Forward slopes at First Ypres

[GreyC]

Hello Gentlemen,

chanced upon this thread and found it very engaging. Thank you for providing such well researched and detailed information.

GreyC

[David Filsell]

Or in my case, a statement and conclusion based on inadequate research - although, in my poor defence, and on reflection,  I suspect order or not "at all costs" would have been Capper's natural reaction!

[lostinspace]

I agree, a very interesting discussion, however, as far as I can tell, Nigel Cave's post # 21 has not been answered: "More importantly, no one has yet explained where the better, reverse slope, defence line could have been established.". It's not like these actions were fought in a hilly countryside, plus I think, as someone else mentioned, the area at that time was obstructed by extensive hedgerows, fences, and woods, not everywhere of course, but I think you would have to admit that this was, to a great extent "close" country, where sight lines were poor and forward positions might have been the only option.
 

Dave

[David Filsell]

British positions at Zandvoorde were on the top of a pronounced slope.

[Guest]

3 hours ago, lostinspace said:

I agree, a very interesting discussion, however, as far as I can tell, Nigel Cave's post # 21 has not been answered: "More importantly, no one has yet explained where the better, reverse slope, defence line could have been established.". 

Dave

 

Given the re-alignment of the firing line following catastrophic losses in 7th Div, it might suggest someone found a better alignment. 

 

One cant help think that the criticism by Haig and Rawlinson was in part aimed at self-preservation. The losses by the end of First Ypres were on a scale unimagined up to that point in the War. The original BEF has seen around 90% Casualties; the late deployment and immediate annihilation of 7th Div effectively marked the destruction of most of the old regular Army. The casualty tables in the OH 1914 Vol II are a stark reminder of the huge proportion of losses borne by 7th Div. 

Edited 21 June , 2017 by Guest

[lostinspace]

Martin,

 

So your point is that a better alignment was "found"? I must be reading about a different battle, as far as I know the only ground given up was that which the Germans had taken, I don't believe that any ground was voluntarily given up in order to "find" better positions. I'm certainly not doubting that 7 Division took enormous casualties but other divisions lost heavily as well, for example 3 Division: 1,099 killed, 3,949 wounded, 2,956 missing (roughly 1,000 fewer than 7 Division). It was a tough fight for all the B.E.F.
 

Dave

[Guest]

2 hours ago, lostinspace said:

Martin,

 

So your point is that a better alignment was "found"? I must be reading about a different battle, as far as I know the only ground given up was that which the Germans had taken, I don't believe that any ground was voluntarily given up in order to "find" better positions. I'm certainly not doubting that 7 Division took enormous casualties but other divisions lost heavily as well, for example 3 Division: 1,099 killed, 3,949 wounded, 2,956 missing (roughly 1,000 fewer than 7 Division). It was a tough fight for all the B.E.F.
 

Dave

 

Dave

 

No. I am simply stating the fact that the firing line was re-aligned. I assumed (maybe wrongly) that this is common knowledge among informed students of this period and I assumed (maybe wrongly) that the new alignment was considered 'better' than Capper's original line rather than 'worse'. You may have a different interpretation.That is your prerogative. I am not trying to change your view. My interest is in establishing facts and separating them from conjecture. Positions were changed. This is a simple fact. If you doubt this I would very politely suggest you read the diaries.

 

The war diaries have all the necessary evidence. Just to reassure you that I am not shooting from the hip, I happen to have transcribed every battalion and Brigade war diary for this period (Aug 1914- Dec 1915). I have also edited them. Twice. Some three times. I have over 50 war diaries published and a back library of nearly 300. The act of transcribing, editing and editing again imparts a detailed understanding of what was actually recorded at the time, on a forensic level. It has been total immersion. All detail has been cross referenced against regimental histories (all OCR scanned and themselves a 79 million word database of searchable material in one click). The ability to cross-reference such large numbers of accounts also enables one to spot out-liers in the accounts and narratives and question detail - effectively what the OH team tried to do but with the rather large advantage of modern technology. Sometimes diarists and authors made mistakes, however the vast majority were quite consistent and congruent in their observations. In simple terms if one has a score of eyewitness accounts, it is easy to spot the confabulators. In addition I have over 50 personal diaries (all transcribed) that cover the period as well as the OH correspondence (transcribed as well).... approaching 2 million words. It took precisely 1 second to find every reference to 'at all costs' in the database to reassure David that this was a 'fact' and not conjecture; something that would require several months of reading. The power of technology. Some diary examples have been posted on this thread. It is a unique database. 

 

This is why I find some of the comments and claims on this thread extremely difficult to resolve: the (British) war diaries are extremely detailed for this period and 99% were preserved intact ..... so (for example) when Jan states that the German Artillery were mostly incapable of indirect fire, I consider this to be a misconception as there are several hundreds of diary entries that record accurate, heavy and devastating German artillery throughout the period defined as First Ypres by the British, particularly in the area of 7th Div. It is so prevalent that it is almost universal, and when we resolve this against the casualty figures and the diaries, it makes sense. 

 

So,if you are 'reading about a different battle' I would be genuinely interested in what books you are reading, as many authors did not wade through 2 million words of diaries. In fact I would assume that none did, and therefore their conclusions are not based on all the available information. - something that is difficult to define, The BEF in 1914 is a grossly misunderstood period in my view (Edmonds laid some good false trails in the OH) and until recently not particularly well served by authors. Poorly served in my opinion. For example Terraine's books are riddled with errors yet he is heavily referenced in later publications as an authority (something that good academics would not counsel) .. His errors are repeated by lazy journalists and authors and internet warriors, which continue to contaminate modern perceptions and interpretations of the war and 1914 in particular. The diaries were not released until 1966 so anything written before this date is largely irrelevant in my view - even the personal accounts as memories demonstrably fail for a host of reasons relating to the psychology of memory formation, storage and retrieval. Writing the Great War necessitates access to the primary material. Given it was locked up for 50 years this was a challenge. The secondary challenge is that the material is absolutely vast and arguably too big to handle by making handwritten notes. It is arguably too large to assess with pencil and paper. This is why I set out to effectively digitise 1914 (I have also done 1915, an even bigger task as well as digitise the regimental and divisional histories). This result is that I could probably disagree in some considerable detail with most books that cover the period. I would be interested in what your reference books are and then I can perhaps illustrate where their weaknesses are. To err is to be human, but we need to know where and when we err.

 

Incidentally I make lots of mistakes but I am not afraid of admitting them....so  any ..err...mistakes are mine. MG

 

 

Edited 21 June , 2017 by Guest

[lostinspace]

Martin,
 

Yes, of course the firing line was changed, I understand that, but what I'm saying is that the line was forced back through constant German attack not because "someone" deemed that it was improperly sited. Also, it seems to me that "it might suggest someone found a better alignment." implies that after 7 Division's sortie toward Menin on the 19th much better positions were available to Rawlinson/Capper but were not utilized, at that point surely the object was to give up the least amount of ground possible?

In reference to "reading about a different battle" I was trying to indicate that in the accounts of Ypres that I have read, the BEF didn't really have much choice about the ground they defended; after changing over from offense to defense they fought for every yard of ground, and if they lost any, counterattacked at the first opportunity to regain it. I hope that clarifies what I meant.
Please understand that I'm not doubting your researching abilities at all, as a matter of fact you are one of the premier researchers on the forum and have done an extraordinary amount of work on the war diaries you have accumulated and made available to others.
 

Dave 
 

[David Filsell]

 From my extensive reading I believe that Rawlinson was covering his back about forward slopes. He clearly states the mistakes made when he returned to England to prepare 8th Division and what had been learned. He had a reputation for covering his back.  Not for nothing was he mistrusted by many senior officers.

In my view Haig's concern about deployment on forward slopes deployment may have involved relative antipathy toward Rawlinson, but it was swiftly made after his arrival and deployment concerned him greatly.

It is also a fact that some present considered the day on which Zandvoorde and that Haig's actions in bringing up reserves so rapidly after its loss was as crucial to the defence of Ypres as that on the Menin road the day after.

From i think the evidence I have seen at the PRO, British positions after Zandvoorde were dictated by events, rather than chosen.  (Although, as I have said, a withdrawal line was outlined and reconoitered, but I have been totally unable to find a record of of the line chosen. There may well be evidence of course

[Guest]

14 hours ago, lostinspace said:

Martin,
 

Yes, of course the firing line was changed, I understand that, but what I'm saying is that the line was forced back through constant German attack not because "someone" deemed that it was improperly sited. Also, it seems to me that "it might suggest someone found a better alignment." implies that after 7 Division's sortie toward Menin on the 19th much better positions were available to Rawlinson/Capper but were not utilized, at that point surely the object was to give up the least amount of ground possible?

In reference to "reading about a different battle" I was trying to indicate that in the accounts of Ypres that I have read, the BEF didn't really have much choice about the ground they defended; after changing over from offense to defense they fought for every yard of ground, and if they lost any, counterattacked at the first opportunity to regain it. I hope that clarifies what I meant.
 

Dave 
 

 

7th Div over-extended according to Rawlinson. Capper would have continued (by refusing his threatened flank and pressing on with just two Brigades) had Rawlinson not stopped him. This had a knock-on effect. 

 

I am not sure one could prove (or disprove) the line was changed for any single reason as the factors were multi-layered. Some diaries suggest realignment to 'conform' with neighbouring troops positions. A fair number of diaries note how some battalions held on against seemingly irresistible pressure, which suggests a variety of responses along the front. One indisputable fact is that Rawlinson and Haig appear to believe Capper had a choice. It is quite possible that he didn't have a choice and the criticism is unfair; he may have been a convenient scapegoat by dint of the fact his Division had suffered enormous casualties in a very short period.

 

It is noteworthy that Rawlinson describes 7th Div as being 'considerably in front of the general line of advance [on 18th Oct]' in his report on IV Corps for Oct 1914. Rawlinson ordered Capper to stop his attack at 11:45 on 19th Oct due to the threat of being attacked on his exposed left flank. This was a direct consequence of 7th Div being 'considerably in front of the general line of advance'. The retirement of 6th Cav Bde and 7th Cav Bde further exposed 7th Div's flank which 'was consequently obliged to fall back' to its old line; Zandvoorde - Kruisiek -  Gheluvelt - Zonnebeke. Orders came from GHQ on 19th for 7th Div to 'maintain and entrench the position now held'. It seems fairly clear that the position fell out of the original starting point and was 'fixed' by GHQ. From the 20th Oct onward the German let loose their intense artillery bombardment and by the morining of 19th Capper had committed his Reserve (22nd Inf Bde). On 23rd before the planned relief of the northern part of the 7th Div  line by elements of I Corps, the Germans broke through 21st inf Be at Reutel (incidentally destroying the 2nd Wiltshires on the way). The situation was partly restored by the 1/1st Northumberland Hussars (TF). On the 26th Oct 7th Div received reinforcements amounting to a Brigade's worth of men. 20th Inf Bde line was broken and the battle degenerated into attack and counter-attack all along the 7th Div front. Rawlinson describes the losses (amounting to 40% of his force) as;

 

"....may possibly have been in some small measure have been due to want of experience in the construction and location of trenches on the part of troops fresh from garrisons abroad .....for the greater part of these nine days the Division had to maintain a front of considerably over five miles. A line of this length allowed for practically no reserve to be kept in hand and consequently afforded no opportunity for relieving the men from the terribly severe strain of watchfulness and exposure in the trenches. The difficulty of defending this front was further increased by the fact that it constituted a salient in the general line of the Allied Forces and was exposed to enfilade fire from the enemy's artillery at first on both flanks and throughout on the right flank. In this position the 7th Division ha to sustain the attack of three German Divisions. Even if the greater part of the attacking infantry consisted of newly raised troops, the determination of their attack in spite of very heavy losses and the powerful artillery behind them rendered them most formidable opponents"

 

So Capper's precarious position was a consequence of over-extending during the general advance. Looking at the maps and in particular accurate contour maps (which I don't believe were available in Oct 1914). I suspect (but cannot yet prove) that IV Corps and GHQ at the time had no idea how precarious 7th Div's position' was. Consequently the IV Corps order to 'hold the line at all costs' effectively constrained Capper. My speculation.

 

As you point out, the sudden and violent swing from offensive to defensive would have been a factor. My impression is that the BEF was stunned by the length, violence and intensity of the German artillery - on a scale that they had to that date not yet experienced. 7th Div's limited artillery, limited artillery ammunition and its alleged inability in counter-battery operations may well have compounded the problems.  Beckett seems to imply 7th Div's Gen Staff were not particularly experienced. I wonder if Capper had sufficient understanding of the position. 7th Div was spread over a few miles of front and one wonders how the limited Staff and Capper himself could have properly appraised the ground and situation given the desperate and intense fighting. I believe French stated that 31st Oct 1914 marked the point of his highest anxiety. In those conditions how does one assimilate the necessary information? 

 

I have not seen or read anything written by Capper in defence of Haig's and Rawlinson's criticism. I would be interested in seeing the exact comments by Haig.

 

 

 

Edited 22 June , 2017 by Guest

[lostinspace]

Martin,

My (limited) understanding of Capper's personality leads me to believe that if Rawlinson had not stopped him on the 19th the 7 Division attack would have continued, even though Lawford's brigade was already in trouble on the left. Here is Beckett on Capper: "Most recently Inspector of Infantry, Tommy Capper was the epitome of the 'offensive spirit'. Almost ludicrously brave, Capper was to be killed at Loos in September 1915. Considered by Haig 'too full of nerves and too much of a crank to get the best out of officers', Capper was certainly not the easiest of commanders, spectacularly falling out with his Chief of Staff, Hugo Montgomery, in November 1914 and demanding his removal after having already threatened to remove all his three brigade commanders in October.". Considering the number of Germans advancing on 7 Division, I think Rawlinson definitely made the correct decision to pull back.
 

Dave

[David Filsell]

Away from home, but from memory, the comment from Haig to French about forward slopes is reported i n Blake's edition of the Haig diaries and Sheffield in the newer edition.

I have been unable to find any correspondence or reports from Capper, despite considerable efforts. His papers, other than odds and ends at Kings, appear to have been lost or destroyed.

Certainly he was charged with the offensive spirit, and, as he showed at Ypres ( see A Galloper At Ypres), an officer who liked getting forward, like many others. There many grossly inaccurate accounts of his death, although I believe I have now got the definitive account. He was one of three  Brigadiers Generals at killed at Loos). He certainly considered that personal risk was acceptable, But suicidally brave implies more think justified about his character, and,  yes, I aware of his quote to the effect that there was a problem in that not enough of his officers have been wounded today. Like many of the most apparently ignorant quotes about Hunter Bunter however, the context of the comment is never given.

Again from memory, the advance was ordered by French who it seems totally failed accept intelligence that the Germans were advancing on Ypres in strength on the 19th. RWF losses were fairly heavy.

The attack on Reutel had an interesting conclusion.  The Wiltshires were virtually destroyed. It is reported that an  nco gathered a small group of survivors an took them back. On his return to the battalion he was told by the quartermaster that his commission had come through while he was in the line. Since he was also the only remaining officer he was also officer commanding. 

Edited 22 June , 2017 by David Filsell

[Guest]

The 'NCO' was Sgt Maj Waylen

 

There is an excellent account of the annihilation of the 2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt in "The 2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt: A record of their Fighting in the Great War 1914-1918" by Maj W S Shepherd MC. 

 

Here are the relevant parts of the War Diary:

 

2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt War Diary

 

22nd Oct 1914. Extremely heavy artillery fire commenced about 7:30 am, again along support trenches, which were now occupied by 6 men and Sgt SMART of MG Detachment who supplied C Coy with ammunition.  This fire was evidently catered for artillery at rear.  

 

At 12:00 pm, enemy made an attack and advanced to about 200 yards from trenches, losing a large number of men, our MGs (two) doing considerable damage.  

During the afternoon, enemy tried to mass in wood opposite Battalion's left flank also in wood across BECELAERE ROAD opposite right flank but were met especially on left with such heavy infantry fire that their dead were literally piled in heaps.  Our MGs again doing excellent work.  

 

About 11:00 pm, the enemy enfiladed D Coy from the left with a heavy artillery fire for about 1½ hours only killing 1 man but doing considerable damage to the trenches.  During the night, the enemy entrenched within 450 yards opposite left flank in front of wood.  

 

23rd Oct 1914. The enemy bombarded the whole of the trenches with heavy artillery fire doing considerable damage both in casualties and destroying trenches.  

During night, the firing on both sides was comparatively light.  Occasional shots only being fired.  The Battalion was re-informed early in the evening by about one Coy of SCOTS GUARDS.

 

24th Oct 1914. About 5:30 am (just before daybreak), the enemy attacked in a very superior force but were driven back with heavy loss.  They attacked again and after about 2 hours of almost continuous fighting in which the enemy lost hundreds in killed and wounded, they broke through the lines having previously continued to come round on our left through trenches that had been vacated.  With the exception of about 30 NCOs and men, mostly from trenches on right, the remainder of Battalion were either killed or captured, a large number being captured.  Cpl ALDERTON who had escaped from trench on left of BECELAERE ROAD together with Ptes DUNN, HOLLISTER and JONES being apparently last to leave the trenches, gathered stragglers together and formed a Rear Guard to Brigade Ambulances by opening out in skirmishing order.  

 

On arrival at 7th DIV HQ, he was met by Cpl BULL and in the evening the APM took party numbering 26 back to Brigade HQ where they met Cpl RICHENS and 50 men which included about 12 L/Cpls.  The majority of these men had been driven from their trenches by artillery fire the previous evening.  The Quartermaster hearing that Lt MACNAMARA was wounded, visited him at Field Hospital and afterwards about 4:00 pm, collected the 50 men above mentioned taking them to Brigade HQ and was informed that no news of Battalion had been received since early morning.  

 

Note: Special mention should be made of the gallant work of Capt COMYN, the MO and stretcher bearers who for the last three days and nights were continuously handling wounded or burying dead.

 

25th Oct 1914. Stragglers numbering 90 having been joined by about 15 during night were marched from Brigade HQ under Sgt MOSS Transport Sgt to 2nd line of transport where they bivouacked and were reformed under the QM Lt S HEWITT and Sgt Major WAYLEN who heard the following day that he and RQMS Sgt REEVES also Sgts WELLS, RUSSELL and DALE had received their commissions dating from 16th inst.

 

26th Oct 1914. The total strength of Battalion including all transport was now 250.  2 Lt WAYLEN took over command.  He and QM Lt HEWITT were the only Officers.  The non-commissioned Officers left were:- 
CQMS SMITH A Coy
Sgt RANDALL Pioneer Sgt
Sgt MOSS Transport Sgt
Sgt Dr ROBBINS
Sgt GROVES Officer Mess Sgt
Sgt PENN Sgt Shoemaker
Sgt O'HANLON QM Stores
Sgt PEARCE Provost Sgt
Sgt Smart MG Sgt
Sgt BURGESS Sgt Mess Cook
L/Sgt MILLER QM Stores
L/Sgt CLEMENTS i/c Stretcher Bearer
L/Sgt MASSEY
Cpl FRY, MG
Cpl BULL
Cpl STEVENS i/c Tool Limber
Cpl ALDERTON
Cpl FENNELL i/c Water Cart
Cpl RICHENS
and 18 L/Cpls

 

 

Edited 22 June , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

On 6/17/2017 at 08:26, bdykstra said:

Hello all, 

I'm doing some research and need to know which battalions of Haig's I Corps ended up on forward slopes at First Ypres. Anthony Farrar-Hockley notes in his book that when Haig readjusted 1st and 2nd Divisions lines in late October 1914 (after relieving IV Corps), six battalions entrenched the forward slopes. Does anyone happen to know which battalions these were? 

Thanks!

Bodie

 

The shuffling of Division. Brigades and Battalions between 26th Oct 1914 and 31st Oct 1914 was complex. In simple terms 7th Div held the line straddling the Menin road (and a few miles either side) on 26th until partly relieved by elements of 1st Div (1st Guards Bde, and 3rd Inf Bde). 1st Guards Brigade relieved 21st Inf Bde between Reutel and Gheluvelt in the northern part of the line leaving the 21st inf Bde to move South towards Zandvoorde. 22nd Inf Bde (I think) were straddling the Menin Rd until 2nd Inf Bde (2nd KRRC and 1st Loyals) moved up and 3rd Inf Bde (1st SWB, 2nd Welsh, 1st Queens). 22nd Inf Bde also shifted left (south) All this reorganisation of the line occurred on 26th Oct (21st Inf Be) and 28th Oct (22nd Inf Bde). 

 

All the above is gleaned from individual battalion diaries. A small number of diaries fail to record which battalion they relieved or which battalion they were relieved by. To add to the complexity the usual rotation between battalions within each Brigade continued and Battalions just relieved were almost always dragged back into the line the next day in counter-attacks.

 

I am 99% certain the following reliefs took place as both sets of diaries concur:

 

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

1st Bn Scots Guards (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn Bedfordshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

1st Bn Black Watch (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) entered the line where 2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div) were annihilated near Reutel

1st Bn South Wales Borderers (3rd Inf Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn RSF (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

2nd Bn Welsh Regt entered the line at Gheluvelt

1st Bn Queens R W Surrey Regt entered the line at Gheluvelt. diary mentions relieving elements of 22nd Inf Bde (7th Div)

 

Stacke's monumental history unsurprisingly has lots of detail on 31st Oct when the 3rd Bn Worcestershire Regt saved the World. The front line is shown overlaid on a contour map . Every battalion was on a forward slope. From the North to the South the battalions shown were:

 

1st Bn Black Watch (just south of Juniper Wood)

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders

1st Bn Scots Guards

1st Bn SWB

2nd Bn Welsh Regt (astride the Menin Rd)

1st Bn Queens

2nd Bn KRRC

1st Bn Loyals

2nd Bn RSF (left/north most Bn of 7th Div)

 

It is a very confusing period and many units ended up in a rather mixed state. It is more complex than outlined above but I think probably identifies the units in question. I hope this helps. MG

 

Edited 22 June , 2017 by Guest

[lostinspace]

Martin,

 

Well done, the original post has been answered, plus Mr. Dykstra might have been given some additional food for thought.
 

Dave

[AOK4]

58 minutes ago, QGE said:

 

The shuffling of Division. Brigades and Battalions between 26th Oct 1914 and 31st Oct 1914 was complex. In simple terms 7th Div held the line straddling the Menin road (and a few miles either side) on 26th until partly relieved by elements of 1st Div (1st Guards Bde, and 3rd Inf Bde). 1st Guards Brigade relieved 21st Inf Bde between Reutel and Gheluvelt in the North part of the line leaving the 21st inf Bde to move South towards Zandvoorde. 22nd Inf Bde (I think) were straddling the Menin Rd until 2nd Inf Bde (2nd KRRC and 1st Loyals) moved up and 3rd Inf Bde (1st SWB, 2nd Welsh, 1st Queens). 22nd Inf Bde also shifted left (south) All this reorganisation of the line occurred on 26th Oct (21st Inf Be) and 28th Oct (22nd Inf Bde). 

 

All the above is gleaned from individual battalion diaries. A small number of diaries fail to record which battalion they relieved or which battalion they were relieved by. To add to the complexity the usual rotation between battalions within each Brigade continued and Battalions just relieved were almost always dragge back into the line the next day in counter-attacks.

 

I am 99% certain the following reliefs took place as both sets of diaries concur:

 

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

1st Bn Scots Guards (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn Bedfordshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

1st Bn Black Watch (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) entered the line where 2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div) were annihilated near Reutel

1st Bn South Wales Borderers (3rd Inf Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn RSF (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

2nd Bn Welsh Regt entered the line at Gheluvelt

1st Bn Queens R W Surrey Regt entered the line at Gheluvelt. diary mentions relieving elements of 22nd Inf Bde (7th Div)

 

Stacke's monumental history unsurprisingly has lots of etail on 31st Oct when the 3rd Bn Worcestershire Regt saved the World. The front line is shown overlaid on a contour map . Every battalion was on a forward slope. From the North to the South the battalions shown were:

 

1st Bn Black Watch (just south of Juniper Wood)

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders

1st Bn Scots Guards

1st Bn SWB

2nd Bn Welsh Regt (astride the Menin Rd)

1st Bn Queens

2nd Bn KRRC

1st Bn Loyals

2nd Bn RSF (left/north most Bn of 7th Div)

 

It is a very confusing period and many units ended up in a rather mixed state. It is more complex than outlined above but I think probably identifies the units in question. I hope this helps. MG

 

Two things:

1. It was the 2nd Worcestershire that made the counter attack that stopped further German attacks. Whether this really "saved the world" is questionable. The Germans were in no state to press any further and the British had to give up the small salient Polderhoek Chateau - Gheluvelt Chateau anyway during the following night.

2. The list of units shows that even after the 7th Division was relieved, other British units kept the lines on the forward slopes as much as possible. So the whole discussion about Capper is a bit useless as the other British units were holding their forward slope lines as well. As Nigel Cave has mentioned before: there was no better option.

 

Jan

[nigelcave]

It is also a bit hard to put all the blame on French (or that's how I am reading it, perhaps mistakenly) for pushing for a continued advance. This was very much in line with what Joffre wanted.

 

My problem is that, given the rest of the line, and given that the advance was still considered a practical possibility by the French certainly (and note the substantial number of troops they sent to the area) and by FM French perhaps reluctantly until (IIRC, I am away from all books) 28 October, I still find it very difficult to see where this new defence line was supposed to be. Give up the line that Capper had and the next defensible one, I suspect, is roughly where things ended up at the end of the fighting in the Ypres area in middish November and when the French took over the whole of the line around Ypres down to, give or take, west of Wijtschaete. 

[Guest]

2 minutes ago, AOK4 said:

 

Two things:

1. It was the 2nd Worcestershire that made the counter attack that stopped further German attacks. Whether this really "saved the world" is questionable. The Germans were in no state to press any further and the British had to give up the small salient Polderhoek Chateau - Gheluvelt Chateau anyway during the following night.

2. The list of units shows that even after the 7th Division was relieved, other British units kept the lines on the forward slopes as much as possible. So the whole discussion about Capper is a bit useless as the other British units were holding their forward slope lines as well. As Nigel Cave has mentioned before: there was no better option.

 

Jan

 

Jan

 

1. It was an ironic reference. My failing for assuming everyone would understand*. The Worcesters clearly did not save the world. I have written about this on other threads. The fact that the 2nd (thanks for the corrective) Bn Worcesters war diary starts with Gheluvelt and works backwards tells us all we need to know about how the Regiment wrote history. I would mostly agree with your assessment.

 

2. As discussed it was because they were ordered to hold the line. This does not necessarily mean this was the optimal position. It assumes that GHQ/IV Corps/I Corps/7th Div/1st Div commanders understood the situation. I think their understanding of the dispositions and the weakness of the positions was not fully understood until afterwards when the recriminations started. 

 

Of interest, given your point that the German Army were 'in no state to press any further" it is interesting to note that the second map in Stacke's history of the Worcesters shows the line at dawn on 31st Oct 1914 and line at 23:00 on the same date. At risk of stating the obvious, the ground over which the 2nd Bn Worcesters charged when they saved the world was under German boots that evening and the Worcesters and the rest of the BEF were a mile further towards Ypres despite the German's inability to "press any further". 

Oddly the new position was not on a forward slope. 

 

* Matthew 13.5 ......and some fell upon stony places....

[AOK4]

27 minutes ago, QGE said:

 

Of interest, given your point that the German Army were 'in no state to press any further" it is interesting to note that the second map in Stacke's history of the Worcesters shows the line at dawn on 31st Oct 1914 and line at 23:00 on the same date. At risk of stating the obvious, the ground over which the 2nd Bn Worcesters charged when they saved the world was under German boots that evening and the Worcesters and the rest of the BEF were a mile further towards Ypres despite the German's inability to "press any further". 

Oddly the new position was not on a forward slope. 

 

* Matthew 13.5 ......and some fell upon stony places....

 

The matter was that the small salient was not tenable as there were no roads to supply the units there! The British had to withdraw because the salient would become a trap for the units there once the Germans could reorganize a bit. It wa snot until the next morning that the Germans discovered the retreat. The Germans were in no state to press further on 31st October 1914.

And the new position was at least partly on a forward slope! The lines South of Polygon Wood were on a forward slope of the vally of the Reutelbeek. If the British would have taken up this position ten days earlier, it would have offered excellent attack possibilities to the Germans as they could have attacked from the Menin Road to the West and North. With more troops available, this would have offered excellent attack possibilities (something they understood very well as it was where they planned their 1915 gas attack originally).

 

I don't know how well you know the actual ground, but I know it very well.

 

Jan

 

BTW: I think Matthew 7,3-5 may be interesting to think over in your case.

 

[Guest]

15 hours ago, nigelcave said:

It is also a bit hard to put all the blame on French (or that's how I am reading it, perhaps mistakenly) for pushing for a continued advance. This was very much in line with what Joffre wanted.

 

My problem is that, given the rest of the line, and given that the advance was still considered a practical possibility by the French certainly (and note the substantial number of troops they sent to the area) and by FM French perhaps reluctantly until (IIRC, I am away from all books) 28 October, I still find it very difficult to see where this new defence line was supposed to be. Give up the line that Capper had and the next defensible one, I suspect, is roughly where things ended up at the end of the fighting in the Ypres area in middish November and when the French took over the whole of the line around Ypres down to, give or take, west of Wijtschaete. 

 

 

In modern military parlance the ground chosen by Capper (and initially endorsed and subsequently criticised by higher command) was 'untenable'. 

 

In my day, "Situation" and "Ground" were the first part of orders. It is and was central to all tactical decisions. The simple fact is that the ground one finds oneself standing on when an attack fails, might not necessarily be optimal, especially if one swings from 'offensive' to 'defensive' operations. Defenders usually have the advantage of choosing ground. As outlined, Rawlinson ordered Capper to halt on 19th Oct due to Capper over extending. To me this is a very basic error: a Divisional commander ignoring the progress of formations on his left and right. It is that fundamental. Poor levels of tactical understanding that ultimately led to the near destruction of his command......The situation required a withdrawal of some distance to optimise the unfolding tactical situation. This is, I think the crux.

 

The ill prepared and ill equipped BEF  - slaves to the French ultra-offensive plans - were really not fit for purpose. They did not have that necessary size, training or equipment to fulfill their politically driven commitments despite Edmonds' claims in OH 1914 Vol I. They were out of their depth on a number of levels and the causes can be traced back a decade to the original commitment. The consequence was the destruction of an Army; the underlying poor decision making has been masked (until fairly recently) by generations of authors of the hero-romantic school confusing massive* casualties as some form of 'heroic success'. The  BEF was so stifled in 1914 by its own lack of tactical imagination, the brutal lessons of 1914 were not learned and passed on; 1915 was even worse in terms of senseless sacrifice. Capper and the small episode in Oct 1914 is simply an acute form of a structural problem in British military doctrine. In some ways I slightly sympathise with Capper. I think he made catastrophic mistakes, but given his training and the mental straight-jacket that the Senior Officers of the British Army were largely constrained by, I doubt anyone would have done any better.

 

The fault was in Downing Street, not on the Western Front; for committing an Army of six Divisions that was not yet fit for purpose. The irony (that word again) is that Capper was a victim as much as any of the men who died under his command. 

 

Any mistakes are mine. MG

 

* I would argue that casualties at Ypres occurred in much higher proportions than the Somme: numbers killed, wounded, missing, POWs as a per cent of numbers committed... it is a constant wonder why 1st July 1916 is a focus rather than 31st Oct 1914. 

Edited 23 June , 2017 by Guest

[nigelcave]

Thanks for that. Yes, indeed, I recall 'situation' and 'ground' all too well as being drummed into us way back when.

 

One problem, of course, was that situation changed - as it had been doing all along what was to become the WF of popular memory during those first months of the war. As a digression, one area that has been much less well covered in the literature is the goings on along the Franco-Belgian border and the La Bassee area.

 

Another 'problem' area is that the French, whilst usually recognised in anglophone literature, are almost invariably underweighted in the various accounts. First Ypres also marks an occasion when, it seems to me, the allies (used deliberately, as the Belgians also performed well) actually acted together remarkably well.

 

And yet another problem is appreciating fully what can only be described as incompetence on a (at least) large scale by many of the principal players on the German side. The failure to keep to a coordinated attack along the length of  the Ypres-Yser front (thus named for the sake of convenience) on 10 November stands out as a highlight, to my mind. And, of course, significant parts of the forces that the Germans brought to bear here were certainly not well equipped, nor well trained.

 

The fact of the matter, in the end, I suppose, is what happened at the end: and thus we have a situation where, by end 1 November, the line had buckled and not given way; the Germans were unable or unwilling to follow through with a major blow on the advantages/territory gained; they then made a mess of the combined armies attack on 10/11 November; and the halting of the German attack was a combined Franco-British victory, aided by the inundation of the ground more or less north of Dixmuide. The BEF, despite shortages of artillery (Haig did order a good proportion out of the line since there was not the ammunition to justify their presence in the line) played its part in retaining the integrity of the line and the pressure against it was considerable. Generally speaking, command function operated well given the number of senior (i.e. brigade commander and above) officer casualties (and casualties amongst the operational staff) that were suffered. In the end, I think the key question as regards First Ypres has to be: how did the Germans fail to win the battle - and thus the campaign and, if not the war, certainly the outlook for 1915?

 

I would agree to some degree re the proportion of casualties (i.e. there are caveats ...) - except that 1 July does really stand out (however much one might think it is a distortion to concentrate on a single day in a campaign that lasted months). In the words of the poet, 1 July 1916 is a different country; rather like March/April 1918 and then August 1918 onwards.

 

 

[David Filsell]

Not mentioned so far is that Rawlinson's concern early in the battle about the length of line his IV Corps was holding and French's angry reaction to it. Equally I must say that French must be judged harshly for his early actions in the battle - regardless of French wishes - and his failure to accept that the Germans were coming on to 7th Division Strong and hard on IV Corps who he ordered  an attack.

[bdykstra]

On 6/21/2017 at 08:57, lostinspace said:

I agree, a very interesting discussion, however, as far as I can tell, Nigel Cave's post # 21 has not been answered: "More importantly, no one has yet explained where the better, reverse slope, defence line could have been established.". It's not like these actions were fought in a hilly countryside, plus I think, as someone else mentioned, the area at that time was obstructed by extensive hedgerows, fences, and woods, not everywhere of course, but I think you would have to admit that this was, to a great extent "close" country, where sight lines were poor and forward positions might have been the only option.
 

Dave

 

Although the hills weren't pronounced, pulling trench lines behind the hill crest was enough to conceal them from the direct line of sight of German artillery. When the 2/Grenadier Guards relieved parts of the 3rd Cavalry Division, they simply pulled the trench line back 300 yards or so onto the reverse slope. I haven't walked the terrain myself, but the units that had experience on the Aisne felt that any sort of reverse slope was advantageous. 

Edited 30 June , 2017 by bdykstra

[bdykstra]

Thanks to everyone for the replies. Great discussion. Thanks  for this quotations from the 2/Welsh Reg war dairy. This is exactly the piece of evidence I was looking for. I will investigate some adjacent units from 1 Div to see if they were also on the forward slope. Interesting that Haig allowed this to happen considering his advocacy of reverse slopes after the Aisne battle. This speaks volumes to the problems of command and control in the BEF at this early stage in the war. 

[bdykstra]

On 6/22/2017 at 11:21, QGE said:

 

The shuffling of Division. Brigades and Battalions between 26th Oct 1914 and 31st Oct 1914 was complex. In simple terms 7th Div held the line straddling the Menin road (and a few miles either side) on 26th until partly relieved by elements of 1st Div (1st Guards Bde, and 3rd Inf Bde). 1st Guards Brigade relieved 21st Inf Bde between Reutel and Gheluvelt in the northern part of the line leaving the 21st inf Bde to move South towards Zandvoorde. 22nd Inf Bde (I think) were straddling the Menin Rd until 2nd Inf Bde (2nd KRRC and 1st Loyals) moved up and 3rd Inf Bde (1st SWB, 2nd Welsh, 1st Queens). 22nd Inf Bde also shifted left (south) All this reorganisation of the line occurred on 26th Oct (21st Inf Be) and 28th Oct (22nd Inf Bde). 

 

All the above is gleaned from individual battalion diaries. A small number of diaries fail to record which battalion they relieved or which battalion they were relieved by. To add to the complexity the usual rotation between battalions within each Brigade continued and Battalions just relieved were almost always dragged back into the line the next day in counter-attacks.

 

I am 99% certain the following reliefs took place as both sets of diaries concur:

 

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

1st Bn Scots Guards (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn Bedfordshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

1st Bn Black Watch (1st Guards Bde, 1st Div) entered the line where 2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt (21st Inf Bde 7th Div) were annihilated near Reutel

1st Bn South Wales Borderers (3rd Inf Bde, 1st Div) relieved 2nd Bn RSF (21st Inf Bde 7th Div)

2nd Bn Welsh Regt entered the line at Gheluvelt

1st Bn Queens R W Surrey Regt entered the line at Gheluvelt. diary mentions relieving elements of 22nd Inf Bde (7th Div)

 

Stacke's monumental history unsurprisingly has lots of detail on 31st Oct when the 3rd Bn Worcestershire Regt saved the World. The front line is shown overlaid on a contour map . Every battalion was on a forward slope. From the North to the South the battalions shown were:

 

1st Bn Black Watch (just south of Juniper Wood)

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders

1st Bn Scots Guards

1st Bn SWB

2nd Bn Welsh Regt (astride the Menin Rd)

1st Bn Queens

2nd Bn KRRC

1st Bn Loyals

2nd Bn RSF (left/north most Bn of 7th Div)

 

It is a very confusing period and many units ended up in a rather mixed state. It is more complex than outlined above but I think probably identifies the units in question. I hope this helps. MG

 

This is excellent. Thank you very much for the response.

Bodie