Der Marnefeldzug 1914

[Robert Dunlop]

Having slowly come to grips with German Gothic script, I offer the following translation of General von Kuhl's section on the Battle of le Cateau from his book published in 1921. He was General von Kluck's Chief of Staff for the German First Army in 1914.

"The Battle of Le Cateau - 26 August

On the evening of the 25th August, the British First Corps arrived at Landrecies, and the Second Corps at Le Cateau, with the exception of the brigade that was attacked by the Germans near Solesmes and arrived late at night. GHQ moved to St Quentin, quite far to the rear. General French was faced with the dilemma of whether he should stand and fight at Le Cateau or continue the retreat. The French territorial troops on the right wing were continuing to retreat, which had exposed the British left flank and threatened to cut off connections with Le Havre. More time was needed to prepare the current position for defence. So the British Commander-in-Chief resolved to continue the retreat toward St Quentin - Noyon, in order to establish the army behind the Oise and Somme rivers. There it was hoped that the troops could rest and be readied to hold the German advance.

On the 26th, the First Corps actually continued to retreat from Landrecies to Guise, while the Second Corps halted along the line Le Cateau - Caudry, alongside Allenby’s Cavalry Division. During the night of 25/26, General Smith-Dorrien decided that his corps could not continue retreating the next day when some troops had been fighting and had only arrived late that night. Besides the enemy was very close. He resolved to stand and fight on the morning of the 26th August. Cambrai was still occupied by the French forces (the 84th Territorial Division had fallen back there after the Battle of Mons). General French went to a meeting with Joffre and Lanrezac on the 26th, near St Quentin, having sent a General Staff Officer to General Smith-Dorrien with an order to break-off and continue the retreat; this was before receiving the message that Second Corps had begun fighting. That evening, after the meeting, General French learnt about the predicament that had befallen Second Corps.

General von Kluck was now presented with a second opportunity to bring the British to battle. First, von der Marwitz’s Cavalry Corps arrived promptly and attacked the British left wing, successfully pinning them until the arrival of the IV Reserve Corps and II Corps.

IV Corps was directed towards the area of Caudry and Reumont and made contact with the British at 9 a.m. IV Corps was covered on the right by IV Reserve Corps and on the left by III Corps, both of whom were ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to advance until they found the enemy flank. The intention of the outflanking manoeuvre was not fulfilled. IV Reserve Corps came into contact with the enemy near Esnes and Haucourt after a long march from Valenciennes. It was dark before the bulk of the divisions could be deployed. The British retreated during the night. III Corps only managed to reach Honnechy. II Corps attacked the French in Cambrai and threw them back. Thus the majority of the fighting fell to IV Corps. In the afternoon, the commander of III Corps, General von Lochow, arrived on the battlefield of IV Corps, where he offered the support of his corps to General Sixt von Arnim. While this offer might have seemed to be helpful, it was not appropriate. III Corps needed to march further to their objective in order to provide maximum assistance. III Corps, which had been re-directed south-east to Aulnoye on the 25th, then south-west to Landrecies on the 26th, should have marched with its two divisions in a column, one behind the other. The advance and deployment of the corps took up too much time and was too late to support the left wing of the army.

On the morning of the 26th, from the British perspective, most of Allenby’s cavalry was on the right wing between the Sambre and le Cateau; 5th Division held the line from le Cateau to Troisvilles, apparently with the 19th Brigade attached; the 3rd Division was near Caudry; the 4th Division had just arrived on the far left near Haucourt; and a cavalry brigade occupied the left wing. The disposition of the British troops meant that General Smith-Dorrien’s situation had became perilous by midday. His right flank was threatened with encirclement following the departure of the British First Corps. In the afternoon, Smith-Dorrien decided to order a retreat during the battle. The fact that the British were forced to retreat under these circumstances and that they could not retire freely confirms their dire situation. Furthermore, 5th Division retreated as it was violently attacked. They had not received the order to retreat from above; it arose because of the confusion. In other words: Smith-Dorrien suffered a heavy defeat.

The British fell back via St Quentin and past the Somme near Ham, where the troops arrived early on the 28th. The cavalry sought to cover the retreat. Day and night the British marched, frequently without provisions and only stopping for short periods.

General French knew that only the bravery of the troops and the support by Allenby’s cavalry and Sordet’s French Cavalry Corps, as well as by General d'Amade’s troops, had saved Second Corps. Otherwise it would have been encircled. The loss of 15,000 men, 80 guns and much material indicated to General French the magnitude of the defeat. "The condition of the army", said French, "was deplorable. The long-term consequences of our losses in the battle of le Cateau were felt up to the battle of the Marne and even up to the first operations on the Aisne". The further the British retreated, the more difficult the situation became. It was not longer possible to stand behind the Somme or the Oise rivers, nor even north of the Marne.

On the evening of 26th August, the British Commander-in-Chief initially ordered the army to retreat to la Fère - Noyon. GHQ went to Noyon. By the end of the day on the 28th, First Corps was south of la Fère, between the forest of St Gobain and the Oise; Second Corps was by Noyon.

From the French perspective, the 84th Territorial Division had fought at Cambrai, having fallen back from Valenciennes to Cambrai. Sordet’s Cavalry Corps finally succeeded in arriving by route marches to the area between the British left wing and Cambrai, where they were engaged in action. It soon fell back towards Peronne. General d'Amade’s army contained two reserve divisions from Paris, the 61st and 62nd, which were moved out to Arras on 25 August. A brigade of 62nd Division was involved in the fighting near Cambrai on the 26th. The divisions then fell back after the 26th via Bapaume towards Peronne, but were attacked on the 27th and 28th August by the German II Corps near Combles and completely defeated. The 61st Reserve Division mainly fled back through Bapaume and Arras; the remnants were only rallied with difficulty in St Pol. The 62nd Reserve Division escaped through Amiens and later became part of the Paris garrison. General d'Amade’s territorial divisions were withdrawn via Abbeville behind the lower Somme."

Robert

[Halder]

Thanks for the translation - I'm slowly working on a book on the Marne campaign at the moment. I know what you mean about the Gothic script. Hideous! I'm very slowly plodding my way through the Reichsarchiv's Official Histories of 1914. Not only do I have to contend with a foreign language, but it's a swine to read to boot. It only seems to have been phased out around 1941-42.

Kuhl's an interesting character, and rather controversial - post-war he was one of the more vociferous "stab in the back" supporters, unlike say Groener who was far more rational about OHL's failings.

[Robert Dunlop]

Halder

I'm pressing on, rather enjoying the challenge at present but I am grateful for your reality check on this . If there are any particular areas that are of interest, please let me know. Von Bülow's account should be arriving any day now and I am looking forward to tackling that too.

Robert

[Halder]

Hi Robert,

Thanks for the offer - I can't think of anything especially at the moment as I haven't really got to grips with my task in earnest!

I don't know if any of this helps. I haven't translated much yet as I'm concentrating my efforts on a book on the Fall of France in 1940.

"Many captured letters from soldiers say quite clearly that the Belgians are expected French help on the right and English help on the left." [brief Chef des Generalstabes, AOK 1, an AOK 2, 20/8/14. Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Band I, p.221]

"Our assumption that the English landed a long time ago and were advancing has been confirmed. We thought they were in the area between Valenciennes and Mauberge, perhaps even further to the rear. They were following the French. Lille-Tournai was free of the enemy. Nevertheless, it was impossible to get a truly clear picture. A rapid advance by First Army towards Second Army was impractical. We had to advance at the side of Second Army." [Kuhl, Der Marnefeldzug 1914, Berlin 1921, p.45]

If you speak French, you can get a translation of Bülow's memoirs via Abebooks, minus that lovely Gothic script...

By the way, if you haven't already got it Mombauer's book on Moltke (mercifully in English) is indispensable.

[Robert Dunlop]

Halder

Bülow's memoirs are already on their way. Thanks for the tip on Monbauer.

Robert

[Fred van Woerkom]

Hi All,

Did you know that that wonderful writer, journalist and historian Sebastian Haffner wrote a book, together with Wolfgang Venohr, called DAS WUNDER AN DER MARNE? Haffner is best known for his works on Hitler, Churchill, German History (From Bismarck to Hitler) and his moving auotobiography, written in 1939 (!) DEFYING HITLER.

DAS WUNDER AN DER MARNE is a kind of play, with essays, in which the main actors like Joffre, Moltke etc, are introduced to the reader (or the theatre audience) in 'speaking parts. It is NOT in Gothic script.

Details: published 1982 by Gustav Lübke Verlag, ISBN 3-7857-0314-7.

It is illustrated.

All the best,

Fred

[Guest Benoit Douville]

I saw the piece of litterature "From Bismark to Hitler" by Haffner the other day at the library and I hesitated to pick it up but now after reading your post I think I will get a copy.

Robert,

I really appreciate the translation of General Von Kuhl.

Halder,

Don't forget to tell us when your book about the Marne Campaign is gona be over.

Regards

[Halder]

Sadly not before the end of the decade at the earliest.

First I've got to finish a book on the Fall of Poland and France 1939-40...

...after that I might write a book on the North African campaign, or do the Marne, not decided yet!

[MartinWills]

For some strange reason I seem to find most gothic script relatively easy to read - it's just the translation that's a bit more difficult!

[Robert Dunlop]

My copy of GeneralFeldMarschall Bülow's book 'Mein Bericht zur Marneschacht' arrived while I was away in the USA. It has all the maps intact. Looking forward to this one as well.

Robert (still struggling to distinguish 'aus' from 'auf' )