Better Gunnery from Invincible at Jutland

[rolt968]

I have been watching the various Jutland documentaries as I can this last week.

I am a little curious about there being very little mention of Invincible and 3 BCS.

All the programs seemed to imply a British view of higher rate of fire over accuracy. Yet only one that I heard explained the difficulty of getting main armament gunnery practice for the battlecruisers based in the Forth.

I don't think I heard anyone mention the much better gunnery of the Invincible and 3 BCS and 5 BS or the reason for it.

Roger M

[MikB]

I have been watching the various Jutland documentaries as I can this last week.

I am a little curious about there being very little mention of Invincible and 3 BCS.

All the programs seemed to imply a British view of higher rate of fire over accuracy. Yet only one that I heard explained the difficulty of getting main armament gunnery practice for the battlecruisers based in the Forth.

I don't think I heard anyone mention the much better gunnery of the Invincible and 3 BCS and 5 BS or the reason for it.

Roger M

Yes, and it really seems to have been outstanding - 8 hits with 48 rounds. As far as I know, this far exceeds anybody else's hit rate.

[James A Pratt III]

I believe the 3 BCS was a Scapa for gunnery practice right before the battle. So it could be the case of a well practiced crew. I would also say the ship most likely had many pre war regulars in the crew which could have helped as well.

[Nom Anor]

HMS Queen Mary with Beatty's main force also shot relatively well. She managed to hit the Seydlitz four times during the Run to the South. She was regarded the "crack gunnery ship" of the Battlecruiser Fleet.

[bill24chev]

Beatty's BC's at Rosyth suffered from a lack of Gunnery practice due to there being no safe range near by.

3rd BC Sqn. had swapped Rosyth for Scapa Flow with 5th Battle Sqn to get some practice in.

This lack of practice was one reason why Beatty's ships tried to increase rate of fire. Although common sense suggests to me that would just waste more ammunition.

The BC forces poor shooting skewed the overall statistics for accuracy compared to the German Fleet. The Battleships and 3rd BC Sqn's gunnery was on a par with Hipper's Scouting Force and von Spee's High Seas Fleet.

I believe HMS Queen Mary was equipped with the more expensive, complex and accurate gunnery control system that probably accounted for her good shooting before receiving the fatal hit(s).

bill

[rolt968]

I'm sure I read somewhere that the Forth based ships had tried to do "local" gunnery practice but it had resulted in broken windows ashore (concussion, not stray shells!). As a result 3 BCS were sent to Scapa to get firing in practice and that the other squadrons would take their turn.

Thanks Bill, for the comment on the relative capabilities of the Battleships and 3 BCS compared to the German forces.

I am not contesting that there was bad practice in the British handling of cordite (which I think has been known for some time) nor that there was an over emphasis on rate of fire.

However I am not convinced by what seems to be an over simplistic view taken by at least two recent TV documentaries which seemed to be saying that rate of fire was given preference over accuracy or at least that rate of fire was felt to be the answer to poor accuracy. It is interesting that in those documentaries only a passing mention in one documentary was made to the reason for lack of practice for the Forth based battlecruisers and no mention at all of the better gunnery of 3 BCS and the battleships.

Roger M

[James A Pratt III]

As for the 5 BS I would say its gunnery was better because it had recent practice at Scapa. The 15 inch guns had a longer effective range and newer DCTs

[rolt968]

As for the 5 BS I would say its gunnery was better because it had recent practice at Scapa. The 15 inch guns had a longer effective range and newer DCTs

Thank you for that. It is a very long time since did serious reading on Jutland (40+ years!). I had a vague memory that 5 BS's gunnery was better.

[MikB]

There was also a lot of variation in the light, due to the direction of the sun as well as the very variable visibility. In general and with exceptions, it looks as if shooting westward and southward gave advantage. And weather-visibility didn't always work both ways - when Invincible was firing on Wiesbaden and Lützow they were clear to her spotters, but the German ships could see only her gun-flashes. Hase (IIRC) of Derfflinger described the sudden visibility change that fatally exposed Invincible as like theatre-curtains parting.

German stereoscopic rangefinders were able to deliver a brighter image in poor light than the British coincidence type, probably through fewer air-glass surfaces. They could also range accurately on indistinct objects like smoke clouds, which was much more difficult with coincidence, which were easier to read with a sharp vertical edge like a mast, funnel or superstructure corner. But stereoscopics required unfatigued operators with balanced binocular vision, which coincidence instruments didn't. At least one RN officer (Goodenough? Keyes? Tyrwhitt?) commented that German gunners got the range very quickly, but deteriorated in lengthy actions - perhaps they didn't have enough fresh operators available.

[DavidIsby]

The RN was well aware of this in the Second World War, hence the attack by Vian's destroyers on the Bismarck was, in part, to exhaust (eyestrain?) the stereoscopic rangefinder operators before the final battle.

[James A Pratt III]

Glad to be of help.

I have also read that a RN officer at the battle of Dogger bank noticed also that the german gunners got the range quickly but they deteriorated as the battle went on.

Visibilty did effect gunnery at Jutland greatly.

Note Vian's destroyers were sent on a night torpedo attack to hit the Bismark which did have radar to assist it gunnery.

[MikB]

Glad to be of help.

I have also read that a RN officer at the battle of Dogger bank noticed also that the german gunners got the range quickly but they deteriorated as the battle went on.

Visibilty did effect gunnery at Jutland greatly.

Note Vian's destroyers were sent on a night torpedo attack to hit the Bismark which did have radar to assist it gunnery.

Off topic, but it wasn't in effective use at the time - the forward aerial had also fallen off into the sea whilst shooting at cruisers in Denmark Strait.

[bill24chev]

The German range finders could acquire the range of a target faster than the RN ones but the RN gunnery control systems were better, once a target was accurately acquired, of predicting changes in a targets ranger, speed and course.

The disasters to RN Battle Cruisers, in both wars occurred in the early stages of an engagement, which I think, supports this.

bill

[michaeldr]

Regarding Gunnery at Jutland; I recommend the article 'Exploding Myths – Battle Cruisers' seen in The Naval Review here http://www.naval-review.com/issues/1990s/1999-1.pdf#Page%3D54&View%3DFit

The author suggests that the Fire Control System chosen was the wrong one. Pollen's system was better, but Dreyer's was chosen as he was not only a naval officer, but also known to both Jellicoe and Fisher.

The author also suggests that the British armoured piercing shell was less then effective; a point which he says was made by Jellicoe himself as Controller of the Ordnance Board in 1910.

[Nom Anor]

Yes, the British armor piercing shell was less than satisfactory at the time of Jutland. It worked well enough in a shallow trajectory, but was defective when it hit the target at an oblique angle. The British finally solved this problem in 1918, when they issued newly designed shells to the Grand Fleet.

[bill24chev]

20 hours ago, michaeldr said:

Regarding Gunnery at Jutland; I recommend the article 'Exploding Myths – Battle Cruisers' seen in The Naval Review here http://www.naval-review.com/issues/1990s/1999-1.pdf#Page%3D54&View%3DFit

The author suggests that the Fire Control System chosen was the wrong one. Pollen's system was better, but Dreyer's was chosen as he was not only a naval officer, but also known to both Jellicoe and Fisher.

The author also suggests that the British armoured piercing shell was less then effective; a point which he says was made by Jellicoe himself as Controller of the Ordnance Board in 1910.

Dreyer had been Jellicoe's Flag Captain before WW1 and transferred from HMS Orion to HMS Iron Duke soon after Jellicoe's appointment as Commander of the Grand Fleet.

 

HMS Queen Mary, recognised as a Crack Gunnery Ship, had Pollen's Argo Clock Gunnery Control.

 

bill

[ernest james]

Just working my way through 'Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland' by John Brooks (2005) and his later book 'The Battle of Jutland' (2016)

 

The author has a background in computing and telecommunications . His view is that the Dreyer tables were better.

I thought that his technical background is evident in his analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Argo/Pollen system against the Dreyer system.

 

In his 2016  book his view is that it is probable that significant amounts of British cordite in magazines at Jutland were unstable. This meant that they were more easily ignited  by flash or hot fragments or local cordite fires. Once again it appeared to me to be well argued technically .

 

I would be interested in what other people think of his books. I found them convincing.

ernest james

 

 

[michaeldr]

The argument for the Pollen system is covered in 'The Great Gunnery Scandal' written by Anthony Pollen (the son of A H Pollen). The book is reviewed in The Naval Review here http://www.naval-review.com/issues/1980s/1981-1.pdf#Page%3D73&View%3DFit – see page 72/3

quote: They also failed to test Pollen's revolutionary fire-control system at all fairly, reacting with a mixture of incomprehension and hostile prejudice to its claims and its supporters. Worse still, some of the system's naval opponents pirated Pollen's ideas and peddled an inferior copy to the Navy which eventually proved virtually useless in action. This is strong meat indeed, but the author largely carries his case.

Of further interest may be the writings of the inventor himself: The Pollen Papers edited by Jon T Sumida was also reviewed in TNR – see http://www.naval-review.com/issues/1980s/1984-4.pdf#Page%3D89&View%3DFit pages 371/2

The reviewer points out that (somewhat belatedly -1925) Pollen's was recognised by an award of £30,000 from the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors “in recognition of the fact that the Navy had nicked some of his brightest ideas.”

[simonharley]

The fire control debate is critically examined in two major scholarly works:

 

The pro-Pollen side is represented in Jon Sumida's In Defence of Naval Supremacy: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Defence-Naval-Supremacy-Technology-1889-1914/dp/1591148030/

 

The pro-Dreyer side is covered by John Brooks in Dreadnought Gunnery at the Battle of Jutland: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Dreadnought-Gunnery-Battle-Jutland-Question/dp/0415407885/

 

In my opinion Brook's conclusions are by far the more compelling, but it's fair to say many people still favour those of Sumida.

 

A cursory examination of the Battle Cruiser Fleet's proceedings suggests that squadrons were rotated to Scapa for heavy calibre gunnery practice fairly often - the question is how often the battleships of the Battle Fleet practiced by comparison.

[MikB]

I'm sure the Pollen/Dreyer debate has many valid points, but the BCF started at Jutland with grossly incorrect range readings and immediately compounded that with confusing both their fire distribution orders and each other's fall of shot. That didn't have so much to do with the processing detail of their fire control systems as with familiarity in use - and possibly calibration - of basic instrumentation, together with clarity and verification of signalling.

 

As far as I remember, the HSF regarded the GF's firing during the fleet engagements as dangerously accurate - I think it was Hase's comment that they found themselves "..im absoluten Wurstkessel" - in the sausage cauldron. To be fair, the GF had better visibility due to time, place and direction of shoot than the BCF, as well as much greater volume of fire; but most commentators seem to regard their shooting as at least satisfactory compared with the initial standard of the BCF.

[James A Pratt III]

I went on an out of town trip and visited a library where they had a copy of Marder's Drednought to Scapa Flow vol 3 that deals with Jutland. Commodore E.S. Alexander-Sinclair commanding the 1st LCS is said to have noticed Germany gunnery falling off after awhile. Marder comments he was not aware of any proof of this.

[TeeCeeCee]

On 22/06/2016 at 11:03, simonharley said:

The fire control debate is critically examined in two major scholarly works:

 

The pro-Pollen side is represented in Jon Sumida's In Defence of Naval Supremacy: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Defence-Naval-Supremacy-Technology-1889-1914/dp/1591148030/

 

The pro-Dreyer side is covered by John Brooks in Dreadnought Gunnery at the Battle of Jutland: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Dreadnought-Gunnery-Battle-Jutland-Question/dp/0415407885/

 

In my opinion Brook's conclusions are by far the more compelling, but it's fair to say many people still favour those of Sumida.

 

A cursory examination of the Battle Cruiser Fleet's proceedings suggests that squadrons were rotated to Scapa for heavy calibre gunnery practice fairly often - the question is how often the battleships of the Battle Fleet practiced by comparison.

 

Where all the capital ships allowed the same amount of ammunition for gunnery practice?

[michaeldr]

I can't answer TCC's above

but with respect to his quote from SH -  A cursory examination of the Battle Cruiser Fleet's proceedings suggests that squadrons were rotated to Scapa for heavy calibre gunnery practice fairly often - the question is how often the battleships of the Battle Fleet practiced by comparison.

Marder's footnote may be useful - see From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol.II where he has the following (see page 64)

"Main armaments were excercised in the Flow, but with sub-calibre. This consisted of fixing a 3-lb or 6-lb gun inside the bore of any 12-inch or bigger gun, so that the sub-calibre could be fired at a target only by moving the turrets and exercising the whole of the main armament control. The battle cruisers could do very little gunnery in the Forth, and the submarine menace was too great to permit any beyond. They carried out sub-calibre practice behind the anti- submarine defences of the Forth; such full-calibre practice as they could manage was done outside Cromarty, though perhaps two or three times a year, a squadron went to Scapa for the purpose."

[simonharley]

8 hours ago, TeeCeeCee said:

 

Where all the capital ships allowed the same amount of ammunition for gunnery practice?

 

According to Nicholas Lambert ('Our Bloody Ships') at some point in 1914 battleships had their outfit of shell (exclusive of practice and shrapnel projectiles) increased from 80 to 100, and battle cruisers from 80 to 110. Also according to him each battleship and battle cruiser "habitually carried eight" practice projectiles which were exchanged "'live' projectiles". The annual allowance of heavy calibre practice projectiles for ships in full commission was 16 per gun according to my copy of the 1915 Manual of Gunnery, Volume III. Whether this was actually adhered to I don't know.

[TeeCeeCee]

On 28/06/2016 at 19:46, simonharley said:

 

According to Nicholas Lambert ('Our Bloody Ships') at some point in 1914 battleships had their outfit of shell (exclusive of practice and shrapnel projectiles) increased from 80 to 100, and battle cruisers from 80 to 110. Also according to him each battleship and battle cruiser "habitually carried eight" practice projectiles which were exchanged "'live' projectiles". The annual allowance of heavy calibre practice projectiles for ships in full commission was 16 per gun according to my copy of the 1915 Manual of Gunnery, Volume III. Whether this was actually adhered to I don't know.

 

16 rounds? >thumbs up<.

 

So do I understand that correctly that they replaced the practice with live rounds and used the latter for practice?

 

I have a vague recollection of reading of '6' practice rounds (per gun, per year) from, iirc, Filson Young, it was a passage mitigating the BattleCruiser gunnery  saying that as the Admiralty only allowed a meagre 6 rounds per year to practice with, what can you expect? I can't find it now so it may have been in Chalmers bio of Beatty?

 

I can understand the Admiralties parisimony, Roberts 'Battlecruisers' does give some prices per 12" shell and they're quite eye-opening (or should that be eye-watering?):

 

Common Pointed @ £14 10s

Common Pointed Capped @ £24 10s

Armour-Piercing (Capped) @  £30

 

This when the average annual wage in Britain in 1910 for a unskilled worker/labourer = £70, skilled = £100 and so on. The average annual shipbuilding wages in 1906 ranged from £50 to £90.

 

Even if we make a 12" practice shell @ £10 each, a 4 round per gun practice session by a battlecruiser would use 32 shells @ £320 (plus cordite costs). It was the price of an average terraced house.

 

Here's another one: Lion used 326 APC at Jutland and, iirc, she's creditted with 5 hits. While I don't have the cost of a 13.5" APC, if we use the cost of the 12" version, the cost of her shell at Jutland was £9,780 (plus cordite). So each hit on the enemy cost approx. £1,956? Of course the sum will be more than that as 13.5s will be more expensive than 12"ers.