would not sabotage the long German lines of communication. It must have obvious to the planners of the German attack on Belgium and France that a few individual railway men and explosives trained quarry workers could wreck the Schlieffen plan by causing delays. With the example of 1870 a policy of terrorising the civilian populations might seem to the German Staff sound policy. 

 

Hedley Malloch's posts above explain the question in great detail.

[ilkley remembers]

On 20/04/2020 at 21:31, James A Pratt III said:

On the KUK Armee in Serbia see:

"The Surrection and Collapse of Habsberg Serbia 1914-1918" a good account of the Austrian occupation of Serbia

the KUK Armee had a habit of taking photos of people they executed see on youtube "Krieg Dem Bilder and the book "A Mad Catastrophe"

in archive.org there is the "Kingdom of Serbia Austro-Hungarian Atrocities report

 

Thanks James for this interesting selection. Comparison is an important element in analysing the atrocities in Belgium and helps to put the behaviour of the German Army into context.

[yperman]

19 hours ago, ilkley remembers said:

 

Thanks James for this interesting selection. Comparison is an important element in analysing the atrocities in Belgium and helps to put the behaviour of the German Army into context.

Gamz's book which James refers to makes the point that the Austrians stopped their mistreatment of the Serbs voluntarily and especially favourably compares the 2nd half of their occupation with Germany's treatment of occupied France and Belgium. The question I suggest posed by Horne and Kramer is were the German actions from the first days planned, the result of paranoia about franctireurs or a brutal culture within the German officer corps? Given the presence of company and field grade officers at the massacres and the defensive  attitudes of German Generals during the war about these incidents does suggest a deliberate policy.

[AOK4]

It was not deliberate as such. Even though the orders were to act strictly upon acts of franctireurs or armed resistance by civilians, what happened in reality was not wanted. Officers that were present were in no position to act or get things back under control. In the case of Leuven to give an example, the problems started at nightfall when German units were pouring into the city from two sides (new units arriving from Germany as well as retreating troops from the front line because of a strong Belgian attack). The sound of fighting echoed between the houses and led to the real belief that the troops in the city were being fired upon, who responded by firing back. Houses from which they believed that they were fired from, were set on fire, leading to massive fires that got totally out of control. The result of it is well known. However, it is clear that there was no initial intention to burn the city. If the Germans would have had that intention, they would have done so when they first entered Leuven on 19 August, almost a week before the dramatic events of the 25th.

From everything that I have read (plenty of first hand diaries as well), there was an honest belief that the Germans were fired upon by civilians and it is clear that in case of these mass events (Leuven, Namur, Roulers to name a few), it was mainly a matter of things spiralling out of control.

BTW, the events at Roulers were sparked by the discovery of the bodies of the German soldiers from a patrol that had been ambushed by British troops. As there were hardly any (allied) soldiers left in Roulers, the newly raised German units (being warned for possible franctireurs from the earlier events in the war) honestly believed that they had been killed by locals and started revenge.

 

For those who syill think that this kind of reaction was typically German, did you see the movie "Platoon"?

 

 

 

[ilkley remembers]

2 hours ago, yperman said:

The question I suggest posed by Horne and Kramer is were the German actions from the first days planned, the result of paranoia about franctireurs or a brutal culture within the German officer corps? Given the presence of company and field grade officers at the massacres and the defensive  attitudes of German Generals during the war about these incidents does suggest a deliberate policy.

 

Yes  Horne and Kramer concluded that the German Army had an institutionalised memory of the actions of francs-tireurs and that this largely dictated the response by both German troops and commanders. In his subsequent book Dynamics of Destruction, Alan Kramer certainly extends this thread to suggest that this was a dress rehearsal  for genocidal German actions in WW2. The problem that I have with this pathology is , I think, that have in fact fallen into the trap of analysing the events of 1914 through the prism of the Second World War which is why context and comparison are all important.

 

As Jan (AOK4) reports Phohlmann et.al say that not all units behaved badly and many local commanders refused to tolerated the  barbaric and ruthless actions by what were frequently raw, poorly disciplined and trigger happy soldiers fed on exaggerated tales of the 1870 war. Alexander Watson in Ring of Steel (2014) also makes the point that the Germans were dilusional about the existence of francs-tireurs and that atrocities were quickly halted by senior officers when they learnt of the extent of the violence toward the civilian population. Many Germans appear to have been ashamed of what happened and were anxious to halt any further atrocities not least because of the danger of widespread ill discipline in the army.

 

In the end my own leanings are away from the view that what happened was deliberate policy and more the result of rank indiscipline and poor command. 

[yperman]

On 22/04/2020 at 21:29, ilkley remembers said:

 

 the result of rank indiscipline and poor command. 

It is maybe possible to see the putting up against a wall and shooting of 77 civilians known by the German troops to be innocent and including 38 women and children at Les Rivages under the orders of Major Schlick of IR 101 in that light - and even the subsequent killing of further civilians in Dinant who were hunted down over the next day op cit pp 51-53 and even the numerous similar atrocities committed elsewhere by 3rd Army who saw themselves as fighting a "peoples war" . Actions Horne and Kramer see as endorsed by the senior levels of command. But  the consistent mistreatment of civilians throughout the German occupation by units from all over Germany including systematic use of large scale  slave labour and starvation suggests either a policy or an attitude - 'culture'- towards  civilians from the outset by the German army. Gumz suggests this was the end of  19th century warfare and the beginning of 20th century "total" warfare.

[AOK4]

21 minutes ago, yperman said:

It is maybe possible to see the putting up against a wall and shooting of 77 civilians known by the German troops to be innocent and including 38 women and children at Les Rivages under the orders of Major Schlick of IR 101 in that light - and even the subsequent killing of further civilians in Dinant who were hunted down over the next day op cit pp 51-53 and even the numerous similar atrocities committed elsewhere by 3rd Army who saw themselves as fighting a "peoples war" . Actions Horne and Kramer see as endorsed by the senior levels of command. But  the consistent mistreatment of civilians throughout the German occupation by units from all over Germany including systematic use of large scale  slave labour and starvation suggests either a policy or an attitude - 'culture'- towards  civilians from the outset by the German army. Gumz suggests this was the end of  19th century warfare and the beginning of 20th century "total" warfare.

 

"Large scale slave labour and starvation"?

 

Who put an economic blockade in force? Because of the economic blockade, Germany at that point concluded that it could let its army live off the land (as allowed by the The Hague conventions) and put pressure on other (allied and neutral) to find a solution for the occupied population. (I don't blame nor condem, I just try to explain what happened and why.)

 

I agree that the "slave labour" was too harsh though and unnecessary, although you should perhaps read the chapter about civilian labourers in my book "Defending the Ypres Front 1914-1918". There was slave labour, however that was mainly restricted to the Zivil-Arbeiter-Bataillone raised late 1916. These battalions (only raised in the Etappengebiet) caused so much upset that they were not expanded later and most of the forced labourers were allowed to return. After that, they recruited "free labourers", and from a lot of witness statements it was clear that not a lot of work was done there. Interestingly, Pohlmann makes the comparison between the occupied civilians labourers and the Chinese contract labourers, used by all allies, who were also civilians put to military labour. Of course their treatment and rations were in general better than the ZABs.

 

Just a few remarks to put some things into perspective.

[Nick Beale]

If you want a comaprison with the Second World War, there's a detailed examination (c. 600 pages, in German) of German behaviour in occupied France in Dr. Peter Lieb's book »Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?« (Conventional War or National Socialist Ideological War?). He looks at the historical precedents, doctrine, legalities etc. then moves on to specifics in 1940–44. He looks in particular at variables such as time units had spent in an area, were units fresh from the Eastern Front more ruthless, did elites (Waffen-SS, Paratroops) behave more harshly than ordinary formations, and so on.

[ilkley remembers]

On 25/04/2020 at 13:00, yperman said:

Actions Horne and Kramer see as endorsed by the senior levels of command. But  the consistent mistreatment of civilians throughout the German occupation by units from all over Germany including systematic use of large scale  slave labour and starvation suggests either a policy or an attitude - 'culture'- towards  civilians from the outset by the German army. Gumz suggests this was the end of  19th century warfare and the beginning of 20th century "total" warfare.

 

Adam Tooze in The Deluge; The Great War and the Remaking of the Global Order observes that after miscalculating Britain’s willingness to enter the conflict and failure to obtain a speedy victory in 1914, German was doomed to endure a defensive war which by 1915 realised it couldn’t win. Despite its industrial might German simply didn’t have either the financial muscle to pay for a long drawn out conflict or the ability to draw on credits from the US financial markets.

Consequently, Belgian and French industrial capacity and skilled workforce were a gift too tempting to ignore and for some sections of the German High Command and the civilian administration were ripe for the plucking. After the predictable failure to lure workers in the occupied territories to voluntarily assist the Germans, resort to coercion was inevitable. It has been commented that this is an indication of Germany’s colonial attitude to occupied territories and even though the actions were of exceedingly dubious legitimacy were embraced as the German military usurped the civilian government. The resultant cruel treatment of forced workers and outright theft of industrial plant would heavily influence the attitude of both France and Belgium towards Germany in the post war years.

Like much of German foreign policy during the war as far as the Western allies were concerned was a propaganda and diplomatic night mare and did far more harm to the regime than any good. The astonishing thing, especially in Belgium, was that unnecessary highhandedness and cruelty was done under the nose of the US backed Commission for the Relief of Belgian who included the hugely influential figure of future president Herbert Hoover.

Did German annex Belgium to satisfy continental colonial ambitions as Horne and Kramer suggest of or as has been argued they developed this policy because they faced a far better resourced enemy? Matter of interpretation I suppose.

 

[ilkley remembers]

On 25/04/2020 at 13:34, AOK4 said:

Pohlmann makes the comparison between the occupied civilians labourers and the Chinese contract labourers, used by all allies, who were also civilians put to military labour. Of course their treatment and rations were in general better than the ZABs.

 

 

Pohlmann might feel justified in making the comparison but sounds like something of a non sequitur. Chinese labourers may have been somewhat duped but I am not aware of any evidence of coercion or ill treatment. I don't doubt that they were subject to the usual casual racism endemic to colonial powers but in the main they were probably treated reasonably well by the standards of the time.

 

On 25/04/2020 at 13:34, AOK4 said:

Who put an economic blockade in force? Because of the economic blockade, Germany at that point concluded that it could let its army live off the land (as allowed by the The Hague conventions) and put pressure on other (allied and neutral) to find a solution for the occupied population. (I don't blame nor condem, I just try to explain what happened and why.)

 

Like the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare the blockade may have been legally dubious but its main danger was the effect of opinion in neutral nations especially the U S. The problem for Germany and Austria/ Hungary was that they managed to surround themselves with enemies with little real opportunity to access food and materials from beyond continental Europe which made the British blockade even more unbearable. It lack of financial muscle also seems to have impeded its ability to pay inflated prices for foreign goods. 

 

[ilkley remembers]

47 minutes ago, Nick Beale said:

If you want a comaprison with the Second World War, there's a detailed examination (c. 600 pages, in German) of German behaviour in occupied France in Dr. Peter Lieb's book »Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?« (Conventional War or National Socialist Ideological War?). He looks at the historical precedents, doctrine, legalities etc. then moves on to specifics in 1940–44. He looks in particular at variables such as time units had spent in an area, were units fresh from the Eastern Front more ruthless, did elites (Waffen-SS, Paratroops) behave more harshly than ordinary formations, and so on.

 

Think that the massacre in Oradour in 1944 was committed by a unit which had been posted from the Eastern Front.

 

Alexander Watson in Enduring the Great War comments on the different nature of German units transferred from the Easter to the Western front in 1918

[Nick Beale]

22 hours ago, ilkley remembers said:

 

Think that the massacre in Oradour in 1944 was committed by a unit which had been posted from the Eastern Front.

At the risk of going 40 years off-topic, yes. Elements of a Waffen-SS Division which had been rebuilding in SW France and had been called north to the Normandy front.

[Hedley Malloch]

On 25/04/2020 at 13:34, AOK4 said:

 

"Large scale slave labour and starvation"?

 

Who put an economic blockade in force? Because of the economic blockade, Germany at that point concluded that it could let its army live off the land (as allowed by the The Hague conventions) and put pressure on other (allied and neutral) to find a solution for the occupied population. (I don't blame nor condem, I just try to explain what happened and why.)

 

 

The wholesale economic exploitation of France and Belgium was a not a response to the success that was the Allied blockade; rather it was a reaction to the German failure that was the Schlieffen Plan. German victory in the west assumed that there would be a short, sharp war which would bring France to its knees. The British were not the only ones who assumed that it would all be over by Christmas. That this did not happen was a tremendous blow to the German army, and particularly to its General Staff who were addicted to planning. They were prepared neither materially nor psychologically for a long war of occupation. 

 

They had to improvise. They had always envisaged that there would be some amount of living off the land, but never to the extent which the failure of the Schlieffen Plan made necessary. That they planned to do this in advance can be seen in the Kriegs-Etappen-Ordnung, (KEO)the German army handbook of how to run a rear-zone area. It is true that Article 52 of The Hague Convention allowed an army to take what it required for the immediate needs of its troops, but the KEO went way beyond this. The rear-zone areas were to be exploited to help the fight against the Allies, illegal under The Hague Convention. I quote:

 

“Foodstuffs, all types of tools, motor vehicles and construction materials, especially those useful for constructing, maintaining and repairing roads, railways and waterways, fuel and lighting material must be collected and stocked in amounts beyond the immediate requirements of the army. Already existing factories, bakeries, abattoirs, mills, distilleries, breweries, cooling plants and agricultural plants are to be systematically exploited; It will be frequently necessary to enlist the help of local civilian workers and medical personnel within the enemy territory’ (KEO, p.57, para.114)

 

This was written in March 1914, before the Schlieffen Plan and two years before the Allied blockade. In turn it reflected German Army General Staff thinking that the enemy’s resources should be used to prosecute the war, articulated in the expression ‘war feeds war’.