Haig's Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany's War on the Western Front: Jonathan Boff

[PMHart]

Jonathan Boff is a very interesting historian. His background in finance before effortlessly scaling the ivory towers of academia means that he has a more varied life experience than many of his ilk. His judgements are sound, weighted with a practicality which sometimes eludes  professorial types. His previous work on Third Army in the final months of the war was a masterpiece. Short, but full of reasoned arguments, all backed by a rock solid factual foundation. I found it invaluable in trying to understand this complex period of the war – moving beyond the tired nationalistic tropes of ‘The Hundred Days’ as peddled by lesser authors. Therefore, I approached Boff’s new book Haig’s Enemy with enthusiasm.

 

First the obvious: wasn’t Lloyd George Haig’s enemy? Or Churchill? Or skulking in the shadows the odious Basil Liddell Hart? Joking aside, it is undoubtedly true that Haig’s BEF faced Ruprecht’s armies with monotonous regularity up and down the Western Front.

 

The book presents us with a potted history of the Western Front viewed through the prism of the involvement if the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht, rather than the usual Anglocentric obsession with British high command. As a result, several worthwhile themes emerge which pin the book together.

 

The German Army was, surprise, surprise, not perfect, but dogged with severe problems of command and control. There was sustained infighting between the German generals based on personal vendettas and internal German military politics. Far from some near perfect system of ‘mission command’, which allowed the ‘right’ man on the spot to take the decisions, there was a sustained level of interference from the OHL Supreme Headquarters by both Falkenhayn and then, after a brief honeymoon, with Ludendorff. By the end, army commanders like Rupprecht, were being side-lined as Ludendorff endlessly pestered, not only Rupprecht's  chief of staff, but also went direct to army, corps and even divisional command teams, Worst of all subordinates become afraid to pass on ‘hard truths’, which caused Ludendorff to gradually lose touch with the reality of events on the Western Front. The German Army was guilty of seeking only tactical solutions to operational or strategic problems. Partly this is because the strategic situation was almost irrecoverable after the French victory at the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914. Yet tinkering with tactics was no panacea. In the end, Falkenhayn, who saw the writing on the wall very early, was right - more efforts should have been put into a compromise peace solution in 1915. But then again Ruppreht hated Falkenhayn! 

 

Another theme is the high respect paid by Rupprecht to the fighting qualities and endurance of the French Army. These were the main enemy on the Western Front from 1914-1916 and still his most feared opponent for the rest of the war. Rupprecht may have been Haig’s enemy, but, in some ways, Foch was Rupprecht’s enemy! Until we can understand this primacy of the French we cannot understand the Western Front.

 

Boff accuses ‘revisionist historians’ of thinking that the British ‘learning curve’ defines the learning process, before explaining the Germans were also involved in a hard-fought dynamic competition. This is not new: many outside academia have now grasped this truism. I like to think of two ‘big dippers’ running side by side – one German one Allied – with the relative heights and therefore battle success at any one point depending on tactical advances, new weaponry and logistical realities. However, the book does throughout illustrate clearly this ongoing process: we see the Germans seeking defensive solutions to every new allied assault tactic. This was not a static war on the intellectual front.

 

One minor quibble is a matter of personal taste. I really enjoy quotes from a subject’s diaries, letters and memoirs which allow them to speak for themselves – rather than have everything filtered through someone else’s brain. I am aware that the selection of quotes leaves control with the biographer, but I still like the subject’s arguments, hopes and fears expressed in their own words. There are some Rupprecht quotes in the book, but not for me enough to get a real grip on the man’s personality.

 

Overall, the military analysis of events is not quite as complex as in Jack Sheldon’s Fighting the Somme, or Richard Foley’s German Strategy and the Path to Verdun. But these publications were aimed at the small specialist markets. Haig’s Enemy is an Oxford University Press publication intended for a mass audience and it is understandable that some of the technicalities have been reined back. Even so this book has been useful in further reshaping my perceptions of the Western Front. Sometimes, I think that we will never understand the full ramifications of that titanic struggle.

 

In summary, excellent content, a stimulating prose style, maps competent and photos interesting if somewhat blurred. As one distinguished Great War author put it: this is a book to read – not just another one for ‘the toolkit’. Absolutely recommended.

Edited 20 April , 2018 by PMHart

[28juni14]

Many thanks for this in-depth review.  And I mean that sincerely; too often reviews do not match the quest of the potential buyer.  Simply stating the book is "a good read", or "fills a gap" provides little incentive to buy the publication.   Again, thank you for this stimulating analysis.

[Buffnut453]

Hmmm...Jonathan was a fellow student on my History of Warfare MA course at King's College, London, 2007-2008.  He's done rather well for himself.  Glad to see he's continued ploughing that academic field!

[Crunchy]

On 20/04/2018 at 18:12, PMHart said:

 

First the obvious: wasn’t Lloyd George Haig’s enemy? Or Churchill? Or skulking in the shadows the odious Basil Liddell Hart? 

 

Many thanks for this review Peter. As always balanced and fair, with a touch of humour.  How Basil Liddell -Hart's biased and unsubstantiated views that influenced a generation when i was a young man have now been exposed with sound academic research!! He, together with Lloyd George, did much unfair damage to the British reputation with his self serving views. 

 

Cheers

Chris

Edited 29 May , 2018 by Crunchy

[AOK4]

I've read this book and was very disappointed. I have read Rupprecht's war diaries, published in the 1920's, which are very detailed. I would have hoped Boff's book would have put Rupprecht in perspective, however this was not the case. Most of the book is just summarizing Rupprecht's book and describing some battles in general. It would have been very interesting IMHO to go into more detail about the plans of the 1918 battles as proposed by Rupprecht's staff, but also into more detail about other decisions Rupprecht made.

 

I don't like the title either. Whether Rupprecht saw Haig as an enemy is not clear to me. Haig was his main opponent on the frontline though.

 

As a whole, when I finished reading, I though "was this it?" and felt I hadn't really learnt anything new.

 

Jan