A MID-WINTER ATTACK

[brindlerp]

Extracted from pages 118 to 126, Chapter V, The Seventh Division 1914 - 1918 by C.T. Atkinson

" December, at any rate its first fortnight, presented no new features. If the ground was getting more water-logged, much had been done to drain and improve the trenches. Steel loop-hole plates, issued before the end of November and found satisfactory, a limited supply of Hales grenades and Very lights, the arrival of the 55th Battery R.F.A., which provided the Division with the field-howitzers it had so long needed, all helped to improve matters. White smocks, first issued on November 19th, proved very useful for patrolling over snow covered ground; with the help of periscopes and of stalkers' field-glasses, provided by the National Service League, more could be done to keep down the sniper; and by strict economy a small reserve of shells was built up for emergencies. The strength of the Division rose gradually, not only through the arrival of drafts, but from the addition of new units. During December 156 officers and 5,111 men joined the Division; battle casualties came to 36 officers and 1,079 men and the total wastage to 77 officers and 2,775 men, a net gain of nearly 2,500 of all ranks. Of the weaker battalions the Borders had had a draft of 570 on December 2nd, the Wiltshires one of 300 on the 17th; the South Staffords, who had rejoined the Division on the 13th, being then 470 strong, were more than doubled by a draft of 500 on the 21st; but the Scots Fusiliers and Gordons continued much under their establishment. On December 5th the 6th Gordons had been added to the 20th Brigade, " T " Battery reinforced the R.H.A. Brigade on December 20th, while the Heavy Batteries were increased from four 4.7-inch guns each to six, though these ancient pieces were none too reliable in their shooting and were almost as likely to hit our own trenches as the enemy's. It was cruel to the gunners that they should be provided with such unsatisfactory weapons.

Of the battle-casualties of the month two-thirds occurred in a not very happily conceived enterprise undertaken on the night of December 18th/19th by orders from G.H.Q. With an optimism which did not indicate any very close acquaintance either with the state of the ground or with the general conditions in the front line, or any very accurate appreciation of the difficulties of attacking entrenched positions defended by modern rifles and machine-guns and protected by belts of barbed wire, the higher authorities of both the British and the French forces had decided upon resuming offensive operations, partly with the idea of profiting by the withdrawal, which had now become known, of several German divisions to the Russian front. The first stage in these operations was aimed at recovering the Messines Ridge. The Third Division attacked there in concert with the French on its left, but neither French nor British could make any serious progress, and General Joffre soon found himself compelled to abandon his offensive in Flanders, but decided to con-tinue it North of Arras and begged Sir John French to do all he could to assist. Orders were therefore issued for local activities at various points in the British line to distract the attention of the Germans and, if possible, make small local gains. A year later these diversions would have taken the form of raids, but in December 1914 the raid had not yet been developed into a definite form of offensive, and in selecting objectives for his attacks General Capper had to think of retaining anything he reached.

Orders for greater activity on the part of the infantry in the trenches were issued by the Corps on December 13th, and at the same time the Divisional artillery indulged in such bombardments as its scanty ration of ammunition would allow. Thanks to the better organization for co-operation with the R.F.C. and to the practice which gunners and airmen were obtaining in combined work, it was possible to get quite effective results from these bombard-ments, considering how little ammunition could be used. At the same time the Division's patrols developed con-siderable activity, bringing in plenty of information about the enemy's trenches and identifying their garrisons by capturing prisoners. A typical example of the patrol encounters which made such demands on the resource, daring, and initiative of officers and men occurred on the night of December 14th, when a party of the Queen's, 23 strong, under 2nd Lieut. Ramsay, left the British lines about 700 yards S.E. of La Boutillerie cross-roads to try to rush a German picquet which had previously been located. While a lance-corporal and six men moved straight forward towards the picquet with orders to divert its attention and draw its fire, the main body worked round to the right so as to get into position on the left rear of the picquet, intending to rush it from the flank as soon as it opened fire. On reaching the position he was aiming at 2nd Lieut. Ramsay noticed a small group of men between him and the picquet, and thinking it might be the rest of his party who had lost their way, sent an orderly to re-connoitre. Private Knowles, the orderly, crept forward and got right in among this party, when finding them to be Germans he shouted out, " Here they are! Open fire." He was promptly bayoneted, but 2nd Lieut. Ramsay's party fired and followed up their volley with a charge, killing two Germans and wounding two others, one of whom was at once sent back to the British lines. A heavy fire was now opened from the main German trench, and as a prisoner had been taken and one of the objects of the enterprise thereby achieved, 2nd Lieut. Ramsay withdrew his party, covered by Corporal Lamond, who lay down and opened fire and then drew off in a different direction from the rest, thereby distracting the German attention. A messenger, Private Viney, was sent to warn the other party to withdraw, but approaching it from the direction of the German trenches he was mistaken for a German and shot: though mortally wounded he managed to de-liver his message of recall before he died, thereby enabling the party to withdraw successfully. The battalion was warmly complimented on the success of the enterprise, and the information obtained from the prisoner proved most valuable, confirming an identification of the 55th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Corps as the immediate opponents of the Division.

The points finally selected for the Seventh Division's attacks were near La Boutillerie and Rouges Bancs. At the first the Warwickshires, supported by the Queen's, were to attack at 4.30 p.m. on December 18th; their attack being preceded by a quarter of an hour's artillery bombardment—all the ammunition supply would permit (4.6-inch howitzers were limited to 20 rounds per gun, 4.7-inch guns and 18-pounders to 40 rounds, only the 13-pounderse having an unrestricted supply). It was to be followed at 6 p.m. by the 20th Brigade's attack, which was to dispense with a previous bombard-ment and to trust to surprise. In this both the Scots Guards and the Borders were to take part, and in case both attacks succeeded a third was to be made by the 2Ist Brigade with the Yorkshires leading.

The 22nd Brigade was attacking just West of the pro-nounced salient in its lines at Well Farm near La Boutillerie. The Warwickshires were to form up in these lines on a front of 200 yards and to advance on the close of the bombardment, the Queen's and South Staffords, who held the trenches to right and left, opening covering fire as they went forward. Two companies, " C " and " D," of the Queen's were to occupy the trenches vacated by the attackers and hold themselves in readiness to support them and open up communications with the position to be captured.

By 4.30 on a December evening it was practically dark, and for some time after the attack started it was impossible to make out what success had attended it. All that was known was that the Warwickshires had gone forward most resolutely in face of a very heavy fire from guns, rifles, and machine-guns and had been lost to sight in the dark. About 5 o'clock, however, a N.C.O. came back and reported that the battalion was held up just short of the German trenches, had lost heavily, and needed reinforcements, whereupon " C " Company of the Queen's and two platoons of " D " promptly went forward to their help. The bom-bardment had inflicted little damage on the German wire and had not prevented the Germans from manning their parapet in force and opening a heavy fire directly our troops got so near that our guns could not fire for fear of hitting their own men. Major Brewis was killed at the head of his Warwickshires within a few yards of the German wire, and several other officers were shot down close to him or in trying to work their way through the wire. One small party established itself in a small trench just outside the German parapet and held on there all night, only to have to surrender when the morning light revealed the hopelessness of their position. But the bulk of the attackers were either shot down on their way across No Man's Land or brought to a standstill outside the wire. The Queen's, though gallantly led by Captains Lee and Fearon, who continued to go forward although wounded, could do no more than reach the wire and reinforce the Warwickshires. Realizing that the attack had failed, the C.O. of the Queen's, Major Montague Bates of the East Surreys, decided not to use the Welch Fusiliers, of whom one company had just reached the front trench, to renew it, but issued orders for the survivors to get back as best they could. This they did, while stretcher-bearers went out and brought in many of the wounded, unimpeded by the Germans. The losses had been heavy : besides Major Brewis the Royal Warwickshires had 8 officers and over 300 men killed, wounded, and missing; of the Queen's 8 officers and 90 men were casualties, more than half of them killed or missing. These casualties were the more felt because both battalions had barely been re-formed after their losses at Ypres, but both the Brigadier and Divisional Commander testified to their gallantry and devotion: it was no fault of theirs that they had failed—they had been asked to do what experience was to show to be impossible in the conditions then prevailing.

The 20th Brigade also, if more successful at first, could make no lasting gain. It attacked on a front of 500 yards from the Sailly-Fromelles road Eastward with two com-panies of the Scots Guards on the right, two of the Borders on the left. Unluckily the Borders do not seem to have heard the signal for the assault, which was given by whistle by the Scots Guards, and the two battalions did not go forward together. The Scots Guards, advancing with great dash and enjoying the advantage of surprise—the absence of the preliminary bombardment proved a real benefit, for that which had preceded the 22nd Brigade's attack had merely put the enemy on the alert—managed to effect a lodgment, though their right ran into thick and uncut wire and lost heavily from machine-guns. Elsewhere, however, the wire, which varied greatly in strength, being quite weak and thin in places, proved less of an obstacle, and Captain Loder, who led the attack, was able to effect a surprise, most of the defenders being bayoneted and others shot down as they bolted. He promptly set to work to consolidate his position in the German line, blocking the ends of the portion taken, though there were gaps between some of his parties where bits of stronger wire had held up the attackers, and not all these could be connected up. Unluckily, too, the great depth of the German trenches made it impossible for the men to see to shoot out of them, and they had to climb out and lie on the parapet to get a fire position. Attacks were not slow to begin, and the Scots Guards were soon hard beset to maintain their ground. Efforts were being made by Captain Paynter, their C.O., to get a communication trench dug across No Man's Land, and some reinforce-ments were sent across, but on the left flank the Borders had failed to get in and the Scots Guards were therefore quite isolated.

The Borders' failure to effect a lodgment was due mainly to the impossibility of hearing the signal for the starting of the assault. They went forward directly the sound of cheering on their right told them the Guards had started, but the delay, though short, was long enough to give the Germans the warning they needed and to let them man their trenches. The Borders went forward in face of a murderous fire which mowed most of them down within a very short time. Captain Askew, the commander of the attacking force, reached the German trenches and was killed there, using his revolver effectively. Some men seem to have got in with him and shared his fate, but a counter-attack drove most of the attackers back, not without a sharp fight, however, for when, during the armistice of December 25th-26th, many of the dead were buried, German bodies were found outside their wire and mixed up with the Borders' dead. A second advance which Major Warren organized proved ineffectual, and now that the Germans were fully on the alert it was recognized to be hopeless to continue the attempt. The survivors of the Borders were therefore withdrawn to the British lines (Privates Acton and Smith of the Border Regiment were awarded the V.C. for their gallantry in going out under heavy fire on December 21st and bringing in wounded men who bad been lying out ever since this attack. Private Mackenzie of the Scots Guards received the same honour for a similar act of gallantry on December 10th).

The effort of the Scots Guards to maintain themselves in the German line looked for a time like meeting with more success. Though strongly counter-attacked they held on stoutly, and though driven out from some points main-tained a hold until long after midnight on the centre of the line taken. But it was evident that No Man's Land was too wide—nearly 200 yards—for a trench to be opened up across it in time, and shortly before daylight the last section held was successfully evacuated, a wounded officer being got safely away (The Scots Guards had 3 officers and 112 men killed and missing, 3 officers and 76 men wounded; the Borders 2 officers and 71 men killed and missing, 2 officers and 40 men wounded).

Apart from this unsuccessful venture the Division's activities were mainly confined to experimenting with improvised trench-mortars and hand grenades, a Grenade Company being formed in each brigade, and to the elimina-tion wherever possible of salients and re-entrants by digging new trenches. The existing salients were not to be aban-doned, but were to be used as advanced posts, while in the same way re-entrants were to serve as support trenches. In places saps were run out from the front line and ultimately joined up so as to make a new front trench. But this work was greatly impeded by trouble with water, which was threatening to make some parts of the line untenable, and the main interest of the closing days of the month was the effort to keep the trenches dry. An informal armistice, started by mutual consent on the morning of December 25th and continued till the next afternoon, did not meet with approval in higher quarters and its repetition was peremptorily forbidden, but it afforded an opportunity for burying and identifying many of those killed in the attack of December 18th, for learning some-thing about those still " missing," and for identifying the German units opposite the Division."

Regards

Richard

[LizM]

Hi Richard

I think you have just solved my problem of where the borders were on 18th Dec 1914 and I can now envisage a picture of where Gt. Grandad was.

Thank you very much.

Is this book still available by the way

Liz

[Geoff Reeves]

Liz: the book is available from the Naval and Military Press (that's where I got my copy) for GBP 22.00.

Item 5313

http://www.naval-military-press.com/FMPro?...ameset.htm&-new