St Mihiel - a squandered victory?

[nigelcave]

Over the last couple of years I have become increasingly interested in the AEF, in particular since I started commissioning some books in the BE series on the AEF.

 

A much-held view, particularly by US historians, is that St M (!2 - 16 September 1918) was a 'squandered victory' and that the US should have ploughed on to Metz and consequently ended the war weeks earlier. 

 

Having spent but a couple of days in the area of the Salient I think that this is implausible (to put it mildly). MacArthur was one of those who plugged this view, claiming that he had got through the AEF lines and viewed Metz from a distance - very unlikely. The base of the St M Salient was covered by the Michel Line, for the sake of argument the Hindenburg Line in that area. In October, over approximately a north south line of ten it twelve kilometres, Maarten Otte and I counted 150 remaining bunkers (all dug in, with maybe ten cams of concrete showing above the surface with the exception of several observation (command?) bunkers), accessed via tunnels and, from those that could be examined via a ventilation shaft, with about a metre, possibly more, of reinforced cover. These bunkers were (largely) constructed from mid 1917. It is quite possible that bunkers that sat more on the surface have been removed since the war, of course, so the 150 are just the survivors.

 

The reality is that nowhere did the AEF get into the Michel Line prior to the Armistice, accepting that the new AEF Third Army had yet o launch an offensive, due in the days originally after what transpired to be the date of the Armistice. My view is that there was not a hope in Hades of the AEF launching a successful attack on the Michel Line immediately after 16 September, nor for some weeks afterwards, as there would have needed to be a complete reorganisation of the line and of the infrastructure in the captured ground (fairly flat and in places rather marshy). A couple of pix for everyone's edification - beware the annotations, as these done from memory and likely to be inaccurate.

Edited 4 December , 2018 by nigelcave

[Kimberley John Lindsay]

Dear Nigel,

Very convincing.

Moreover, the AEF had just started its "learning curve".

Kindest regards,

Kim.

[nigelcave]

I did try to edit the typos in my original post but, alas, the 'save changes' button seemed to have disappeared, so bear with me, please!

[phil andrade]

Didn’t the Americans face an enemy that was in the process of withdrawing, and a force that was comprised largely of sub standard units, including some rather reluctant troops from the Austro Hungarian army ? In those circumstances, a striking initial success hardly portends a subsequent potential for the same results . 

 

Germans have proven themselves masters of reflexive fighting and ferocious and effective counter attack. Doesn’t the fighting in the Meuse Argonne indicate how the Americans would have fared if they had attempted to exploit at St Mihiel ?

 

You can tell from this that I don’t know much about this battle ; and I would hate to begrudge the success achieved. 

 

Who would trust MacArthur’s account ?

 

Phil

 

 

[paulgranger]

I know next to nothing of the St Mihiel offensive except a vague notion that it was fought against opposition that was already retreating or about to do so. Having read something of the Meuse Argonne offensive, it seems to me that that much derided phrase `lions led by donkeys' could be applied to the AEF, so I very much doubt that St Mihiel could have been fought to a war-winning conclusion. 

[nigelcave]

My take, for what it is worth.

 

As regards troops, I very much doubt that an attack would have worked, as the Germans had retained and added to the numbers they had in what, for a better term, could be called the Metz defensive area. At the start of the St M offensive, IIRC, the Germans were outnumbered by the AEF (and a French Corps) by about 6 or 7 to 1, possibly more; and whether they had begin to pull out or were just about to pull out of the Salient is a relative quibble, as all levels of higher command knew that it was imminent and some heavy artillery had been withdrawn. Quite frab=nkly, the Salient was pretty indefensible. 

 

The problem the AEF would have faced in a second phase would have been reorganisation, infrastructure and a pretty resolute opposition (such as they faced in the M-A, which, with some exceptions, more or less car-crashed after the first few days). The St M plain was, in parts, quite boggy/marshy; and they would have been under direct German observation. By no means am I saying that it was impossible to break through - just not in September and the next stage would quite likely have had to wait several weeks if it had been adopted.

 

The morale of the story is that there were no easy options for the allies in attacking the Germans in August-mid October 1918, if then.

[Open Bolt]

Very interesting - and a fine day for photographs, Brother Cave.

I may not be alone in this - what recommended texts are there for the AEF in the Great War, that adequately interpret their effort in a modern light? 

[nigelcave]

On balance I think that the AEF did remarkably well given all the circumstances and the military point from which it had to start (which was no fault of the military); about the only thing that it had going for it was a huge reservoir of manpower: everything else made them more or less dependent on the allies for much of their equipment. I would suggest that its main problem was effective command at all levels. There can be no other convincing explanation for the figure of 100,000 'shirkers' , however that figure is qualified (the new AEF First Army's commander's figure) on the M-A front by mid October - and most of those would, it can be assumed,  be infantry. But then look at the reality of the problem.

 

On a different note, some of the best memoirs of the war that I have read have been AEF ones - take, for example, Trench Knives and Mustard Gas, or the excellent accounts of Barber (a sapper) and Casey (a gunner).

[nigelcave]

8 minutes ago, Open Bolt said:

Very interesting - and a fine day for photographs, Brother Cave.

I may not be alone in this - what recommended texts are there for the AEF in the Great War, that adequately interpret their effort in a modern light? 

Altho' it is a Battleground Europe book [with all that flows from that] and altho' I have a vested interest, as the editor of the series, Maarten Otte's Meuse-Argonne (which takes the account of the battle to the end of its first phase, mid October, when Liggett took command of First Army from Pershing) is very good indeed. Many (all?) of the American narrative accounts of the M-A suffer terribly from poor mapping. I sometimes wonder how much time they were actually able to spend on the ground.

 

Maarten's BE book on Montfaucon is also now out - a detailed look at one part of the AEF's front and the first week or so of the offensive in that area. He is working on St Mihiel now (hence my interest).

 

Liggett seems to me to have been a very competent Army commander, far from a donkey. The problem of command that the AEF faced is perhaps most baldly illustrated by the fact that Pershing commanded First Army for the first three weeks plus of the M-A - an army of about 600k men, give or take; whilst at the same time being C-in-C of the AEF. No C-in-C of either side faced that sort of command pressure; even the BEF split into armies in short order, when far fewer men were involved and the instruments for offensive action were considerably less complex.

 

Edited 4 December , 2018 by nigelcave

[Open Bolt]

Thank you, I shall immediately look at Maarten's titles.

[nigelcave]

To conquer hell, by Edward Lengell (2008) is available from A -n, cheap second hand and has some reasonable (sort of) maps.

Ferell (spelling?) has written a number of books on the AEF, including the M-A, or at last aspects of it. 

 

Generally (and with all the problems that come up with a sweeping statement noted) I find that American writers tend to be polemical, one way or the other. The reality, like everything in WWI, is rather more nuanced.

[sheldrake]

I can see why Pershing might have picked the sector as a good place for the AEF to deploy to win the war in 1919, but it wasn't going to happen in the last Q of 1918.  There are two problems with the "continue to Metz" argument.

 

#1  The AEF was in no condition to wage any sustained operation on its own towards Metz - or frankly anywhere else.  Pershing wanted to go into "winter quarters"  and train his army, and for good reason.  Its commanders were greener than grass at every level and its administration and discipline was a shambles.  I had a graphic insight into this in the summer when I took a descendant of member of the 114th Field Artillery Regiment to where it fought in St Mihel and the Argonne. By 4th October the unit was immobilized through lack of horses.  They had been worked to death or incapacity. I found it hard to believe that a  mounted unit recruited from country boys from Tennessee could allow its horses to be neglected.   

But the recent issue of Stand To contains a paper on British and French attitudes to the AEF.  This raises the same issues.

#2 Foch was supreme commander and wanted the Americans at attack between the Meuse and the Argonne as part of his overall strategy.   Pressure along the hinge of the allied offensive threatening the key railway line near Sedan would force the Germans to reinforce the sector.   This was still a key activity. The AEF did not need to break through to be effective in achieving the operational goal of pinning the enemy.  Nor did it need to be tactically proficient.  There is a rationale for Pershing's ruthless demands on his troops in the Argonne. I heard this argument put forward forcefully and persuasively by a modern US strategist.

Edited 4 December , 2018 by sheldrake

[Open Bolt]

My thanks again.

Looking on said (or rather unsaid) website I skipped over a number of seemingly US written books - unconscious racism perhaps. This looked particularly trustworthy I thought:  'A major revision of the history of World War I, Sons of Freedom resurrects the brave heroes who saved the Allies, defeated Germany, and established the United States as the greatest of the great powers.' (Geoffrey Wawro). It is hard to know where the revisionist pendulum is at when looking for works on foreign powers, I am equally lost for a good French history. Perhaps it might be best to always read histories written neither by victors nor losers but disinterested parties, but then they wouldn't be written...

[nigelcave]

You could always try the great work of Professor Mosier ....

[Open Bolt]

5 minutes ago, nigelcave said:

Professor Mosier

I am indebted once more - I've an unread Alistair Horne on Verdun on the shelf too.

Perhaps I should say that the Wawro book might be fine, but the blurb is excruciating...

[sheldrake]

I enjoyed reading the ABMC guide to American Battlefields and Monuments.  It is a well written battlefield guide - even considering  present company. 

 

Thunder in the Argonne by Douglas Mastriano is a good read and he brings the story to life.  (Just ignore the comments on modern politics)  

The AEF Way of War by Mark Groteleuschen is really good. It compares the performance of four divisions - 1,2 28 and 77 and the learning that took place. 

[Open Bolt]

Thank you too for these - yes the ABMC is quite good - the others I shall look at.

I fear I have caused this topic to drift, please carry on!

 

EDIT: Ah Mosier is on the 'other' list, what a fool I've been :-)

Edited 4 December , 2018 by Open Bolt

[nigelcave]

The problem with what is in many ways the really excellent ABMC guide (along with large maps in the folder - reprinted about twenty years ago, but only the hardback reprint with the maps in the pocket) is that it is very Regular divisions oriented.

 

Mark G's book is, indeed, very good; the problem with it, I think, is that it is difficult to generalise from four divisions (two regular, one national guard, one national army - the numbering works 1 - 25 Regular, 26 - 75 National Guard, over 75 [possibly including 75 - away from books] National Army). More the case when three at least of these divisions were involved in several major battles.

 

Of all the books that I have read on the M-A, I consider the best to be on the 26th Infantry (the title escapes me), which is blessed with good maps and has the sort of detail in it that helps to make sense of this important allied (OK, to be accurate associate) offensive.

 

It is, to me at least, quite evident that one of the biggest (to a degree self-inflicted) issues for the AEF lay in the over-sized AEF divisions. Another problem for the AEF was, perhaps, that they took the wrong message from the 'easy' victory at St M.

 

And yet ... The AEF did adapt in a remarkably short space of time, if expensive in casualties; no question that as a military force on the Western Front that it would have been very formidable indeed had the war dragged on into 1919. And, yes: Pershing was under a lot of pressure from the allies to deliver the goods.

[nigelcave]

4 minutes ago, Open Bolt said:

 

EDIT: Ah Mosier is on the 'other' list, what a fool I've been :-)

 

Mosier has been, as I recall, high on the list of 'worst books' on the war on this Forum. It includes such gens as the British fighting on Aubersville (sic) Ridge and the failure of the British and French to call Mons and Guise the same battle, despite being about fifty miles apart and fought on different dates.