100 Days

[jacksdad]

On 31/10/2019 at 22:44, phil andrade said:

But the loss of life in 1918 was indeed enormous, and I have consulted the CWGC database and also the 1914 population census to compare the proportionate loss of life suffered by the UK and Dominion contingents in France and Belgium between 8 August and 11 November 1918. I wanted to check my suggestion above that New Zealand took the biggest hit.  In terms of actual deaths, per 100,000 of  total national population in 1914, the UK lost 149 ; Canada 140, Australia 112 and New Zealand 204.  I had not expected that degree of Kiwi sacrificial supremacy.  

 

That is very interesting reading, i did not know that about the level of casualties that the NZEF suffered. The Division was in almost constant action from Mailly Mallet/Rosignol Wood onward.

 

 I recall, and i could be wrong, that the Australian Corps were rested during the latter part of this action, and that may account for the more fortunate rate per 100,000 that they incurred.

Edited 2 November , 2019 by jacksdad

[DarrellDuthie]

Hi Phil,

 

Thought this might be of interest. From the CAMC 100 Day report. IN particular note the "wastage" of the infantry.

 

(a)—Percentage of Reinforcements Required to Replace Monthly
Wastage.
The supply of reinforcements necessary to maintain the Forces in the
Field up to war strength is based on the statistics of wastage per month
for each arm of the Service.
This wastage from all causes has been found to be as follows:
Wastage per month.
Per Cent.
Infantry ................................................................................. 10
Cavalry 5 Artillery (Field and Horse) .................................. 3½
Artillery (Siege and Heavy Batteries) .................................. 3
Machine Gunners ................................................................. 10
Engineers .............................................................................. 4
Signallers .............................................................................. 4
Cyclists ................................................................................. 5
C.A.S.C................................................................................. 3
C.A.M.C. .............................................................................. 3
Veterinary Corps .................................................................. 2
Railway Troops (Construction) ............................................ 3
Railway Troops (Operative) ................................................. 3
Labour Group and Infantry Works Company....................... 3
Forestry Corps ...................................................................... 2

 

Further a couple of small comments regarding casualty figures relative to population. It struck me there are two variables: 1) the propensity to get recruited/conscripted/sent into action and 2) the propensity to get killed. The differing rates of deaths per 100K  has something of course to do with when (or if) countries had conscription. Secondly, in large countries like Aus. and Can. where agriculture is important more men could not/would not/were exempted from serving. Finally in a case like Canada the recruitment rates in Quebec were much lower. Less recruits, less deaths per head. Also I wondered how things like the RN are incorporated? England had a big navy, NZ not so! 

I'm quite interested in what you wrote about the discrepency in wounded/killed in 1916/17 and 1918. I'll have to think about this.

 

All the best,

Darrell

[phil andrade]

Thanks for that tabular info , Darrell.

 

Very informative : I’m going to reflect and comment.

 

You’re right about the several  criteria that impinged on national death rates : I must emphasise, though, that the death rates I cited from the CWGC were strictly confined to the 96 day period between 8 August and 11 November 1918 in France and Belgium only, so pretty well reflect the loss of life suffered by the troops there and then, and would not have been altered by the different systems of conscription, exemption etc that existed in the Dominions compared with the UK.  It might well be the case, though, that British soldiers were cut from a different cloth from their Dominion counterparts in those final battles : the proportion of youngsters was high in the British ranks, as Dr Jonathan Boff has suggested in his essay on the Hundred Days. Conscription had certainly worked its magic on the demographics.  Then again, look at the death of my Canadian friend’s uncle, who was seventeen when he died a week before the Armistice .

 

I’m  sure that the number of RN deaths contained in that sketchy analysis of the death rates was so small as to be immaterial .

 

This is developing into a rewarding thread for me, and I’m delighted to see that jacksdad has contributed, so we have authentic kiwi input too.

 

There is a revealing statement from the Australian Medical History which attests to the different nature of the casualty figures from 1916 and 1918, so I’ll get back soon with the data.

 

Phil

[phil andrade]

Darrell,

 

These are the figures that I found in the Australian Medical History which, I think, demonstrate the differences between the 1916 and the 1918 fighting, regarding the disparities in the fatality of the respective casualty statistics.

 

Between 1st July and the 30th November 1916 - a period of 153 days -  the Australian battle casualties on the Western Front are tabulated :

 

Killed : 9,186

Died of wounds : 2,207

Died from gas : 15

Wounded : 25,382

Gassed : 215

Prisoners : 951

 

Total, 38,401, including 11,408 fatalities ( 30%)

 

Here are the figures for the 183 days between 1st April  and the 30th September 1918 :

 

Killed : 7,165

Died of wounds : 3,108

Died from gas : 166

Wounded : 30,854

Gassed : 8,969

Shell shocked : 95

Wounded remaining at duty : 1,407

Prisoners : 502

 

Total : 52,266, including 10,439 fatalities ( 20%)

 

The differences are striking : more than one sixth of the 1918 casualties were gassed compared with fewer than one in a hundred of the 1916 battle casualties. Significantly fewer were posted as killed in the 1918 figures ; although - and this is significant - a higher number died from their wounds, both in absolute and relative terms.  This attests the better ability to bring in badly wounded  and dying men who, at Fromelles and on the Somme, perished where they lay and were included among the killed. The overall impression is that the enormous numbers of casualties in 1918 - the highest of the war for the BEF - did not imply that the fighting was deadlier than it had been in the static battles : indeed, it was the earlier fighting that proved more fatal.  I’m also venturing an interpretation that slight wounds were more meticulously recorded in the 1918 sample , and that this might inflate the figures beyond the 1916 remit.

 

The other aspect of the casualty record of the 96 days between 8th August and the Armistice is the degree to which it’s apparent that the Canadians plied their greatest effort, compared with the other contingents of the British and Dominion armies on the Western Front.

For the entire war on the Western Front, 11.6% of all UK deaths are attributable to the “ Hundred Days” of 1918. For the Canadians, the corresponding ratio  is nearly double, at 22%. The Australian and NZ figures are 12% and 18.6% respectively .  This is, of course, not properly comparable, because the Canadians were heavily engaged on the Western Front while the ANZACs were dying at Gallipoli instead. The Canadians stole a year’s march in this respect. So I've used the CWGC database to compile the figures from 1st July 1916 to the Armistice : confined to this period, it’s apparent that 15% of all UK deaths are attributable to the Hundred Days, compared with just over 12% for the Australians and a striking 19% for the NZs.  The Canadian preponderance is very remarkable : 27%.  Here, again, we have to remember that there were significant numbers of Australians and Kiwis who were dying in the Middle East theatre, so there must be a degree of circumspection.  That said, the more I reflect on the Canadian numbers, the more inclined I am to acknowledge the enormity of Canada’s contribution.

 

Phil

 

 

[DarrellDuthie]

Hi Phil,

 

Very interesting stuff. Thanks for that! I think your conclusion that

6 hours ago, phil andrade said:

it was the earlier fighting that proved more fatal

is entirely correct. Your supposition that the static fighting was more costly is almost also surely correct. Certainly war diaries all through the early years describing casualties almost every single day, even when nothing was happening, support this. Sadly many of these casualties achieved nothing.

 

Your calculations regarding the 100 Days certainly seem on target. When I first broached the topic of some suffering disproportionately this is what I meant. Certainly Canadian casualties, relative to forces in the field were horrendous. Which is no surprise if you look at the day-for-day operations over that entire period, and the sheer scale of the opposition. The surprise if any is that they weren't much worse (see Gen. Currie's comment below). To that I suppose you can attribute all the advances in training, artillery, combined arms and so forth, together with a certain softening of the German will at moments (not all), and I think a certain esprit de corps.

 

Below are two tables from the Report of Overseas Military Operations CEF referring to Canadian Corps operations. The first from the Amiens battle. The second from Arras up to the capture of Cambrai. To my surprise the casualties in the first period are heavier (roughly 800/day) vs. the second (600). The ratio of killed to wounded is roughly 1 in 5. Eyeballing it, it looks roughly similar to the figures from the Aussies. Perhaps you'll find it interesting. Unfortunately no separate statistics for gassing.

 

August 8 – 22, 1918

The casualties suffered by the Canadian Corps in the 14 days' heavy

fighting amounted to—

Officers. Other Ranks

Killed .......................... 126.................... 1,688

Missing ....................... 9.................... 436

Wounded..................... 444.................... 8,659

Total.................. 579.................... 10,783

Considering the number of German Divisions engaged, and the

results achieved, the casualties-were very light. (This note from Gen. Currie)

August 22 – October 11, 1918

Officers. Other Ranks.

Killed ............................... 296 ................. 4,071

Missing ............................ 18.................. 1,912

Wounded.......................... 1,230 ................. 23,279

Total ......................... 1,544 .................. 29,262

 

Regardless of the casualties (or the successes) these battles have garnered precious little attention (and certainly no movie!). Refer to Arras and one thinks of the doomed 1917 offensive. This second battle involving cutting through at least 5 major German lines (including the D-Q/Hindenburg hinge) but is all but unknown. LIkewise the 2nd battle of Cambrai (in which the 11th Imperial Division did good work) is completely unknown. Where whole forests have been felled to describe Cambrai 1917, this battle is consigned to the footnotes of history... if that. Which is strange, considering that while up to 11 German divisions were thrown into the fray, the Canadian Corps ultimately prevailed and the success of this battle opened the way to the city itself and undermined the entire German front to both north and south. This and the Allied success at St. Quentin effectively did in the Hindenburg line.

 

Keep up the good work!

All the best,

Darrell

 

[phil andrade]

Darrell,

 

You’ll find, I think, that the difference between the Canadian and the Australian compilations regarding the killed to wounded ratio is attributable to the missing : the Australian Medical History identified the prisoners of war, and all the rest of the missing were counted as killed, which almost undoubtedly reflected their fate.  The Canadian missing in the reports you cite contained a mixture of dead whose fate had not been confirmed - certainly the majority - and a smaller number of prisoners .  

 

The CWGC data for Canadians commemorated in France and Belgium between 8 August and 11 November 1918 reveal well over eleven thousand deaths : evidence, I suggest, that the men posted as missing in the reports you cite had been, in the majority of cases, killed. In addition, the number of wounded - more than 34,000 - would have included a large number who would die in hospital. I expect that the gas cases are included with the wounded.

 

My cut off date of 11 November is too arbitrary : no doubt more wounded died after the Armistice.

 

The comments I make are based on my interpretation : there is a deal of supposition on my part, and I hope that I’ve not made any big mistakes. 

 

Thanks for bearing with me,

 

Editing here : as a second thought, I’ve consulted CWGC for the number of Canadian deaths from 8 August to 11 October, to conform with the dates in your post, and the figure is about 10,550.  The number of killed in your tabulation is c.6, 200, the missing just shy of 2,400....if all the missing had been killed -  unlikely, I reckon - that would still leave about two thousand to account for, which would look plausible for the number of died from wounds and gas poisoning after admission to hospital .  Of course, there were deaths from accident and disease to allow for, too....but these were surprisingly few in number, despite the ‘flu pandemic. I believe that the majority of Canadian deaths from the ‘flu occurred after the Armistice .

 

Incidentally, wasn’t Currie reviled by many Canadians because of his decision to press home the final attack at Mons, which resulted in deaths literally up to the last minute or two of the war ?

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

Edited 3 November , 2019 by phil andrade

[2ndCMR]

4 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Incidentally, wasn’t Currie reviled by many Canadians because of his decision to press home the final attack at Mons, which resulted in deaths literally up to the last minute or two of the war ?

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

No, the attacks on Currie were largely instigated by Sir Sam Hughes, former Minister of Militia and Defence, who was angry that Currie had not given his son Garnet a divisional command in the Canadian Corps, despite the fact that Hughes had given Currie his initial command in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.  Hughes' attacks were initially launched under parliamentary privilege, but as I recall he made the mistake of repeating them through a small Ontario newspaper to which he had long connections.  Currie was then able to sue for libel, which he did successfully.  There were others, particularly officers of the 5th Canadian Division which was broken up in the UK for reinforcements, who also resented Currie, as well as the proteges of a few officers he had relieved of command for incompetence.  Incidentally, Currie refused the suggestion of creating a Canadian Army of two reduced corps, despite the fact that he would naturally have received command.   Haig and his minion Rawlinson threatened Currie with dismissal if his plan for the crossing of the Canal du Nord failed - it would have well suited their animus and agenda if they could have got rid of Currie when the hard work had been done. 

 

There's gratitude for you.

Edited 4 November , 2019 by 2ndCMR

[phil andrade]

2ndCMR,

 

Your allusion to the animus and agenda of Haig and Rawlinson intrigues me.

 

Was there “ bad blood” here, something conspiratorial ; or was Haig genuinely anxious about the repercussions of failure, and keen to warn Currie, rather than to threaten him ?

 

Phil

[AOK4]

The abundant use of gas in 1918 is something which I have mentioned already elsewhere on this forum. It's something which I am researching a bit in between after I had given a talk about Avelghem in the commune a year ago (mainly from the German point of view, but I am keen to find out more about the British use of it as well). I must once do something with that.

 

Jan

[2ndCMR]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

 

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

2ndCMR,

 

Your allusion to the animus and agenda of Haig and Rawlinson intrigues me.

 

Was there “ bad blood” here, something conspiratorial ; or was Haig genuinely anxious about the repercussions of failure, and keen to warn Currie, rather than to threaten him ?

 

Phil

As any such decision to relieve Currie of command would be up to Haig to initiate, so obviously the choice would therefore be his to do so.  Of course someone like "Rawly" could be relied upon to put up the recommendation if required. 

 

The Dominion government would have had to agree, and it seems highly unlikely that they would have as Sir Robert Borden by that point had seen the imperial feet of clay very clearly and would probably have been glad to get Haig by the lapels, as he had Lloyd George after Passchendaele.

 

Haig probably knew by then that Lloyd George was considering replacing him with Currie if the war continued into 1919 and so any excuse to get Currie out of France would be jumped at.  Haig had a history of pushing out possible competitors I suggest.

 

Considering the successes of the Canadian Corps under Currie, to attempt to remove him for the failure of one bold attack, would IMHO be prima facie evidence of an animus and agenda; it obviously could have no military benefit or purpose, could it?

 

Haig was happy enough to let his cronies carry on whether they failed or not; "professionals" all of course!

 

 

Edited 4 November , 2019 by 2ndCMR

[phil andrade]

2ndCMR,

 

Your depiction of Haig and his entourage of cronies is unflattering, at best !

 

Mind you....who’s to say your wrong ?

 

There was a lot of resentment flying about....I find it remarkable that the New Zealand record doesn’t exhibit the same degree of this as their Canadian and Australian counterparts do ; and this despite a higher per capita loss of life.....if my interpretation of CWGC data is right  - always something I’m conscious might be wrong .

 

I think I remember Haig getting pretty bitchy about the politicians leaning on him at this phase of the war....he made comments in his diary : something like I’m going to get all the blame if this goes wrong, and precious little praise if things work out !

 

In this sense he might have succumbed to the temptation to kick down a bit, and transfer the pressure to his Lieutenants.

 

I must get the books and see if I can cite something to this effect.

 

Phil

[adk46canada]

Interesting thread to which I can perhaps add some colour regarding casualty rates in the Canadian Corps.

 

On the Somme 1916, the Canadians suffered 1.96 wounded to every killed in the campaign. Over the war, the total was just under 2.9 wounded per death and during Second Arras, running from 26 August to 3 September, the figure was just under four wounded to every man killed. The higher total on the Somme was a factor of dominating German artillery, horrible weather, and multiple defeats that left wounded men in No-Man's-Land that could not be recovered.

 

The much better figure at Arras was a function of better weather, victories that resulted in early recovery of the wounded, improved medical care and better evacuation using tramways, and most importantly, the relative impotence of German artillery. There were two crucial factors to this. First, the Germans pulled back their field artillery to evade being overrun in attacks, with the result that the German forward zone was often left uncovered by field artillery. The German defending corps admitted in its after action report that this decision was a mistake.

 

Second, the German gunners were working under severe ammunition restrictions. There were repeated references to German artillery regimental histories to shell shortages. According to Jonathon Boff's study on the Third Army, the German Second Armee facing Byng's army was restricted to firing 50,000 shells a day. The Canadian Corps, with no more than three divisions in line at a time, fired an average of 96,000 shells per day during Second Arras. Thus, a three division corps fired twice as many shells as an entire German army.

 

I do not have detailed gas casualty figures but they were relatively few in the campaign. There were several particularly bad incidents, including the crippling of a company by mustard gas, but overall the gas effects were minimal in respect to casualties.

 

Regards

Bill

[DarrellDuthie]

20 hours ago, phil andrade said:

The number of killed in your tabulation is c.6, 200, the missing just shy of 2,400....if all the missing had been killed -  unlikely, I reckon - that would still leave about two thousand to account for, which would look plausible for the number of died from wounds and gas poisoning after admission to hospital .

Hi Phil,

 

Fortunately a few others have joined the discussion! However as to the above there are a few things to keep in mind. This was a report sent home fairly shortly after the war. Also, and more importantly, it does not include Canadian casualties OUTSIDE the corps (as I tried to point out earlier to another comment, there were huge numbers of Canadians in things like the cavalry, airforce, tanks, engineers, etc., etc.). Finally I wonder if the CWGC casualties include Newfoundland. I'm still surprised by the difference though. As you rightly say many of the missing and wounded will have died.

 

Bill's explanation of differing casualty rates at Arras vs. Somme was interesting. Also the artillery usage figures are illuminating.

Not sure I completely buy the Haig/Rawlinson/Currie animosity. For the most part I think they had a professional, mutually-respecting relationship, although far too few historians pay attention to these critical "human" factors. Currie was libeled after the war about the Mons casualties and he sued. Some think this was a cause of his relatively premature death.
 

Finally, to return to NZ casualties. I think some of the explanation lies in the fact that of the NZ men who volunteered, almost all ended up in the infantry. This in contrast to British, Canadian and even Australian units. Think of all the men in logistics trains, medical corps, etc. This doesn't diminish the figures, but it goes some way to explaining the striking differences. Incidently I suspect the same would be true of Newfoundland. I believe recruitment rates were relatively high; they all ended up in the infantry, and the Newfoundland experience in the Great War was not a happy one (on Jul 1 1916 for example) 80% of the battalion were casualties.

 

All the best,

Darrell

 

 

Edited 4 November , 2019 by DarrellDuthie

[MikeMeech]

17 hours ago, 2ndCMR said:

No, the attacks on Currie were largely instigated by Sir Sam Hughes, former Minister of Militia and Defence, who was angry that Currie had not given his son Garnet a divisional command in the Canadian Corps, despite the fact that Hughes had given Currie his initial command in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.  Hughes' attacks were initially launched under parliamentary privilege, but as I recall he made the mistake of repeating them through a small Ontario newspaper to which he had long connections.  Currie was then able to sue for libel, which he did successfully.  There were others, particularly officers of the 5th Canadian Division which was broken up in the UK for reinforcements, who also resented Currie, as well as the proteges of a few officers he had relieved of command for incompetence.  Incidentally, Currie refused the suggestion of creating a Canadian Army of two reduced corps, despite the fact that he would naturally have received command.   Haig and his minion Rawlinson threatened Currie with dismissal if his plan for the crossing of the Canal du Nord failed - it would have well suited their animus and agenda if they could have got rid of Currie when the hard work had been done. 

 

There's gratitude for you.

Hi

 

I am not sure how Rawlinson is involved in this 'story' about the Canal du Nord, Horne was Currie's Army commander.  Reference Currie's plan for the Canal du Nord, Tim Cook in 'Shock Troops' pages 506-507 has the following:

 

"But even Currie's commander, General Henry Horne, considered the plan too dangerous.  He worriedly visited Currie in an attempt to convince him to try something less complicated, even though he was always supportive of the Canadians.  But Currie refused to budge.  Even when Horne appealed to Haig and roused the field marshal to visit Currie on September 21 at Canadian Corps' headquarters, Currie would not significantly alter his plans.  The high command nonetheless remained worried about the daring nature of the plan.  A final private visit by Curries old mentor, Sir Julian Byng, must have left the Canadian commander a little shaken, especially when Byng asked: "Old man, do you think you can do it?"  Currie responded in the affirmative, and Byng left confident that his old Canadian Corps could pull it off.  Currie had faith in his men, and Haig and Horne backed their dominion general."

 

Schreiber in 'Shock Army of the British Empire' page 98, has similar but expands on Byng's discussion with Currie with the following:

 

""Do you realize that you are attempting one of the most difficult operations of the war?  If anybody can do it, the Canadians can do it, but if you fail, it means home for you."

 

Various other publications have similar, I am not sure of the source for your statement, I could look through my other Canadian sources but I can't recall it being in one.

 

This does not appear to be "threatening with dismissal".

 

Mike

 

 

[MikeMeech]

12 hours ago, 2ndCMR said:

 

Haig probably knew by then that Lloyd George was considering replacing him with Currie if the war continued into 1919 and so any excuse to get Currie out of France would be jumped at.  Haig had a history of pushing out possible competitors I suggest.

 

Considering the successes of the Canadian Corps under Currie, to attempt to remove him for the failure of one bold attack, would IMHO be prima facie evidence of an animus and agenda; it obviously could have no military benefit or purpose, could it?

 

Haig was happy enough to let his cronies carry on whether they failed or not; "professionals" all of course!

 

 

Hi

LG's post war comments in his memoirs have been gone over by many, LG had an axe to grind and is not totally reliable, however, what he wrote was the following:

 

"Since the war I have been told by men whose judgement I value that the only soldier thrown up by the War on the British side who possessed the necessary qualities for the position was a Dominion General.  Competent professional soldiers whom I have consulted [It is thought this was possibly Capt. Liddell Hart] have all agreed that this man might and probably would have risen to the height of the great occasion.  But I knew nothing of this at the time.  No report ever reached me either as War Secretary or Prime Minister, which attributed any special merit to this distinguished soldier.  The fact he was a civilian soldier when the War broke out may have had something to do with the tardiness in recognising his exceptional abilities and achievements." (page 1367 of his 'War Memoirs' 1936).

 

Who is he talking about?  He later (page 2016) comments:

 

"Monash would, if the opportunity had been given him, have risen to the height of it."

 

Currie was not mentioned as a Haig replacement post war by LG, nor was he or Monash during the war, so I am not sure how Haig knew "that Lloyd George was considering replacing him with Currie" when even LG didn't know that.  What is the source of this, it is not LG's Memoirs?

 

Mike

[2ndCMR]

Well I must thank you for doing the checking that I should have done before posting some of those points, and for quoting those sources.  The core of the matter however, remains the fact that Currie was asked to propose the methodology for a highly risky operation, one that there was good reason to think would fail, and then warned that if it did fail, apparently even in the first attempt(!), he would be relieved of command.  

 

Was there another corps commander in France with Currie's record of success, indeed success against the odds and where others had in some cases failed before?

 

What then would be the logical reason for planning to relieve a commander with a long and proven, indeed very recently re-proven, record of success if a single highly difficult and risky operation was not successful in the first instance?

 

Clearly, from an objective point of view, there could be no reason, particularly in the situation that prevailed in late 1918.

 

So Haig and Horne apparently did not warn or even intimate to Currie of his being relieved of command in the event of failure, but then Byng "his old mentor" comes to warn him that he will be relieved if the crossing fails?

 

Where did Byng learn that?  There's really only one answer: GHQ and his contacts there.

 

So what we seem to have is Haig and perhaps Horne discussing the intention to fire Currie if the crossing fails, Byng getting wind of this, and for whatever reason deciding to go and see Currie and warn him.

 

Now in fact we have something worse than Haig or Horne issuing that warning; we have Haig apparently planning Currie's dismissal, but failing to tell him as much.

 

Byng doesn't say, "might be", he says "will be".   If he had merely heard it said that Currie might be dismissed, would Byng have made so definite a statement?  No, it seems clearly that Byng must have become aware that this was Haig's definite intention.

 

Was that because Byng had just heard of this decision, if such it was, or was he aware that Haig had nourished the intention of relieving Currie for some time, if an excuse could be found?   After nearly losing the war in March-April, Haig's position was by no means secure.   His replacement if any would I assume have to have come from the generals in France, so who would be the most likely candidate?  Now the BEF had survived Haig & Kiggell, just barely, and generals of real ability like Smith Dorrien and Allenby had been sent off, so who might the politicians choose as Haig's successor?  Whoever Haig judged that to be, that officer would be a marked man I suggest.

 

I doubt that "over-weening conceit" is too strong a term for the self-perception of Haig and his ilk, particularly vis a vis "colonials".  It certainly seems to have been a self-perception immune to all proofs of their own inadequacies; though since it was a conceit was based largely on social origins rather than professional competence, there is a certain perverse logic to its immunity!  

 

No question also that their amour propre and professional, indeed national dignity had been repeatedly bruised by Imperial failure and colonial success, and I have no doubt they and many others of a similar mind, were eager for a chance to "take the colonials down a peg" in the person of their commander, whose humble and non-"professional" origins made his successes even more irritating and embarrassing. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited 5 November , 2019 by 2ndCMR

[phil andrade]

18 hours ago, adk46canada said:

Interesting thread to which I can perhaps add some colour regarding casualty rates in the Canadian Corps.

 

On the Somme 1916, the Canadians suffered 1.96 wounded to every killed in the campaign. Over the war, the total was just under 2.9 wounded per death and during Second Arras, running from 26 August to 3 September, the figure was just under four wounded to every man killed. The higher total on the Somme was a factor of dominating German artillery, horrible weather, and multiple defeats that left wounded men in No-Man's-Land that could not be recovered.

 

The much better figure at Arras was a function of better weather, victories that resulted in early recovery of the wounded, improved medical care and better evacuation using tramways, and most importantly, the relative impotence of German artillery. There were two crucial factors to this. First, the Germans pulled back their field artillery to evade being overrun in attacks, with the result that the German forward zone was often left uncovered by field artillery. The German defending corps admitted in its after action report that this decision was a mistake.

 

Second, the German gunners were working under severe ammunition restrictions. There were repeated references to German artillery regimental histories to shell shortages. According to Jonathon Boff's study on the Third Army, the German Second Armee facing Byng's army was restricted to firing 50,000 shells a day. The Canadian Corps, with no more than three divisions in line at a time, fired an average of 96,000 shells per day during Second Arras. Thus, a three division corps fired twice as many shells as an entire German army.

 

I do not have detailed gas casualty figures but they were relatively few in the campaign. There were several particularly bad incidents, including the crippling of a company by mustard gas, but overall the gas effects were minimal in respect to casualties.

 

Regards

Bill

 

 

Bill,

 

Thanks for this.  It’s a first rate contribution that allows me to reconsider my interpretation of the data.

 

You’ll not take it amiss, I hope, if I wonder whether the difference between the rates of deaths to wounded might reflect the inclusion of died of wounds with the “ killed”. Did the Second Arras figures exclude the died of wounds, while the Somme figure for killed conflated them ?

 

Phil

[Rugbyrelic]

On 01/11/2019 at 22:29, phil andrade said:

Does memory serve me, if I recall an anecdote about Foch, related by David Lloyd George, in which the Frenchman demonstrated his strategic  method to the Welshman by dint of feigning a delivery of rapid punches, from his chops to his guts, and then pretending to kick him in the shin, for good measure ? 

 

Was this the inspiration behind the Hundred Days, tout le monde a la bataille ! ...keep punching all along the front, no respite ?

 

No time for bite and hold here : far too breathless and relentless for that.

 

Foch provided inspiration ; Haig implementation ; Dominion contingents as the best practitioners ?

 

Editing here : Scope for me to reconsider the role of anecdote : there’s another one about Foch, this time accentuating his reputation for eccentricity in the pre war days when he was lecturing to students in a war college. He expressed his admiration for the parrot, because the bird was able to climb its cage, using its claws effectively, but securing each step upwards by clasping with its beak. Now, if that’s not bite and hold, I don’t know what is !  

 

Enough for now....all eyes on the rugby !

 

Phil

Phil,
Thanks for your many responses and input - and hope you enjoyed the rugby!

I'm intrigued by the Foch anecdote you quote here regarding 'Bite & Hold' and a parrot - do you have any reference sources for this at all ?

 

Chris

[phil andrade]

Chris,

 

Many a time an anecdote like this sticks in my mind, but I cannot for the life of me remember where I read it, or heard it.

 

I promise to seek the source, and do my best to authenticate it.

 

Phil

[adk46canada]

Phil,

 

Fair question, but the figures are similarly calculated. The ratio for the entire war was from the Canadian Official History. The figures for the Somme and Second Arras were my calculations based on the figures from the CWGC website for the number killed against the total losses less killed and captured. I tested these numbers by looking at specific battalion engagements during Second Arras where I have particularly good figures and it bears out. It should be noted, however, the ratio during the battle was not consistently 4 to 1 but did go as high as 5 to 1 where an attack was particularly successful. The failures tended to be closer to 3 to 1.

 

Regards

Bill

[MikeMeech]

8 hours ago, 2ndCMR said:

Well I must thank you for doing the checking that I should have done before posting some of those points, and for quoting those sources.  The core of the matter however, remains the fact that Currie was asked to propose the methodology for a highly risky operation, one that there was good reason to think would fail, and then warned that if it did fail, apparently even in the first attempt(!), he would be relieved of command.  

 

Was there another corps commander in France with Currie's record of success, indeed success against the odds and where others had in some cases failed before?

 

What then would be the logical reason for planning to relieve a commander with a long and proven, indeed very recently re-proven, record of success if a single highly difficult and risky operation was not successful in the first instance?

 

Clearly, from an objective point of view, there could be no reason, particularly in the situation that prevailed in late 1918.

 

So Haig and Horne apparently did not warn or even intimate to Currie of his being relieved of command in the event of failure, but then Byng "his old mentor" comes to warn him that he will be relieved if the crossing fails?

 

Where did Byng learn that?  There's really only one answer: GHQ and his contacts there.

 

So what we seem to have is Haig and perhaps Horne discussing the intention to fire Currie if the crossing fails, Byng getting wind of this, and for whatever reason deciding to go and see Currie and warn him.

 

Now in fact we have something worse than Haig or Horne issuing that warning; we have Haig apparently planning Currie's dismissal, but failing to tell him as much.

 

Byng doesn't say, "might be", he says "will be".   If he had merely heard it said that Currie might be dismissed, would Byng have made so definite a statement?  No, it seems clearly that Byng must have become aware that this was Haig's definite intention.

 

Was that because Byng had just heard of this decision, if such it was, or was he aware that Haig had nourished the intention of relieving Currie for some time, if an excuse could be found?   After nearly losing the war in March-April, Haig's position was by no means secure.   His replacement if any would I assume have to have come from the generals in France, so who would be the most likely candidate?  Now the BEF had survived Haig & Kiggell, just barely, and generals of real ability like Smith Dorrien and Allenby had been sent off, so who might the politicians choose as Haig's successor?  Whoever Haig judged that to be, that officer would be a marked man I suggest.

 

I doubt that "over-weening conceit" is too strong a term for the self-perception of Haig and his ilk, particularly vis a vis "colonials".  It certainly seems to have been a self-perception immune to all proofs of their own inadequacies; though since it was a conceit was based largely on social origins rather than professional competence, there is a certain perverse logic to its immunity!  

 

No question also that their amour propre and professional, indeed national dignity had been repeatedly bruised by Imperial failure and colonial success, and I have no doubt they and many others of a similar mind, were eager for a chance to "take the colonials down a peg" in the person of their commander, whose humble and non-"professional" origins made his successes even more irritating and embarrassing. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hi

 

Schreiber, page 99, has a different interpretation on this matter:

 

"Horne's unwilling acquiesence to Currie's plan also firmly underlined  Currie's primacy in operations where his Corps formed the "spearhead."  Haig's refusal to overrule Currie on Horne's behalf supports the position that Haig trusted Currie's judgement in operational matters more than some of his own Army commanders.  Moreover, it was indicative of the growing realization that the Canadian Corps, and by extension Canada, was now a "junior" but sovereign ally."

 

Mike 

[phil andrade]

2 hours ago, adk46canada said:

Phil,

 

Fair question, but the figures are similarly calculated. The ratio for the entire war was from the Canadian Official History. The figures for the Somme and Second Arras were my calculations based on the figures from the CWGC website for the number killed against the total losses less killed and captured. I tested these numbers by looking at specific battalion engagements during Second Arras where I have particularly good figures and it bears out. It should be noted, however, the ratio during the battle was not consistently 4 to 1 but did go as high as 5 to 1 where an attack was particularly successful. The failures tended to be closer to 3 to 1.

 

Regards

Bill

 

Bill,

 

It’s clear that I must defer to you here.

 

Many a time, I see  disparities that defy explanation : there is a conviction in my mind that, in some figures, the “killed” include significant numbers of men who died from wounds before they were evacuated further down the casualty chain, while in others, there was a more meticulous separation of those who were actually killed in action ;  and the wounded who died - even in RAPs- were segregated as died from wounds.

 

Phil

[adk46canada]

Phil,

 

I agree you have to be careful of quoted figures as how they were derived can lead to a distortion. Comparisons have to be be viewed carefully to ensure they are using a similar basis and that you understand how the figures were arrived at.

 

For instance, historians, based on the Canadian Official History, will report 173,000 Canadian Expeditionary Force personnel were wounded or injured during the war. Along with 60-66,000 killed and 3,300 captured it suggests over half of the 424,000 who served overseas were captured, wounded, or died. This is misleading, as the wounded/injured total were instances and not individuals wounded or injured. Thus, it was entirely possible for a soldier to be wounded two times, captured, and then die in captivity. They would then count as 2 wounds, one capture, and one death in the totals. For instance, the 3rd Battalion reported on 1 May 1918 it had 116 all ranks serving in the battalion who were twice wounded.

 

Regards

Bill

[2ndCMR]

14 hours ago, MikeMeech said:

Hi

 

Schreiber, page 99, has a different interpretation on this matter:

 

"Horne's unwilling acquiesence to Currie's plan also firmly underlined  Currie's primacy in operations where his Corps formed the "spearhead."  Haig's refusal to overrule Currie on Horne's behalf supports the position that Haig trusted Currie's judgement in operational matters more than some of his own Army commanders.  Moreover, it was indicative of the growing realization that the Canadian Corps, and by extension Canada, was now a "junior" but sovereign ally."

 

Mike 

 

One could just as easily conclude that Haig would have been happy to have an excuse to relieve Currie, and that he over-ruled Horne's objections to Currie's plan of attack simply because he thought it would give him the pretext he was hoping for. 

 

Horne of course would be concerned for his own reputation and career as having an attack by a corps under his command fail would not reflect well on him.   Indeed he might well have feared that he would be dismissed also, if only as cover for the dismissal of Currie, as in obtaining the consent of the Dominion government being able to point to an Army commander relieved as well would make it very hard for the Dominion government to claim that Currie was being made a scapegoat or treated unfairly compared to others.

 

And of course, regardless of Currie's fate, if the Canadians failed it would be a nice counterpoint to the various victories, which while probably ensuring Haig's continuance in his position, would have rankled none the less for it, nay, more.

 

IIRC it was Wolsely who remarked that his officers were "as jealous of each other as school girls".    It's remarkable what people will stoop to in their desire to "get ahead", and stay there.  Haig was a prime example of that.

 

 

Edited 6 November , 2019 by 2ndCMR

[phil andrade]

5 hours ago, 2ndCMR said:

 

 

IIRC it was Wolsely who remarked that his officers were "as jealous of each other as school girls".    It's remarkable what people will stoop to in their desire to "get ahead", and stay there.  Haig was a prime example of that.

 

 

 

That explains it : Haig was educated at St Trinian's, not Clifton !

 

There is an innate tendency, I suppose, in military hierarchies, for jealousies to surge as rivalries develop. I have to admit that I was a bit shocked when I read somewhere that Haig had a grudge against Allenby because the latter had been chosen, instead of him, to be Master of the Hunt in some pre war societal competition to be the most highly regarded officer in the Mess.

It all sounds ludicrous to our ears : but that's what life was like back then.

 

At the beginning of the war, there was the mutual detestation of John French and Smith- Dorrien, which Kitchener seemed to have overlooked...or was there something deliberate in this choice ?  Keep the blighters at each other's throats, and they will be trying so hard to out perform each other that performance will edge up a notch or two ?  I think of Stalin's fostering of mutual suspicions between the commanders of several  soviet armies as they approached Berlin in 1945.  A bit of a stretch to compare that with the Hundred Days, but it does cross my mind.

 

Phil

Edited 6 November , 2019 by phil andrade