Entrenchment, Field Fortifications, and the Learning Process in the B.E.F., 1914-15

[lostinspace]

Thought this file might be of some interest as Mr. Dykstra's thesis is focused on the early days of the B.E.F. (Aisne to 2nd Ypres); before the trench systems became so incredibly complex:  
http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/1538/2/ucalgary_2014_dykstra_bodie.pdf
 

Dave

[Fattyowls]

Certainly of interest to me, thanks Dave.

[David Filsell]

Interesting stuff - although I have some arguments with his views for the reasons he gives for IV corps positioning itself on forward slopes at Ypres in 1914. 

 

It was, as admitted by Rawlinson in a lecture to 8th infantry Division after he had been sent home from command of IV Corps in October 1914 by French (ostensibly to better, prepare the last regular division of the BEF for war) that defensive positions on forward slopes had been selected to ensure maximum fields of rifle fire.

This belief was in fact deeply ingrained in the British infantry and taught before the outbreak of war. At the lecture - which was later published / Rawlinson's GSO 1, Montgomery, stated definitively that experience at Ypres had it had taught that that long fields (as taught) of were unnecessary.

 

The use of deploying on forward slopes was certainly was a wrong -  but not, as stated in the thesis, a decision made in 'defiance, of regulations. For Rawlinson this mishandling of IV Corps - and particularly 7th Infantry Division - formed a very early step on the so called learning curve. Equally the author takes insufficient note of just how overstretched IV Corps - which at Ypres was only one infantry division and a reduced cavalry division strong - was. Rawlinson caused French much annoyance by complaining the he was at one point in October holding no less than 12 miles of line.

[Old Tom]

I have not read the document cited, but would remark that it all depends on the situation and the topography. At an early stage of the war when most artillery fire was direct and deployed close to the supported infantry the increased field of view from a foreword slope could be an advantage.Later when artillery skills at indirect fire improved and tactics changed rearward slopes could be preferable, however indirect artillery fire required FOOs  who could see into enemy territory.

[David Filsell]

Absolutely correct, that's pretty much what FSR s laid down. Not least, on the deployment of forward slopes it stated however that they should be sighted with the objective of leading to offensive action (like all defensive positions). It also pointed out their dangers - not least to resupply and communications. 

 

The view about employing long fields of defensive fire seems to have been developed as a result of the Boer War - where the enemy used them with great effect - and in the Russo Japanese war, although the very obvious effects of 'modern' artillery seems  to have been largely ignored. Not least on of the students of the Russo Japanese  war Was Tommy Capper, a thruster with a capital THRUST and head of the Staff College at Quetta, who commanded Rawlinson's - and later Haig's IV Corps.  It should be pointed out that Capper, OC 7 Corps had been Inspector of Infantry prior the outbreak of war where he was in a position to influence positional thinking of infantry.

 

That the 'doctrine' of long fields of fire were necessary was in the words of Rawlinson's GSO1 actually 'taught' before the war . Nevertheless, Haig was concerned about the forward slopes positions chosen by Capper's Division and, as commander of I Corps, complained to Sir John French about the lines chosen by Rawlinson's IV Corps commanders. (All that said, from mid to late October 7th Infantry Division (12 infantry battalions) covering anything less than 5 - 6 mile long lines which because of the need to man such an overlong line made it virtually impossible to move to new positions. 

 

Little has been written about it, but it is clear that the British Army learned its lessons about the effects of artillery on the Aisne - Wellington could have reminded them - and the need for the best and safest positions for trench lines (in act little better than scrapes at Ypres under pressure from a stronger enemy with offensive objectives) and Rawlinson, Capper and most officers at all level new to war in 1914.

[bdykstra]

I am actually the author of this piece. Thank you for posting it. I also appreciate the feedback and comments. I am developing an article based on the Ypres chapter now and will be sure to incorporate these ideas. 

 

Bodie

[bdykstra]

On 7/22/2016 at 22:57, David Filsell said:

It was, as admitted by Rawlinson in a lecture to 8th infantry Division after he had been sent home from command of IV Corps in October 1914 by French (ostensibly to better, prepare the last regular division of the BEF for war) that defensive positions on forward slopes had been selected to ensure maximum fields of rifle fire.

 

Can you direct me toward this lecture? I'd like to take a look and incorporate it. Thanks!

 

Bodie

[David Filsell]

Dear Mr B 

I am rarely unwilling to help others on the forum, and hope this does not seem outside the spirit of the group. May I ask in what you wish to incorporate it. I ask since incorporation in my own writing is my objective and for obvious reasons I would like to do it first. It is a rare piece of documentation which took me a very long time to locate.

regards

David

[bdykstra]

I am producing an academic paper. I understand if you want to use the results of your findings first. It seemed like an interesting document, and I would merely be siting it as evidence for why rawlinson and IV corps entrenched the forward slope. However, there's several documents in the CAB files at the national archives that say as much. 

[David Filsell]

The answer - if only on the face of it - seems clear and very simple. I believe, but cannot evidence that it was doctrine dictated - if not official doctrine. Facts are that  it was used by the aggressive Capper commanding 7th Inf Divn, former head of Indian Staff College speaks volumes. 

Speaking of IV Corps Montgomery indicates as much by taking about the pre-War belief in the need to ensure long fields of fire. Forward slopes obviously provided these. He added that on his reurnto te U.K. That they had not been essential and that forward  slopes deployment cost lives. (As Wellington could  have told him). IV Corps was also green and fresh to the fight in October 1914. I suspect I Corps and. II Cops had had leaned of front slope dangers before Ypres

Haig complained to French about Rawlinson's troops using forward slopes, so presumeably I Corps did not use them. Since IV Corps had only one Inf Div, Capper's 7th I think you have your men who served inthem That said the weight an constancy of  German  offensive allowed little opportunity/luxury to pick your ground or those who fought it.hoe this helps.