Bayonets and the German cavalry on the eastern front

[trajan]

I'm hoping that one of you eastern front and/or German cavalry specialists might spot this one and can help me on what is really for me a bayonet matter, albeit also a cavalry one...

According to reliable German sources, an Imperial Decree issued late in 1914 (I think 11 November 1914) instructed that all cavalry units of the 'Heer' were to be issued with bayonets. I have not seen a transcript or copy of the original for this, but I know from a Prussian Kriegesministerium document I do have a copy of that beginning on 10 February 1915, the cavalry units on the east front began to be issued with these, and specifically S.84/98 bayonets.

This order was extended to the cavalry units on the west front by a Kriegesministerium decree of 8 April 1915, which adds the information that these bayonets must be delivered to the units concerned with a "schutzschiene am rücken des griffs oder mit massivem Metallgriff...". So they were to receiver either bayonets with a 'flashguard'', the official introduction specifically for 84/98's of the schutzblech (as it was officially known) having been issued one day earlier; or with some form of all-metal ''Ersatz'' bayonet. The directive then adds that any bayonets lacking a "schutzschiene" or any that were booty weapons, be ''given back'', I assume to the armourers. (Just to add here, for those unfamiliar with the subject, bayonets with a flashguard or a metal grip were specified as the cavalry used Kar.98's, and its short muzzle and the large muzzle flash it generated charred the wooden grips on those bayonets that had them, the flashguard subsequently being introduced for all forms of German bayonets in service use)

But all that bayonet type business is a by the by, in a sense, as what I am really after is: does anyone have an explanation, other than shortage of suitable bayonets, for the issue of such to the cavalry units on the east front in February 1915, but a two month delay before they were issued to the cavalry on the west front? I have always (rightly or wrongly) associated the issue of bayonets to the German cavalry with a change in their role brought about by trench warfare and so their increasing use from autumn 1914 as skirmishers, but I have very limited knowledge on their true role on either front in late 1914 and early 1915, and especially if in early 1915 there were any differences between their role on the two fronts.

Thanks in advance for any advice, help, and informed comment,

Trajan

[dman]

German cavalry, at first, were armed with KARABINER 98A - a short barrel (17.7 in, 450 mm) carbine. Was also issued to

support troops (artillery, engineers, etc)

Short barrel gave vicious recoil and muzzle flash/blast. Was replaced starting in 1908 with KARABINERr 98 AZ with

longer (23.6 in, 600 mm) barrel - had bayonet attachment ( Aufplanz) and stacking prong (Z)

Original KAR 98A lacked bayonet - cavalry were equipped with sabres instead .

Flash guards were used to protect wooden hand grips on bayonets from being scorched by muzzle flash

[trajan]

Thanks Dman - any thoughts, though, on the reason for the 2 month delay between the issue of bayonets to the cavalry on the east front and that on the west? The only other Kriegesministerium orders I am aware of relating to the issue of bayonets to the Heer during the GW, as with, e.g., the S.98/05, seem to have been applied to both fronts simultaneously, albeit in some cases (as with the S.98/05) the Bavarians only got to know about these orders after the Prussians had implemented them!

Trajan

[aussiesoldier]

Emperor Trajan,

Whilst Thomas’ books The German Army in WW1 says that cavalry units were issued with 84/98 bayonets prior to the war, and photographs during the early months of the war on the Western Front seem to support this, it is not inconceivable that S98/05s were issued. Photographs in Mery’s book, German Ersatz Bayonets, shows cavalry with metal copies of S98/05, and a modified IS71, and Jager equipped with a EB90. Considering Mery lists 62 different ersatz bayonets, including modified French, Russian, British, Belgian, Chinese (undelivered export), etc, any of which may have been modified to fit the KAR88, I don’t think you could be definitive. It is an unimaginable list of variations and one which enthusiasts of British arms could simply not comprehend.

Just an ancillary note - cavalry regiments on the Eastern Front retained their swords and lances well into 1916. On the eastern front, cavalry continued to perform some traditional roles, both providing reconnaissance and driving into the rear of Russian forces. At Tannenburg, cavalry troops would be employed as a screen at Vistula, the intention being to confuse Rennenkampf. The German cavalry was constrained by the fact that it was outnumbered some ten-to-one; a force ratio that caused even the boldest horseman to think twice before riding out to find the enemy.

What will remain as a brilliant cavalry achievement was the employment of the Kavallerie-Korps Garnier. Gamier’s Corps comprising 5 cavalry divisions was engaged in the gap made at the Battle of Vilna. It succeeded in getting to the rear of the Russians, but as it was obliged at the same time to detach several divisions against the reinforcements coming from the east, its strength was not sufficient to bar for a long time the retreat of the Russian columns. Nevertheless it had brought about a great success and it had really contributed toward gaining the battle.

The Battle for Schaulen: 14th-27th of July 1915: 3 cavalry divisions, reinforced by flying columns, threw off the chains of trench warfare and burst through the weakly defended Russian lines. It was the war of movement that the Generals had dreamed of. Accompanying them were the Reitenden Abteilungen of the Feldartillerie and the infantry on wagons and automobiles. Although von Below’s offensive had failed to fully encircle the 5th Army at Schaulen it had struck a very heavy blow and the Germans assumed the Russians would need some time to recover from it.

Raiding on the Eastern Front was important, such as that of the 1st Kavallerie-Korps on the 6th and 7th of May, 1915, in Lithuania, reaching to 25 kilometers to the northeast of Kovno, and penetrated to a distance of about 60 kilometers.

[aussiesoldier]

Further to the above .. . .

German Cavalry on the Western Front

General von Posek, the Inspector General of the German cavalry during Weimar, reflected that during the first months of the war mounted attacks in the German cavalry were made only by individual squadrons, regiments and brigades. He states that in 1914 the German cavalry was unprepared for dismounted fighting which only gradually and at the cost of much blood became a “daily habit.” He also reflected that the organization of cavalry into divisions was necessary in time of peace and that this principle was misunderstood by Germany before 1914, and the German cavalry was found from this fact in a state of inferiority.

They also failed to provide adequate feed for their hundreds of thousands of horses, entering the war with few arrangements to feed their horses. This was clearly a matter of incompetent logistics planning. Cavalry divisions were quickly taken out of the line to search for fodder. Indeed, just nine days into the war many cavalry forces were forced to halt and rest for four days. By the Marne von Moltke would comment, ‘the army no longer had a single horses capable of dragging itself forward.” But all this was unnecessary. Well-led and independent cavalry, ranging far ahead of the infantry, could have feed off the country they were invading. One officer remarked, “ . . . fodder was frequently found, ready harvested and stacked in the fields . . . “

(I read a US Cavalry Journal from the late 1920s that stressed this fodder crisis as a key factor in the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and argued that a well feed cavalry with a strong remount service, aggressively led, should have guaranteed the German's success in 1914. They were astonished at the poor planning from a nation that boasted of its talented General Staff.)

Why not? Was it that the generals leading the Schlieffen Plan’s swing around the French did not want the cavalry, or not appreciate its potential? Indeed, after twelve months, most of the cavalry divisions were moved to the Eastern front, and by 1916, were being turned into dismounted units. According to General Balck there were two basic failures of leadership:

(i) a lack of commanders capable to sustaining the offensive regardless of losses, and

(ii) the fodder crisis.

For the latter, there is no excuse, but to respond to the former, quality adventurous cavalry generals are born and neither the French, nor the Germans possessed any in the right places in 1914. Added to this is the infantry generals’ inability to see the potential that cavalry offered in putting well-trained and well-armed troops onto the battlefield at a much faster pace than the ‘walking’ infantry. (How many Cavalry Generals were on the General Staff?) Indeed, German cavalry was much more suited to the defensive, responding well to the retreat from the Marne and the race to the channel.

By the beginning of 1915 with the solidifying of the trench system, they could no longer find employment on the Western Front. 2nd and 4th Cavalry Corps were dissolved and the dismounted divisions were converted to Cavalry Schützen Divisions. Here, the cavalry brigades were renamed Cavalry Schützen Commands and performed a similar role to that of an infantry regiment command. It would be at this time that they would have been issued bayonets if they did not already possess them. The 1st and 3rd Cavalry Corps were transferred to the East. With less use as pure Cavalry formations, each underwent a series of re-designations according to their particular role from time to time.

The increasing shortage of horses led to the 4th, 5th and 9th Cavalry Divisions being dismounted in October 1916. The 3rd Cavalry Division was dissolved in November 1916 and the 6th and 7th Cavalry Divisions were also dismounted in November 1917. The Guards Cavalry Division followed in March 1918. Whilst a role remained for the German cavalry in the remaining years of the war, they never quite seemed to recapture the essential nature of their traditional fighting character.

[trajan]

Whilst Thomas’ books The German Army in WW1 says that cavalry units were issued with 84/98 bayonets prior to the war, and photographs during the early months of the war on the Western Front seem to support this, it is not inconceivable that S98/05s were issued. Photographs in Mery’s book, German Ersatz Bayonets, shows cavalry with metal copies of S98/05, and a modified IS71, and Jager equipped with a EB90. ...Just an ancillary note - cavalry regiments on the Eastern Front retained their swords and lances well into 1916. On the eastern front, cavalry continued to perform some traditional roles, both providing reconnaissance and driving into the rear of Russian forces. At Tannenburg ...

Thanks Aussie soldier.

I am surprised that Thomas claims that cavalry units had bayonets before 1914 as Friedag's guide to the German army for 1914 states quite specifically that the Blanke-Waffen issued to the cavalry units of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurttemburg, were along the lines of degen or sabres, although he does of course note that they were issued with Kar.98.

I was also a tad surprised that the cavalry on the eastern front retained their swords into 1916! I have before me a photograph in a German book taken 19 May 1915 that shows the 1.Eskadron of the Saxon Ulanen-Regiment Nr.18 ceremoniously parading their swords at Lille before surrendering them in exchange for (according to the caption) bayonets. As for lances, well that does not surprise me as photographs show them being carried into the late war period, although I have a transcript of a Bavarian directive of a Prussian order dated 25 May 1915 that cavalry were not to carry lances but to "have Seitengewehr 84/98 to hand".

I was not surprised, though, that Mery has photographs of cavalry with bayonet models other than the 84/98 or the 'Ersatz' knife bayonet which, according to Bavarian records, was classed as the S.88/98. When I get a chance I'll look back at that book.

Trajan

[trajan]

Further to the above .. . .

German Cavalry on the Western Front

Thanks again. I enjoyed that read, but it is certainly a surprise for me to learn about just how badly prepared the Heer was in its use of cavalry for the advance through France in August 1914, and I can see that the lack of a cavalryman on the Prussian GS would have hampered the ability to see the role that cavalry could play in ensuring a swift advance. There again, I don't know very much about cavalry tactics, but I had always understood that by the Franco-Prussian War the Prussians had already adopted the idea of using cavalry in a skirmishing and flanking role rather than a more aggressive one, so perhaps the fault lies back ultimately in the awareness of what concentrated fire did to the Light and Heavy cavalry brigades in the Crimea?

Trajan

[trajan]

... it is not inconceivable that S98/05s were issued [to cavalry]. Photographs in Mery’s book, German Ersatz Bayonets, shows cavalry with metal copies of S98/05, and a modified IS71, and Jager equipped with a EB90. ... [added by Trajan]

I had a chance to check some of my notes and indeed, some cavalry units were issued with bayonets of an unexpected kind... Haven't checked my own unit-marking files yet, but in Jackson's Seitengewehr 14 book, there on p.110, he lists the following bayonets and scabbards as unit marked for the Kgl.Bayer.8.Chevaulegers-Regiment:

S.98/05 a.A.

S.98 a.A. (FOUR examples)

EB.8

S.14 (three examples).

I have to admit, the news of cavalry having S.98's was startling...

[trajan]

A couple of things to add... I now have more transcripts of some at least of the relevant orders on the supply of the S.84/98 to cavalry which may be of interest to others. I haven't translated any of them yet but will do so when I can, but I thought I'd provide some interim data on their dates and a summary of their contents.

09 Nov. 1914: the S.M. the Kaiser orders the cavalry to be equipped with 'aufplanzbare Seitengewehre 84/98'.

28 Nov. 1914: the Kriegsministerium notifies the Chief of General Staff, etc., of the AKO ordering that the cavalry are to be supplied with these S.84/98 as from January 1915.

22 Dec. 1914: the reserve cavalry are to be issued with 'Schusswaffen 98 mit aufplanzbare Seitengewehre', the order specifying 'Gewehre 98 oder Karabiner 98 mit aufpflanzen Seitengewehr'.

20 Feb. 1915: replacement of previously issued S.14 by 'Seitengewehren mit Metallgriffen' (yes, you did read that right...S.14...)

25 Feb 1915: announcement confirming an order of 23 Feb.1915, that the first step is to issue cavalry on the East front with 'Seitengewehr mit Metallgriff'.

Please don't quote any of this as 'fact' yet - I still have to translate the flipping things, but I believe in sharing and wanted to let those interested know how things were developing on this issue...

Trajan