The Somme - some personal thoughts

[Old Tom]

These are based based on reading secondary sources and recollections of views expressed on the forum. I would be surprised if it says anything that has not been said before but hope that it will be of some interest. As we approach the anniversary of the opening of the campaign it seems appropriate.

What was the operation for? Perhaps better: what was the aim? This must  be attributed to General Joffre and predates the German offensive on Verdun. It has never been clear to me other than in the very general terms that the Germans are there and they must be fought.  As the German pressure on Verdun increased so did the BEF’s share of the Somme offensive.

Was the BEF well prepared to fulfil its role? To a large extent no. In particular, most divisions lacked experience in attacking operations, and the artillery was lacking in large calibre pieces and in high quality ammunition capable of destroying barbed wire entanglements and deep bunkers. The reasons for that situation lie in the years before the war broke out. Provision of an expeditionary force was low on government priorities and although the deployment of such a force was very well planned but its subsequent support during lengthy operations was not .  Taking artillery ammunition as an example, expansion of manufacture was arranged but this involved factories without experience and quality suffered.

Was the BEF’s attack well planned? This is a more difficult question and involves the contentious matter of the competence of senior officers. Officers operational experience before the war was in small scale (by WW1 standards) colonial policing,  by no means an unsound base for officers in units but not for those in command of formations much larger than had previously existed. Also the increase in the size of the BEF from four to fifty divisions required recalling retired officers and quickly promoting those of the regular army that survived the initial battles. A result was that detailed planning was at too high a level, and the C in C involved himself in matters that should have been left to Army, Corps and Divisional commanders.

Was the scale of the attack too large? It is necessary to consider the depth i.e. to breakthrough in one assault or in stages and the width. Both considerations determine the artillery support needed and the combination of attempted breakthrough and width required more than was available.

Was there any success on day one? Not a great deal and what there was  not exploited. A division on the right of the attack, near French forces advanced 3,000 yards and held their ground and two days later on of their officers carried out a reconnaissance to a depth of some two miles. It is not clear if the C in C was aware of this advance which might have been a base for flanking attacks. This measure of success was, no doubt, assisted by the French artillery and it is also of note that the Brigade Major of the divisional artillery became CIGS in WW2.

 

[Seadog]

Sorry to see that your post had not as yet received any responses so here are my opinions on the battle

 

1.0 Command

Incompetent, unfocused and totally lacking in Imagination with no clear objectives, plus a crass disregard for human life which viewed from this distance in time is astounding

 

2.0 Tactics

Not enough large calibre guns to smash dugouts and destroy barbed wire

 

3.0 Troops

Ordered to advance at a slow walk with rifles at the port as command considered that any attempt to rush the enemy positions would result in chaos as the troops were mainly inexperienced.

 

4.0 Result

"Race to the parapet" lost as the Germans emerged from their dugouts and mounted their machineguns whilst the British were still walking at a steady pace through no-mans land and were then confronted by the intact barbed wire.

 

Hence 90,000+ allied dead overall plus thousands of wounded, a generation destroyed and all down to the incompetence of the senior commanders who sadly learnt absolutely nothing and repeated the disaster on a grand scale in Flanders 1917.

 

Discuss

Norman

[keithmroberts]

I am just working through the volume discussed elsewhere in the forum that has been edited by Matthias Strohn, and I think most of the contributors would take a very different view to Norman, as indeed I do. I would agree wityh Norman's point 2, as it was clear beyond any doubt that the British artillery was not sufficient or of the right kind to prevent the German's from recovering quickly, but it is also clear that the "walking steadily" is a fairly large over simplification. It was sadly true of some units, but Bill Mitchinson deals with that, not least by reference to Rawlinson's tactical notes. 

 

Tactics changed and were developed  dramatically during the battle of the Somme, and were very different towards the en of that battle. Even more so at 3rd Ypres where both sides had changed their approach considerably.

 

I think the charge of callousness and incompetence is also grossly unreasonable.  Life is too short to dig out all the sources, and the analyses, but it was never just that simple, or even  that stupid. I am swamped by work on a project at present, and the weight of available research on the Somme Battles would require some moths to address seriously, so I will leave it there.

 

Keith

[Toby Brayley]

1 hour ago, Seadog said:

 

3.0 Troops

Ordered to advance at a slow walk with rifles at the port as command considered that any attempt to rush the enemy positions would result in chaos as the troops were mainly inexperienced.

 

 

 

Discuss

Norman

 

Norman, 

 

In my very humble opinion, given the sheer amount of kit that the guys were carrying on the 1st July, it is no wonder they "walked" across no mans land. I would imagine even the fittest of men would have struggled to maintain anything more than a brisk walk/jog and then be able to fight effectively at the end of it.

 

I was just looking at the orders for the 1st Battalion the RWR for July 1st.

 

To summarise.. 

 

Aside from his usual battle order load, each man is carrying 300+ rounds of ammunition in his webbing and in cotton bandoliers. 2 Mills Bombs are to be carried in the lower pockets of the SD jacket. 2 PH hoods, each in separate bags, are also to be carried, not to mention the various shovels, picks, communications equipment, rolls of barbed wire etc etc. As you know these were distributed to the men on the day so that they would be able "reconstruct" the German trenches and hold against any form of counter attack. 

 

It really does all add up to a tremendous burden! 

 

Toby 

 

*edited for some truly god awful spelling..... before Steven comments!

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Gareth Davies]

1 hour ago, Seadog said:

Sorry to see that your post had not as yet received any responses so here are my opinions on the battle

 

1.0 Command

Incompetent, unfocused and totally lacking in Imagination with no clear objectives, plus a crass disregard for human life which viewed from this distance in time is astounding

 

2.0 Tactics

Not enough large calibre guns to smash dugouts and destroy barbed wire

 

3.0 Troops

Ordered to advance at a slow walk with rifles at the port as command considered that any attempt to rush the enemy positions would result in chaos as the troops were mainly inexperienced.

 

4.0 Result

"Race to the parapet" lost as the Germans emerged from their dugouts and mounted their machineguns whilst the British were still walking at a steady pace through no-mans land and were then confronted by the intact barbed wire.

 

Hence 90,000+ allied dead overall plus thousands of wounded, a generation destroyed and all down to the incompetence of the senior commanders who sadly learnt absolutely nothing and repeated the disaster on a grand scale in Flanders 1917.

 

Discuss

Norman

 

Gosh Norman, there is so much in your post I disagree with.  First of all command.  Command took place at many levels yet you seem to be condemning anyone in a command position.  Are you saying that over 250 Battalion commanders were incompetent?  Or are you saying that >3000 platoon commanders were unfocussed and had no clear objectives?  Or are you dragging up that old Lions led by Donkeys theme?

 

In the last month clear evidence has been presented on the GWF that dispels the idea that the whole of the attacking force walked slowly towards the German lines.  Yes, some did, but on 1 Jul it was under 25% of the attacking force that did so. 

 

 

[phil andrade]

The OP asks what the operation was for, and what its aims were.

 

The plans of Joffre are alluded to - a very important thing to mention....what is not mentioned, however, is the overall coalition strategy that envisaged simultaneous efforts by French, British, Russian and Italian armies on their respective fronts.

 

If we fail to countenance that, then I fear we will miss the principal feature of the raison d'etre of the Somme, as discussed at Chantilly at the end of 1915.

 

Subsequent events, of course, rather changed the way things turned out.

 

Norman mentions  " 90,000 + allied dead overall".

 

The British Empire forces alone lost something in the order of 125,000 dead in the 1916 battle of the Somme, and the French probably half as many, so we would be nearer the mark to speak in terms of two hundred thousand allied deaths, and twice as many wounded...well over six hundred thousand casualties in all.

 

Phil 

[Old Tom]

The way that the available artillery was used is a major factor. Perhaps the fact that the shell is the the artillery weapon not the gun may have been overlooked. My reading does not let me comment on whether this aspect i.e. the availability and effectiveness of ammunition featured in the difference of opinion between Haig and Rawlinson. However the decision to attack two lines with artillery support that might have been sufficient for one is questionable.

[phil andrade]

Trying to assess the objectives and impact of the Battle of the Somme, I'm bound to ask :

 

Which frightened the Germans more...the Franco British onslaught on the Somme, or the huge success of Brusilov in the earlier summer that year ?

 

There is a wider historiographical theme implicit in the question.

 

Does our very understandable - and, I daresay, justifiable - pre-occupation with the Somme blind us to the momentous events that were developing in other theatres of the war ?

 

People like to conflate the Somme and Verdun, almost as if they were inseparable as twin battles.

 

Perhaps we might do well to consider how Verdun, the Somme, Brusilov's Summer and the entry of Romania were impinging on each other.

 

Phil

[Old Tom]

A sweeping question which I don't feel qualified to answer fully. I would suggest that the BEFs sustained offensive on the Somme demonstrated that it had become a significant force capable of inflicting serious casualties. Certainly the Russian  part in the war - as in WW2 - is frequently not allocated the importance it deserves. I offer no comment on Romania.