Pulteney

[David Filsell]

I would be very grateful if anyone could direct me to the source of the comment about Lt Gen Sir William Pulteney which, (effectively) described him as a very ignorant soldier (I don't even have the precise comment) I'm afraid.

David

[IPT]

His chief of staff between April and October 1917, Charles Bonham-Carter, said of him, " Putty was a dear old man (not so old), but the most completely ignorant general I served with during the war and that is saying a lot"

The original source may be Victor Bonham-Carter in "In a Liberal Tradition" (1960).

[David Filsell]

IPT,

Thanks very much. I am currently reviewing the new book on him, a 750 word tome. He left no papers, the book makes extensive use of his letters to otherand Corps War Diaries. Up to mid 1915), so far I see no sign of him being anything other than a highly competent, conscientious, progressive and caring Corps Commander who was far from ignorant. His relationships with Smith Dorrien show a huge degree of patience, despite the fact that that he had to deal with SD's clearly appalling temper and ire.

His letters to female friends also show him to have light touch with sexual innuendo, huge concern about the provision of arty ammunition, sniping rifles and telescopes, rifle grenades and etc. I've developed quite an affection for him, but we shall see what 16, 17and 18.

Thanks I am most grateful.

Any other judgements or comments on Putty would be welcome.

[Staffsyeoman]

I think you mean pages David, even though some might say that 750 words was plenty! Still awaiting my review copy - I went to the launch of the Farrar-Hockley biography instead...

[Black Maria]

Prompted by another thread on this forum I am reading Charles Carrington's ' Soldier from the wars returning' , and in it he mentions that after the war he asked

Major-General Sir Robert Fanshawe, which was the best Corps commander he served under?, and Fanshawe replied " Oh 'Putty' ( Sir W.Pulteney , 3rd Corps),

he let me do exactly what I liked ".

[David Filsell]

Thanks both for these comments. Much appreciated. I'll watch my ps and ls in future.

David

[squirrel]

The 47th Division didn't think too highly of him after High Wood.

[David Filsell]

Squirrel,

Thanks for that. Can you point me toward any specific quotes in support please - not that I doubt your comment - but to point me in the right direction?

David

[squirrel]

History of the 47th (2nd London) Division from page61, particularly page 68 para 2.

War Diary of the 1/18th (County of London) battalion London Regiment (London Irish Rifles), 1/19th (County of London) battalion (St Pancras) for accounts of the attack on High Wood.

Essentially, a frontal attack on High Wood without artillery support to leave lanes for the Tanks was unsuccessful with heavy casualties incurred as, while the Divisional and Brigade Commanders had requested artillery support, this was denied by Corps who hoped that the four tanks allocated, only one of which actually reached the edge of the Wood and stuck, would clear the Wood for the infantry.

Trench Mortars had been brought up but were ordered not to fire prior to the attack.

In the event, after the initial costly infantry attack, the Brigade Commander, after requesting artillery support yet again and which proved to be ineffective, ordered the Trench Mortars of 140 Brigade to fire a barrage - 750 rounds in 15 minutes fired from eight 3" mortars - prepared the way for a second infantry attack which was successful.

Major General Barter, the Divisional Commander, who had requested artillery support on a number of occasions for the attack, was sacked for "wanton waste of men". He was later to clear his name but was never reinstated.

[David Filsell]

Squirrel

Many thanks.

David

[IPT]

When Charles Bonham-Carter arrived at III Corps in the summer of 1917, he described how his predecessor, Brigadier Cecil Romer left him some instructions regarding the GOC, Sir William Pulteney. Apparently, the note from Romer stated ‘Never let Putty out of your sight. If you do he will either give an order you cannot carry out, or give a promise which you cannot fulfil. I followed his advice as much as possible’.

(Bonham-Carter, Memoir Chapter IX p. 1, Bonham-Carter Papers)

[David Filsell]

Squirrel,

Just checked the 47 Inf Div attack in the book. It is covered in some detail and is also somewhat equivocal. Whilst apportioning ultimate responsibility to/on Pulteney as Corps Commander - rightly in broad terms - the author highlights a range of problems at levels from Haig down to Barter as well as brigade commanders and the artillery. I dot feel qualified to pass judgement but it's well worth taking a look at the brief analysis in Leask's new book. What does seem apparent on a brief read is that he rest of the Corps attack went better for a variety of reasons and that High Wood was a hell of a place to take.

Thanks again for the lead.

Davis

[brummell]

The 'clear lanes for tanks' issue I think would be harshly pinned on Pulteney, as that was an Army-wide issue on 15 Sept, not specifically resulting from Pulteney. Planning to use tanks in High Wood at all was madness; refusal by the division to use them, which would be quite reasonable and could be cogently argued, or planning to use them on the flanks rather than the wood itself, would have obviated the problem - and those decisions rested with the division.

[David Filsell]

IPT

Thanks for that. The author notes that Bonham Carter lasted only six months as BGGS, and suggest that the man may have some animus towards Pulteney and who may in fact have sacked him. He also notes his criticisms are not echoed by others who served him. Not a conclusion I have drawn, but interesting that like Hunter Bunter a man gets labeled forever by a few comments made by his juniors!

David

[squirrel]

The 'clear lanes for tanks' issue I think would be harshly pinned on Pulteney, as that was an Army-wide issue on 15 Sept, not specifically resulting from Pulteney. Planning to use tanks in High Wood at all was madness; refusal by the division to use them, which would be quite reasonable and could be cogently argued, or planning to use them on the flanks rather than the wood itself, would have obviated the problem - and those decisions rested with the division.

Considering the requests from the Divisional, Brigade and Battalion commanders, as well as the commander of the tanks allocated for the attack, who were all in agreement for a thorough artillery bombardment of High Wood prior to the attack and the tank commander's reluctance to use the tanks in the attack on the Wood at all, it must have been made clear to Corps that it was felt that the initial attack would fail.

We have a situation where the views of the "man/men on the spot", who had carried out close observation of High Wood and had an appreciation of the ground and the difficulties involved were overruled, and in the event, after having attempted to comply with their orders from Corps and Army level, finally took the initiative to capture the Wood in the manner in which they had initially suggested using their own resources.

For a detailed account of the planning for the use of tanks on 15th September 1915 see Trevor Pidgeon The Tanks At Flers volume one p 53,54,55,56.

p 54 " He (Rawlinson) asked each Corps Commander in turn to explain his proposed use of tanks. Pulteney, commanding III Corps on the left, said he would use six tanks against Martinpuich. approaching it along the roads leading from the South and South West. As for his other main target, "The tanks will go quickly through High Wood because they will have cover all the way."

[David Filsell]

Simply for information: Pulteney actually got four tanks according to Leask.

[squirrel]

D13,D21, D22, D23 according to Pidgeon. The initial planning with Rawlinson, Pulteny, Elles and others was a pretty convoluted affair.

Haig had suggested at one stage that the tanks should not advance without the infantry.

In any event, 47th Division felt that Pulteny could have done more to "fight their corner" so to speak at High Wood and similarly in 1917 in the defence of Bourlon Wood.

p 123 History of the 47th (London) Division - "The 62nd Division, acting under orders from the Corps, insisted on the whole of the 141st Brigade being sent in to Bourlon Wood to relieve their Brigade. In protest against this Major-General Gorringe urged that to crowd seven battalions (four of 141st brigade, one of 140th Brigade and two of dismounted cavalry) and forty seven machine guns in to the wood, which already contained one battalion of the 59th Division on the right, would only involve excessive casualties without increasing the adequacy of the defence.

[David Filsell]

I'll read on. Thanks

[squirrel]

Just had an e-mail from Helion Books so now understand the reference to "Leask". Book ordered through the GWF Abebooks link.

[David Filsell]

Be interested to see what you think. I review for Stand To!, sometimes put something up on the forum about books I consider worthwhile. But some preliminary thoughts herewith (from the perspective of being half way through the book).

Just reached planning stage for the Somme and as ever I feel it was doomed from the start. Leask shows why.

Pulteny's many many letters to lady friends form the backbone of the book, they are often wry, hint at 'fun and games' and offer many fascinating views of other officers and his life as a Corps commander. I don't think I can recall another biography of a senior officer quite like it..I must say that so far Pulteney comes over as a soldier dedicated to his men's welfare - in and out of the line - methodical and it must be said most 'soldierly'.

Leask backs up letters with material from War Diaries, but neither condemns nor over eggs him. Whilst making it clear that the reader must make up his omind up about his subject one feels he developed considerable respect and affection for his subject - as am I.

[squirrel]

Thanks David, looking forward to reading the book when it turns up.

I must say that from what I have read the preparation of 47th (London) Division for the major battles in which it was involved were pretty thorough.

I wonder how much of this was done at Corps, Division and Brigade level? - at Loos for instance, 141 Brigade had bombing platoons, battle cadre, brigaded machine guns, used attack practice areas, all of which, according to most accounts, did not happen until 1916 and planning for the Somme. And there was the football of the London Irish, of course....

[David Filsell]

Interestingly no less than14 divisions went through III Corps in 14 and 15. It made a number of unprepared K Divisions ready and by 16 after training them up and loosing them to other Corps rated them more highly than regular Divs.

[squirrel]

That's quite a point to note.

[David Filsell]

Still reading! Interestingly both Haig and Rawlinson had doubts about Barter before High Wood. And Pulteney was not a man who de gummed very frequently.

[delta]

D13,D21, D22, D23 according to Pidgeon. The initial planning with Rawlinson, Pulteny, Elles and others was a pretty convoluted affair.

Haig had suggested at one stage that the tanks should not advance without the infantry.

All four tanks became ditched; three before they crossed the British front line. Only Delilah manned by crew D13 could be conisdered successful as it managed to reach the centre of the wood where it became stick across a German ditch.

i did not realise that Elles was in involved in the Flers planning and would be grateful for more information.