Gallipoli: Early Disembarkation and Survivability

[phil andrade]

Martin,

Let me sugest that this differential might have something to do with the number posted as missing.

Might it be that there was a larger proportion of casualties posted as missing in the 42nd than there was in the 29th ?

Bearing in mind the fact that " missing" at Gallipoli meant death in perhaps 97% of all cases, this could provide an explanation of sorts.

It seems that about one in eight of all battle casualties in the 29th were missing ( rough and ready estimate of 2,500 missing out of 20,000 battle casualties). Do you have corresponding figures for missing in the 42nd ?

That said, there is still a bewildering disparity in battle casualties : maybe I'm clutching at straws.

Edit : On reflection, it's clear that the number of fatalities ascribed to each division bears the same ratio as the number of respective battle casualties, so I doubt that my point about the missing has much merit....sorry !

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

The 86th Inf Bde's casualty and strength returns returns for 8th June-31st Dec 1915 have been preserved. The gap between the landings on 25th April and 8th June (when the Brigade records start) can be partially filled in with the war diaries. The data is patchy as the diarists were more concerned with staying alive than recording returns. Despite this we are able to reconstruct a number of units.

The 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers:

25th April 1915: Landed with........................................25 Officers and 918 ORs

26th April 1915: Diary records strength as...................15 Officers and 411 ORs ..... a 40% and 55% reduction in Officers and ORs respectively.

30th April 1915: Diary records strength as...................11 Officers and 354 ORs.......a 56% and 61% reduction in Officers and ORs respectively (from landing numbers)

17th May 1915: Diary records 1st reinforcements of .....1 Officer and 47 ORs........these would have been part of the original War Establishment and suggest 5% were held in reserve.

19th May 1915: Diary records strength as...................12 Officers and 337 ORS.......this includes 27 returned wounded.

31st May 1915: Diary records casualties to date:.........16 Officers and 639 ORs

2nd Jun 1916: Diary records 2nd Reinforcements of.....17 Officers and 509 ORs.......Mostly Kitchener men but will likely include every spare man from Base Details.

4th Jun 1916: Diary records further casualties of...........9 Officers and 123 ORs

8th Jun 1916: Diary records strength as.........................12 Officers and 533 ORs...Note 4 Officers attached from other units.

In summary:

Total numbers landed from 25th Apr - 8th Jun..............43 Officers and 1,474 ORs

Total Strength recorded in dairy on 8th Jun..................12 Officers and 533 ORs

Implied total number of casulaties 25th Apr- 8th Jun......31 Officers and 941 ORs

Some observations:

Roughly speaking the equivalent to the war establishment of a battalion had become casualties in the space of 44 days.

Within the first week Officer numbers had halved and OR numbers had reduced by over 60%

Up to 8th Jun 1915 the 1st Bn fatalities had been 380 All Ranks. Roughly half of these happened before the mass reinforcements of 2nd Jun.

Looking at the Brigade data for the 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers the battalion received multiple drafts but the attrition rates continued to outstrip its ability to reinforce:

From the 533 ORs on 8th Jun, numbers rebuilt to 610 on 18th Jun.........................a net increase of 77

From 18th Jun numbers dwindled to a low of 387 on 29th Jun.................................a net decrease of 223

From the low of 29th Jun numbers rebuilt to 1027 on 6th Aug.................................a net increase of 640*

From the peak of 1027 a low of 588 was reached on 22nd Aug...............................a net decrease of 439

From 588 numbers again rebuilt to 994 on 29th Aug...............................................a net increase of 406**

From this peak numbers collapsed to just 133 after the blizzard of 27th Nov........... a net decrease of 861

* Includes drafts:

17th Jul 99

20th Jul 200

31st Jul 121

3rd Aug 176

Total: 596 - note this implies at least another 118 recovered wounded, sick and missing from 21st /22nd Aug rejoined

** Includes drafts

24th Aug 145

25th Aug 100

26th Aug 43

Total: 288 - note this implies at least another 44 recovered wounded and sick rejoined

From the cycles above, roughly speaking there was a minimum influx of another 1,123 men - consisting of 884 reinforcements and 239 recovered sick, wounded and missing. At the same time there was a minimum outflow of 1,523 ( including 681 fatalities and a further 842 wounded and sick). The peaks and troughs do not tell us the full story as they are simply snapshots on particular dates. Between these points the turnover of men would likely exceed the net increases/decrease due to the ebb and flow of the recovered wounded and sick.

There is more data that will povide absolute clarity on the period 8th Jun-31st Dec. Given the battalion recorded the running totals to 4th Jun, we should be able to get a very accurate picture. MG

[Guest]

1st Bn Royal Munster Fusiliers spent eight months on the peninsula with only a few short breaks to refit before being thrown back in. On departure the Battalion had less than 200 men despite receiving drafts in the region of 1000 men in addition to its original strength of 1002 men. The exact numbers are elusive as the diary for Nov is MIA. If the neighbouring Battalions in the same Brigade are any guideline, roughly speaking slightly close to 2,000 men passed through its ranks at Gallipoli. Casuallties (all types) would be approximately 90% for two battalions worth of men.

In October the Battalion received a draft of 100 men, of which 86 were recovered wounded. At the time at least 15% of the battalion would already have been evacuated as a casualty and returned. Possibly more. Of the 195 men who embarked from Suvla in Dec 1915, some would certianly have been recovered wounded or sick, - meaning 90% casualties (all types) would have been a conservative estimate.

MG

[Guest]

31st Infantry Brigade's Officers in the original cohort had a rather torrid time.

5th (Service) Bn Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers

6th (Service) Bn Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers

5th (Service) Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers

6th (Service) Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers

All landed on 7th Aug 1915 with 25-27 Officers (including MO) and around 750 ORs per Battalion. Subsequently they received less than 20 Officer reinforcements between them. One battalion was commanded by a 2nd Lt and another by the QM before the end of September 1915. Of the 109 battalion Officers that landed in August 1915

Killed, Died of Wounds..........24

Wounded...............................59

Evacuated sick......................11

Total.....................................94

Of the wounded, 8 returned. To save you the calculations:

Battle casualties..................77%

Fatalities..............................22%

Overall casualties................86%

All this happened in just 55 days. The 70 Battle Casualties averaged just 23 days on the peninsula.

3 of the 4 Lt Colonels became casualties.............75%

6 of the 7 Majors became casualties....................86%

25 of the 26 Captains became casualties.............96%

59 of the 68 Subalterns became casualties..........87%

1 of the 4 Quartermasters became a casualty.......25%

[Guest]

I stumbled on some grim data in a diary today: The 2nd Bn Royal Fusiliers (86th Infantry Brigade, 29th Division) left the UK on 16th March with 25 Officers, and MO and 962 ORS. The Transport Officer and 48 ORs plus 12 ASC men sailed on a separate ship and joined the battalion at Mex camp on 30th March 1915. Some more men went to hospital on the following days. On the 8th April 1915 the battalion embarked for Gallipoli with 25 Officers, the MO, the Transport Officer and 990 ORs (incluing Tpt details) The Battalion landed on 25th April 1915 at Cape Helles on 25th April 1915. On 17th Sep, only 145 days later the diarist took stock of the losses.

War Diary 17th Sep 1915. On checking the casualty books the following are the number from the landing 25th Apr to date -

....................Officers.....Other Ranks

Killed.............19...............260

Missing...........7..................96

Wounded......40...............914

Sick...............24...............376

Total............. 90............1,646

Total All Ranks..............1,736

Numbers who landed with the Battalion on 25th Apr and have been present ever since - Officers Nil, Other Ranks 66.

There are also of the originals - 2 Officers and about 100 men returned to recover from their wounds.

This is only part of the story. During these 145 days, the diary recorded 32 Officers and 2,107 Other Ranks reinforcements in 12 drafts. It is possible that the number might be higher as the diary between 13th May and 5th Jun is missing - a period when other battalions in the same Brigade received around 180 reinforcements. Taking the known numbers, a total of 58 Battalion Officers and 3,097 Other Ranks passed through the ranks during this period. Effectively the battalion turned over nearly three times its War Establishment in less than 21 weeks

The 66 Other Ranks who remained unscathed represent just 6.7% of the Original Battalion. At this stage these 66 men still had three more years of the war to get through. They were also about to face the worst blizzard in a century at the end of November, where the 2nd Bn Royal Fusiliers suffered more than any battalion on the peninsula, being reduced to the following:

1st Dec 1915. At an inspection of the IXth ARMY CORPS Commander the strength of the Battalion was shown as follows:

Coy W - Strength 3, Effective 2

Coy X - Strength 12, Effective 7

Coy Y - Strength 10, Effective 6

Coy Z - Strength 19, Effective 7

HQ - Strength 26, Effective 16

MG - Strength 14, Effective 4

By this date at least another 342 men had joined the Battalion. Again the figure may well be higher as the dairy for most of November is missing. As an absolute minimum of the 3,439 Other Ranks who joined the battalion before 26th Nov, only 84 would still be functioning on 1st Dec and of these only 42 would be classed as 'effective'. Other Ranks casualty ratios of 98.8% for over three battalions worth of men.

Capt Gee was one of the survivors. He made record of the events that day. The storm was hurricane force, and flash floods destroyed trenches in the Suvla Plain and inundated the trench system. Men drowned, and then it froze. Hard. RN ships logs record temperatures falling to 2 Farenheit, the equivalent of minus 16 degrees celsius. If one is looking for examples of the inner strength that some men managed to muster in the most horrendous of times, this takes some beating. This is Gee's record of that day. (Note his numbers slightly differ from the war diary)

It was a dark night in the trenches at Suvla Bay and the 26^th Nov will long be remembered and perhaps spoken of in years to come. The men had just “stood to” and the Sgt Major reported “Garrison correct , Sir” when a terrible clap of thunder, worse than a bombardment of HE broke the stillness of the night. This was followed by zig-zags of lightening which appeared to split the heavens in two and then the rain fell as only it can fall in the tropics. Within half an hour the trenches held a foot of water rushing so quickly that it was difficult to stand. At 7 pm the Barricade gave way and a solid wall of water 7 ft high swept the trench carrying everything and everybody before it. By 8 pm the flood had reached its height and the force of the water had somewhat abated so that I was able to swim from a tree to No.1 Platoon. The men were on the parados of the trench up to their breasts in water, it was the same with No.2 Platoon, only about 9 rifles had been saved. No.3 Platoon had gathered on a high bit of land and having no trees to hang on to had formed groups and were clinging to each other. No.4 Platoon were fighting for their lives, their part of the line being a maze of trenches many of which had been washed away burying the men in the mud and making it v difficult for the man to retain a footing anywhere.

At 2 a.m. the water began to subside and the men were set to work to construct a breastwork behind the trenches. No tools being available we had to do this by scooping up handfuls of earth and by dawn a resemblance of cover had been formed and we found it useful for the enemy gave us about a dozen shrapnel. To add to our comforts it began to freeze hard and a snow blizzard came down and the whole of the place was soon covered by snow; many of the survivors of the flood died from exposure. With the help of the Sgt Major I counted the Company and of the 139, only 69 remained.

It was now discovered that the ration party had been drowned and all the food and drink we had was one gallon jar of rum, this we issued out and Pte Oldfield who had swum to HQ brought up orders that the line was to be held at all costs. This order was also afterwards brought to me by the Adjt. During this time – the first night – the cheerfulness of the men was marvellous, the slightest joke or mishap produced roars of laughter. By 8 o’clock I had a few rifles in working order and we were able to return the fire of the Turks, but I gave the order to cease firing as soon as the enemy ceased and during the whole of the 27^th v little r-fire took place. All day the weather was freezing & more men died; towards night it turned to rain & it was impossible to move. At 2 a.m. 28^th the CO brought me half a bottle of whiskey and told me that the Adjt and himself were the only live persons at the Battalion HQ. At 3:30 a..m. the Adjt brought me two Officers to help me. All my own Officers and most of the NCOs had gone under, and told me to let the men who could not fight make their own way to the Red Cross station. I passed the order on to each Platoon & about 30 men left, hardly one of whom could walk upright, most of them having to crawl through the mud & water on all fours. I then counted up and found that I had only 27 living souls in the firing line & only 10 rifles in working order. About 5:30 the order to “Retire to Battalion HQ” came along and after waiting for X Company to get clear, the Company started in the following order: No.1 Platoon, No.4 Platoon, No. 2 Platoon, No. 3 Platoon. I stayed with the last 4 men. We had barely gone 30 yards before the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th man were killed, the two first through the head, and the latter through the heart; 10 yds further on the other man got it and as I lifted him to dress his wound the breath rushed out of his body with an awful sound. I remember falling in the mud and sticking a bayonet in the ground to help me out and the next clear thing I remember was Lt Wilkinson rubbing my feet and bending my toes and they did hurt. On Tuesday the 30^th Nov the Corps Commander Sir Julian Byng inspected the Battalion – 84 strong: survivors of 661 Other Ranks and 22 Officers. Poor W Company mustered 2 – Sgt Major Pascall and myself. Total strength 27: Distribution – 18 effective, 9 non-effective. Distribution of effectives: 1 Signaller, 4 Sgts, Regtl Dump 10 (8 reported unfit), Other Ranks 3 (18-8=10)

Sgd. R Gee (Capt)

CSM Pascall had landed on the Peninsular a month after the initial landings. He was awarded the DCM, (possibly for this action?). Gee received no recognition, however he was later to win the VC in another corner of a foreign field. Somehow one is not really surprised. MG

[Guest]

1st Bn Royal Dublin Fusiliers landed on 25th April 1915 with 25 Officers and 985 Other Ranks.

According to their published history, at the evacuation in Jan 1916, only 11 Other Ranks served throughout the Gallipoli campaign and remained unscathed This is 1% of All Ranks who started the campaign. Another 78 Other Ranks and one Officer had been invalided and returned during the campaign.

Most of the diary is missing and the history does not provide any detail on the number of RDF men who served with the 1st Battalion at Gallipoli. Given the 6th and 7th (Service) Battalions also served there it would be a rather difficult task to unpick the 1st Bn men from the medal rolls. If the 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers is any guide (same Brigade) a reasonable estimate would be around 3,000 men.

Interestingly the number of 1st Bn RDF and 1st Bn Lancashire Fus men who returned after becoming invalids during the campaign is remarkably similar - at least in the same order of magnitude at 78 and 100 respectively. This also begins to challenge the idea that 59% of invalids returned to duty in the front line*. If they did, the time away from their battalions was considerable.

MG

*OH Medical Services: Medstats

[MartH]

Martin, which bit of Casualties and Medical Statistics are you using? Some of the figures are based upon samples. And as your work has show, you have to pick the right unit to sample.

[Guest]

On 10th Oct 1915 the staff of the 29th Div calculated how many men had served continuously from the landings on 25th April 1915, and how many had returned after being invalided. The numbers speak for themselves. Edit. Averages for the 12 Battalions has been added to the table.

Source: WO 95/4306 29th Div A&QMG War Diary

MG

[Guest]

Martin, which bit of Casualties and Medical Statistics are you using? Some of the figures are based upon samples. And as your work has show, you have to pick the right unit to sample.

Short Version: There are a number of tables in Medstats which have remarkably similar results: Roughly speaking 90% of non-fatal casualties "returned to duty". Of these, roughly 60% returned to "front line duty". This has created the perception that recovery ratios were very high. This may be so, but the time lag between being invalided and leaving hospital, and the time lag between leaving hospital and becoming 'fully effective' again is something not captured in the bare statistics. Elsewhere in Medstats there are tables on the speed of recovery and per cent which again give the impression that a high per cent of invalids returned to duty within weeks. The hard evidence from the BEF in 1914 and the MEF in 1915 is at odds with the composite stats.

Long Version: I have used the broadest measure and the stat that is most often quoted. Medstats (Vol IV) page 20 Table 8 which is based on the Survey of Casualties covering two large samples totalling over 1 million cases also on page 278 Table 9 and table 10. It is the largest study by a very long way. Sample size is 18.5% of casualties 1916 onward.

Dardanelles. Page 204 (Dardanelles Campaign) has a myriad of data. Tables 11a 11b and 11c - Admissions to Hospital and final disposal of cases. Table 11c works out the per cent.

Wounded (ORs) - 88.63% returned to duty

Sick (ORs) - 97.49% returned to duty

Injured (ORs) - 96.64% returned to duty

Total (ORs) - 95.23% returned to duty.

Sample size is 193,000 admissions to Hospital. Note it does not sub-divide 'return to duty' as returning to front line v returning to L of C , Garrison etc.

29th Div: Large Sub-Set. The 29th Div's infantry would be a very large sub-set, yet the data in the 29th Div A&QMG war diary suggests a very low per cent returned to duty while in theatre. Clearly, for the Medstats data to hold water, the majority returned to some kind of duty after the campaign. For the commander on the ground this is not particularly helpful as the 'temporary' losses needed to be replaced. There is another thread on this and I am reluctant to duplicate the debate here. Medstats and the hard stats from large samples such as the 29th Div are slightly at odds.

Wounded & Injured v Sick. The distortion is that two-thirds of admissions were 'Sick' and the majority would have been dysentery cases which has a high recovery rate. Stripping out the sick and only looking at the Wounded and Injured we still get 88.9% returning to duty. Comparing this to the 1916-18 samples, we have 90% returned to duty which breaks down into 18% returned to front line from a front line medical unit, and 60% from a hospital and 12% returned to duty on L of C, garrison or sedentary occupation. The data sets have fairy similar profiles despite that variables of climate and campaign.

A rough calculation indicates the 29th Div saw nearly two times its War Establishment as battle casualties and the equivalent of a War Establishment as non-battle casualties. Counting the men still standing, overall the 29th Div's infantry processed slightly over three times its war establishment in less than six months. Despite this the 29th calculated that less than 16% of its casualties returned to front line duty.

Verification. A cross check of a large subset of the data is possible as the 88th Inf Bde Forms Z largely survived. The 86th Inf Bde has a complete set of daily casualty data by battalion from the beginning of June through to the end of the Campaign (12,000 data points: K, W, M, S and Strength; Officers and ORs). It is possible the reconstruct the daily ebb and flow on Officers and Men for the 86th Infantry Brigade HQ, 2nd Bn Royal Fus, 1st Bn Lancs Fus, 1st Bn RMF and 1st Bn RDF. I have done this exercise. The data can also be resolved against the reinforcement data. There are some small gaps in the reinforcement data, some of which can be filled from the Brigade and A&QMG diaries. We have about 90% of the picture and it seems to me that it is simply impossible for the Medstats data to hold for the 29th Div's infantry sub-set.

Cross-Referencing with TF. The anecdotal evidence from the Manchester Regt TF battalions is very consistent with the battalions of the 86th Div and the 1st Bn Essex Regt shown earlier in the thread.

Cross-Referencing with New Army. Also, we have good daily data sets for the three Kitchener Divisions, although the data starts in August, the picture is similar. Any unit that saw hard fighting at Gallipoli seems to have data that is at odds with Medstats. The missing parts are the TF Divisions that saw less action and the other Arms. It is difficult to see how these provide a statistical counter-balance to the fighting Divisions. Work in progress but things are beginning to unravel just as I expected it would.

MG

[MartH]

Martin,

Apologies for the delay in replying, life's a bit busy, and thank you for your comprehensive reply.

Your explanation is very interesting and show how much there is still to learn.

The genesis for Casualties and Medical Statistics was fraught, in October 1920 the analysis was transferred to Ministry of Pensions, statistics for 1914 and 1915 had been generated but I don't think all. In 1922 that they decided not to use all 23 million cards but 2 samples of 500,000, I believe these where for 1916 onwards. It would be good to know what of the original documentation survives.

Have if you looked at General History Volume IV which cover Gallipoli? There is on table on 57 which may be of interest to you, https://archive.org/stream/medicalservicesg04macp#page/56/mode/2up

Have you looked at the Annual Reports of the Health of the Army? which is quoted in both volumes?

I look forward to you doing/unraveling the first day of the Somme, many thanks for your awe inspiring analysis.

[Guest]

A small piece of gold dust from the 1st Bn Royal Inniskilling Fus War Diary on 6th Dec 1915, exactly one year after leaving India:

6th Dec 1915. Anniversary of the Battalion leaving India. Calculation of casualties from commencement of campaign to 16th Nov 1915 including original Battalion and drafts sent out:-

Killed in action, died of wounds, died of disease.........267

Missing ........................................................................79

Wounded (approx)...................................................1,001

Strength of original Battalion:990, Drafts 1,205.......2,195

One Officer and 20 men returned from Rest Camp MUDROS, Capt A H B HAMILTON.

Of the original Battalion who left INDIA 6/12/14 there are now 2 Officers serving with the Battalion (Capt M F HAMMOND-SMITH Adjt & Capt and 2 Lt [Quarter] Master W A MORRIS and 118 OR. Of these, only 34 have not left the peninsula.

34 of the original 990 is only 3.4%. These men of course would have another three years fighting ahead of them. If casualty rates for these next three years matched that of Gallipoli, there would in theory be no-one left unscathed. MG

Edit. Incidentally it also show that 86 men had returned to duty from the original 990, implying a wounded and sick recovery ratio (to the front line) of only 8.7% of the originals. Again this number is significantly below what we might expect from Medstats rough numbers.

[Guest]

A comparison of the 1st Bn Border Regt (Dardanelles)and 2nd Bn Border Regt (Western Front):

Battle Casualties (BC) among Officers in the first cohorts

Battalion........................Original Number ......Killed......Wounded....Tot BC .......Survived unscathed

2nd Bn (BEF 1914)......................27..................15.............9..............24....................3..............

1st Bn (Gallipoli 1915)..................26..................13............10.............23....................3..............

I would not expect the data to be similar due to a myriad of factors, however the data is remarkably coincidental despite happening in completely different theatres, conditions and climates and happening months apart. Admittedly a very small sample and not statistically robust....however 10 other regular battalions in the 29th Div (Gallipoli) with sister battalions with the BEF on the Western Front in early 1914 show remarkably similar patterns (very similar data to the Border Regt). I wonder if this tells us anything about common factors such as leading from the front. The high concentration of battle casualties and fatalities in particular towards the beginning of the respective campaigns. Sample is over 570 Officers spread across 22 battalions (11 in each theatre - Dardanelles Apri 1915 onward and Western Front Aug 1914 onward)

What is clear is that regardless of the theatre of Operation (Gallipoli or Western Front) attrition among the Officer Ranks of the first cohorts was devastatingly similar. Some interesting correlations:

1. Time. In both groups the average time before becoming a Battle Casualty was 28 days. (4 weeks)

2. In Theatre. In both groups all but one fatality happened in the initial theatre of operations. One wounded Gallipoli veteran was later killled in Nov 1917 and one BEF veteran (wounded at Ypres) was later killed on the Somme. The point here, if it is not already clear is that the concentration of fatalities was heavily weighted towards the beginning of the war. Very few of the wounded died in later campaigns.

Point 2 might suggest that being wounded might have saved men from being killed in later campaigns, especially if they were medically downgraded or when recovered, moved to roles not quite at the sharp end. If an Officer stayed in a battalion for long enough he had a 50% chance of becoming a fatality and greater than 80% of become a non-fatal battle casualty. I will post the 29th Div regular battalion data alongside their regular BEF counterparts in due course.The idea behind comparing battalions from the same regiment is that they would likely be influenced by the same regimental ethos and attitudes towards leadership. MG

[phil andrade]

Martin,

To find out whether this speaks of " leading from the front", wouldn't it be necessary to set these officer casualties against those of the other ranks, and see if the proportion in the BEF differed from that in Gallipoli ?

Editing here : I put myself to the task, and discovered by use of Medical Stats that in the BEF, F&F, 1914, one officer was killed for every 14.3 men. At Gallipoli, British contingent only ( excluding RND) the figure was one to 17.8 : suggesting that when it came to leading from the front, the BEF officers were even more fatally deployed than their Gallipoli counterparts. I looked elsewhere to find info on Dominion troops at Gallipoli, and found figures for the New Zealanders. For the Kiwis, there was a significant difference from the British, with one officer being killed for every 22 men. I hope to find Australian figures ; but what I have here is of some note, I think.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Martin,

To find out whether this speaks of " leading from the front", wouldn't it be necessary to set these officer casualties against those of the other ranks, and see if the proportion in the BEF differed from that in Gallipoli ?

Editing here : I put myself to the task, and discovered by use of Medical Stats that in the BEF, F&F, 1914, one officer was killed for every 14.3 men. At Gallipoli, British contingent only ( excluding RND) the figure was one to 17.8 : suggesting that when it came to leading from the front, the BEF officers were even more fatally deployed than their Gallipoli counterparts. I looked elsewhere to find info on Dominion troops at Gallipoli, and found figures for the New Zealanders. For the Kiwis, there was a significant difference from the British, with one officer being killed for every 22 men. I hope to find Australian figures ; but what I have here is of some note, I think.

Phil (PJA)

Phil

I am not sure the aggregate data will necessarily tell us anything as the underlying factors are too complex and too difficult to isolate. Trying to draw robust arguments from the data is fraught with controversy. I assume you mean that 'leading from the front' would imply a higher ratio of Officers killed per men led. It does not necessarily follow. A hundred well led men might also be led to their untimely deaths. It all depends on whether they were followed or not. There are plenty of examples of Officers leading charges being followed by fewer and fewer men.

The other major factor was simply the number of Officers available and the ability of the military machine to replace permanent casualties among the Officer ranks. At risk of stating the obvious, dead Officers and hospitalised wounded Officers are out of the picture and can't become casualties again. If a Battalion can't replace them, the burden of leadership falls on depleting numbers of (original) Officers. This means that the few remaining original Officers are more likely to become casualties in the subsequent operations. We see this time and again in both sets of data (Gallipoli and the Western Front) simply because the permanent casualties among Officers was catastrophically high. Operations in the initial months were very intense and the Army was literally running out of trained regular Officers. It is worth remembering that on mobilization (sic) most Battalions required Officers from the Special Reserve to make up numbers. Brigade and Divisional Staffs, Cyclist Companies etc had to be assembled and every Battalion lost three Officers to the New Armies before a shot was fired. This meant that the pool of SR Officers was immediately depleted and the number of Officers left for reinforcements was critically low.

Unlike the Other Ranks, there seems to have been no hard and fast template for the amount of training required before being considered 'Fully trained and effective' - 6 months for recruits although some saw far less.For Officers an OTC certificate was often all that was required.Hundreds (thousands?) of subalterns were commissioned on the back of having served in the OTC and the possession of a Certificate (A or B - I can't quite recall). Hundreds of them may well have had their rendezvous with death after only a few weeks of subsequent training. The Army List provides the devastating data. The commissioning dates of subaltern Officers when compared to their deaths is crushingly short in many cases.

At some stage this year I will have the Infantry, Cavalry and Yeomanry Officers' 1914 and 1914-15 Star medal rolls populated with the casualty data including wounded (1914 is done and Gallipoli 1915 is close to completion). I will add commissioning data as well (from the Army List). What is particularly disturbing is the number of young men commissioned in 1914 who died with the new armies in 1915. Some rudimentary initial analysis suggests being a K1 New Army subaltern was very likely the most risky job in the British Army during the whole war. The fatalities and non-fatal battle casualties among the first cohorts of the young Officers of the 9th-14th Divs may even surpasses the Armageddon faced by the original regular cohorts of 1914 and the 29th Div in the Dardanelles.

Some large sampling of the August 1914 cohorts of the Western Front and the April cohorts of Gallipoli is providing unexpectedly similar results. Officer fatalities of 47% in both sets and Non-fatal battle casualties of 32% and 39% respectively. The K1 Cohorts look like they might exceed 55% fatalities and in a few cases close to 60%. It is work in progress and given the size of the data set will take time to complete. If experience is anything to go by, the early sampling is usually a very good guide.

Separately, the data on early TF battalions is also as bad. I have just crunched the 1/5th Bn Royal Scots (TF) at Gallipoli. See separate post.

My assumptions are that tactics had not materially changed in 1915 (frontal attacks, inadequate preparation, inadequate levels of artillery ammunition, leading from the front etc) and the consequences for Battalion Officers, and subalterns in particular was simply catastrophic. MG

[Guest]

1/5th Bn Royal Scots (TF). This battalion had the 'honour' of being the only TF battalion in the otherwise regular 29th Div. It disembarked at Gallipoli on 25th April in 1915. One of the great challenges the battalion faced was that the TF reinforcement chain was different to that of the Regulars in the 29th Div and the Battalion had significantly fewer reinforcements during its time on the Peninsula. Consequently the residual number of Officer and men dwindled to such low levels that it was taken out of the line on 17th Oct 1914, some three months before the other 11 regular battalions left Gallipoli for good. It was replaced by the Newfoundland Regiment and the 2/1st Bn London Regt (TF) but later reunited with the 29th Div in Jan 1916.

The Battalion landed with 29 Officers and close to 1,000 ORs. Of the 29 Officers

26 (90%) became battle casualties at Gallipoli. Of these;

12 (41%) became fatal casualties

14 (48%) became non-fatal battle casualties

note: One individual swings the data by 4%.

The data has one very unusual feature: the speed of the attrition was remarkably high.

30% battle casualties within 3 days

69% battle casualties within 14 days

90% battle casualties within 64 days

For the battle casualties, their average time before becoming a casualty was 16 days.

The data might actually be worse as four named Officers at disembarkation simply disappear from the records and are not recorded in the diaries again. They might well have been non-battle casualties. None appear in the nominal rolls in later months and weeks and it is distinctly possible that every Officer became a casualty if non-battle casualties are included. I may amend the data if more info becomes available. The data above is the minimum. MG

Edit. The published history identifies another Officer who was wounded (not recorded in the diary). Numbers amended accordingly. Incidentally it also states that after two months of fighting only the CO, Lt Col Wilson now remained. This implies the other three also be came casualties. It is worth noting that Lt Col Wilson had also been wounded on 28th April and had recovered suggesting 100% Officer casualties.

As far as the Other Ranks are concerned there is insufficient data in the diary or history to be able to reconstruct the full picture. The history records at evacuation the 1/5th Bn Royal Scots (TF) was 'about 100' strong, meaning roughly 90% of the ORs had become casualties. 292 were killed. It is uncertain how many reinforcements reached the 1/5th Bn while at Gallipoli, but it is clear that the vast majority of battle casualties rested on the original cohort.

[Gary D]

The 1/4th Bn Royal Scots (TF) embarked with 30 Officers and 941 ORs in May 1915. At the end of the campaign one Captain, the MO and 148 ORs managed to extricate themselves from the peninsula. I am not certain of the number of reinforcements the battalion received during the campaign, but it is likely to exceed a couple of hundred (I need to check). While possible, it is highly improbable that all the 148 ORs were 'originals'.

Even for 'late' arrivals, 'survivability' was challenging.

This intrigues me very much, as I have just made a deal in which I will be recieving an old pipe marked/ inscribed to the 4th Royal Scots. A. Company specifically. It appears the pipe was originally inscribed with the year 1914 and subsequently 5,6,and 7 were added meaning 1915 1916 and 1917. Thus it's owner had managed to survive the campaign.

[momsirish]

Hello Martin G, and PJA

I believe this task which you both have undertaken is one of love of the challenge, and it certainly shows an Esprit De corps, which reflects on the great worth of this forum. For one I'm glad you both have the dedication for the task.

In the stats produced by the staff of the 29th Division in 10 October 1915 there probably was there any distinction between the severity of the sickness or wounds suffered by invalided individuals who returned to duty.

It would be interesting to know what percentage of recovered wounded and sick had sufficient wounds and ailments that would have made them eligible to be invalided out of service but chose to return to their old battalions. Possibly the higher number would be for regulars than for TF troops as esprit de corps might be higher among regulars who had seen long time comrades and friends dying.

Thanks

Momsirish.

[momsirish]

edit to my earlier post:

In the 10 October 1915 stats produced by the Staff of the 29th Division there was possibly No distinction regarding the severity of wounds or illnesses suffered by invalided individuals who had returned to duty.

[Guest]

From "Britain's Sea Soldiers: A History of the Royal Marines 1914-1919" Appendix I Dardanelles pages 165-168.

 

The Appendix records the fate of the original 126 Officers and WOs who landed at Gallipoli between 25th -29th April

93% Casualties

67% Battle Casualties of whom 28% were fatal.

26% Non Battle Casualties

Only 8 were were on the Peninsula throughout the Campaign and another 7 returned to duty meaning only 15 of the original 126 were present at the evacuation. 

 

 

 

Edited 19 April , 2017 by Guest

[pjwmacro]

On 08/07/2015 at 01:02, QGE said:

1st Bn Royal Dublin Fusiliers landed on 25th April 1915 with 25 Officers and 985 Other Ranks.

According to their published history, at the evacuation in Jan 1916, only 11 Other Ranks served throughout the Gallipoli campaign and remained unscathed This is 1% of All Ranks who started the campaign. Another 78 Other Ranks and one Officer had been invalided and returned during the campaign.

Most of the diary is missing and the history does not provide any detail on the number of RDF men who served with the 1st Battalion at Gallipoli. Given the 6th and 7th (Service) Battalions also served there it would be a rather difficult task to unpick the 1st Bn men from the medal rolls. If the 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers is any guide (same Brigade) a reasonable estimate would be around 3,000 men.

Interestingly the number of 1st Bn RDF and 1st Bn Lancashire Fus men who returned after becoming invalids during the campaign is remarkably similar - at least in the same order of magnitude at 78 and 100 respectively. This also begins to challenge the idea that 59% of invalids returned to duty in the front line*. If they did, the time away from their battalions was considerable.

MG

*OH Medical Services: Medstats

 

On an off chance and slightly off topic - can your great work on this subject give me any information on what happened to Capt A W Molony. I believe he went ashore at V beach with W Coy 1 R Dubs Fus on 25th Apr - I think in Oct 15 he then was attached to MGC (M ) as an A /Maj and then (Feb 16), shipped to India as OC 22 Bty Motor Machine Guns. Any light  as to how he got from Apr to Oct 15 would be appreciated. I believe he was Alexander Weldon Molony? 

Regards Paul Macro

[michaeldr]

Paul,

 

I suggest that you contact our GWF Pal 'Oak' who as Philip Lecane authored 'Beneath a Turkish Sky' [ISBN 978 1 84588 865 7] covering the RDF at the landings.

Philip has several quotes from Alexander Molony and he may well be able to direct you to his papers which could fill in the gaps for you. At Gallipoli Molony was wounded in the first few days after the landing.

 

Good luck

Michael

 

edit to add: I see from Philip's bibliography that there is a ref to 

Molony, Senan 'On the River Clyde, They Died, They Died' White Star Journal, Vol.9, No.2, 2001

which could well be another lead worth following

Edited 24 April , 2017 by michaeldr