Map printed diagonally - how common was this?

[WilliamRev]

I'm just tidying up a few loose ends on my dissertation on 3rd Division at Third Ypres (polygon Wood). The maps for the action were printed [by 5th Field Service Company] with the north-south grid running diagonally (see my photo), presumably so that the battlefield fitted on a single map, not two. This proved disastrous because with so many officer casualties, NCOs took over maps and compasses, and they knew (so they thought) that on a map north is at the top, and not the top right-hand corner as in this case. In the early morning mist of 26 September 1917 some headed off in the wrong direction.

 

My questions are: how common was it to print maps skewed like this? Is this unique or are there other examples? Was it done after September 1917, or was the lesson learned?

 

Any thoughts whatever are very welcome! Thanks

 

William

 

Edited 5 January , 2018 by WilliamRev

[MBrockway]

Funnily enough I came across another one this morning, William!

 

It's of LOCRE and from Aug 1918.

 

See here:

http://digitalarchive.mcmaster.ca/islandora/object/macrepo%3A71310

 

Mark

 

[MBrockway]

Here are a few more ...

 

Langemarck - 1:10,000, Jul 1917

http://digitalarchive.mcmaster.ca/islandora/object/macrepo%3A71282

 

Frezenberg - 1:10,000, Jul 1917

http://digitalarchive.mcmaster.ca/islandora/object/macrepo%3A71291

 

Houthulst Forest - 1:10,000, Aug 1917

http://digitalarchive.mcmaster.ca/islandora/object/macrepo%3A71287

 

Rouges Bancs, Fromelles - 1:10,000, early 1916 (also shows a North arrow and has interesting notes on landmarks)

http://digitalarchive.mcmaster.ca/islandora/object/macrepo%3A70871

 

 

This One Inch map is interesting as the map is "upright", but the map's grid is surveyed to be at approx 45 degrees to True North - unusual.

 

Peninsula of Gallipoli and the Asiatic Shore of the Dardanelles - 1:63.360, Great War overprint on a 1908 base map.

http://digitalarchive.mcmaster.ca/islandora/object/macrepo%3A4120

 

 

[WilliamRev]

Thanks Mark, these are very interesting. I think that those Ypres 1917 maps are possibly all Gough's Fifth Army, rather than Plumer's Second Army, (or am I wrong?) In Passchendaele in Perspective (ed. Liddle, Leo Cooper 1997) Peter Chasseaud examines the differences between 2nd and 5th Field Service Companies - essentially Second Army knew the Ypres salient in great detail, and Fifth Army didn't, and were on a very steep learning-curve when they took over after Messines. Perhaps they had a penchant for these slanty maps. I'd love to hear more opinions.

 

William 

Edited 5 January , 2018 by WilliamRev

[michaeldr]

 

4 hours ago, WilliamRev said:

My questions are: how common was it to print maps skewed like this? Is this unique or are there other examples?

 

It was certainly common in the early days of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign and true for both the British and the French armies

The basic problem being that the peninsula was not aligned North/South, but rather north-east to south-west

 

with acknowledgements to the WFA/IWM disc 'Mapping the Front - Gallipoli'

 

[Howard]

8 hours ago, WilliamRev said:

Any thoughts whatever are very welcome! Thanks

 

This is a screen grab from the WFA Mapping the Front scan collection database of about 6000 maps filtered for "not north up". There maybe some more maps for which that was not entered, e.g. there is at least one message map where the basemap is dated 5/10/1918 showing parts of square 28 that is also not north up.

There are two more maps, both 36 SW 3 & 36C NW 1 [parts of] from 1915 drawn South up.

 

Howard

[Guest]

9 hours ago, WilliamRev said:

I'm just tidying up a few loose ends on my dissertation on 3rd Division at Third Ypres (polygon Wood). The maps for the action were printed [by 5th Field Service Company] with the north-south grid running diagonally (see my photo), presumably so that the battlefield fitted on a single map, not two. This proved disastrous because with so many officer casualties, NCOs took over maps and compasses, and they knew (so they thought) that on a map north is at the top, and not the top right-hand corner as in this case. In the early morning mist of 26 September 1917 some headed off in the wrong direction.

 

My questions are: how common was it to print maps skewed like this? Is this unique or are there other examples? Was it done after September 1917, or was the lesson learned?

 

Any thoughts whatever are very welcome! Thanks

 

William

 

 

I would be very surprised if marked maps as shown in the OP were taken into battle. Most that I have seen are annotated with "not to be taken into the front line" or something similar. I would be equally surprised to see evidence that NCOs with three years'  battle experience could not work out where magnetic North was relative to the map. By 1917 NCOs were not simpletons. They were hardened, intelligent men selected from millions. Men of initiative.  I don't doubt your conviction but I would be fascinated to see hard evidence that NCOs made this mistake. Is this some idle conjecture from a diarist or are there multiple references? We're ALL the Officers casualties and were only Officers briefed from the maps pre Ops?I doubt it. By 1917 battle preparation was far more sophisticated than in prior years. The idea that NCOs had no prior sight of the maps is stretching the imagination somewhat. Happy to be shown the door on this.. 

 

Separately: Any right minded individual faced with a map with diagonals for the first time would surely stop and take a moment to consider this. Is it remotely possible that this was a post event construct by someone trying to explain away another disaster? 

Edited 5 January , 2018 by Guest

[WilliamRev]

3 minutes ago, QGE said:

 

I would be very surprised if marked maps as shown in the OP were taken into battle. Most that I have seen are annotated with "not to be taken into the front line" or something similar. I would be equally surprised to see evidence that NCOs with three years'  battle experience could not work out where magnetic North was relative to the map. By 1917 NCOs were not simpletons. They were hardened, intelligent men selected from millions. Men of initiative.  I don't doubt your conviction but I would be fascinated to see hard evidence that NCOs made this mistake. Is this some idle conjecture from a diarist or are there multiple references? We're ALL the Officers casualties and were only Officers briefed from the maps per ops? I doubt it. By 1917 battle preparation was far more sophisticated than in prior years. The idea that NCOs had no prior sight of the maps is stretching the imagination somewhat. Happy to be shown the door on this.. 

 

Separately: Any right minded individual faced with a map with diagonals for the first time would surely stop and take a moment to consider this. Is it remotely possible that this was a post event construct by someone trying to explain away another disaster? 

 

Well this very map was taken into battle by my grandfather, who was commanding 'A' Company 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers. It is printed on the thinnest of paper, so would be easy  to destroy at short notice.

 

It was the GOC 3rd Division Major-General CJ Deverell, in his report after this battle who thought:

 

'The Gravenstafel Sheet issued for the operations was printed with the grid lines running diagonally across the map. This was unsatisfactory and liable to lead to errors and confusion among junior officers and NCOs who are not experts at map reading, and who have been taught that the top of the map is north. If this was done in order to include the whole area on one sheet it would have been preferable to issue two sheets with the grid lines running normally.' [ TNA: WO 95/1418-1, 8 Brigade War Diary, September 1917, GS 135]

 

William

[Guest]

12 hours ago, WilliamRev said:

 

Well this very map was taken into battle by my grandfather, who was commanding 'A' Company 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers. It is printed on the thinnest of paper, so would be easy  to destroy at short notice.

 

It was the GOC 3rd Division Major-General CJ Deverell, in his report after this battle who thought:

 

'The Gravenstafel Sheet issued for the operations was printed with the grid lines running diagonally across the map. This was unsatisfactory and liable to lead to errors and confusion among junior officers and NCOs who are not experts at map reading, and who have been taught that the top of the map is north. If this was done in order to include the whole area on one sheet it would have been preferable to issue two sheets with the grid lines running normally.' [ TNA: WO 95/1418-1, 8 Brigade War Diary, September 1917, GS 135]

 

William

 

William. How do you know it was taken into battle by your grandfather? I ask, simply because most of the 'facts' passed down to me about my grandfathers in the Great War have proven to be wrong and out of line by a country mile. Just because it is in his ephemera does not necessarily mean it was taken into battle. It would be against quite stringent battlefield procedure and  standard operating procedures. The intelligence risk of losing a marked map would be large. The Printing Sections published unmarked maps as well. Taking a marked map into battle was I think completely against all standard practice.The hard evidence that this was taken into battle would be interesting to see. 

 

Maps are not easy to destroy if you are dead. That is why marked maps were not taken into battle. The diaries and Op Orders frequently provide hard evidence this was reiterated. I doubt very much this map was taken into battle and I doubt very much anyone can prove or disprove it was taken into battle. If this is the cornerstone of the GOC's argument it is not particularly strong.

 

Edit: Unsurprisingly, Pargraph 24. of the 1st Bn RSF Op Order for the attack on 26th Sep 1917 by Lt Col N McD Teacher DSO  dated 25th Sep 1917 states:

 

" No maps etc showing barrage lines, positions of HQs or anything which would be of use to the enemy will be taken into action. No copy nor extracts of these orders are to be taken into action"

 

It is the very last paragraph of the Op Order immediately above the Adjutant's signature. 

 

Separately, it seems the man who was responsible for the operation has hindsight clarity. Is there evidence from the ground that this was an issue? There is a danger of relying too much on a single reference whose author (the GOC) has much to gain from this conjecture. 

 

Potentially a one-legged stool of an argument. . If it is to be more robust I would suggest finding more references to the idea that junior officers and NCOs couldn't read maps in 1917. This type of map had been in circulation since April 1915 at the very least.

Edited 6 January , 2018 by Guest

[Guest]

I am curious to know who said it was disastrous? The 8th Bn East Yorks  - the Battalion that allegedly lost direction - seem to be oblivious of this as their diary records everything went well and they captured their objectives by 07:00 including taking machine guns and prisoners....

 

The maps were printed a full 16 days before the Operations in question, suggesting Officers and NCOs had some time to peruse the maps. The Op Orders reference to them as well it seems, so not exactly new info. Incidentally the GOC's self-serving criticism identifies Junior Officers as well as NCOs who were allegedly bamboozled by diagonal lines. It is easy to blame the junior leaders as they were invariably the larger part of the casualties and generally not around to offer a counter argument as many were probably dead or wounded. The 8th East Yorks recorded 2 Officers killed and 7 wounded.  They went in with more than 20 Officers meaning two-thirds would be functioning in command and control (and presumably map reading). The recorded facts seem at odds with the GOC's views. 

 

As you know, the HQ 3rd Div war diary (WO 95/1379) includes an extremely long set of post operation reports, including a Q & A which specifically asks if the maps were adequate. The written response makes no mention of the diagonal lines being a problem. The reports also reveal that the loss of direction on the left (8th Bn East Yorks and 7th Bn KSLI which passed through the East Yorks) was caused by the inundation of the Zonnebeke which created a marshy area impassable to troops about 50 yards wide. This forces the 8th East Yorks to the left and created the gap between them and the 2nd Bn Royal Scots whose right was on the arrow-like railway embankment. The gap was eventually closed by the 8th Bn East Yorks shifting right after the 7th Bn KSLI passed through. The diaries seem to be fairly consistent in their assessment of the day. 

 

Edit 2. If one took a bearing from the map assuming North was at the top of the map and marched on the line of that bearing with a compass, the net effect would be to move further clockwise (to the right), not the left as grid north was about 30 degrees (clockwise) from the vertical of the map.  For example, if one set a bearing of 45 degrees (assuming the top of the map was North) and marched on this bearing with a compass, if the diagonals (grid North) were 30 degrees to the vertical of the map, the net effect would be that one would be marching on a bearing of 75 degrees to the vertical axis of the map.  All in all it makes the GOC's thesis rather bizarre. MG

 

Edit 1. The HQ 8th Infantry Brigade War Diary records that the 8th Bn East Yorks (on the left of the 2nd bn Royal Scots) marched on a compass bearing. Regardless of whether lines on maps were diagonal or perpendicular, a bearing doesn't change. In addition the Royal Scots had their right on the railway line which provided a fairly solid reference point. The post operation report states " ...the Railway embankment acted as an excellent guide for the Right Battalion..."It seems marshy ground was partly  the reasons for the Left Battalion to change direction. The same report records that "...the Left Battalion had to march by compass bearing..." 

 

Incidentally the same maps in the Brigade War Diary are dated 6th July 1917 ,meaning they had been in circulation for at least 80 days before the action. Not exactly new.  The map also has SECRET written on the top. Hardly something that would be taken into battle. The Brigade boundary was the straight railway line. One probably couldn't ask for a better reference point for a boundary. 

 

The "Report on Operations East of Ypres from 25th September 1917 to 1st October 1917" starts:

 

"With the view to getting thoroughly acquainted with the ground on which the Operations were to take place all the officers and a proportion of the NCOs were sent up on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th..." here is the rest which seems to suggest  reasonable amount of prior preparation and planning,  particularly with regards to understanding the ground and studying maps. One might reasonably assume the same underlaid maps that were printed 80 days earlier. ...

 

 

Edited 8 January , 2018 by Guest

[WilliamRev]

Many thanks for your detailed response, and alas I am so busy that I can only reply very briefly.

 

I quite agree with you that Deverall's primary concern in his report is covering his own back.

 

In the early morning mist there are mentions of most of the battalions of 76 Brigade losing direction at some point, as well as 7th King's Shropshires. Deverell certainly thought that the maps were a problem, as I quoted above, and walking the battlefield which I have done a number of times, the slanting grid is strangely disorientating (and I am good at map reading!), so he does have a point. In the mist (30 yards visibility until around 7am when it dispersed according to 2nd Lieutenant Huffield of 2nd Suffolks) the railway embankment would not be visible to the vast majority of 3rd Division. 1st RSF lost 16 of 20 officers, 2nd Royal Scots lost 10 officers, 10th RWF 11 officers, 1st Gordons 10 officers, 2nd Suffolks 9 officers, KORLR (estimated) 10 officers, so officer casualties were over 50%. Thanks, by the way, for the East Yorks officer casualty figure - I was looking for that yesterday afternoon.

 

As you say, 8th East Yorks did reach their objective, the Red Line, but 7th KSLI who leap-frogged them, came up short of Hill 40, as did 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers after leap-frogging 2nd Royal Scots. The continuation of the attack at 6.30pm ended in troops retiring in confusion, and reserve units had to be deployed to save the situation, and large casualties suffered, which is one reason why I described the battle as disastrous. 3rd Division ultimately failed to take the Blue Line, their final objective (except on their right where 76 Brigade took Zonnebeke Church and the Lake), and It was left to 3rd Australian Division to take Hill 40 (aka Windmill Hill) on 4 October.

 

Although Polygon Wood is sometimes regarded as an Australian battle, 3rd Division lost more casualties (4,032) than either 4th or 5th Australian Divisions of Second Army on their right. (1,529 and 3,723 respectively), and that is partly what my dissertation is about....

 

You have mentioned several issues which have been of great help to me - many thanks!

 

William

 

Edited 6 January , 2018 by WilliamRev

[Guest]

3 hours ago, WilliamRev said:

Many thanks for your detailed response, and alas I am so busy that I can only reply very briefly.

 

I quite agree with you that Deverall's primary concern in his report is covering his own back.

 

In the early morning mist there are mentions of most of the battalions of 76 Brigade losing direction at some point, as well as 7th King's Shropshires. Deverell certainly thought that the maps were a problem, as I quoted above, and walking the battlefield which I have done a number of times, the slanting grid is strangely disorientating (and I am good at map reading!), so he does have a point. In the mist (30 yards visibility until around 7am when it dispersed according to 2nd Lieutenant Huffield of 2nd Suffolks) the railway embankment would not be visible to the vast majority of 3rd Division. 1st RSF lost 16 of 20 officers, 2nd Royal Scots lost 10 officers, 10th RWF 11 officers, 1st Gordons 10 officers, 2nd Suffolks 9 officers, KORLR (estimated) 10 officers, so officer casualties were over 50%. Thanks, by the way, for the East Yorks officer casualty figure - I was looking for that yesterday afternoon.

 

As you say, 8th East Yorks did reach their objective, the Red Line, but 7th KSLI who leap-frogged them, came up short of Hill 40, as did 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers after leap-frogging 2nd Royal Scots. The continuation of the attack at 6.30pm ended in troops retiring in confusion, and reserve units had to be deployed to save the situation, and large casualties suffered, which is one reason why I described the battle as disastrous. 3rd Division ultimately failed to take the Blue Line, their final objective (except on their right where 76 Brigade took Zonnebeke Church and the Lake), and It was left to 3rd Australian Division to take Hill 40 (aka Windmill Hill) on 4 October.

 

Although Polygon Wood is sometimes regarded as an Australian battle, 3rd Division lost more casualties (4,032) than either 4th or 5th Australian Divisions of Second Army on their right. (1,529 and 3,723 respectively), and that is partly what my dissertation is about....

 

You have mentioned several issues which have been of great help to me - many thanks!

 

William

 

 

 

William. It comes down to one fact: If the GOC's theory was correct and the diagonal Northings were ignored and the vertical axis of the map was taken as North, anyone taking  a bearing from the map and marching/advancing on that bearing using a compass would in fact be moving too far to the right, not the left; the consequences would be the complete opposite of what GOC 3rd Div claims. I will stick my neck out and say that the GOC's thesis is utter nonsense and self serving bluster to cover the failure to achieve the objective.  He not only lost his compass he lost his moral compass as well.  I have never seen a longer Post Operation report. It is like War and Peace. 

 

Like many failures it hinged on a single factor: the inundated Zillebeke in this case. The idea that the 'diagonal grid'* led men astray seems to completely ignore the multiple diary entries that clearly demonstrate it was the obstacle of the flooded valley that forced  8th Bn East Yorks to the left. As I have no doubt you know, the brigade commander claimed to have personally reconnoitred the Zillebeke the day before.  If you need an excellent parallel, have a look at the attack on Scimitar Hill/ W Hills/Hetman Chair at Suvla on 21st Aug 1915 by 11th Div, and 29th Div (with a Yeomanry afterthought). The myriad of hedges ran at diagonals to the line of advance and forced the advancing troops off the line of advance with fairly disastrous concequences. It was the costliest day of the whole campaign by a very wide margin. It is the features on the ground that impact the behaviour of soldiers on the ground, not maps or compass bearings (all of which barely survive the first moments). Command an control of men was limited by the distance a voice could be heard or line of sight - all extremely limited in the heat of battle.. Men act according to atavistic instinct and no amount of training or preparation can offset the natural instincts to follow the topography (read shelter).

 

Your dissertation might provide a valuable insight of how Post Operation reports can allow self-serving GOCs distort the reality. As the saying goes "More dangerous than an Officer with a Map". I suspect (but cannot prove) that GOC 3rd Div had no idea what he was talking about with regards to maps. Luckily for him, whoever read the report didnt know the basics of map reading either, other wise his bluster would have been seen for what it was. 

 

Good luck with your dissertation. If you managed to navigate the 7th KLSI war diary without losing the plot you are a better man than me. In the remote chance you have not done so already, I would recommend reading East Yorks history on this. Ditto Royal Scots. As you will know, the RSF history is one of the poorest Great War regimental histories produced. 

 

MG

 

* Acutally the grid is not diagonal, it is the orientation of the map that is diagonal. The northings and eastings are correct relative to the ground. 

Edited 6 January , 2018 by Guest

[WilliamRev]

Thanks for all these thoughts; they have been very helpful, particularly that Deverall is essentially trying to let himself off the hook, not least for not telling the infantry the extent of the swamp that they were going to have to cross.

 

William

[battiscombe]

while I cannot add to the interesting discussion on map grids - for the purposes of the dissertation note that these were surely Field Survey [not Service] Companies ..

 

 

 

 

[Guest]

On a pedantic note, the 'grid' was not 'diagonal'...the grid is correct; northings and eastings are correct relative to to true North. It is the map that is printed on a diagonal. Note all the place names are orientated correctly along the East-West horizontal but appear tilted due to the print orientation. A small but important point when describing these maps. MG

[MBrockway]

4 hours ago, QGE said:

On a pedantic note, the 'grid' was not 'diagonal'...the grid is correct; northings and eastings are correct relative to to true North. It is the map that is printed on a diagonal. Note all the place names are orientated correctly along the East-West horizontal but appear tilted due to the print orientation. A small but important point when describing these maps. MG

 

Except for the examples from the Dardanelles higher up, which are based on a grid that is at an angle to True N.

 

I agree with Martin that printing the place names etc. following the standard E-W convention makes it visually very clear that the map alignment is oblique.

 

Mark

 

 

 

[Guest]

16 hours ago, MBrockway said:

 

Except for the examples from the Dardanelles higher up, which are based on a grid that is at an angle to True N.

 

I agree with Martin that printing the place names etc. following the standard E-W convention makes it visually very clear that the map alignment is oblique.

Mark

 

At risk of stating the obvious......  In my day map reading 1.1 was "orientate the map to the ground". I suspect a small amount of research would find the same map reading principles in 1917. If this proves to be right, it raises further questions about the integrity of the GOC's claims. The diaries clearly show that Officers and NCOs had three days to familiarise themselves with the ground and the forming up or "jumping off" positions and to identify their objectives on the ground. This was before the heavy morning mists of 26th Sep. It is inconceivable that these Officers and men didn't refer to their maps at this stage; if this type of map had been new to these men, it would have been abundantly clear during the familiarisation period that the map image was not aligned North-South.

 

The Report on Operations shown in Post #10 para 2 states

 

"from a study of the country both on the map and on the ground it appeared that the chief obstacle would be the ZONNEBEKE stream which crossed our front diagonally East of BOSTIN FARM"

 

My underlining. To my mind this is pretty conclusive evidence that maps were used prior to the advance during the familiarisation process (as one would reasonably expect). The Brigade diary also states that a reconnaissance of the Zonnebeke stream was undertaken and records in some detail the decisions taken to overcome the obstacle by way of portable bridges and hurdles.. It would seem unlikely that all this careful prior preparation and planning was carried out without reference to maps. One might reasonably argue it was impossible to do without a map. It therefore seems unlikely that Officers and NCOs were later allegedly confused by these maps as the process of orientating the maps to the ground in the days prior to the attack would have brought this issue to the forefront of their concerns. My speculation. MG

Edited 7 January , 2018 by Guest

[Crunchy]

20 hours ago, QGE said:

 

 I will stick my neck out and say that the GOC's thesis is utter nonsense and self serving bluster to cover the failure to achieve the objective. 

Your dissertation might provide a valuable insight of how Post Operation reports can allow self-serving GOCs distort the reality.

 

Martin,

 

I wouldn't argue on these points you have made. Many of us who have served have all seen reports that avoid addressing the real reasons, placing the blame on others, or putting the best light on a bad situation. I was called in to research one submitted by a company commander in Vietnam that was self serving, and at complete odds with everyone else's version of events.  One only has to look at the HQ ANZAC and 1st Australian Divisions reports on the landing at Anzac to see similar self serving documents that avoided the realities and exaggerated the opposition encountered.   

[Howard]

There are three "Norths" on a map, grid, true and magnetic. It would be a mistake to use grid north as true north.

 

On this example, the grid lines are not parallel to true north just like on OS maps of the UK. It would have been handy to show the magnetic variation to grid north but so much key cartographic information is missing from these and modern maps that this is not surprising, people are simply expected to know.

 

In the trenches it would have been a faff to get the map oriented accurately especially as there was so much metal around to affect the wonderful and very sensitive prismatic compasses then in use.

 

Howard

[Guest]

On 1/7/2018 at 10:30, Howard said:

There are three "Norths" on a map, grid, true and magnetic. It would be a mistake to use grid north as true north.

 

On this example, the grid lines are not parallel to true north just like on OS maps of the UK. It would have been handy to show the magnetic variation to grid north but so much key cartographic information is missing from these and modern maps that this is not surprising, people are simply expected to know.

 

In the trenches it would have been a faff to get the map oriented accurately especially as there was so much metal around to affect the wonderful and very sensitive prismatic compasses then in use.

 

Howard

 

 

I am sure the Officers and men knew the differences between the three Norths and perfectly understood the problems of surrounding iron influencing compasses. It would be interesting to dig up the map reading training manuals to better understand the level of basic knowledge at the time.

 

Lining up the map with a straight railway embankment (the right/southern boundary of the 8th Infantry Brigade) would be a reasonably easy thing to do. The diaries suggest this was and the 2nd Royal Scots and 2nd Gordons managed to adavance along this axis without any problem. Similarly lining up a map with known features such as Bostin Farm (the area of the 8th East Yorks' advance) from a known position before starting the operations would be fairly simple.  Neither require a compass. It would be obvious to a blind man when orientating his map to the ground that the map was on a diagonal.  The more one thinks about this, the more bizarre the GOC's later comments appear. 

 

Front line trenches in 1917 would have MG positions with fixed lines and defined arcs which would most likely be plotted on sketch maps and their bearings known. Similarly the FOOs would have a scientific understanding of  distances and bearings. The level of information would be considerable. The Brigade devoted three whole days to familiarisation and specifically states that maps were used - see Operation Report above. Incidentally one of the diaries includes a disc map for the wind direction which shaded in the arcs of 'risk' from German gas releases. The consequences of not orientating this map to the ground are obvious.  

 

The GOC's arguments imply that Officers and men in thick mist had veered off to the left because they did not realise that North was not at the top of the map sheet. We know from the diaries that this was not the reason. The GOC imlpies they were using maps to find their way with limited visibility. In these instances it is inconceivable (to me at least) that an Officer would not use his compass to find where North was and attempt to advance on the original bearing given at the beginning of the attack (or bear off to compensate for the left move to circumvent the obstacle). These are pretty basic techniques.  Despite all the 'noise', the 8th East Yorks merrily achieved their objective.  

 

Despite all the metal, the RFA and RGA shot 'off the map' for most of the war with some reasonable success. Presumably the FOOs managed to cope with the iron harvest .  I would disagree with your arguments that maps were a 'faff'. They were critical pieces of equipment that could mean the matter between life and death.  MG.

Edited 8 January , 2018 by Guest

[Guest]

Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching 1912

A much better copy (edited). 

 

Military Sketching, Map Reading and Topography

by Mockler-Ferryman late Prof of Military Topography Royal Military College Sandhurst. 1911 (second edition)

Edited 7 January , 2018 by Guest

[squirrel]

Spot on  - should all have been part of the officer's training as follows:

 

Manual of map reading and sketching 1912 (reprinted with additions General Staff War Office 1914) part 1, chapter 1,

 

1. All regimental officers must be so trained as to be proficient in the following subjects:-

i. Map reading

ii. Map enlarging

iii. Adding topographical information to an existing map or to an enlargement

iv. A certain amount of sketching on blank paper

 

40. An important item to look for on a map is the direction of true or magnetic North...

 

41. A map is said to be "set" when it is laid out to correspond with the ground, so that true North on the map points to the North Pole...

A map may, therefore be set as follows:-

i. With Compass...

ii. By objects - A map can be set by objects on the ground without using the North point or compass...

A map may be set approximately for reading by identifying on the map several prominent objects that can be seen , or by standing on or near some straight feature marked on the map, such as a straight road, railway, river, canal &c. The map is then held so that the directions between these objects as they appear on the ground and on the map are parallel to one another.

[Guest]

The relevant pages from the 1912 manual about 'setting' the map to the ground. I doubt very much the 1917 manual had not replicated these. The very basics of map reading;

 

 

[Guest]

The 8th Bn East Yorks was alleged to have gone astray due to the poor map reading abilities of its junior officers. Trawling the War Diary one can identify the 16 Platoon commanders.

 

One was commissioned  on 25/12/1914

Two were commissioned on 10/5/1915

One was commissioned on 22/1/1916

Twelve were commissioned in 1917. Of these:

 

Eight were commissioned on 28/3/1917.....182 days before the action

Two were commissioned on 26/4/1917....153 days before the action

Two were commissioned on 27/6/1917 .... just 91 days before the action. 

 

[Sources: War Dairy WO 95/1424, Army List August 1917]

 

The LOOB is unknown but t least five of the subalterns killed or wounded that day were from the 28/3/1917 cohort. The others were the 1914 man, one of the 1915 men. and the 1916 man who stayed with his platoon despite being wounded in the head early on. 

 

I believe Officer training in 1916-17 had been extended to a year (happy to be corrected). The OCTU syllabus would include map reading and the manuals shown above. That aside the Officers on the day were fairly raw although I suspect this was typical for the time. 

 

Of note is that the battalion CO, 2IC, Adjutant and all the Company Commanders were unscathed. If anyone was providing direction, it would have been at this level.

 

Edited 7 January , 2018 by Guest

[WilliamRev]

Thanks once more for these further comments. They have all been helpful, especially in suggesting that I should not necessarily take Deverall's report at face-value.

 

William