V.C. Awards. Ratio of Officers to Other Ranks.

[neverforget]

All corps etc are included in my original post. The information is here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_First_World_War_Victoria_Cross_recipients

[Guest]

You say you`re not criticising my thread. O.K.

I agree with some of your your sentiments, but as this is a thread dealing with possible biases re. V.C.s, I posted the table to show a relatively even spread of V.C.s across all of the regiments. Hope that explains your question about the point of posting it.

It goes without saying that there were innumerable acts of bravery that went unrewarded, but for me, that doesn`t diminish the individual courage of the men who actually were rewarded, or the award itself.

I for one find it inspiring to read the accounts of these acts of exceptional and selfless bravery, though it may be boring or misleading to others. Each to their own. I only started the thread for people who may have been interested.

If we shadows have offended

Think but this and all is mended;-

It was not my intention to offend and if I have I apologise. My arguments are based in fact, not conjecture. The so-called spread of VCs raises questions. There were 1,762 battalions in the Great War. In your table 13 Guards battalions (0.74% 1.26% of all 1,033 battalions) were awarded 24 of the 1,033 351 infantry VCs (6.83%). This suggests the Foot Guards were over three five times more likely to be awarded a VC. (Calc: 2.32/0.74 = 3.14 6.83/1.26 = 5.42) By extension it suggest this minuscule cohort of men were over three five times braver. While this is possible, it is statistically so unlikely as to be more or less impossible in my view.

This suggest to me at least that there were strong and dominant political forces at play. The award of a VC was highly subjective and had a greater chance if the potential recipient was a Guardsman. None of this I can prove but the stats are very compelling. In fact they are undeniable. There is anecdotal evidence for the randomness of VC awards: Compare the London Gazette's fantastical citations for Grenfell (9th Lancers) and C A L Yate (2nd KOYLI) in early 1914 with independent eyewitness accounts. Both citations report charges that in fact didn't happen. The Govt was short of victories and short of heroes. Grenfell in his own words was acutely embarrassed to have been awarded the VC.

To be clear, this is my speculation, but a view based strongly anchored in irrefutable stats. For those who fall back on the hackneyed idea of "lies, damned lies and statistics" I would offer the counter views of Bertrand Russell:

"Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show."

The elephant in the room is that the Guards awarded themselves a disproportionate number of VCs. By extension this raises question. It arguably undermines the perceived 'value' of a Guards VC relative to non-Guards regiments' VCs. Put simply; they were not as evenly spread as we might have expected and reinforces my view that a Great War VC tends to overshadow the remarkable achievements of lesser mortals who I think deserve a proportional amount of recognition. A book on DCM winners would be more interesting I suspect.

Any mistake are mine. MG

Edited with corrected calcs.

[Muerrisch]

Then again we have Robert Graves going into print to say that regular soldiers [regardless of rank] were to be favoured as any awards would prove useful after the war. Goodbye to all that, not to hand at the moment.

Such a claim would indeed be susceptible to statistical analysis. Regulars are identifiable in almost every case.

[ianjonesncl]

There is anecdotal evidence for the randomness of VC awards: Compare the London Gazette's fantastical citations for Grenfell (9th Lancers) and C A L Yate (2nd KOYLI) in early 1914 with independent eyewitness accounts. Both citations report charges that in fact didn't happen. The Govt was short of victories and short of heroes. Grenfell in his own words was acutely embarrassed to have been awarded the VC.

The transcript below is from the War Diary of 119 Battery RFA recording the Action at Elouges. I have highlighted the deeds of Captain Grenfell who's actions and those of the 9th Lancers are noteworthy. This at least supports his citation:

VC Citation - Captain F Grenfell

"For gallantry in action against un-broken Infantry at Andregnies, Belgium, on 24th August, 1914, and for gallant conduct in assisting to save the guns of 119th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, near Doubon the same day."

Interestingly, the Battery Commander Major EW Alexander is not mentioned, though he was awarded the VC in the same action as Captain Grenfell.

VC Citation - Major EW Alexander

For conspicuous bravery and great ability at Elouges on the 24th August 1914, when the flank guard was attacked by a German corps, in handling his battery against overwhelming odds with such conspicuous success that all his guns were saved, notwithstanding that they had to be withdrawn by hand by himself and three other men. This enabled the retirement of the 5th Division to be carried out without serious loss.

I have always wondered why there was an inconsistency.

Report of the action of the 119th Battery at ELOUGES August 24th 1914

On the afternoon of Aug 24th 1914 the 119th Battery formed part of the flank guard under Lt Colonel Balland, Norfolk Regt. Near ELOUGES. One section under Lieut. C.O.D. PRESTON was detached about 500 yards on the right of the other 2 sections. After the remainder of the 5th Division had the retired the Germans worked round the right and took this section in rear. It was ordered to retire. Lieut. Preston was wounded. The section moved by a road in front of the other two sections towards the left. While moving along the road it was caught up by a Cavalry Brigade retiring at a fast pace and carried along by them. They were under very heavy shell fire. One of the lead horses was shot and Sgt. McCartney dismounted and cut it out. After going for about half a mile Lieut Preston halted his section and brought it into action against German Cavalry. Afterwards he took on German Infantry and Machine Guns until they got within 800 yards of the guns. He then sent one gun out of action & was again wounded. Sgt McCartney took his gun under cover and then rode back to assist Lt Preston to get the other away. The wagon of this sub-section was found not to be following the gun and Lieut Preston went back to try to get it away, but was unable to do so as most of the horses were killed. Altogether he was wounded 4 times twice severely. He was put in an Ambulance & Sgt McCartney brought the section away. The other 4 guns remained in action longer. When they were ordered to retire it was necessary to run back by hand under cover owing to the heavy fire. Captain Grenfell, 9th Lancers asked if he could assist in anyway. He was asked if he could help running the guns back by hand as owing to heavy casualties few men were available. One gun was run back by the men of the Battery & then the men of 9th Lancers assisted in running back the remainder of most of the guns & most of the wagons. After that the Battery retired. Captain Grenfell was wounded before and again while assisting the 119th , but he still continued to help. The conduct of the 9th Lancers was splendid as at least 3 German Batteries were concentrated on the 119th (one on its right flank) there was considerable infantry fire brought on the men at the same time, by German infantry on the mining dumps 4 to 600 yds away. While retiring one wagon & a limber were hit by shells and had to be abandoned. 2 officers and 48 men in the Battery were killed & wounded and 4 missing. 43 horses were killed and several wounded.

[Guest]

Put simply the charge of the 9th Lancers against 'broken infantry' allegedly never happened. Multiple eyewitness accounts record the so-called charge being stopped by a single strand of barbed wire well before its unseen objective - close to the railway and there being no encounter with infantry. Some eyewitnesses state they could see no enemy when they charged. The recover of the British guns happened after the 'charge'. There is an equally fantastical painting and artists' illustrations of the 9th Lancers among German artillery -something that most definitely did not happen. The episode conflated rescuing British guns with charging German guns and it was compared in the British press with the charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War. The reality is that the alleged charge against broken infantry (or German guns as the press later claimed) was a complete fabrication. The Cavalry were in the eyes of one observer like panicking sheep in front of the wire. Later, Grenfell (and others) helped rescue the 119 RFA Battery guns, but the alleged charge against the 'broken infantry' which justified the 9th Lancers moving forward was the product of the British propaganda machine. MG

PS. the fact that Genfell was a personal friend of the sycophantic author John Buchan who was in charge of the media side of the Propaganda Bureau might have had something to do with the conflation. He later wrote the Grenfell's biography which perpetuated some of the myths. MG

[neverforget]

If we shadows have offended

Think but this and all is mended;-

It was not my intention to offend and if I have I apologise. My arguments are based in fact, not conjecture. The so-called spread of VCs raises questions. There were 1,762 battalions in the Great War. In your table 13 Guards battalions (0.74% of all infantry battalions) were awarded 24 of the 1,033 infantry VCs (2.32%). This suggests the Foot Guards were over three times more likely to be awarded a VC. (Calc: 2.32/0.74 = 3.14) By extension it suggest this minuscule cohort of men were three times braver. While this is possible, it is statistically so unlikely as to be more or less impossible in my view.

This suggest to me at least that there were strong and dominant political forces at play. The award of a VC was highly subjective and had a greater chance if the potential recipient was a Guardsman. None of this I can prove but the stats are very compelling. In fact they are undeniable. There is anecdotal evidence for the randomness of VC awards: Compare the London Gazette's fantastical citations for Grenfell (9th Lancers) and C A L Yate (2nd KOYLI) in early 1914 with independent eyewitness accounts. Both citations report charges that in fact didn't happen. The Govt was short of victories and short of heroes. Grenfell in his own words was acutely embarrassed to have been awarded the VC.

To be clear, this is my speculation, but a view based strongly anchored in irrefutable stats. For those who fall back on the hackneyed idea of "lies, damned lies and statistics" I would offer the counter views of Bertrand Russell:

"Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show."

The elephant in the room is that the Guards awarded themselves a disproportionate number of VCs. By extension this begs question. It arguably undermines the perceived 'value' of a Guards VC relative to non-Guards regiments' VCs. Put simply; they were not as evenly spread as we might have expected and reinforces my view that a Great War VC tends to overshadow the remarkable achievements of lesser mortals who I think deserve a proportional amount of recognition. A book on DCM winners would be more interesting I suspect.

Any mistake are mine. MG

Thank you for the lecture on mathematics, facts and conjectures, but you might note that what I have done on this thread is to do the maths, present facts, and invite conjectures from others.

I`m happy that the work I have done has raised questions, and I`m grateful to everyone for adding to the debate on my humble little thread. I much prefer to hear other people`s thoughts on the matter, rather than my own.

[Guest]

Likely I'm a member of the "gullible masses". I know I should be more careful when posting anything suggestive of anecdotal evidence here. Nevertheless, the fact remains that a disproportionately high number of junior officers were killed and wounded. Don't suppose it has a lot to do with V.C.s, although if they were dead they could not make recommendations.

Hazel

Hazel for what it is worth I am one of the gullible masses I bought the book (twice - once on kindle). Aside from the Six Weeks claim it is an excellent book which I would not hesitate to recommend. He is a very good author, but the tabloid headline claim seems to be aimed at creating a shock factor in order to sell more books.. MG

[Guest]

Thank you for the lecture on mathematics, facts and conjectures, but you might note that what I have done on this thread is to do the maths, present facts, and invite conjectures from others.

I`m happy that the work I have done has raised questions, and I`m grateful to everyone for adding to the debate on my humble little thread. I much prefer to hear other people`s thoughts on the matter, rather than my own.

I agree with everything you say, I simply think the table generates more questions. I note the table replicates the table in Appendix VII to Part II of Brig James' "British Regiments 1914-18".

My calculation was wrong (now amended). Of the 1761 battalions only 1,038* were regular, TF field units or New Army service battalions. according to James' analysis. Adjusting for this figure the Guards would appear to have been awarded (proportionally) 5.5 times more VCs than the non-Guards battalions, which is fascinating. Edit: I suspect that when other adjustments are made this figure would rise. MG

* Even this figure is doubtful. For example James' table shows the Royal Scots with 14 TF battalions as 'Field units' and 6 Reserve units. In fact only 6 of these battalions served on any active front, with 14 serving in the UK and many later being absorbed. This distortion of 'Field Units' is carried right through the table.

Of the Royal Scots' 2 Regular, 14 TF 'Field Units' and 6 Service battalions (the 22 battalions in James' and your total), only 14 served on any active front. It is difficult to see how anyone in the 3/9th Royal Scots TF based in Catterick might have been awarded a VC for example. If the calcs are to have any meaning it might be worth adjusting for the number of battalions that served on active duty in the vicinity of an enemy.One would see quite different numbers. Similarly one might consider that the number of men that served in each Regiment or battalion varied considerably based on their experiences, so the number of men who served in each Regiment is not accurately reflected by the number of battalions.

Edit 2: There are other distortions: 8 regular battalions remained in India .... the 2nd Connaughts' war lasted five months before it was amalgamated with the 1st Bn...many Service battalions were amalgamated etc, All this means that comparisons of this nature are susceptible to quite large distortions. This is why stats that are generated from James' tables can be misleading as his numbers don't make any adjustment. Comparing the 4 battalions of the Grenadier Guards and their 7 VCs with, say the Royal Scots might benefit from some adjustments.

Edited. MG

[Guest]

One possible way of refining the data is to calculate for each battalion the number of months they were on active service in a war zone. I call this 'battalions months'.

This approach allows us to adjust downwards for amalgamated battalions, home service battalions, training and reserve battalion, battalions stuck in India or garrison battalions nowhere near a battlefield. It also adjusts for battalions that arrived after Aug 1914. A battalion that served continuously from Aug 1914 to Nov 1918 would have served for 52 months. The Grenadier Guards' four battalions served at the front for a combined 183 'battalion months'. By comparison the 14 battalions of the Royal Scots served at the front for a combined 584 'battalion months'. On this basis, men serving in the Royal Scots' battalions (combined) had 3.2 times as much active service than men serving in the Grenadier Guards' battalions (combined). The two regiments claim the same number of VCs for the Great War. To avoid confusion, while it refines the 'per battalion' approach I am not sure it tells us much.

I happened to have this data for every battalion and every regiment*. If we do the calculation for all 1,761 infantry battalions the total number of 'battalion months' spent in a war zone was 31,640. Of these the Foot Guards accounted for 624 'battalion months' or 2.02 % of all infantry time in a war zone between Aug 1914 and Nov 1918. Using this as a base the Foot Guards' battalions were awarded (proportionally) 3.3 times the number of VCs than the Line Infantry (Reg, TF and New Armies combined).

Incidentally the peak number of battalions on active service in a war zone at any one time was 832 battalions in Dec 1917, or slightly less than half of all battalions in the Great War. MG

MG

* based on previous work for war diary dates.

[edwin astill]

Some years ago I did an analysis of VCs as a ratio of regiment fatalities - the latter as a proxy (yes, I know, arguable) of "nastiness" endured. I may even have posted it on this forum. Even using that measure I seem to recall the Guards did pretty well.

Edwin

[Kitchener's Bugle]

The Victoria Cross holds a kind of mythical status with the general Public.

Go to any military museum and you will see "the Public" gravitate toward the medal if on display.

The public has an on-going fascination with the medal and the men behind the medal and this is proven by the number of books on the subject.

Of course there will have been gallant acts that no one would have ever known about and acts that in hindsight would have justified the award in many peoples eyes. Many VC Recomendations were "down graded" to the DCM of Course.

I think you have done some interesting analysis here. One of the several explanations for junior officers wining so many medals will be around the assessment criteria. One of the aspects that is sought is the ability to make the difference and turn the tide at the most desperate moment, often turning sure defeat into triumph and inspiring others by their actions. No doubt junior officers by the nature of their roles and direct enermy to enermy location would have had opportunity to do so. Self sacrifice and complete disregard is another major factor.

With this all said though, it is not an exact science and it is open to changes. The "bar" in the Second World War was raised considerably higher of course.

[neverforget]

Some years ago I did an analysis of VCs as a ratio of regiment fatalities - the latter as a proxy (yes, I know, arguable) of "nastiness" endured. I may even have posted it on this forum. Even using that measure I seem to recall the Guards did pretty well.

Edwin

It would be interesting to see this analysis, Edwin, as this factor was something that I also felt should enter the equation, as should the "battalion months" mentioned. The whole subject is surrounded in grey, and there are many issues to debate.

Incidentally, I`ve never seen the Appendix VII to Part II of Brig James' "British Regiments 1914-18". The table of VCs per btn that I posted was sourced from a history of the "Warwicks".

The Victoria Cross holds a kind of mythical status with the general Public.

Go to any military museum and you will see "the Public" gravitate toward the medal if on display.

The public has an on-going fascination with the medal and the men behind the medal and this is proven by the number of books on the subject.

Of course there will have been gallant acts that no one would have ever known about and acts that in hindsight would have justified the award in many peoples eyes. Many VC Recomendations were "down graded" to the DCM of Course.

I think you have done some interesting analysis here. One of the several explanations for junior officers wining so many medals will be around the assessment criteria. One of the aspects that is sought is the ability to make the difference and turn the tide at the most desperate moment, often turning sure defeat into triumph and inspiring others by their actions. No doubt junior officers by the nature of their roles and direct enermy to enermy location would have had opportunity to do so. Self sacrifice and complete disregard is another major factor.

With this all said though, it is not an exact science and it is open to changes. The "bar" in the Second World War was raised considerably higher of course.

Thanks for this K.B. You are quite right in what you say about it not being an exact science.

You raise another issue regarding the bar being raised in WW2. It`s not something that I`ve given any thoughts to before now, but my initial inclination is that men were used with considerably more care in WW2, and that largely, the tactics employed by the army ensured that officers and men weren`t sacrificed in the same way.

Anyway, thanks to all for posting.

Despite all the ramifications surrounding VCs, I still feel that our history is richer with their inclusion.

[Kitchener's Bugle]

Clarkson is in the news again for all of the wrong reasons but this really is an exceptional documentary......

The twist at the end is amazing!

You also get to see the original gun metal and the VC's "in waiting".

There is a lot of examination of the character of VC Winners from the 20th Century as well as the criteria's.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tpg6h16k8eU

[neverforget]

Clarkson is in the news again for all of the wrong reasons but this really is an exceptional documentary......

The twist at the end is amazing!

You also get to see the original gun metal and the VC's "in waiting".

There is a lot of examination of the character of VC Winners from the 20th Century as well as the criteria's.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tpg6h16k8eU

Thanks for posting this, K.B. Fascinating viewing.

Like him or not, his presentation here is faultless imho.

As for the twist in the tale; (which I won`t spoil) superb.

[David Filsell]

Martin

An somewhat unkind analysis overall of the Grenfell Buchan relationship I think. That said the contemporary accounts, and there are a number, that I have seen refer to 'wire' not barbed wire.