Ottoman entry into war

[michaeldr]

A very interesting paper by Mustafa Aksakal (American University, Washington DC) describing the Ottoman Empire's progress towards war in the late summer of 1914 has just been published

Note the early (7^th May 1914) speculation re the future of the Goeben

and the situation report from Turkey's Military Attaché in Berlin addressed to Enver Pasha (24th September 1914)

from The Journal of Ottoman Studies: see https://www.academia.edu/24546540/Why_did_the_Ottomans_enter_a_European_War_in_1914_New_sources_new_views?auto=download&campaign=upload_email

[trajan]

Thank you Martin for that article.

Interesting to read Cemil Bey's pessimistic account of how things were going in France that early on.

Also nice to read his observation that "The new army corps now being established are given both partial and full firearm training to make them as strong as possible..." as all the evidence from the point of view of rifles and bayonet production reveals a clear lack of preparation by the Prussian High Command for war, with front line units exchanging their Gew.98's for Gew 88's so that the Reserve and Ersatz units had something 'modern' to train with!

Julian

[michaeldr]

Thank you Martin

[Guest]

Mates,

What I found interesting was the missing man in this act.

A certain Adm S, who took the feet across the Black sea and started the war.

And his part in the Turkish entry into the war.

​S.B

[gilly100]

Thanks for posting this interesting paper Michael. All adds to the narrative.

Cheers

Ian

[trajan]

Whoops! Sorry... Had my former prof. Martin Harrison on my mind... Thank you Michael!

Mates,

What I found interesting was the missing man in this act.

A certain Adm S, who took the feet across the Black sea and started the war.

And his part in the Turkish entry into the war.

​S.B

Actually on a re-read, it did strike me that more could have been said. One of the journal's editorial committee is an office neighbour and I'll see if I can find out more - if wanted! But, there again, this was a 'festschrift' contribution which would help explain its 'note'-type format, needing desiring to know more.

Julian

[michaeldr]

One of the journal's editorial committee is an office neighbour and I'll see if I can find out more - if wanted!

Thanks Julian; if there is more, then it would be good to see

best regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

More (at 92 pages, much more) here on the same theme from

PERCEPTIONS JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS - Summer-Autumn 2015 Volume XX Number 2-3

see http://sam.gov.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/perceptions_summer-autumn2016.pdf

particularly of interest perhaps

The Great War and the Ottoman Empire: Origins by Ayşegül Sever and Nuray Bozbora

and

Ottoman Military Reforms on the eve of World War I by Odile Moreau

[bob lembke]

How important a factor was the seizure of the completed Turkish battleship built in a UK yard

and purchased with the contributions of thousands of Turkish citizens and school children?

Did this actually enrage the Turkish populace, and did this indignation reach the Turkish

leaders of the period? (Was there a second ship? Did Britain compensate Turkey?)

Fredrick the Great, I think, sent a military mission to Turkey, ca. 1760, of which I know

nothing, but there had been rather continuous German Army aid to and cooperation with Turkey

since about 1835. I also wonder if the German state took much part in the pressure on Turkey

to, for example, grant Christian missionaries extra-territorial rights and status, whereby

Christian missions had the status of foreign embassy establishments, and thereby beyond the

reach of Turkish authorities and law. I have seen claims that some missionaries were using

these rights to maintain armories and arm Armenian rebels. (We must remember that the Armenian

rebellion began in 1894.) Such a claim might be defensive propaganda.

I would imagine that Prussia and then the German Empire was not in the forefront of these

invasive and irritating activities and pressures of some European powers, and thereby gained,

in contrast, relative good will.

I am sure that the inactivity of the British admiral, who in 1914 was in charge of preparing

the defenses of the Dardanelles, was a further irritant.

Bob Lembke

[Guest]

Michael,

Thanks for the interesting articales "JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS".

Cheers

​S.B

[Bryn]

Thanks for that post, Michael. Very interesting.

Bob, why would Britain compensate Turkey? The Brits were fairly sure Turkey would ally with Germany, so no way were they going to hand Enver a couple of battleships, whether he had paid for them or not. Now whether Turkey WAS going to side with Germany or not at that time is a moot point; the fact is Turkey did side with Germany.

[michaeldr]

Perhaps the exact events in the Balkans in the summer of 1914 did come as something of a surprise, but surely there were plenty of early signs as to which way the Ottoman empire would aline itself in the case of an European war.

Otto Liman von Sanders arrived in Turkey on 14 December 1913 together with a mission of 42 German officers. The next day they were officially entered into Ottoman service and Liman was given the rank of full General, commander of the First Army and in protocol, next immediately after the Minister of War. Liman was by no means the first German officer to be attached to the Ottoman army; there was a long history of such posts manned by von der Goltz, von Morgen, von Strempel, von Leipzig, von Lossow and Humann amongst others. All kept up a good relationship with their hosts and ensured that the Ottoman army purchased German guns.

Only the most naive observer could imagine that the Turks would not be sympathetic to the Germans in any time of upheaval or even war. Britain, France and Russia all objected to Liman's mission and the fact that as he commanded the Turkish First Army this meant that in effect a German commanded the Dardanelles Straits (Russia's only warm water exit to the western world, and through which nearly all of her exports travelled).

This pre-war diplomatic incident is general known as the 'Liman affair' and it was resolved by the compromise of the Kaiser making Liman a 'General of Cavalry'. Since his contract with the Turks stipulated he receive from them one rank higher, Liman then became an Ottoman Marshal and in consequence of this promotion had to give up command of the First Army, becoming instead Inspector General of the Turkish Army. The Germans having successful out maneuvered the allies on this point, there can be little doubt that London, Paris & St Petersburg all saw the Ottoman empire as thus having moved even closer to Berlin.

On 31 July 1914 Bethmann-Hollweg authorized Wangenheim to sign the Treaty of Alliance between German and Turkey.

The next day, 1 August 1914, Wangenheim advised Berlin that the Goeben could be used, if “strengthened by Turkish fleet, to keep Russian Black Sea Fleet in check, assure cable connections with Rumania, and prevent a Russian landing on Bulgarian coast.”

[NB: this is before the two German ships' famous cruise of the Med; on the night of 31 July/1 August they docked at Brindisi]

The treaty was signed for the Ottoman government by the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Paşa, at 4 pm on 2 August 1914.

Please note that all of the above only takes us up to 4 pm on 2 August 1914

and that this is BEFORE the British announced that they would like to take over the contracted for battleships: see Sir Edward Grey's telegram addressed to Mr Beaumont (acting senior British diplomat in Turkey, since Sir Louis Mallet was at that time, still on holiday!) sent 3 August 1914

TURKISH ships building in Great Britain.

Arrangements are being made with the firm of Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co. for His Majesty's Government to take over the Turkish battleship " Osman I " now building with that firm. Please inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government are anxious to take over the contract.

The Turks did indeed protest about the money (in part) already paid by them, however they were immediately assured that Britain would make good the costs involved.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. Your telegram of 3rd August. [recvd at FO on 4th]

I am sure Turkish Government will understand necessity for His Majesty's Government to keep all warships available in England for their own needs in this crisis. Financial and other loss to Turkey will receive all due consideration, and is subject of sincere regret to His Majesty's Government. You should inform Grand Vizier.

The Turks however, preferred to use the subject of the payment as propaganda in front of their own people, to aid in eventually gaining their support for the Turkish government's secret, but already signed, commitment to Germany to be allied with them in the case of war. The British compensation offer was no doubt kept strictly out of the view of the Turkish public. Giving Britain the chance of a sympathetic hearing in front of the Turkish public was the last thing that either the junta or the Germans wanted.

Notwithstanding the FO's offer to Turkey, the First Lord of the Admiralty also took a hand in personally trying to persuade the Turkish leadership that an equitable financial arrangement could be arrived at. See Churchill's telegrams addressed to Enver which I have previously quoted here

including an offer to 'hire' the ships for the duration of the war and then either return them to Turkey or pay for their loss.

I believe that everything was done by the British to accommodate the Turkish side and persuade them to remain neutral, however, unknown to the British, the Turks had already cast in their lot in with the Germans.

It is worth reading the following:

- The Beginnings of Ottoman-German Partnership: Diplomatic & Military Relations between Germany & the Ottoman Empire before the First World War - A Master’s Thesis by EDİP ÖNCÜ which can be downloaded from the web (144 pages)

- Correspondence respecting Events Leading to the Rupture of Relations with Turkey - HMSO, London, 1914 (available as a download from the web, 104 pages)

- Winston Churchill by Martin Gilbert, Vol.III, 1914-1916 & its first 'Companion' volume

regards

Michael

[Ghazala]

Excellent as always Michael. Thank you.

[michaeldr]

Thanks Ghazala,

It is interesting that after the FO and the First Lord had tried and failed to persuade the Turks,

the government even dragged in the King, to try his luck

No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 25, 1914.

HIS Majesty the King desires that your Excellency should convey to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey a personal message from His Majesty, expressing his deep regret at the Sorrow caused to the Turkish people by the detention of the two warships which His Imperial Majesty's subjects had made such sacrifices to acquire. His Majesty the King wishes the Sultan to understand that the exigencies of the defence of his dominions are the only cause of the detention of these ships, which His Majesty hopes will not be for long, it being the intention of His Majesty's Government to restore them to the Ottoman Government at the end of the war, in the event of the maintenance of a strict neutrality by Turkey without favour to the King's enemies, as at present shown by the Ottoman Government.

Best regards

Michael

[MaureenE]

Two memoirs, available online

"At the Admiralty", page 81, Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919 by Djemal Pasha, Formerly…Imperial Ottoman Naval Minister, Commander of the Fourth Army in Sinai, Palestine and Syria. 1922 Archive.org. The author was Naval Minister from February 1914, until the outbreak of the war when he was promoted.

Five Years in Turkey by Otto Liman von Sanders, translated, from the 1920 German edition Funf Jahre Turkei, by Col Carl Reichman, US Army (Retired) published 1927 by the United States Naval Institute. Contents. With two maps at the back of the book. Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt.

• Fünf Jahre Türkei Original 1920 German edition. Archive.org.

Cheers

Maureen

[michaeldr]

Maureen,

Many thanks for the first of your links

(I'm lucky enough to have a hard copy of the second)

regards

Michael

[trajan]

Thank you Michael for the background references and Maureen for the links. Clearly, Berlin would have welcomed an Ottoman involvement, but any idea as to how much the Ottoman government's eventual decision was essentially down to the stance taken by Enver Pasha rather than a properly considered debate by all those involved?

[michaeldr]

any idea as to how much the Ottoman government's eventual decision was essentially down to the stance taken by Enver Pasha rather than a properly considered debate by all those involved?

From EDİP ÖNCÜ's thesis

Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Secretary to Sultan Mehmed Reşad, states in his memoirs:

Once Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa seized control of the Army and the Navy,* they carried out so-called ‘reformation’ in the Navy and Army by dismissing almost all of the officers who graduated from the military schools before Enver and Cemal. Thereafter, the reins of government passed from the hands of the Sublime Porte to those of Enver Paşa

* 3 January 1914

and an example from the 1914 HMSO publication

No. 12.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—{Received August 13.)

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, August 12, 1914:

I saw the Grand Vizier this morning and made strong representations to him against restrictions of free passage of the Straits, which the military authorities are now imposing under various pretexts. I said they had been holding up passenger and grain ships in the Dardanelles, refusing to deliver papers to ships wishing to leave Constantinople, and ordering grain ships to return to Constantinople at their caprice. The Grand Vizier admitted that the War Office had been most high-handed in their action, in violation of international obligations. It seems that the Minister of War has now got entirely out of hand, and I gather that he alone is responsible for the present situation. Matters are undoubtedly becoming serious, but a Cabinet Council is being held this afternoon, and I hope I may be able afterwards to report some improvement. I should add that all foreign shipping is affected by the restrictions to which I have alluded above

The diplomats seem hidebound by the traditional rules of the game which dictated whom they could deal with.

Churchill had the right idea and knew who was in charge and whom to contact; Enver.

However Enver's mind was already made up!

(NB The emphasis in the two quotes is mine)

regards

Michael

[bob lembke]

Thank you Martin for that article.

Interesting to read Cemil Bey's pessimistic account of how things were going in France

that early on.

Also nice to read his observation that "The new army corps now

being established are given both partial and full firearm training to make them as

strong as possible..." as all the evidence from the point of view of

rifles and bayonet production reveals a clear lack of preparation by the Prussian High

Command for war, with front line units exchanging their Gew.98's for Gew 88's so that

the Reserve and Ersatz units had something 'modern' to train with!

Julian

An area of particular interest to me, and an object of much study, were the ultra heavy

German and Austrian siege guns, the German 42 cm howitzers and Austrian and German 30.5 cm

mortars. (My grand-father served with these in Belgium in 1914, and later in Russia,

being responsible for the supply of ammunition to them in Belgium.) At the outbreak

of war the Germans had several extremely heavy 42 cm guns (I am separated from my

materials, but they may have weighed something astonishing like 180 tons emplaced.) and

only two completed more mobile 42 cm guns. However, at the outbreak of war, these two

guns were in the workshops at Krupp undergoing some modifications, and had to be quickly

completed and collected, and likewise the gun crews for these vital guns were not

assembled, and men had to be collected from reserve status to form the necessary crews.

Certainly if the High Command knew that the war was going to start they would not have

these critical guns unavailable and the necessary gun crews unassembled. There guns were

able to destroy or capture Belgian forts that were designed to hold out for 90 days in

two or three days, vital to turning the French flank about Paris.

Another factor in the Ottomans deciding to fall into the Central Powers' camp was the

efforts of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his propagandists to woo the Islamists, both with two or

three visits to Turkey and Palestine (I have seen, in Istanbul, the fountain that he

donated and dedicated on the old Roman Hippodrome.), which I think also extended to the

spreading of rumors that Wilhelm II was actually Muslim! I think that he actually visited

Istanbul before he became Kaiser. I think that there were similar efforts in Jerusalem. As

I have alluded to before, the policy of forcing "capitulations" on the Ottomans, for

example making Christian missions above Ottoman law, must have badly angered the Ottomans

to many European states. I was surprised to read of the great political strength of the

pro-missionary forces in US politics. I don't have a judgement on the importance of these

factors, but they must have helped tip the balance, if there was one.

[trajan]

Didn't know about those big ones Bob! I had assumed that the Austrian ones were the only ones around.

By the way, yes, the Hippodrome fountain was dedicated to Kaiser Bill - I was looking at it only yesterday with my daughter and my sons, before we walked down the hill past the Sublime Porte to board a ferry at the Stamboul quays of E-11 fame!

Julian

[alantwo]

Bob

I happen to be reading 'Artillery in the Great War' by Strong and Marble. According to the authors Krupp works designed a 420mm (16.2-inch) mortar which weighed 175 tons and that could only move by railway. It fired a shell which weighed over a ton.

Regards

Alan

[bob lembke]

Yes, I have letters from my grand-father in which he was in the batteries during

the day, as the German 42 cm howitzers (I would call them)and the Austrian 30.5 cm

mortars (I would say) fired on the Belgian forts, and then he would write the letter

that night, to my father, who had not gotten into the war yet. He was an Explosives

Officer, a technical officer, and had once been a sergeant in the Prussian Heavy

Artillery. He was responsible for getting the ammunition for these guns to them, but

he had an able assistant, so he could spend the day in the battery. I could locate,

today, where the batteries stood to within 100 yards, and I know, to the shell, how

many were fired every day.

A friend wrote and published a book about these guns, and I helped him, reading dozens

of books about them and the reduction of these forts, and in Russia in 1915. The book

is one of the Osprey series. I think we used about 75 books, and only one was in English,

the rest German, French, and Flemish.

The shells were made in small batches, so they could vary; the principal fort-buster

weighed 2550 lbs, the HE shell 2100 lbs, and the heaviest shell ever made for it was

3100 lbs. They were fired about five miles in the air, so you can imagine the kinetic

energy involved when the shell hit the fort. They would go thru 40 feet of concrete, earth,

steel, corridors, etc. before exploding. The great volume of poisonous gasses from the

shell's explosion killed as well as the blast and concussion. Sometimes the shell hit a

magazine, once with something like 280 tons of shells and explosives.

The Germans were very secretive about their 42 cm guns, but the Austro-Hungarians

really publicized their 30.5 cm (12") "Moto-Moersern". The highly mobile carriages

were designed by Professor Porsche.

[bob lembke]

The heavy version of the 42 cm howitzer came by standard rail cars, and the set first

off-loaded a set of the narrow-gauge trench railway (I'm missing the term) so that a

narrow-gauge line could be laid down to the selected site for the gun. Then the gun

components were brought to the site by the narrow-gauge RR and assembled. A large

pit had to be dug and layers of wood and steel and concrete put down to absorb the

fantastic recoil. The equipment brought to the site included a heavy crane for

assembling the gun.

The gun might fire on a fort from six miles away, but a telephone line was laid down

to allow an officer, even possibly the gun commander, to direct and adjust fire

directly. Often a line of sentries had to protect the telephone line, say from angry

local civilians. A battery consisted of two guns, usually. Especially later in the war,

special precautions had to be made to prevent the enemy from discovering the location

and shelling the gun. Often a battery might have an infantry company assigned to it

to guard it and to provide extra labor when requited.

The more mobile version, which could be towed down a road by steam tractors, had to

fire slightly lighter shells.

On at least one occasion the Germans approached a fort under a flag of truce and offered

to show the Belgian officers of the garrison what these guns had done to the last fort they

shelled. When they saw the destruction, they returned to their fort and negotiated a

suitable level of shelling to be fired before they surrendered, for example, ten shells

and then run up the white flag, with some honor retained.

It could be argued that these guns were economic. I saw a study where say 40 of these 2100

or 2550 lb shells did the damage and caused the surrender that at another fort required

2000 250 lb 21 cm shells, at a higher cost and a longer time to reduce the fort.

If a fort held out say three days without blowing up, often the garrison would run out the

back doors of the fort or perhaps mutiny. Waiting for a pair of these shells to land

every eight minutes for ten hours a day would drive the garrison crazy, especially as

the garrisons were not top quality troops in the first place.

These guns proved to put themselves out of business, as no one was foolish enough to

expect a fort to stand up to such shelling, as the war went on. But in 1916 the French

forts stood up to these guns somewhat better than the Belgians did, even possibly because

of better concrete.

One possible cause of the Belgian forts falling quickly may have been upgrading and

improvements ordered before the war, in part to withstand the shelling of heavier guns.

(Not this heavy!) The Belgians put the work out to bid, and awarded the contract to whom

I imagined was the low bidder, a noted heavy engineering company called Friedrich Krupp,

who took over the blueprints of the Belgian forts and performed the contracted-for

improvements. The low bidding process may have proved to be a false economy some years

later, when the same firm sent the forts crashing down about the Belgians' ears, partially

due to, it is thought, faulty concrete.

[WilliamRev]

A very interesting paper by Mustafa Aksakal (American University, Washington DC) describing the Ottoman Empire's progress towards war in the late summer of 1914 has just been published

Note the early (7^th May 1914) speculation re the future of the Goeben

and the situation report from Turkey's Military Attaché in Berlin addressed to Enver Pasha (24th September 1914)

from The Journal of Ottoman Studies: see https://www.academia.edu/24546540/Why_did_the_Ottomans_enter_a_European_War_in_1914_New_sources_new_views?auto=download&campaign=upload_email

Many thanks for this article; I'm currently (battling with) writing an essay on Gallipoli, and although short this article has some extremely useful new stuff about the Ottomans, written by a Turkish academic.

William

[michaeldr]

William,

You're very welcome

Yes it is a short piece, but having looked around the web a bit, I think that it was probably condensed from a much longer book of his - http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=25208

Good luck with the essay

Michael