Bite and Hold

[PhilB]

I`ve never quite got my head around Bite & Hold. You saturate a small area with gunfire then move in and occupy it. The enemy loses a lot of men in the barrage and you lose a lot of men moving in to take over. This is clearly a strategy of attrition, as it would take countless bites to make significant progress into Germany.The taking of the ground seems to have little point and only increases one`s own casualties. Wouldn`t a barrage without infantry attack achieve more in attritional terms? Or does the military mind demand an infantry attack? Phil B

[Mark Hone]

In the end infantry etc have to close with the enemy, drive them off and occupy ground-even in Gulf War I for example. Bite and Hold became the basic British tactic throughout the First and Second World Wars, cf El Alamein and battles in Normandy. Criticized by Americans and others as too methodical, but you pays your money.... See Paddy Griffith's book 'Battle Tactics of the Western Front' for further details.

[andigger]

Bite and hold wouldn't have been a realistic strategy if the goal was make it into Germany. However if the objective is a transportation center like Lille, bite and hold movements might have worked as you continue to threaten the enemy flanks and salients moving ever closer. If the British generals had more than a few months of trench warfare experience in the spring of 1915, and a different outlook this idea might have worked around Neuve Chappell and Aubers Ridge.

Andy

[armourersergeant]

I always look on bite and hold as a limited achievable objective taken with surprise and speed held and reinforced so as not to over extend lines of supply and man power and then cut down the enemy counterattack when they attempt to take back the ground. the surprise lessens the casualties on your own side but the expect enemy counter attack is expected and thus inflicts heavy losses on them.

Was not NC a classic bite and hold action if only the commanders had known it at the time!?

regards

Arm.

[Guest AmericanDoughboy]

"Bite and Hold" to "show the enemy what we're made of" and/or drive them away with countless assaults is argueable a good tactic, but as Andy stated, it is not a good strategy if you are recklessely struggling to make your way into Germany.

~Parker

[Robert Dunlop]

'Bite and hold' was not about getting into Germany, at least not during such operations. It was a strategy formulated to deal with the German defense-in-depth and counter-attack doctrines. Generally speaking, German defenses became stronger as the assault penetrated further. After about 1,000-1,500 yards, the attacking infantry ran out of effective artillery support. This reflected the huge difficulties in getting the guns forward sufficiently quickly. At the same time, casualties and exhaustion made the infantry vulnerable to the inevitable immediate counter-strokes.

'Bite and hold' meant that the attacking infantry stayed within effective artillery range. This, combined with the relative freshness of the attackers, meant that the Germans advanced into killing zones. Unless the Germans packed the front line, which they usually didn't, this was when the maximum casualties were inflicted on the defenders, not during the opening barrage.

If 'bite and hold' is regarded as part of the attritional arsenal, then the effects of the strategy are not seen until late in the war. By contrast with Third Ypres, in late 1918 Plumer's Second Army had little difficulty retaking the high ground around the salient and then pushing on to the Scheldt. The German Army had been worn down to the point where it could not hold the salient. Obviously, German losses were also due to their vigorous Spring offensives but Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele had all taken their toll.

Robert

[PhilB]

After about 1,000-1,500 yards, the attacking infantry ran out of effective artillery support. Robert

This would indicate, then, that 1500 yds was the limit of a bite and hold operation? Surely, at that rate, the enemy needn`t bother counterattacking - it would be more attritionally effective not to? And at a battle every month or so, only 10 miles advanced per year! Phil B

[Ste]

Surely, at that rate, the enemy needn`t bother counterattacking - it would be more attritionally effective not to?

The Germans attempted to mount counter attacks very soon after Allied assaults for most of the war. Given that troops who have just stormed a position are generally at their most vulnerable and in some disarray immediately after their success, there is some logic to thise. The captured trenches would be facing the wrong way, unfamiliar, damaged by the barrage and have convenient communication trenches to the new front, providing potential points of access. In theory, the opportunity to evict the new tenants is most ripe straight away - bring down an isolating barrage on no-man's land and attack before they organise.

However, this principle of immediate counter could be deadly to both sides. If the original attackers manage to re-inforce their lodgement, perhaps because the isolating barrage has been inneffective, if they have hours to 'turn around' the trenches by erecting firing steps and reversing the parapet/parados and blocking communication trenches, and if they manage to establish good communications with their artillery support, they can give a robust account of themselves and defeat the counter handsomely.

The Germans developed a tendency to apply this principle whatever the circumstances. Plumer and others learned to exploit this and began to plan for it.

Cheers,

Ste

[Robert Dunlop]

This would indicate, then, that 1500 yds was the limit of a bite and hold operation? Surely, at that rate, the enemy needn`t bother counterattacking - it would be more attritionally effective not to?

Phil

Yes, from what I understand this would be a maximum. During Third Ypres, Plumer's 'bite and hold' tactics really stymied the Germans. This was the occasion par excellence when the British used the tactic on a recurring basis. In desparation, they packed the forward trenches in an effort to pre-empt the British and Dominion's attack in the Battle of Broodseinde on 4th October. The British barrage caught the Germans in the front line, causing horrendous casualties.

And at a battle every month or so, only 10 miles advanced per year!

Only if you assume the outcome of a battle to be determined locally. Taking the Somme as an example, it comprised a series of limited operations that made small advances (by comparison with the vision for day one). Eventually, the extent of the advance meant that the Germans had to rethink where best to create a stable defensive line - hence the development of the Hindenberg Line.

Similarly, if you take the Ypres salient, it becomes possible to push out from the salient to a point where the whole Belgian coast becomes unviable defensively. The effects of limited advances in the last 100 days illustrates what happens when you reach a geographic threshold that requires significant realignment.

So getting back to your first point, 'doing nothing' is not really an option.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Was not NC a classic bite and hold action if only the commanders had known it at the time!?

Arm

I think it would have been an excellent example, if it had been used in that way. As with so many battles, the British casualties rose steeply after the first day because they kept trying to take more ground instead of chewing up the German counter-attacks while preparing for the next step forward by bringing up the artillery, mapping out the German batteries and engaging them, etc. Ongoing counter-battery work was a key to Plumer's successes.

Robert

[PhilB]

Quote:- In desparation, they packed the forward trenches in an effort to pre-empt the British and Dominion's attack in the Battle of Broodseinde on 4th October. The British barrage caught the Germans in the front line, causing horrendous casualties.

I understood this to be a case in which both sides packed their front trenches preparatory to an attack - a rare instance of both sides attacking simultaneously?

Did the Germans ever adopt the bite and hold policy? I tend to think not. They seemed to go for ever more sweeping attack plans? Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil

This was just such a rare instance. The Germans were not aware, so far as I know, of the forthcoming attack by the British. It just so happened that the latter got their preparatory barrage in about thirty minutes before the main German barrage was due to go in. The Germans had fired some shells over, causing the British and Dominion forces to fear that their attack had been discovered.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Did the Germans ever adopt the bite and hold policy? I tend to think not. They seemed to go for ever more sweeping attack plans?

Phil

There were several examples of attacks with limited objectives, which is not necessarily quite the same as 'bite and hold' if you define the latter as a deliberate enticement to lure German counter-attacks into the atillery killing zones. Mostly, these attacks were aimed at taking local vantage points, such as Hill 60 near Ypres or the attack on Vregny Plateau in January 1915 (described in detail by Gundmundsson in his book on Strosstruppen). In such attacks, the Germans were very adept at pushing machine guns well forward in support of the attack and then to beat off counter-attacks. Their artillery would fire protective barrages as well.

The sweeping attack plans were more characteristic of parts of the Verdun offensive (though Falkenhayn's overall strategy was more like 'bite and hold' in conception) and the various Spring offensives in 1918.

Robert

[PhilB]

Although one can point out exceptions (as you have above!), I`m left with the feeling that Bite & Hold was generally devoid of any strategic objective other than attrition. I`m also left with the feeling that it typifies the differences between German and British attitudes. Is this fair? Phil B

[armourersergeant]

Surely Messines was a bite and hold battle that was not small. I do not believe bite and hold to be all about killing the enemy by artillery killing grounds.

The tatic to me has much going for it and at its base the military advantage of take an area of ground consolidate it and then defend it. Surely this is a sound tatic. Not to over extend and out run your supplies and still inflict casualties heavier than your own. Assuming it works correctly. Or capturing territory.

If the enemy fails to try and take back the ground then they lose. If this constantly happens then they lose alot of ground. So eventually they have to counterattack.

regards

Arm.

[PhilB]

Arm - The advance at Messines was up to 4,500 yds, so outside Robert`s guideline for Bite & Hold.

Do the figures confirm that B&H was economical for the attacker in casualty terms? It would make sense if it was, but I can`t see that gaining ground at the rate of 1500 yds per battle makes sense otherwise. Phil B

[andigger]

I`m left with the feeling that Bite & Hold was generally devoid of any strategic objective other than attrition.

Phil,

I think Robert's point that increasing bite and hold actions that threaten another more substantial objective are also an important strategy. If the Spring Offensive had been executed more along those lines, I believe Lille might have fallen. Also as Robert pointed out, the Belgian coast was successfully cleared in 1918 this way.

Andy

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil

Messines is a very interesting example. Plumer's original objectives for Messines were less ambitious to start with. Haig wanted the attack to include the Oosttaverne Line, which lay at the foot of Messines ridge. The attack was organised in two phases. The mines helped significantly in the success of phase one, which saw the troops to the top of the ridge. There was then a significant pause while the supporting artillery was bought forward and the ridge line consolidated. Then the advance down the hill took place.

Casualties were minimal in the initial advance. Crowding on the ridge line meant that the German gunners inflicted significant casualties - a lesson that Plumer learned for his future operations in Third Ypres. The capture of the pillboxes at the base of the ridge was a much tougher affair. The real plus for the day was von Laffert's decision to post his counter-attack divisions well to the rear. They were unable to get into the battle, partly because they were so exposed to the British artillery as they tried to come forward.

The capture of the ridge line gave the allies a significant advantage, just as the Germans had enjoyed previously. It meant that the operation could be conducted in two phases because the Germans were so exposed on the reverse slope and the low ground beyond. There was no such advantage in the 'bite and hold' operations of Third Ypres. The multi-phase approach, the use of mines and counter-battery work to neutralise the defenders, the advantage of the ridge and the failure of the German counter-attack system meant that the 4,500 yards advance at Messines was doable.

Well-planned 'bite and hold' operations were less costly for the British. This had significant advantages in terms of morale as well. The men felt supported during and after the attack. There wasn't the same degree of humiliation at giving up ground that had been won at such cost. I cannot comment on whether the cost to the Germans was greater. The seemingly inexorable grinding forward of the British attacks in Third Ypres did seem to take a toll of German morale.

The degree of planning needed to execute a successful 'bite and hold' operation should not be under-estimated. This comes through very clearly in Plumer's biography.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Just finished the messines chapter in his bio, which was why i mentioned it.

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

I`m left with the feeling that Bite & Hold was generally devoid of any strategic objective other than attrition. I`m also left with the feeling that it typifies the differences between German and British attitudes. Is this fair?

Phil

The idea that 'Bite and Hold' is only about attrition has been dealt with above. However, as a mechanism for achieving decisive strategic victory (as opposed to local capture of ground), it does represent a key difference between British and German attitudes to major offensive actions. By its nature, 'Bite and Hold' was not about immediate exploitation of a break-in, which is all that such an action could hold to achieve.

In 1918, the Germans could not afford the time needed to wage war in this fashion. Nor was it in the nature of their offensive thinking, which constantly attempted breakthrough and rolling up/envelopment, leaving aside the minor operations to straighten the line, etc mentioned above. Not that the British were unaware of these concepts.

For the Germans to succeed, they realised they needed complete surprise, overwhelming fire power and a point of weakness. When these tactics were bought to bear against Gough's Fifth Army, the Portugese 2nd Division, and the Chemin-des-Dames, then decisive break-through resulted. The Germans maintained waves of infantry assault divisions, supporting artillery and fighter-bombers to exploit success whereever it occurred. However, the Germans never achieved decisive break-out. The defences would buckle in front of their attack and then fall back, to be shored up at a distant point.

When the Germans attacked against their style of defense, notably General Gouraud's Fourth Army outside Reims, the attack really came unstuck. Basically, they were sucked into a sparesly but well-defended middle zone of resistance, which became the French killing zone, combining artillery and machine guns to devastating effect.

The impact of the various 'successes' was to weaken the German Army, both in terms of losses in manpower and, more importantly, morale. The latter seems in large part due to the huge disappointment that the wonderful, long-desired victory

never materialised. This then paved the way for the relentless 'bite and hold' operations all along the Western Front in the last 100 days, resulting in the final collapse of the German will to continue the war. Note, however, that the allied offensives were all designed to converge on the German's main route of supply, with the aim of cutting off as much of the German Army as possible. Thus, the operations of the last 100 days were not just mounted purely for sake of gaining small chunks of ground nor of wearing down the German Army by attrition.

So, in answer to your question, it does typify the difference between German and British attitudes. When Petain replaced Nivelle, the British and French approaches converged. The Battle of Malmaison in October 1917, which displaced the Germans from Chemin-des-Dames, was a classic 'bite and hold' that Plumer would have been proud of. Which of the two approaches won the day? History gave us the answer, until WW2 when the Germans realised the ambition of fast and deep break-out with the highly mobile panzer divisions. But that is another story.

Robert

[PhilB]

Quote:-

. This then paved the way for the relentless 'bite and hold' operations all along the Western Front in the last 100 days, resulting in the final collapse of the German will to continue the war. Note, however, that the allied offensives were all designed to converge on the German's main route of supply, with the aim of cutting off as much of the German Army as possible. Thus, the operations of the last 100 days were not just mounted purely for sake of gaining small chunks of ground nor of wearing down the German Army by attrition.

Robert, I haven`t previously thought of the 100 day actions as bite and hold. After all, there was an advance of 12k by noon on the first day! How many actions would you say there were and what was the total advance gained? Phil B

[AndyHollinger]

My assumption all along was Bite and Hold was a reaction (and thus learning) to the failure of major offensives. By using this tactic, small achievements could be made by limited offensives. Each "Bite" out of a defensive line would, eventually, make the line untenable and thus achieve the results of a major offensive without so high a price and be more likely to achieve a positive outcome.

Without manuver, Bite and Hold allows flanking actions and the ability to affect a static or even a defense in depth. You can carve out decisive points in detail ...

I think one of the confusions ... and it may be on my part ... is that it is confused with Trench Raids in force. Bite and Hold seems to be an advance by bounds only in a larger scale against a heavily entrenched foe.

[andigger]

I think one of the confusions ... and it may be on my part ... is that it is confused with Trench Raids in force. Bite and Hold seems to be an advance by bounds only in a larger scale against a heavily entrenched foe.

Andy... I didn't think trench raids had as one of their objectives to capture area (even if that area was a trench). I thought thier primary purpose was reconnaisance, either capturing an officer, assesing the strength of the enemy , or getting the lay of a particular stretch of land. In comparison a bite and hold movement would capture at least some stretch land and then work to defend it.

Andy

[PhilB]

Andy G - That was my understanding. A trench raid doesn`t capture ground.

Andy H - I think it highly probable that B&H was, as you say, a reaction to failed major offensives.(Claimed to have been thought up by Rawlinson`s staff in late 1915). I can`t see, though, that several B&Hs make one major offensive. Surely a series of bites into a defensive line produces a series of salients? And we have yet to establish that B&H operations were, in fact, economical in casualty terms.(ie British losses less than German). One possible advantage of B&H, not yet mentioned is that it limits the potential damage if things go wrong and is therefore less likely to result in Limogeing! Phil B

[andigger]

Phil B.... you have unwhittingly illustrated the point of my other thread (poll: Andy, Andy, Andy). I, Andy H, explained that a trench raid doesn't capture gound.

You switched us in your post.

Andy H