Forward slopes at First Ypres

[bdykstra]

Hello all, 

I'm doing some research and need to know which battalions of Haig's I Corps ended up on forward slopes at First Ypres. Anthony Farrar-Hockley notes in his book that when Haig readjusted 1st and 2nd Divisions lines in late October 1914 (after relieving IV Corps), six battalions entrenched the forward slopes. Does anyone happen to know which battalions these were? 

Thanks!

Bodie

Edited 17 June , 2017 by bdykstra

[Yorke Scarlett]

Hi,

 

Not having the time to actually run through the book to pick out the 'six battalions' - I suggest you get hold of a copy of Ian Beckett's 'YPRES - The First Battle 1914'. Includes interesting comments by officers as to the siting of trenches on the forward slope.

 

 

[Guest]

The main culprit was Capper and his 7th Div. The correlation between casualties and forward slopes was high. 20th Inf Bde is singled out in Beckett's account

 

To the right of 2nd Division, 7th Division, which had had another trying day on 24 October, started even later and made little headway. Moreover, its 20th Brigade, which held the tip of the existing salient in the British line at Kruiseecke, itself came under attack from the German 54th (Württemberg) Reserve Division, 200 men of the latter’s 242nd Reserve Infantry Regiment being captured. The British position, however, was precarious with no communication trenches and no wire, the German artillery fire having prevented any improvements to the position and most of the British occupying a forward slope of the hill around the village under German observation. Capper, indeed, favoured siting trenches on forward slopes with overhead cover, deriving the method from Japanese practice in the Russo-Japanese War, Rawlinson later pointedly writing in his operational report that the division’s heavy losses ‘may possibly in some small measure have been due to want of experience in the construction and location of trenches on the part of troops fresh from garrison stations abroad’. *

 

* OFH, p. 248; PRO, WO95/ 706, IV Corps Operational Report, 14 November 1914; IWM, Garwood Mss, 91/ 23/ 1, diary, 29 October 1914.

 

 

Matters were rather different opposite 7th Division and 7th Cavalry Brigade (3rd Cavalry Division) when Fabeck’s main effort began about 0645 with another bombardment. While the heavy guns were distributed all along the front, most were concentrated against the defenders around Zandvoorde. Mostly sited on forward slopes in full view of the German observers, many of the British trenches were blown in during the course of a 75-minute bombardment. Indeed, many men were forced back to the support line. It has been suggested that, given Haig’s previous criticism of Rawlinson allowing Capper to occupy such forward trenches, he had done singularly little to prevent a recurrence. The same fault was observed with Byng’s cavalrymen and even some units of 1st and 2nd Divisions on 29 and 30 October though Byng at least had recognised the dangers but felt unable to further expose Capper’s division by altering his own dispositions. 13 Some men of the machine-gun section of the Royal Horse Guards and two squadrons from each of the 1st and 2nd Life Guards stayed forward but they were overwhelmed by a mass infantry attack by two regiments of the 39th Division and three Jäger battalions at about 0800. By 1000 hours the Germans had occupied Zandvoorde although this was not immediately apparent to I Corps since telephone communications were scarce and easily disrupted. In the case of 7th Division, two of its three cable wagons were lost though one was subsequently recovered. 14 Indeed, due to the isolated nature of many British positions, messages were often passed back through division to corps and then forward again to adjacent units. In this particular case, Byng had been watching the action and sent an officer to Haig’s headquarters in the so-called White Château on the Gheluvelt Road – close to what was to become known as Hellfire Corner – and Allenby was informed by telephone from there. Once atop the Zandvoorde ridge the Germans were able to enfilade the positions of 21st Brigade to the extent that the brigade headquarters came under direct artillery fire as did the trenches of 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers from the neighbouring 22nd Brigade. The battalion was completely overrun, only eighty-six men surviving death or capture. Of those lost, 276 officers and men, including Lieutenant Colonel H.O.S. Cadogan, had been killed and only fifty-four taken prisoner. The 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers also took heavy losses.

 

Beckett, Ian. Ypres: The First Battle 1914 (pp. 155-156). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 

 

 

 

7th Div was largely annihilated during this period. 

 

20th Inf Bde

1st Bn Grenadier Guards

2nd Bn Scots Guards

2nd Bn Gordon Highlanders

2nd Bn Border Regt

 

21st Inf Bde

2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt

2nd Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers

 

22nd Inf Bde

2nd Bn Queens Royal West Surrey Regt

1st Bn South Staffs

2nd Bn R Warwicksire Regt

1st Bn RWF

 

All had exceptionally large casualties in the 7th Div in Oct-Nov 1914

 

Beckett alos cites 2nd Bn Scots Guards (20th Inf Bde) on forwards slopes as well as 1st Bn Grenadier Guards (2nd Div 4th Guards Bde)

Edited 19 June , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

The 1st Bn Welsh Regt war dairy (3rd Inf Bde)

 

31st Oct 1914. The Battalion held the trenches on the forward slope about 400 yards E of the Village of GHELUVELT and N of the MENIN road in touch with the 1st Bn QUEEN'S ROYAL WEST SURREY REGT. One machine gun was in position on the road itself during the night but was withdrawn at dawn and placed in an emplacement 150 yards in rear of B Coy. B Coy under Lt T B S MARSHALL held 150 yards of trench with its right on the road facing E with 2 platoons of D Coy under 2 Lt C A B YOUNG facing NE covering the left flank of B Coy. The SOUTH WALES BORDERERS continuing the line towards the NW.

 

Supports - 1 Platoon of D Coy were in support in a sunk lane connecting with the MENIN road, under Capt H C REES, the other platoon being held in Reserve in the village of GHELUVELT. Battalion HQ and Col C B MORLAND were also in this sunk lane.

 

2 Platoons A Coy under 2 Lt H G A CORDER in dug outs along the MENIN road between the sunk lane and the village. C Coy under Capt W A G MOORE supported our left flank with 2 Platoons in a small wood in rear of the point at which D Coy connected with the 1st Bn SOUTH WALES BORDERERS. 1 Platoon in trenches just in front of a windmill on the edge of the village from which position supporting fire could be brought to bear on the ground in front of B Coy at long range.

 

As soon as it was light the enemy opened a very heavy fire on the trenches apparently from every gun that could be brought to bear and in addition advanced several field guns to within 700-800 yards of our trenches supporting their infantry attack.

 

About 8:10 am B and D Coys having suffered very severe losses on account of the terrific fire it being impossible to support them and because the sunk lane was indefensible Col C B MORLAND decided to retire with what men he could collect. The CO sent messages to inform the 1st Bn QUEEN'S ROYAL WEST SURREY REGT, 1st Bn SOUTH WALES BORDERERS and Capt W A G MOORE C Coy of his retirement, also a message to the KING'S ROYAL RIFLES who  were in support S of the MENIN road SW of GHELUVELT. It is doubtful whether all or any of these messages reached their destinations. Col MORLAND reformed the supports who had retired under a very heavy high explosive shrapnel shell fire in the N end of the village. The platoon of C Coy in trenches by the windmill remaining in their trenches, also a platoon of C Coy which was in the small wood retained its position.

 

Capt H C REES (the writer of this account regrets that he has at present no definite information as to the movements of these supports under Col MORLAND's command for about 2 ½ hours) and about a dozen men some of whom were carrying 2 Lt C A B YOUNG who was wounded did not see in which direction Col C B MORLAND had gone and so went through the village reporting the situation to Maj PEIL commanding a battery of the 39th BDE bout 400 yards W of the village and was ordered by him to occupy some trenches to cover the Battery.

 

About 10:30 am the 1st Bn GLOUCESTERSHIRE REGT who were Brigade reserve were ordered forward to counter-attack and Capt H C REES with some 60 stragglers he had collected moved forward on their left towards the N end of the village and on reaching the lane leading to C Coy's position at the windmill he saw Col MORLAND on the path behind him. Col C B MORLAND told him not to go forward as it was only wasting men also saying that Capt W H FERRAR had been killed endeavouring to lead a bayonet charge from the barricade on the MENIN road. This counter attack of ours was driven back about 11:30 am and between then and 1:30 pm our troops were driven out of GHELUVELT.

 

About 1:30 pm Col MORLAND, Capt MOORE, Capt REES, 2 Lt CORDER a Captain in the 1st Bn  GLOUCESTERSHIRE REGT with about 30 men took up a position in a trench to cover Maj PEIL's Battery. By this time the German advanced infantry were apparently in a wood SW of GHELUVELT - S of the MENIN Road. At 2:00 pm when the Officers were standing in a group discussing what was to be done a shell burst in front of them instantly killing Capt MOORE and mortally wounding Col MORLAND. The Command of the Battalion now devolved on Capt REES who formed  firing line across the open to cover the Battery, the trench in which Col MORLAND and Capt MOORE were hit being constructed to face N. The Battery opened fire at a range of 700 yards and completely checked the rifle fire. Lt BLEWITT of this Battery obtained permission to move one gun on to the MENIN road itself and in a duel with a German Field Gun also on the road in GHELUVELT obtained a direct hit and knocked the German gun out.

 

The force of the German attack appeared now to be expended (see account of No. 2 and 4 Platoons p 32) and 2 Companies of the ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGT moving forward at dusk some 300 yards under a heavy rifle fire enabled some sorting out of units to take place. The situation at 5:30 pm N of the MENIN road being as follows - from the road - From right to left -

200 yards of trench held by men of various units with no Officer in charge.

150 yards held by ROYAL MUNSTER FUS.

200 yards held by about 70 men of the 2nd Bn WELSH REGT and Lt BOYD and 13 men who were all that could be found of the 1st QUEEN'S ROYAL WEST SURREY REGT under Capt REES.

250 yards held by 1st DIV CYCLISTS under Capt CLARKE connecting with the BLACK WATCH.

All units dug themselves in.

 

Casualties.

Lt Col C MORLAND died of wounds 31/10

Maj O B PRITCHARD wounded         31/10

Capt W A G MOORE killed                31/10

Capt W FERRAR killed                       31/10

Capt C R BERKLEY DSO wounded     29/10

Capt F E PACKE wounded                 21/10

Capt W S EVANS wounded               29/10

Lt G D MELVILLE wounded                30/10

Lt A G A CORDER wounded                2/11

Lt G D PARTRIDGE missing              31/10

2 Lt C A B YOUNG wounded                2/11

Lt QM R M HILL wounded                 31/10  wounded at HOOGE

2 Lt J C COCKS wounded                   30/10

2 Lt J B MARSHALL missing               31/10

Capt A O OPPENHEIM missing       31/10

2 Lt NICHOLL  killed                            29/10

2 Lt FOWLER (RWS) wounded            5/11

 

The above casualties with the exception of Lt QM HILL occurred at GHELUVELT.

 

Officer Casualties at GHELUVELT

          Killed    Wounded    Missing

              4               7                  3

 

A Coy QMS COWNIE Killed

B Coy CSM PRICE killed

 

           Killed   Wounded   Missing

A Coy:    3             19              123

B Coy:    9             29              135

C Coy     5             28               67

D Coy     0             16               79

--------------------------------------------

              18           92             404

--------------------------------------------

Total Casualties                  514

 A large percentage of the missing have since been accounted for as wounded or prisoners of war. It was impossible at the time to determine what casualties had occurred.

 

31st Oct 1914. Report on Operations of the Welsh Regiment 31st Oct.

 

The Battalion occupied trenches in front of GHELUVELT  of the MENIN Road. The 1st Bn SOUTH WALES BORDERERS were on the left, the 1st Bn QUEEN’S ROYAL WEST SURREY REGT on the right one platoon of the WELSH REGT being S of the MENIN Road connecting with the 1st BN QUEEN’S ROYAL WEST SURREY shortly after dawn the German Artillery opened a very heavy fire on our trenches. About 8 am a German Filed battery using direct fire opened on the trenches at a range estimated at about 800 yards. By 10 o’clock the forward trenches twice blown to pieces and Col MORLAND decided that the position was untenable and ordered the Battalion to withdraw 2 platoons of A Coy, 2 of D Coy were able to withdraw through the village of GHELUVELT and reformed in rear of the 1st Bn SOUTH WALES BORDERERS leaving a firing line near the windmill to help the KING’S ROYAL RIFLES to cover the retirement.

 

Col MORLAND sent messages to 1st Bn QUEEN’s ROYAL WEST SURREY REGT, 1st Bn SOUTH WALES BORDERERS and C Coy 2nd Bn WELSH REGT under Capt MOORE, notifying them of his retirement.

 

The order to Capt MOORE who was echeloned in a wood to the left rear of the Battalion’s original position never arrived. Capt MOORE held on to this position until he found German infantry coming round in his rear and then withdrew.

The Battalion took part in the general counter-attack to retake the village during which attack Capt FERRAR was killed attempting to lead a bayonet charge from the barricade.  This counter-attack having been repulsed the Battalion became much scattered and whilst collecting stragglers Col MORLAND and Capt MOORE were killed by a shell. At nightfall some 70 men of the Battalion with a part of the 1st QUEEN’S ROYAL WEST SURREY REGT first occupied a position N of the MENIN road facing GHELUVELT. At 1:00 am on Nov 1st were sent S of this road where they dug themselves in.

 

1st Nov 1914. The Battalion remained in these trenches all day and were relieved by the KING’S ROYAL RIFLES. After dark the Battalion bivouacked the night of Nov 1st in woods SW of HOOGE.

 

2nd Nov 1914. On the afternoon of Nov 2nd the Battalion were ordered forward to attack an reoccupy the trenches  held the previous night by the KING’S ROYAL RIFLES. They moved in support of the 1st Bn GLOUCESTERSHIRE REGT through the woods at VELDHOEK and closing up with them took part in the bayonet charge just after dark when the line was reorganised after this charge the Battalion held some 150 yards of trenches at the East edge of VELDHOEK WOOD.

 

H C REES, OC  2nd Bn WELSH REGT 9/11/14

Edited 19 June , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

units of Byng's 3rd Cavalry Division (7th Cav Bde) were also exposed on forward slopes. See Trial by Fire by Gardner  p 213and  the First Seven Divisions by Ernest Hamilton. 

 

7th Cav Bde

1st Life Guards

2nd Life Guards

Royal Horse Guards

Leicestershire Yeomanry.

 

I believe R A Lloyd's account of this action sis one of the very best. See A trooper in the Tins .... also known as Troop Horse and Trench. 

 

The 4th Guards Bde and two Battalions of the 2nd Inf Bde were put on forwards slopes (I think) on 29th Oct.

 

Edited 21 June , 2017 by Guest
typos

[AOK4]

I think attributing the heavy British losses only to their lines being positioned on forward slopes a little bit too simplistic. Most of the German artillery of the new units was incapable of indirect fire, lacked knowledgeable artillerymen (most of the new recruits had hardly fired a shot during training) and was short of ammunition. Other problems were the nature of the soil, which made trenches collapse easily and the sometimes very closed nature of the landscape which allowed enemy troops to infiltrate. The lack of fortification effort (trenches, barbed wire etc.) was also one of the problems.

Positioning of trenches on forward slopes was something which was common practice for quite some time during the war and didn't lead to such disasters then.  

 

Jan

[David Filsell]

The positions on forward slopes before Zandvoorde, were it has been stated, originally dug by the Scots Guards. They were apparently, neither moved or greatly improved while held by cavalry. Although surveys were undertaken and a fall back line was prepared, no detail of it seems to have survived.  

The comanding officer of the RWF, whose bn was in lines on the left of Zandvoorde, had advised a staff officer that he judged his positions to be a death trap, although walking the ground indicates that they were not on forward slopes. Cadogan was advised to 'protest' the position. There is no record that he did so.

Once Zandvoorde had been taken the RWF were shelled from the village and taken in the flank. It seems clear, from the fact that the Germans did not capitalise on taking the village, that its defence was sufficiently effective to destroy the attackers command and control at junior officer level.

The comments on communications problems need more careful examination too.

Haig was informed very swiftly of the loss of Zandvoorde  by what  was probably a Hubert Gough to Jonny Gough communication. Possibly, possibly, this wash transmitted by the Belgian telephone system, possibly by galloper, and highlighted the the threat to Ypres - which arguably offered more promise than an attack on Ypres down the Menin Road. Thevmessage triggered a Haig's Ill examined or explained, but rapid and successful, efforts which managed to get six or so infantry battalions from reserves forward that prevented the, admittedly disorganised, German advance from Zandvoorde.

[Guest]

3 hours ago, AOK4 said:

I think attributing the heavy British losses only to their lines being positioned on forward slopes a little bit too simplistic. Most of the German artillery of the new units was incapable of indirect fire, lacked knowledgeable artillerymen (most of the new recruits had hardly fired a shot during training) and was short of ammunition. Other problems were the nature of the soil, which made trenches collapse easily and the sometimes very closed nature of the landscape which allowed enemy troops to infiltrate. The lack of fortification effort (trenches, barbed wire etc.) was also one of the problems.

Positioning of trenches on forward slopes was something which was common practice for quite some time during the war and didn't lead to such disasters then.  

 

Jan

 

 

I would offer an alternative view: The diary evidence would challenge some of these ideas; just about every diary of the British units in question mention the severe effects of the German artillery fire; the diary evidence is overwhelmingly in support of the idea that artillery fire was the main cause of casualties. It is a simple fact that those units positioned on forward slopes saw significantly higher casualties - by a very long way - and all describe the dominant effect of artillery rather than small arms fire. The diary entry of the 2nd Bn Scots Guards (20th Inf Bde, 7th Div) for 25th Oct is typical. It starts:

 

"25th Oct 1914.  The Battalion remained in their dug-outs most of the day.  The Germans shelled the position all along the line with a tremendous number of guns all day....."

 

And later;

 

"....Our trenches were tremendously shelled all day, some of the trenches being blown in.  Lt G R DRUMMOND and Capt H L KEMBLE being buried in their trench and had to be dug out."

 

And the following day:

 

"26th Oct 1914......When it got light at 4:00 am, many dead were seen lying in heaps all round the trenches.   The wounded were collected and under great difficulty, were moved to an ambulance wagon, this was owing to shell fire which was concentrated on the village, destroying practically every house which then remained standing and killing the remaining Germans who were still hiding in the houses and had been sniping since daylight.....The shelling continued until another attack was launched and the garrison in the trenches found themselves completely surrounded and eventually a few remaining survivors became prisoners of war about 12:00 pm.  

 

And a day later the Battalion counted the bill, just 20 days after disembarking;

 

"27th Oct 1914.......

Strength of Battalion, 12 Officers, 460 NCOs and men including Transport.
Losses, 17 Officers, 379 NCOs and men."

 

It was not until the 30th that the Scots Guards started digging on a reverse slope:

 

30th Oct 1914.  The Germans shelled ZANDVOORDE till the sky became as black as a LONDON fog.  The Battalion withdrew at about 12:00 pm from GHELUVELT - ZANDVOORDE road to a position in the woods to cover the guns.  We came on the GORDON HLDRS who had been having a very hot time.  Their wounded were going back in streams.  There was also a Battery in a field which was silenced by the Germans, with dead Germans lying all round one gun being turned upside down.

The 1st Bn GRENADIER GUARDS, 3 Officers and 180 other ranks, 2nd Bn SCOTS GUARDS 200,  BORDER REGT 250 other ranks remained in reserve.

The 4th GUARDS BDE arrived and occupied the ground on the right of the GORDON HLDRS facing South.  After dark the 21st INF BDE less the 2nd Bn GORDON HLDRS marched via the YPRES - MENIN road to VELDHOEK and occupied a position facing East, 2nd Bn BORDER REGT on the left with their left on the main road.  2nd Bn SCOTS GUARDS and 1st Bn GRENADIER GUARDS on the right.  We dug ourselves in during the night.  The position was about 100 yards in rear of the forward slope to GHELUVELT.  The Germans occupied ZANDVOORDE on this day.

 

However, the German artillery still managed to find them. and relentlessly shell them for five more days until they were relieved. It is difficult to see how small arms fire could play a role in their slow destruction when positioned on a reverse slope from 30th Oct; no mention on any indirect MG fire for example.Note the rather lower casualty rates once moved to the reverse slope position. Of particular note is the Scots Guards comments on the fate of those on the forward slopes 

 

31st Oct 1914.  After digging all night, the 1st Bn GRENADIER GUARDS, 2nd Bn SCOTS GUARDS and 2nd Bn BORDER REGT were shelled all day.  The amount of ammunition used by the Germans must have been something colossal.  Only the very stoutest troops could have stood such severe bombardment.  The trenches on the forward slope suffered severely, the 21st and 22nd INF BDEs losing very heavily.  The Germans made an attack and got through our line between the 21st and 22nd INF BDEs but fortunately did not go on.  Their attack on the YPRES - MENIN road was checked by a charge and counter-attack by 1st INF BDE.  The 1st Bn SCOTS GUARDS was conspicuous in this assault.

We remained in trenches all day and were relieved by the RIFLE BDE after dark.  The 20th INF BDE moved more to the right into the woods and dug themselves in.  The whole Brigade now only holding about 300 or 400 yards of trench.  Our casualties very small.

 

1st Nov 1914.  Nothing of great importance to note.  The shelling was heavy and it was impossible to leave the trenches till after dark.  The Brigade, 2nd Bn SCOTS GUARDS and 2nd Bn BORDER REGT now only occupy a frontage of about 400 yards.

 

2nd Nov 1914.  Nothing special to note.  The Battle of YPRES continues.  Extremely heavy shelling.  The 2nd Bn BORDER REGT were attacked and the 1st Bn GRENADIER GUARDS came up in support.  The attack never became serious and was easily repulsed.

 

3rd Nov 1914.  Heavy shelling all morning.  Lt D R DRUMMOND was killed about 7:00 am.  Enemy reported to be massing in the woods.

 

4th Nov 1914.  Very heavy shelling otherwise nothing special to report.

 

5th Nov 1914.  After continuous shelling, the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Bn GORDON HLDRS, 7th INF BDE, 3rd DIV.  A draft of one Officer (Lt  C A M CATOR) and 100 base details joined the Battalion.

Losses since 27th Oct, 4 Officers and 136 men.

 

I would simply argue that the diary evidence suggests artillery was the primary major cause of casualties. 

 

Which suggests that some of the poorly trained German artillerymen managed to do some considerable damage. The central issue of being on a forward slope is that the enemy Artillery observers can see the fall of shot. It is difficult to resolve the theory that most of the new German artillery were incapable of indirect fire with the records of the men on the recieving end. Claerly there were enough German artillerymen who were capable of indirect fire and the 'hidden' German batteries are something that repeatedly get mentioned in British diaries. On the 5th Oct 1914 20th Inf Bde was at Southampton ready to embark at roughly 30 Officers and 973 men per Battalion. Exactly one month later the Brigade took a tally: the average strength of the Battalions was 6 Officers and 345 men - implying Officer casualty ratios of 80% and OR casualty ratios of 65%. The 1st Bn Grenadier Guards was reduced to 4 officers and 406 men

 

In the British Army it was not common to deploy on forward slopes at the time; while possible within the (then) current tactical doctrine, it was not used often and after Oct 1914 was very rarely used again. That Haig and Rawlinson specifically mention the problems in various despatches, diaries and official reports of positioning troops on forward slopes might suggest this kind of tactical response simply led to catastrophic levels of casualties. 7th Div was annihilated in less than a month and has the unenviable claim to being the formation that lost most men in the least amount of time in the BEF in 1914-15. One has to see the near annihilation of K1 at Gallipoli and Loos to come close to their horrendous stats.

 

From the perspective of British tactical doctrine it was hardly ever used again in the Great War. Le Cateau (right flank, 5th Div) and Ypres Oct 1914 (7th Div and elements of 1st and 2nd  Divs and 3rd Cav Div) are the two stand out episodes of this type of tactical deployment; both were met with catastrophic losses in killed and wounded and POWs (in the case of Le Cateau) for the Battalions involved. The Officers in the infantry battalions and RFA Brigades of the 5th Div on the forward slopes of the right flank of Le Cateau were simply horrified by their positions. It was considered 'suicidal'. Its commander was sacked a few months later. 

 

The diary evidence for Ypres 1914 suggests forward slopes and rudimentary 'trenches' that were barely 4 feet deep and not contiguous were the primary cause. In simple terms it is possible to track the casualties of over 90 British Battalions and over two dozen Cavalry regiments on the Western Front during the days in question. The units that met with the highest casualties were on forward slopes. 

 

I would strongly recommend R A Lloyd's account of the Life Guards at Ypres to get an impression of the near annihilation of the units in the Cavalry line.

 

Any mistakes are mine. MG

Edited 19 June , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

2nd Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers (21st Inf Bde, 7th Div)

 

30th Oct 1914.  6:00 am.  A terrific bombardment opened along the whole line and upon the supports.  

11:00 am.  As on the 29th, the troops upon our left were forced to retire and the 2nd Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUSILIERS were ordered to retire which they did under a very heavy fire reforming 1200 yards behind our original position, the 20th INF BDE being on our left.  There we remained under shrapnel fire along the GHELUVELT - ZANDVOORDE ROAD.  

Suddenly it became evidence that the enemy had occupied ZANDVOORDE, for a field gun opened fire from that place enfilading our trenches and causing a lot of casualties at 900 yards range.  

4:30 pm.  Their fire was extremely accurate and it was with some difficulty that we retired forming a new line facing ZANDVOORDE and the enemy's advance checked.  After dark the new line was taken up but the Battalion was ordered to take up a more forward and very exposed position in order to protect the right flank of the 3rd INF BDE.  The line was now occupied by the 2nd Bn BEDFORDSHIRE REGT on right, ourselves on the left and 2nd Bn YORKSHIRE REGT in reserve.  

Edited 19 June , 2017 by Guest

[josquin]

Martin,

David states that the forward slope positions were prepared originally by the Scots Guards. Is it known who made the decision for forward slope siting?

What was Capper's history subsequent to First Ypres?  Any biographical perspective will be appreciated.  Your discussions of

the consequences of forward slope siting are detailed and convincing.  Did Capper or any other B.E.F. commander make any attempt to justify the decision

for the forward slope siting?  Russo-Japanese precedent notwithstanding, it seems self-evident that such an approach would be excessive in its cost.

The Japanese casualty figures at Port Arthur should have provided sufficient cautions. Regrettably, such a lesson was lost on the B.E.F. command.

Josquin

[Guest]

 

5 hours ago, josquin said:

Martin,

David states that the forward slope positions were prepared originally by the Scots Guards. Is it known who made the decision for forward slope siting?

What was Capper's history subsequent to First Ypres?  Any biographical perspective will be appreciated.  Your discussions of

the consequences of forward slope siting are detailed and convincing.  Did Capper or any other B.E.F. commander make any attempt to justify the decision

for the forward slope siting?  Russo-Japanese precedent notwithstanding, it seems self-evident that such an approach would be excessive in its cost.

The Japanese casualty figures at Port Arthur should have provided sufficient cautions. Regrettably, such a lesson was lost on the B.E.F. command.

Josquin

 

 

I dont know the anser to these questions. My understanding is that Capper or at least his staff delineated the line of defence and by implication the position on the forward slope. I recall reading somehere that after the disaster that befell the 7th Div it was generally recognised (and possibly there was some official instruction, or high level order that this type of deployment would be avoided if at all possible. The diary entries of some Brigades and Battalions under Bulfin suggest they were 'dragged forward' by 7th Divs decision and felt that they could not leave 7th Div's flanks 'in the air'; i.e. Cappers' poor judgment had knock on effects for other units either side.

 

I have not read the post event reports in detail, although it would be easy to research. 

 

The British Army went through a tactical revolution between the Second Anglo-Boer War and the Great War, and included observers on both sides of the Russo-Japanese War. Many of the lessons were incorporated in tactical doctrine, although the question of 'forward slopes' and the delpoyment of artillery in particular had not been resolved. There were two schools of thought. The disatser at Colenso loomed large for some time. 

 

What is interesting is that the commanders who ended up in these precarious positions appear to be gung-ho fire-breathers. Fergusson on the 5th Div (claimed he would died fighting in the last ditch with his men and that there would be no retreat at Le Cateau. Oddly he was in the rear with the gear when the 2nd Suffolks and the 2nd KOYLI were destroyed). Capper is  described as reckless by Beckett. 

 

Bulfin's account might shed some light. I have transcribed all the unit diaries and operation reports for this period so there is a  mountain of detail....I am busy on demographics at present but will see if there is anything that can answer your questions... MG

Edited 20 June , 2017 by Guest

[nigelcave]

Would anyone care to suggest where the reverse slope positions were to be found in this area S of the Menin Road/ E of Gheluvelt and which at the same time would give integrity to the overall position of I Corps? [Bearing in mind, of course, that the plan was for the Entente to push eastwards from the Salient for the first couple of days of what has become known as First Ypres.]

[David Filsell]

sActually, having tried, long and hard, , I can tell you that it is fairly difficult to research. I have found very little in after action reports. (Others many know/do better).

Nigel makes a good point, but the fact not yet mentioned her, is  that there also seem to have been little in the way of support trenches to  support the forward lines at Zandvoorde (which were described in one account as hastily dug and never improved by the cavalry) 

Certainly the cavalry were forced to make all troop movements and re-deployments  at night. There was also difficulty in bringing up rations.  Equally machine guns seem to have been in ill judged positions, frpom serviving sketch maps - particularly that positioned just ahead of the current cavalry memorial (its extremely tired mg team had fields of fire both on left and right  and directly forward) The position stood out like a sore thumb and would have probably been an early artillery unit.

There is no fully satisfactory biography of Capper, although there are some papers at Kings. It is believed that his papers and letters were destroyed, although it has also been suggested family members in the channel Islands have/had a portrait and may hold some papers. But I have been unable to locate them.

Various articles have outlined his career however - including one by me in Records, the magazine of the Haig fellowship.. He was killed at Loos , although a his death has been variously and wrongly reported for years. A detailed first person account of his only became available fairly recently when I located it a copy of the last edition of the 7th Infantry Division old comrades association.

Interestingly Capper was director of infantry (and former head of the Quetta Staff College) before being given to command of 7th Inf Div - it would therefore seem logical that, as a 'new boy' , he was unaware of the problems about forward sloped on the Aisne, the ferocity of German artillery and had not been advised of them and simply followed accepted doctrine - using forward slopes to provide on fields of fire. Interestingly, despite popular belief, the 7th had a high proportion of reservists in its ranks, despite most of its bn having been returned from postings overseas.

[Guest]

4 hours ago, nigelcave said:

Would anyone care to suggest where the reverse slope positions were to be found in this area S of the Menin Road/ E of Gheluvelt and which at the same time would give integrity to the overall position of I Corps? [Bearing in mind, of course, that the plan was for the Entente to push eastwards from the Salient for the first couple of days of what has become known as First Ypres.]

 

Presumably Haig and Rawlinson had some thoughts on an alternative deployment.  The map below is from HQ 7th Div General Staff war diary (WO 95/1627) which shows the line on 19th Oct. Some of the diaries describe Kruiseik (sic) position as being Kruiseik Hill. A cursory look at Geopartaile shows the challenges of the topography. with both Zandvoorde and Kruiseke on high ground that falls quite steeply to the East and South east to a flat basin now occupied by the N58. 

 

I vaguely recall seeing notes on a Staff Ride from the late 1920s or possibly mid 1930s on the deployment. 

 

 

Edited 20 June , 2017 by Guest

[josquin]

Martin and David,

Your informed, and informative, replies to my enquiry are appreciated greatly. I located two articles that answered some of my questions

regarding Capper--Ian Beckett's article in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography ("Sir Thompson Capper") and Keith Simpson's

"Capper and the Offensive Spirit," in the Journal of the RUSI vol.118, issue 2; 51-56 (1973). At the time of publication, Simpson was

a Lecturer in War Studies at RMA Sandhurst, and his analysis is quite thorough.  Both authors emphasize Capper's zeal for "the offensive

spirit," for the "elan" favored by the French military preceding and during the Great War.  Beckett states that while he was Commandant

of the Staff College at Quetta, Capper imparted the lessons he derived from the Russo-Japanese War, in particular the necessity for

"attacking dash" to overcome entrenched positions.  Regrettably, Capper, as well as the French General Staff, failed to recognize the

extent to which modern artillery, machine guns, and advances in technology made "elan" tragically untenable.  Sir John French and

the higher echelons of the government appeared to have no difficulty with the 7th Division's 10,000 casualties out of an original complement

of 14,000--far from being sanctioned or criticized, he was knighted ("Knight Commander of the Order of St.Michael and St.George,"

London Gazette 16 February 1915 and 16 March 1915).  As you said, David, Capper and his command decisions are difficult

to research; indeed, as seen in another thread on this Forum, there is no agreement even regarding the circumstances of

his death at Loos. Given Capper's doctrine of war and its disconnect with the realities of war in the 20th Century, it seems

as if his enthusiasm for forward slope siting is both problematical and an element of a consistent military doctrine.

 

Josquin

[AOK4]

A lot of the discussion is also talk afterwards from our cosy armchairs.

 

One of the reasons why the British Ypres offensive in 1917 didn't go anywhere was because the British never managed to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau (exactly the area which you are now blaming the British of defending it in 1914!). One should go on the spot and realize the excellent view holding that line offered towards the Roeselare - Kortrijk - Menen area. I can understand why Capper was keen on trying to hold that ground (especially in view of his planned offensive).

 

Jan

[nigelcave]

I agree with Jan on this one; I travelled all along the 1914 Ypres front for a total of several weeks when working on the Ypres 1914 Battleground Europe books and it is very difficult to see where a suitable line could have been found. Context, too, is everything, given the point that the Entente were still committed to an advance out of Ypres, even after the events of 20-22 October. Kruiseke forms the east-south-east / south eastern shoulder of the Gheluvelt Plateau: give that up and where is your line.

 

For what it is worth, note that almost the entirety of the German line facing the British on 1 July 1916 was on a forward slope.

[Guest]

2 hours ago, nigelcave said:

For what it is worth, note that almost the entirety of the German line facing the British on 1 July 1916 was on a forward slope.

 

I don't quite see how one can draw comparisons between the German trenches on 1st July 1916 and the British trenches at Ypres in 1914. The German positions in 1916 were radically different from the rudimentary disconnected semi-built trench lines of Oct 1914. They were massive, complex, extremely deep (vertically) and the position was in great depth. In Oct 1914 the 7th Div was holding so many miles of front that it was incapable at one stage of having anything in reserve; there was at one stage no depth at all. To compare Oct 1914 with Jul 1916 really does stretch the imagination. 

 

One other major factor in Oct 1914 was that the RFA had hardly any ammunition. Many batteries were reduced to a few rounds per day. There is a thread that covers this in detail using primary material. The British ability to actively engage the Germans with counter-battery fire was particularly poor. Again the diaries record this in minute detail. This is a tiny shard of the South Staffords' war diary describing how they dug their trenches on 25th Oct when attached to 20th Inf Bde;

 

"The enemy then were bursting their shrapnel beautifully on this ridge and Jack Johnsons were falling beside our hasty entrenchments dug with the small entrenching tool and even hands alone".

 

Here is Lt Col Forbes (CO 2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt) personal diary for 21st - 24th Oct (the day he was made a POW). It is one of the more detailed personal accounts written only a few weeks after the events. I think it provides a good idea of the general situation in that area, particularly the accuracy and intensity of the German artillery and the lack of British artillery support. Highlighting is mine. Needless to say the Battalion was annihilated  

 

21st Oct 1914.  The position which the Battalion now occupied was on a plateau on the eastern edge of which a belt of trees and some small copses obscured the view to the front; the village of REUTEL marked our right flank restricting the view to the south, to our left the ground rose slightly rendering everything to the north invisible.  In the rear were a number of small houses and the POLYGONE wood.  Between the wood and our trench line was a deep re-entrant which drained in a south westerly direction to the POLYGONEBEKE.  The situation is best understood by a reference to Trench Map, GHELUVELT, 28 north-east 3, scale 1/10000.  The trenches were sited on a north and south line some 200 to 300 yards from the eastern edge of the plateau.  

 

The trenches were under a heavy fire throughout the day from artillery, MG and rifle fire.  The former was, at first, ineffective but the enemy Gunner was improving his range hourly.  

 

The field of fire in front of A Coy on our right was less open and not so good as elsewhere and the Germans taking advantage of this launched a strong attack on that point.  They advanced in several lines in rather close formation, but were repulsed at every effort with heavy losses.  Other attempts were made all along the line but without effect.  

 

Lt GRIMSTON who had all through shown great pluck and had set an excellent example to his subordinates, was killed in the afternoon.  

The following message was received from Brigade HQ in the course of the day:-

 

BM 21st Oct:
Orders are to hold present position.  AAA There must therefore be no abandonment  of trenches.  AAA All baggage not actually required for fighting purposes should be sent back in good order and under a responsible Officer of each unit to HALTE, second kilometre east of YPRES, to report to Administrative Staff Officer of 7th DIV from whom instructions will be received.  AAA Please send Orderly some information as to situation with you. AAA  From 21st INF BDE.  

 

There had been no telephonic communication with Brigade HQ since we had reoccupied our trenches.  Every effort to restore the connection was made by the Battalion.  Signallers who had to work under the fire of the German Artillery but the guns were searching our rear and in so doing were damaging the wires.  All messages had, therefore, to go by hand.  Several did not reach their destination and the Messenger Orderlies had to cross a hailstorm of shot and shell.  In the performance of this duty Pte MEAD exhibited great pluck and resource.  

The Battalion Ammunition Reserve and food supplies were in a farm building, adjoining the local reserve trenches and the very difficult task of sending them on to the firing line devolved on Capt HENSLOW and volunteers of Letter D Coy.  These men at great personal risk carried the supplies over some 200 yards of open ground into the trenches.  The following were conspicuous in this respect:-

 

Cpl BUSBRIDGE, L/Cpl HUNT, L/Cpl BECK, Ptes PERRETT, NASH, PENNY, SMITH, BLUNSDON and Pte BERRY, all of D Coy.  Also CQM Sgt PARKER and Pte GILL of B Coy.  Pte BERRY was killed on his 2nd or 3rd journey.  

 

A brief cessation of the fighting was taken advantage of to reinforce A Coy on our right from the local reserve but it was found that Capt TIMMIS' Coy were well holding their own.  This Coy were well handled and showed great coolness, shooting straight and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.  At length the enemy began to suffer from his own artillery fire and withdrew.  The reinforcements being no longer required withdrew but the Rifles were beginning to show signs of wear and tear.  Many had jammed and extractors broke; the only available Clearing Rod, the property of the Belgian Interpreter, was sent up to the Firing Line but it was soon lost in the debris in the trenches.  An order was sent to the Armourer Sgt, who was with the Regimental Transport, to come forward but he did not arrive.  

 

Our artillery fired a little in the early part of the day but we received no support from them in the latter part when the fighting was most severe.  A Bty had been in position about 200 yards in rear of our right but they withdrew at dusk.  Their CO was wounded.  There was no observation post in our vicinity and therefore no co-operation between us.  

 

After dusk the German artillery, for a considerable time, shelled the area in rear of us, severely damaging the road through the wood by which all our supplies had to come.  The consequence was that vehicles could not approach nearer than ¾  of a mile and, for that distance, had to be carried by hand.  

 

Information was brought by the Brigade Maj, 21st INF BDE, that the 22nd INF BDE, who prolonged our line to the left, were about to take up another position further back.  This Brigade had suffered heavily on the 19th Oct at KEZELBERG and again during the day's fighting near ZONNEBEKE and were not strong enough to remain in their present position which extended from our left to and including the village of BROODEINDE.  They were consequently withdrawn to a shorter line 1½  kilometres further back.  This created a difficulty for us as it left our left flank 'in the air' and the wood and the dwelling houses in our rear rendered it impossible to find another suitable position for ourselves.  Further any movement of that kind by the 2nd Bn WILTSHIRE REGT would have only exposed the left flank of the ROYAL SCOTS FUSILIERS in the same manner.  Consequently Letter D Coy (less the 2 Pls still in the firing line) were ordered to entrench themselves in rear of our left and guard that flank.  The trench was sited and dug in the dark and was ready by daybreak but daylight showed the field of fire to be uncomfortably short.  We were thus left without any Battalion Reserves.  

 

The enemy made two more attempts to assault during the night, both were repulsed, but we were allowed no rest as intermittent firing kept everybody on the alert.  

 

22nd Oct 1914.  Several further attempts were made to capture our position by assault.  These were all repulsed but the German artillery fire had become very accurate and the trenches began to fall in burying men, rifles and spades.  The local reserve trenches now fortunately vacated, were completely destroyed by high explosive shell, one of these shells pitching into D Coy's trench killed Capt C G M CARTER, 2 Lt E L A H BURGES and Pte PIKE.  No part of the line escaped and the men worked hard repairing the trenches and digging our buried comrades.  

 

A farm about 200 yards in front of D Coy was giving cover to the enemy and interfering with our field of fire.  Cpl BECK and Pte TRIM (killed 24th Oct) volunteered to go forward and set alight to it.  They succeeded in doing so, returning safely notwithstanding a heavy fire opened on them by the Germans.  A particularly heavy MG fire was brought to bear on our left flank and, for a time, it seemed probable that the enemy was directing his main effort there.  The gap created by the retirement of the 22nd INF BDE was still open, our sole protection being the ½ of D Coy under Capt le HUQUET, posted there the previous night.  

 

This situation was reported to Brigade HQ and in the course of the day small detachments of NORTHUMBERLAND HUSSARS and Divisional Cyclists were placed in the gap.  Capt le HUQUET and his party came in for some heavy shrapnel fire, but his trench was well provided with traverses and few casualties occurred.  In other parts of the line the fire was increasing in intensity and 6 German MGs were in action opposite A Coy.  

 

The work of getting forward supplies and ammunition had been rendered much more difficult by the destruction of the old reserve trenches and the adjoining farm, and a considerable quantity had been destroyed.  Notwithstanding this Capt E L W HENSLOW and the above mentioned men continued to carry on this duty/ they had frequently to dig one another out.  Of this party Pte FREEGARD was killed and 4 others wounded.  

 

The trouble with the rifles was becoming more serious, many more had become useless and a message was despatched to Brigade HQ asking for 100 more.  The absence of artillery support was being badly felt by us and it emboldened our enemy who, shortly after dusk, brought up his guns to a sheltered position a few hundred yards in front of us and commenced shelling the Battalion on our right.  

 

23rd Oct 1914.  We were allowed no rest during the night; more attempts to assault were made and again repulsed.  At daybreak he renewed his attack with vigour; the shelling of the trenches with high explosive shell continued practically all day.  The trenches were blown in to a greater extent than they had been on the previous day and many men were lying in the open exposed to MG fire, fortunately not very accurate.  

 

Letter C Coy's trenches suffered more than the others; probably because our 2 MGs which the Germans seemed to have located were with them.  Shells were constantly bursting close to the guns; one was hit and the trench blown in burying 2 Machine Gunners.  The gun was damaged and was sent back for repair not coming into action again.  The single MG remaining continued in action but after a short time it also was hit by a shell fragment and knocked into the trench, the back sight breaking.  This was replaced and Lt SMITH endeavoured to get it into action again but owing to the dilapidated state of the trench and to the heavy fire he could not then do so.  Lt R SMITH then moved his gun and endeavoured to make a new position for it.  This was detected by the enemy who could see the earth being thrown up and a shell bursting in front destroyed the trench.  Eventually the gun was got into action again and though no in good working order it continued in action for the remainder of the day.  

 

The enemy now made an attempt to advance against our right under cover of some buildings in front of A Coy which they succeeded in reaching and occupying.  They were shelled out of them by their own guns, which set alight to the buildings, causing the Germans to evacuate them.  In so doing they came under fire of A Coy and lost heavily.  

Letter B Coy on the left were suffering severely from the shell fire and at 4:00 pm half their trench was blown in, men had to be dug out and Pte DEADMAN and others were suffocated.  The trench occupied by 2 Lt W P CAMPBELL, Sgt WRIGHT and most of No. 5 Pl was untenable.  Maj C A LAW ordered them to the trench on their left which had been vacated by the 1st Bn SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT.  At dusk, Maj C A LAW went to see them but found only Sgt WEBB and 14 men.  2 Lt W P CAMPBELL and the remainder had disappeared.  

 

Nearly all the houses and buildings in our vicinity were burnt and destroyed and no more water could be obtained from the wells.  A small party of RE under a Subaltern were entrenched close behind the Battalion HQ trench; the latter held up, but that of the RE was destroyed and the occupants forced to retire.  

The weakness of our left flank was giving increased cause for anxiety and the CO despatched Capt HENSLOW to Brigade HQ to explain the situation.  Later on Capt and Adjt CULVER took a similar message.  Both Officers succeeded in accomplishing their errand, having had to run the gauntlet of a storm of shot and shell.  

Mysterious orders had been passed from trench to trench that retirement was to take place.  It was impossible to discover the source of this false report but a lull in firing enabled the CO to inform each Coy Officer that no retirement would take place unless and until the Battalion was relieved and that the order, when given, would be given in writing.  It is suspected that some of the 'stragglers' we picked up in OSTEND were German spies and that these false reports emanated from them.  It is a fact that some of these men have not been seen or heard of since.  

 

A small detachment of the 1st Bn SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT arrived and reinforced C Coy.  the men were not required but their rifles were welcome.  The rifle trouble was more acute than ever and fresh trouble arose with the Bayonets which would not fix.  The 1st Bn SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT detachment left at dusk having suffered heavy loss.  As daylight faded the Germans ceased firing.  Our men were weary with continual fighting which had gone on for 3 days and nights, but all set to work to repair the broken down trenches and this work went on all night.  

 

A further reinforcement of 3 Pls of the 2nd Bn SCOTS GUARDS arrived after darkness set in.  One Pl under 2 Lt Lord GARLIES reinforced A Coy and the other 2 Pls, under Lt ORR (since killed), went into a part of the trench previously held by the 1st Bn SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT; those on our immediate left being too much dilapidated for occupation.  

 

Later Brig Gen WATTS commanding 21st INF BDE arrived and after inspecting the position returned to Brigade HQ.  Lt Col CADOGAN (since killed) then arrived with about 300 men of the ROYAL WELSH FUS.  In consultation with Lt Col FORBES it was decided to place the bulk of these as a local reserve in rear of our right flank and to entrench the remainder in rear of the left flank which had now become more secure.  Unfortunately, the ROYAL WELSH FUS had brought no entrenching tools and those we had were required by us all night.  The RE before going back had promised to send up their tool-cart but it did not arrive.  Lt G MACNAMARA then went back to secure some.  About 12:00 am, Lt Col CADOGAN informed Lt Col FORBES that if no tools arrived before the fighting recommenced, he would be obliged to take his men away.  Lt Col FORBES agreed that no other course was open.  

 

The tools did not arrive and the ROYAL WELSH FUS withdrew.  Lt G MACNAMARA when attempting to return to the trenches with a party of about 80 men of the WILTSHIRE REGT who had been blown out of their trenches, received a bullet wound in the chest.  

Information reached us that we should probably be relieved on the following day and the men were much cheered by the news.  They would however been much more cheered if they could have been assured of some artillery support.  

 

24th Oct 1914.  During the night, heavy firing was heard in the direction of the 2nd Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUSILIERS.  It was not till 3:00 am that the enemy renewed his attacks on us.  At 5:30 am, the artillery bombardment was resumed.  It was again accurate and overwhelming and in a very short time our trenches were again destroyed and our power of resistance further weakened by increased trouble with the rifles.  

 

Heavy fighting was going on south of the village of REUTEL.  As mentioned before, 2 of our Pls under 2 Lts M R FOWLE and ROGERS respectively, were entrenched on the southern edge of the village.  At about 150 to 200 yards to their right was a Coy of the 2nd Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUS under Capt WHIGHAM. In the meanwhile the remainder of the Battalion were busy re-pelling the German attacks on their front.  German snipers began to occupy houses in our rear and within short range of our trenches, there was also sniping from the wood behind us and we were "pinned" to our trenches, which were not affording very scanty cover.  Notwithstanding the weakening of our fire owing to the increasing rifle trouble and to the entire absence of artillery support, we managed to hold our front.]

To Capt WHIGHAM's right was a thickly planted wood which separated him from the remainder of his Battalion.  The Germans made a strong and determined attack on Capt WHIGHAM's trenches and succeeded in capturing them by 6:00 am (vide Trench Map Scale 1/10000).  This was entirely unknown to the remainder of the ROYAL SCOTS FUSILIERS and was known only to the 2 Pls of the WILTSHIRE REGT who were south of the village.  Against these 2 Pls, the Germans now hurled themselves.  In the meantime fighting was general all along our front.  2 Lt FOWLE was badly wounded (he was killed later in the morning) and 2 Lt ROGERS and the remainder of the party reduced to very small numbers, after a hand-to-hand fight, were at length driven from their trench to the wood in rear and on the southern side of the village.  They were still unable to inform the remainder of the Battalion who, busy with their own front, were in complete ignorance of the actual state of affairs.  

 

The Germans then occupied the village of REUTEL and mounted MGs in the houses.  We continued however holding our front until 8:00 am.  The trenches afforded very scanty cover and bullets were coming from flank and rear.  The Germans massed in strength in the village and in the re-entrant behind us, they had no difficulty in doing unobserved.  Then in overwhelming numbers they emerged.  Many were shot from the rear and Coys and Pls being fully engaged with the enemy in front did not know what might be happening to their immediate neighbours.  A Coy were captured before C Coy on their left were aware of it.  In these conditions, a bayonet charge was impossible nor could fire be brought to bear on the enemy approaching from the right flank and rear.  The 2 Pls of D Coy echeloned on our left rear and their view restricted by the houses behind them and knew nothing of the developments on our right.  

 

The trenches were thus captured bit by bit from right to left.  The Germans protecting themselves from their own artillery fire by displaying black and yellow diagonal screens.  The CO with the Senior Maj and the Adjt proceeded in the direction of A Coy but were surrounded by Germans and captured.  2 Lt CAMPBELL who had been shelled out of B Coy's trench on the previous day, was attempting to re-join but he and 2 Lt M R FOWLE who was being taken back wounded, were both killed by the same shell. 

 

On being taken through the German lines we were able to see something of the havoc wrought in his ranks by our fire, his trenches were filled with dead and corpses were stacked in heaps in the copses, as well as to estimate the strength of the German Infantry which had been opposed to us.  The latter consisted of 2 Regiments (6 Battalions) of the WURTEMBURG ARMY and the 57th JAEGER Battalion.  There were men wearing the numbers 243, 244, 246 and 247.  The fact that 2 complete Regiments made the final assault was communicated to Lt Col FORBES by the German Gen in immediate command, who courteously congratulated the CO on our resistance.  

 

The 7th DIV possessed no Howitzer Batteries and this deficiency was severely felt.  There was no aeroplane observation and there were no anti-aircraft guns.  On the other hand the Germans appeared to lack none of these things.  They had an artillery observation post in their front infantry line and seemed able to place each shell precisely where it was wanted.  One of their Staff Officers afterwards informed us that our guns had never found theirs.  

 

In the area occupied by us there was little ground left untouched by their high explosive shells.  All houses, farms and ricks in the neighbourhood were ruined or destroyed.  The unmetalled road running west through the POLYGONE wood was, for some distance, cut up by shells and for the past 2 days enemy snipers were in the wood itself.  This made the matter of supplies and ammunition as well as the carrying back of the wounded difficult.  Simultaneously with the German enveloping attack on our right an attack was developing on our left.  Owing to the configuration of the ground this attack was unseen by us but after being captured, Capt MOORE saw the enemy advancing on that flank in several lines.  After taking our position, the enemy appears to have made no effort to go forward into the POLYGONE wood.  He made strenuous and unsuccessful efforts to obtain from us information as to what Reserves might be behind us.  The intensity of our fire and his own heavy losses thoroughly deceived him.  As far as we were aware there were no other British Forces between us and YPRES.  

 

The Battalion left ENGLAND 1,100 strong.  On the morning of the 24th Oct 1914 450 wounded and unwounded Rank and File, only, were left; this being the number captured.  About 70 were in rear with the Regimental Transport and 80 were on their way to the trenches when Lt MACNAMARA was wounded.  500 Rank and File thus are unaccounted for and must be assumed to be killed and wounded.  Seven Officers (Capts A C MAGOR and C G M CARTER, Lts E SPENCER, H S GRIMSTON, M R FOWLE, E L A H BURGES and W P CAMPBELL) were killed.  10 other were wounded.  

The total casualties have not yet been ascertained.  

 

Note:- The 7th DIV landed at ZEEBRUGGE on the 7th Oct 1914 with the intention of assisting in the defence of ANTWERP.  ANTWERP however, succumbed on the 9th Oct.  Next, it was intended to secure MENIN but was forestalled by the Germans.  After that it became a Vanguard holding the line ZONNEBEKE - GHELUVELT - ZANDVOORDE pending the arrival of the rest of the British Army from FRANCE to stay the German advance to YPRES and the Channel Ports.  The line to be held was 5 miles long and the section allotted to the 2nd Bn WILTSHIRE REGT, 1000 yards long.  For this purpose the Division had to be sacrificed and some idea of the nature of that sacrifice may be gleaned by the fact that when the Division was (on our about the 5th Nov) taken out of action, the 21st INF BDE numbered 8 Officers and 750 men out of an original total of 120 Officers and 4000 men, while the 22nd INF BDE mustered no more than 4 Officers and 700 Ptes.  

The above was originally written at KREFELD in December 1914.  15 copies were made, 12 of which had to be destroyed to prevent them falling into German hands.  On the arrival of the Officers and Non Commissioned Officers in HOLLAND in 1918, it was re-written with a few minor alterations.  

Scheveningen FORBES Lt Col.
 

2nd Sept 1918 2nd Bn WILTSHIRE REGT.

 

 

 

Edited 20 June , 2017 by Guest
formatting

[Guest]

3 hours ago, AOK4 said:

A lot of the discussion is also talk afterwards from our cosy armchairs.

 

I can understand why Capper was keen on trying to hold that ground (especially in view of his planned offensive).

 

Jan

 

1. Any discussion of history is by definition 'talk afterwards'. Haig and Rawlinson levelled the original criticism which suggests at least that men on the ground saw a fault in Capper's decisions. He may well have been the scapegoat; that would be a far more interesting debate. 

 

2. Capper held his ground simply because he was ordered to "at all costs" and no other reason. The massive butcher's bill was (in my view) primarily a function of Capper's choice of ground  - arguably forced by immediate circumstances - following his failed attack on Menin. This was compounded by GHQ being unaware of the poor position, its inability to see the broader picture in terms of topography and troops and ordering him to hold on at all costs. The Op Orders are intact from GHQ downward as are the messages and signals. These also filter down to Battalion level. One can see the paper-trail from GHQ down to Battalion level quite clearly. There is a mountain of primary material on this episode of the war. The HQ 7th Div Gen Staff diary is itself a tour de force of record keeping. Ditto HQ IV Army Corps where Rawlinson's Report on Operations in Oct 1914 is embedded. The appendices of both diaries run to many hundreds of pages. 

Edited 20 June , 2017 by Guest

[David Filsell]

Critism of the line came first from Haig to French, only then from Rawlinson to Capper. Haig was critical of Rawlinson - not least , he considered him to be rather above himself. One consequence of this was that Rawlinson was sent home to prepare the 8th Inf Div for action in Belgium  - effectively however he was degummed. French had objected to the fact that Rawlinson was given independent command of the 7th when it was landed in Belgium. There is strong evidence of French's ire at this and consequently with Rawlinson.

While I stand  to be corrected there was as far as I can see no actual 'order' for Capper to hold at all costs, rather an awareness that In view of the situation it was essential to do so. I am happy to be corrected on this. And of course he did hold on, although it is difficult to know what would have happened if the Germans had got their act together after taking Zandvoorde or if Haig - on the 31st also commanding 7th Inf Div - had not taken such effective and almost  immediate action to bring forward reserves that day.

It should be noted that the line on the 19th was rather different by the 30/31st. Equally the lack of anti aircraft guns - Pom Poms - was of little importance. They were considered pretty useless pieces of kit.  The issue 4.7 guns - effectively field guns - in lieu of howitzers - there were none left in the armoury - was inevitable but there was no alternative although it appears that there was no shortage of ammunition for these guns (from written accounts). Amazingly the 4.7 continued in service until after the Somme battles.

There remains much still to be researched and written about October 31st . A recent Pen and Sword book on the battle is, in my opinion, deeply unsatisfactory.

Edited 20 June , 2017 by David Filsell

[nigelcave]

4 hours ago, QGE said:

 

I don't quite see how one can draw comparisons between the German trenches on 1st July 1916 and the British trenches at Ypres in 1914. The German positions in 1916 were radically different from the rudimentary disconnected semi-built trench lines of Oct 1914. They were massive, complex, extremely deep (vertically) and the position was in great depth. In Oct 1914 the 7th Div was holding so many miles of front that it was incapable at one stage of having anything in reserve; there was at one stage no depth at all. To compare Oct 1914 with Jul 1916 really does stretch the imagination. 

 

 

 

Quite; but I was trying to make the point that many positions on the WF for a good chunk of the earlier years of the war were on forward slopes. But the point is perhaps academic and one is comparing chalk with cheese as regards the tactical situation. More importantly, no one has yet explained where the better, reverse slope, defence line could have been established.

 

 

[David Filsell]

Further to my earlier posting, 7th Inf Divs advance toward Menin was of course ordered by Sir John French who ignored warnings that the Germans were advancing in force. That day the RWF also suffered unecessary casualties. It should also be noted that Haig had brought the position of the 7th division on forward slopes soon after his I Corps moved into position on the left of Rawlinson's IV Corps. Away from home, no refs available, but the dates and Haig's complaints about both Rawlinson's behaviour - not least flying a flag on his staff car, the progative of the King - and the deployment of his force on forward slopes are recorded in his published diaries.

[Guest]

9 hours ago, David Filsell said:

 

While I stand  to be corrected there was as far as I can see no actual 'order' for Capper to hold at all costs, rather an awareness that In view of the situation it was essential to do so. I am happy to be corrected on this.

 

This part is not particularly difficult to research. Given we are discussing 7th Div, the evidence is unsurprisingly in the 7th Div battalion diaries. If Capper did not make the order, there must have been a catastrophic failure in command and control among his staff given the number of battalions and thousands of men that "went to their Gawd like a soldier" in the belief that they were holding on at all cost. Echoes of Le Catoo.....

 

The aggressive rhetoric is almost identical to that conveyed by Fergusson at Le Cateau and had almost identical consequences: Pyrrhic victory. Rather than question 'facts' that are easy to establish, we might focus on whether 7th Div were deliberately sacrificed for a greater aim, rather similar to parts of 5th Div at Le Cateau. Both commanders were full of offensive rhetoric about fighting to the last (or words to that effect) yet were surprisingly absent when thousands of their men took it on the chin like all good British soldiers. I find this part a great curiosity. I am still searching for the ditch that Fergusson claimed he would die in next to his men. Over 4,000 of his men died who served under him in 1914 by my calculations. I have not researched Capper's bill but will do in due course. I seem to recall the OH 1914 Vol II has a good summary (with all the ususal caveats).... While I don't doubt their personal bravery, I would suggest that commanders have a greater responsibility to the men under their command by leading them properly. 

 

Just a few of the multiple examples:...

 

2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt War Diary

 

1st Nov 1914. Received the following message from I CORPS through 7th DIV,

"Please congratulate the YORKSHIRE REGT on their stout performance".  To this was added, "I am very pleased to send this on to you and [illegible]concern", signed the Brig Gen 21st INF BDE.  

 

This morning we dug another trench running up to east close to our position of the day before but had got orders to hold on to our present line at all costs.  The Royal Engineers put up obstacle in front of our trenches.  After spent a quiet day but the 20th Infantry Brigade repulsed repeated attacks by the enemy inflicting heavy losses on them. Capt R B CORSER slightly wounded.  

 

 

1st Bn Royal Welsh Fusiliers War Diary

 

21st Oct 1914. Enemy's attack recommenced at daylight and their line having now pushed up to within 100 yards in some places of the trenches their artillery was able to range in these with extreme accuracy and many trenches were demolished by shells bursting actually in the parapet.  Many casualties were caused in this manner.

 

At 9:00 pm the MG section 2nd Bn ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGT was sent up to left of 1st Bn ROYAL WELSH FUS to replace the Regt's MG section both whose guns were out of action.  Fire was very heavy all day and supports were very scarce and could only really be got up to the firing line when available.  The supply of ammunition was also most difficult.

 

3:30 pm a fresh message arrived urging necessity for holding the line intact at all costs.  Most of the trenches were now untenable as the enemy's having artillery had blown them in and at abut 6:00 pm the line was broken in places.  Parties of B & D Coys were taken prisoner owing to their refusal to leave the trenches where these on their flanks were destroyed.  

 

A secondary line about 250 yards in rear was taken up and all available troops organised for its defence.  The enemy did not press his advantage and when orders were received to withdraw to ECKSTERNEST at 1:30 am the movement was carried out without difficulty.

 

1st Bn South Staffordshire Regt War Diary

 

25th Oct 1914.  The whole Battalion were in the wood near the Brigade HQ just of the YPRES ROAD.  At 4:00 am the Regiment moved off towards KRUISEKE, where we were attached to the 20th INF BDE, D Coy under Capt C G RANSFORD who was left under Col EARLE who commanded the GRENADIER GUARDS  and who was a son of Gen EARLE who was killed with Col EYRE at the BATTLE OF KIRBEKAE on the 10th Feb 1885.  Here you see that history repeats itself again.  Of course, to these who do not know Gen EARLE commanded the force at the BATTLE OF KIRBEKAE, Col EYRE was the Colonel who commanded the 38th REGT at this battle and who had risen from the ranks being granted a commission for distinguished service in the CRIMEA. 

 

The rest of the Battalion entrenched at the bottom of the hill behind the GRENADIER GUARDS section and near the Brigade HQ.  A Coy dug trenches along the road and B & C occupied the bomb-proof shelters near the Battalion Staff HQ.  On the night of the 25th, about 7:00 pm D Coy who were in reserve with the GRENADIER GUARDS were ordered to go up and reinforce the firing line, and after they had been there some considerable time they captured 19 GERMAN prisoners behind the GRENADIER GUARDS trenches.  As D Coy entered the village behind the GRENADIER GUARDS trenches they surprised a GERMAN patrol of snipers and took them prisoners.  

 

Capt C G RANSFORD and Lt D C TWISS moved on with two Platoons and, having moved forward about 250 yards, came under very heavy rifle fire from the SCOTS GUARDS trench which was now in the possession of the GERMANS.  At about the same time the SCOTS GUARDS behind commenced firing thinking they were the enemy.  It was here that Capt C G RANSFORD, I am informed by an Officer who was present, told Lt D C TWISS to carry on.  Capt C G RANSFORD, who had already been wounded a second time in the arm, went forward alone to reconnoitre the enemy's position and has not been seen or heard of since.  This Officer, I am informed by all ranks, did excellent work, both on this day and on many other days previous to the one described.  This detachment was practically wiped out to a man.  

 

Before midnight Lt D C TWISS who had also done very hard work, had been wounded.  Orders were brought back to Lt [blank] who was in command of the other two Platoons, to reinforce the party under Lt D C TWISS.  This was being carried out when they came under heavy fire unexpectedly from the front, being under the impression that they were being fired at by their own men, they moved 70 yards to their left flank and got into the GRENADIER GUARDS trenches and remained there until one hour before dawn.  In the course of the night a party of GERMANS came up to the front of the trench, saying, "Don't shoot we are SCOTS GUARDS and SOUTH STAFFORDS", but when within 10 yards the spikes of their helmets were plainly seen and the troops of course fired on them, and those few that were left beat a very hasty retreat.  

 

Late this night, which was a very miserable one of continuous heavy rain the whole night through, A Coy under Maj S C WELCHMAN, reinforced the BORDER REGT.  They had to advance to this position under a terrific hail of bullets.  With reference to this advance, No 2 Pl under Lt H W MacGEORGE was ordered by Maj WELCHMAN to lie down in extended order.  The Major moved forward to a farmhouse, to see if he could see anybody there, and he shouted back "There is only one wounded", and he was immediately returning when No 4 Pl under 2 Lt TOMLINSON came from the farmhouse and caught 6 GERMAN snipers.  He brought them to Maj WELCHMAN, who gave the order for them to be taken to the 22nd Brigade HQ, immediately after which he ordered the NCOS and men to get into the BORDER REGT'S trenches, after which they remained there until 8:00 am the next morning, the 26th.  The casualties here were very heavy.  Maj S C WELCHMAN was wounded during the night or early in the morning.  Lt H W MacGEORGE was wounded about 7:15 am on the 26th.  Lt F R J TOMLINSON and Lt C R C BEAN, about 7:30 am on the 26th, were both hit in the leg by a bullet; the latter two have not yet been heard of.  B Coy were used on patrol in rear of the GRENADIER GUARDS trenches, where they patrolled all night and retired from there at 7:00 am on the 26th, going into our original barracks bear the Battalion HQ.  

 

We remained there until 10:00 am, about which hour we received orders to reinforce C Coy.  Two Pl were sent forward under Lt C G HUME for this purpose, and during the heavy firing several men were killed and wounded, including Lt C G HUME who did so well.  He was undoubtedly one of the pluckiest and cheeriest of Officers and was smoking a cigarette at the time he was hit, and had previously been directing his men where to fire.  

 

C Coy advanced at 7:30 pm to reinforce the BORDER REGT under very heavy rifle fire.  They had instructions from Maj J F LODER-SYMONDS and Lt H K SHORE that the position was to be held at all costs.  Early next morning a message for reinforcements was sent to Colonel, who dispatched Lt HUME and party of B Coy, Maj A C BUCKLE was also with this party.  It was this day that Col R M OVENS, who was fearfully pressed for men, saw a sort of general retirement.  Capt (QM) F H WHITE was sent to ascertain the reason of it and found that a message of work of command "Retire", had been given by, I think, a GERMAN.  All CORPS, numbering about 250 men and Officers were making a retirement in a disorderly mob, Capt (QM) F H WHITE explained that retirement had not been ordered;  he got the men together and with difficulty brought them forward to the firing line under a fearful shell and rifle fire.  This was of course what was badly wanted, as every man was urgently needed at this critical moment, and as these men were brought forward Lt Col R M OVENS and Capt S BONNER, who had been hard worked trying to cope with one of the most critical situations managed to reinforce the most dangerous positions and kept the general line intact.  

 

The 25th and 26th of Oct 1914 were the most trying days the Battalion had seen during the campaign to date.  The GERMANS had been pressing hard the whole day to push through our very weak trenches, which had been very much reduced by fearful shell and rifle fire.  

About 2:00 pm a party under Lt Col R M OVENS and Capt S BONNER and Capt(QM) F H WHITE took up a position along a ridge of ploughed land, also alone a road and wood running NE to GHELUVELT, where we held the road until nearly dark, in view of, it was thought, a forced retirement of our Brigade, who had suffered so severely.  The enemy then were bursting their shrapnel beautifully on this ridge and Jack Johnsons were falling beside our hasty entrenchments dug with the small entrenching tool and even hands alone. 

 

The following Officers and total men were killed and wounded during the days of the 25th and 26th Oct 1914.  

A Coy.  
Maj S C WELSHMAN - wounded.  
Capt O de TRAFFORD, prisoner, 
Lt C R C BEAN wounded and prisoner, 
Lt H W MacGEORGE wounded, 
Lt F R J TOMLINSON wounded and prisoner.  

B Coy.  
Lt C G HUME Killed.  

C Coy.  
Capt C H GREEN wounded.  
Lt H K SHORE wounded.  
Lt R C MOORE-RADFIELD wounded and missing.  

D Coy 
Capt C G RANSFORD wounded and missing, 
Lt D C TWISS wounded, 
Lt H R S BOWER, wounded, 
Lt R R RILEY prisoner.  

About 80 killed and 36 wounded and prisoners.

Edited 21 June , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

On 28th Oct 1914 Col Montgomery GSO 1 HQ 7th Div issued an 8 point instruction which emphasised a number of points that were to be "strictly observed". It ended:

 

" (8) Positions must be held. If any part of the line gives way the security of the whole front is effected. There can be no thought of retirement when it is realized that those who retire imperil the whole army and the whole cause for which the army is fighting"

 

It was followed by a series of orders, instructions and messages that reiterated the fact that 7th Div would continue to hold the line for a number of days. Here are the series of orders embedded in messages from I Corps on 2nd Nov 1914 and repeated by 7th Div to hold onto the line "at all cost". The last one has Capper's signature as one might expect. This took about 5 minutes to find in 7th Div's HQ Gen Staff war diary in the Appendices (WO 95/1627)

 

WO 95/1627. Crown Copyright material. Open Government License. 

 

 

Edited 21 June , 2017 by Guest

[David Filsell]

Noted with thanks, I stand corrected. certainly words I fully admit I had missed. And a very bad miss at that. You lives and you learns.

reagards

David