BEF 1914 - Early Disembarkation and Survivability

[phil andrade]

Martin,

Did battalions really lose half of their establishment KILLED in two days ?

Your chart shows how bad the Aisne figting was : my RUSI citation for September 14th comes to mind.

Edit : Those fatalites for the Scots Guards, 11-12 November, presumably amounted to nearly 300...is that CWGC info ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Martin,

Did battalions really lose half of their establishment KILLED in two days ?

Your chart shows how bad the Aisne figting was : my RUSI citation for September 14th comes to mind.

Edit : Those fatalites for the Scots Guards, 11-12 November, presumably amounted to nearly 300...is that CWGC info ?

Phil (PJA)

Phil

It should read killed or wounded (now amended). Apologies - I was typing too hastily. I am basing this on 212 killed assuming 2:1 wounded:killed making roughly 600 battle casualties. The history provides some supporting evidence

The regimental history: "The 1st Scots Guards had been practically destroyed. Its total casualties from its first entry into the Battle of Ypres up to the 15th November [1914] were 9 officers killed, 7 wounded, 5 missing; of other ranks 105 had been killed, 151 wounded and 430 were missing". It records Capt Stracey and 69 men remained. To save you the calculation the totals are 686 for this period. It is also worth noting the same battalion lost 240 casualties at Gheluvelt on 29th Oct, 40 at Bixschoote and 215 on the Aisne. It is possible that the CWGC dates are simply taken from the last date the battalion was in the line (12th Nov) and all the MIA subsequently categorised as MIA&KIA were simply given the 11-12th Nov as the dates of their death. The History's numbers are taken directly from the diary which describes the casualties as being within the Ypres area. This might include Gheluvelt but my reading is that it doesn't. Either way by the evening of 12th this battalion was reduced to one officer and 69 men.

The war diary recorded every draft. Assuming 1,000 men in the main body, a further 434 ORs joined the 1st Bn up to 6th Nov in five drafts. On 12th Nov only 69 ORs mustered. Losses appear to have been around 1,365 to that point. Losses on the Aisne and Bixschoote were recorded as 206 and 38 ORs respectively. The Ypres area recorded as 686. Total 930, leaving around 435 unaccounted for - hence my belief that 'Ypres area' did not include the 240 losses at Gheluvlet. Including these still leaves 195 men unaccounted for. Arguably this is merely semantics. This battalion was destroyed in less than 3 months.The highest concentration of casualties (killed) according to the CWGC data was on 11th-12th (202 killed)

It is an fairly extreme case in terms of concentration of losses, but the losses were not the worst.

1st Bn Scots Guards: 414 killed in 1914. 212 killed over 11th-12th Nov 1914........Not to be confused with 672 killed for 1st and 2nd Bns combined for 1914. CWGC data.

[phil andrade]

Thanks for clarification, Martin.

The reality was bad enough, Lord knows. I wonder if the 212 Scots Guardsmen who died 11-12 November were victims of the Prussian Guards' bayonet attack at Nonne Boschen.

On November 11th just passed I thought about that battle, it being the centennial. It conjures up images of Inkerman more readily than it does of the Somme.

I suspect that sometimes CWGC attributes date of death by default - especially for September 25 1915.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

I gather, he said with a half smile, that my 1:2 ratio has become the received wisdom?

[phil andrade]

I gather, he said with a half smile, that my 1:2 ratio has become the received wisdom?

Not by this fool.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

I gather, he said with a half smile, that my 1:2 ratio has become the received wisdom?

It entirely depends on definitions. The Infantry TF is over 1:3, so it depends on what you are looking at. Taking a 1:2 ratio for the regular infantry seems to ensure this generates a minimum number of wounded, and therefore can not be seen as any attempt to inflate the battle casualty data.

There is of course an element of subjective interpretation; whether one includes DOW with KIA or with WIA. It makes a big difference. To get a ratio of 1:2 one needs to include DOW with KIA. Interestingly the ratios in MedStats do not use this methodology. It includes DOW with WIA. The only sub-group data for infantry is that mentioned in SMEBE page 249.

Killed*............307,975

Wounded ......908,692

Missing..........155,450 (all assumed to be KIA)

*includes DOW.

gives us...... WIA = 908,692 = 1.96 - note this is for the regular infantry 1914-18 all theatres. ...

KIA+ MIA 463,425

...however, if one makes the necessary adjustments for twice and thrice wounded and net off the DOW from KIA, add the DOW back to the WIA etc, the ratio becomes 1: 2.28. ...more than a 10% shift. I think it is possible to tweak the data in any direction if one has a mind to do so. For the purposes of the OP it seems better to use the lowest ratio as this would be the most conservative approach. Regardless of which ratio is used, it seems very clear that the battle casualty rates of 1914 were exceptionally high, even by the standards of later years.

The exercise has been interesting as it has blown apart a few misconceptions I had about this period. I understood it was catastrophic for the Old Contemptibles but I never quite understood the magnitude of the casualties, and more importantly just how few wounded were recovering sufficiently and making it back to the same units. Fatality rates, and battle casualty rates were both much higher than my preconceptions and the recovery of wounded was lower and slower than my expectations. The histories understandably get caught in the low-wire entanglement of the OH numbers. Subsequent histories have not really torn the data apart - at least none of the histories I have read. The idea that the BEF was destroyed in 1914 is about right. Where this analysis veers away from the accepted wisdom is the idea that 63% of hospitalised wounded returned to duty in the front line and 8% were discharged as invalids(MedstatsTable 8 Page 20)

While this might be the case for the whole army for the whole war, this seems highly unlikely for the line infantry cohorts of 1914. A third died, and two thirds were wounded, suggesting we would expect 42% to return to front line duty. I don't get any data for regular battalions landing in Aug 1914 that comes anywhere close. Medical discharges are roughly 20% of main body cohort, implying the discharged as a per cent of hospital cases must be much higher; probably at least 4 times, maybe 5 times greater than the numbers implied by MedStats. To be clear I am not arguing that MedStats is wrong, simply that the aggregate data that forms our understanding on casualties can be misleading if applied to the cohorts of 1914 and in particular the regular infantrymen. Put simply there is a huge asymmetry between the analysis of the unit data and the aggregate data in the reference material. On some measures it was undoubtedly the worst period of the war. I am beginning to understand why the British were so slow to learn from their mistakes. The men who has learned anything in 1914 were either dead or in hospital leaving a very small proportion to carry the lessons through to 1915.

I am not sure I will ever fully appreciate what those men went through. MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin, quite so.

As to the suffering, herewith a part of my recent ST! article for those with no access to it. The battalion, handicapped from the start by the fact that 2nd RWF had taken the cream of the reservists in August, was by no means unique:

1^st RWF, involved in the attempt to save Ostend, were marched here and there and then suffered three dreadful days in October in the First Battle of Ypres, being reduced to an officer-less husk of less than 90 men.

In November their newly-commissioned 2Lt Joe Cottrill [ex RQMS] wrote to a friend:

... The result (for the 1^st RWF) was they were all surrounded by the Germans, what happened to Col Cadogan and (Adjutant) Dooner no one can find out, but I fancy myself they are both wounded and prisoners. (They were both dead). Johns (ex Orderly Room Sergeant) is a 2Lt here; he is at present in command of a Company. We are in a rotten state for NCOs, there are only the SR people to promote. It is quite a new Bn and they are a crowd. All SR and Section D. Sorry to say the old 1^st Bn got a severe shaking last month at Ypres, out of 28 officers and 1120 men (sic) only one officer (Parker, Quartermaster) was left and two Sgts and 45 men besides Transport men. Of about 40 of the Sgt’s only myself, Snobs (the sergeant shoemaker) and Master Cook, the Drum Major, Johns OR (Orderly Room) and a Lce-Sgt Evans were left. ... As regarding the Col-Sgt’s who came out with the Bn this is how they stand as far as I can find out, Sgt-Major (the original sergeant major was Shem Williams, wounded 26^th October and subsequently commissioned) and Arm-Sgt Thorpe wounded in England; Col-Sgts Allen, Shea and Wood PoW in Germany; Allbutt, Underwood, and Downs wounded in England; Craven and Sullivan cannot be traced, reported missing, may be dead or PoW.

Thus a whole layer of middle management, expertise and experience was lost to the battalion.

[Guest]

Thus a whole layer of middle management, expertise and experience was lost to the battalion.

As part of my Royal Sussex Regt analyis I am using the enlistment dates (based on Nixon Army Numbers) to approximate the 'man years' of experience in a typical battalion and how many were lost in 1914...then compare this to the 'man years' of experience of the men they were replaced with. It is pretty awful reading. As you point out the experience was simply irreplaceable. I think the OH refers to this from memory... MG

[ss002d6252]

As part of my Royal Sussex Regt analyis I am using the enlistment dates (based on Nixon Army Numbers) to approximate the 'man years' of experience in a typical battalion and how many were lost in 1914...then compare this to the 'man years' of experience of the men they were replaced with. It is pretty awful reading. As you point out the experience was simply irreplaceable. I think the OH refers to this from memory... MG

The things we do for fun...

Great minds think alike - this is one of the things on my to do list for the 6th. I have all the enlistment dates tied down enough to give me an idea (at least the last 2 1/2 years work is finally giving some results. The figures should show an large difference due to the massive increase in post Aug 14 enlistment but it's interesting all the same.

Craig

[Guest]

The things we do for fun...

Great minds think alike - this is one of the things on my to do list for the 6th. I have all the enlistment dates tied down enough to give me an idea (at least the last 2 1/2 years work is finally giving some results. The figures should show an large difference due to the massive increase in post Aug 14 enlistment but it's interesting all the same.

Craig

I haven't worked out how to adjust for Reserve service. Given a soldier would serve 12 years one might amortise his colour service experience to zero over his Reserve service. Having said that , we know the Army still valued Section D men for another 4 years, so there would in theory be residual value in a time expired Section B man. Kitchener obviously thought there was residual value by asking time expired men to re-enlist, so presumably he at least thought this past service was worth something. How does one compare the value of a man who served 3 and 9 with his co-recruit who signed on for the full 12?

For an August 1914 battalion one would also need to know the breakdown of the service of the Reservists. I am only aware of a few surviving records, although all battalions were asked the composition of the main body and the number of years since the Reservists last served with the colours. MG

[ss002d6252]

I haven't worked out how to adjust for Reserve service. Given a soldier would serve 12 years one might amortise his colour service experience to zero over his Reserve service. Having said that , we know the Army still valued Section D men for another 4 years, so there would in theory be residual value in a time expired Section B man. Kitchener obviously thought there was residual value by asking time expired men to re-enlist, so presumably he at least thought this past service was worth something. How does one compare the value of a man who served 3 and 9 with his co-recruit who signed on for the full 12?

For an August 1914 battalion one would also need to know the breakdown of the service of the Reservists. I am only aware of a few surviving records, although all battalions were asked the composition of the main body and the number of years since the Reservists last served with the colours. MG

This is where I have it easier with the T.F. men as I know enlistment dates quite closely - I have some re-enlistments of former men but there's not enough to make a huge difference to the results.

For the regulars I would suggest the best method would be to just look at the total 'regular' years served up to August 14 - it's not a true reflection of effectiveness of time served but it would give you a relatively easy figure to calculate that could be used consistently and removes many arguments over adjustments for reservists and Class D etc.

Craig

[phil andrade]

Martin,

Please would you revisit your tabulation of Regular Army infantry casualties ? That statement that the 155,450 missing were all presumed to be killed.....are you sure about that ?

I have a very strong suspicion that the figure includes prisoners.

Here I guess, but I estimate that rather more than half of those missing were POWS.

The criteria for the missing figure are different from those in the Medstats.

The assertion that was made earlier ( apologies, Grumpy, if I misquote or misunderstand you) that, overall, two men were wounded for every one killed outright is definitely not correct . There were of course episodes when a unit sustained a freakishly high proportion of killed among the casualties - the French in August and September 1914 being the principal example. But the overall total of deaths from all causes in the armies of the British Empire ( SMEBE) were tabulated at 908,000, with 2,090,000 wounded. Remember that the 908,000 includes deaths from non battle causes ; the actual number of men killed in action or died from wounds probably did not exceed 800,000, and that includes the missing presumed dead . This equates to a 2.5 to one ratio of wounded to battle deaths ; if you take the DOW out of the equation, and focus on wounded to killed outright, you get something like 3.5 to one. This certainly comes over loud and clear in Medstats, if the missing are taken into account.

Other armies' experience needs to be mentioned.

Russian battle casualties were estimated by General Golovin, whose job it was to compile the reports, at 1.3 million killed and 4.2 million wounded 1914-17. Of the wounded, 350,000 died ; resulting in totals of 1.65 million killed/died of wounds and 3.85 million wounded.

In other words, thirty per cent of the men who were hit in battle were either killed outright or died from wounds. For the British armies, the figure was a little lower : 27 to 28 per cent. Significantly, it reached or exceeded thirty per cent in 1914, and also at Gallipoli.

The French figure was rather more " fatal", reflecting the terrific proportion of loss sustained in 1914. The French medical department gave a rounded estimate of 900,000 killed and 2,550,000 wounded, of whom 250,000 died, producing the two to one ratio that we've been discussing : 1,150,000 dead and 2,300,000 wounded...but even that, it should be noted produced more than 2.8 wounded for every one killed outright. There were an additional 175,000 non battle deaths to be reckoned with.

The German figure of 2.0 million army deaths and 4.25 million wounded indicates very similar experience. Allowing for non battle deaths, we have about 1.75 million killed/died of wounds, just under thirty per cent of the men who were hit in combat.

There we are, then...I've been quiblling and splitting hairs. Hope you don't mind.

Phil (PJA)

[ss002d6252]

Martin,

Please would you revisit your tabulation of Regular Army infantry casualties ? That statement that the 155,450 missing were all presumed to be killed.....are you sure about that ?

I have a very strong suspicion that the figure includes prisoners.

Here I guess, but I estimate that rather more than half of those missing were POWS.

The criteria for the missing figure are different from those in the Medstats.

Phil (PJA)

Is this Post 68 ?

Statistics page 329 suggest that Regular & T.F. POW's in Germany totalled 151,181 (other ranks) but the table doesn't give a breakdown by Arm (although clearly the majority would be infantry).

Craig

[Guest]

Martin,

Please would you revisit your tabulation of Regular Army infantry casualties ? That statement that the 155,450 missing were all presumed to be killed.....are you sure about that ?

I have a very strong suspicion that the figure includes

Phil (PJA)

Phil, you are probably right. There is a footnote on page 237 of SMEBE that the General Annual Report if the British Army 1913-19 has 'the final corrected figures'. GARBA shows 244,814 'Missing including Prisoners' for British ORs all Theatres of which 149,093 reported as POW have been released, suggesting at least 61% were indeed POW. It is still unclear whether the other 95,000 odd men were unreleased POW (unlikely in 1921 surely?) or whether they are indeed MIA who were later deemed KIA or died in captivity. I note that CWGC data for killed is higher than SMEBE, GARBA and MedStats, which might suggest some were subsequently classified as KIA.

If this is correct then my assumption that the MIA were all KIA is wrong and needs to be adjusted. If 39% of the missing were killed rather than 100%, this means the ratios will move to 2.46. If none of the MIA wer killed the ratio will be 2.95.

One of the huge challenges is that the definitions and numbers across SMEBE, MedStats and GARBA all differ slightly.

Thank you for highlighting this. For the purposes of the OP it simply means the situation was probably even worse for the regular infantry if Wounded:Killed ratios were as high as 2.46 or 2.95. As mentioned earlier I am mindful that one needs to be as conservative as possible with assumptions. The caveat here is that GARBA gives data for the Infantry but does not split regulars from the TF so an assumption that regular and TF infantry MIAs and POWs were proportional is necessary. I doubt this was the case, particularly in 1914, but with no hard data we simply have to use what we have to hand.

Infantry wounded:killed ratios were lower than the Army as a whole and regular infantry ratios were lower than TF, so I am fairly certain the regular infantry ratios should be lower than the Army's. Ditto 1914 v 1915 etc.... So it follows that ratios for regular infantry in 1914 would still be some of the lowest of the war.... .?

There is no doubt in my mind it was catastrophic for the regular infantry. Any mistakes are mine. MG

[phil andrade]

Martin,

Thanks for the very good grace that you display when dealing with my challenges.

While disparities exist between SMEBE and Medstat, the general orders of magnitude are reassuringly similar. The difference that matters in the context of our discussion is that Medstats is insistent on giving proper account for the composition of the figures for missing ; differentiating between those who were confirmed POW and the rest who could not be accounted for and almost certainly shared the fate of those posted as killed.

For F&F, the Medstats gives what I reckon to be the most authorattive reckoning for 1914-18 :

381,261 killed ; 151,356 died of wounds ; 144,898 missing ; 174,926 prisoners. Wounded ( less died of wounds) : 1,837,613.

The figure for wounded includes cases of gas poisoning, as does the figure for died of wounds.

The extrapolation I make is that this indicates an actual figure of 526 ,159 killed ( 381,261 + 144, 898 ) and 1,993,969 wounded ( 1,837,613 + 151,356). The arithmetic here gives a ratio of roughly 3.75 wounded for every one killed.

The same source for 1914 tabulates :

13,009 killed ; 3,657 died of wounds ; 6,596 missing ; 19,915 prisoners. Wounded ( less died of wounds) : 55,689.

Using the same method for extrapolation this produces :

Killed ; 19, 605 ( 13,009 + 6,596 ) and 59,346 wounded ( 55,689 + 3,657). This gives a ratio of just over three wounded for every one killed - a very significant indicator of how the 1914 fighting was significantly more fatal in terms of killed to wounded ratio than the following years.

I can't help noticing how the number killed in 1914 is almost identical to the number taken prisoner.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

Is this Post 68 ?

Craig

Heck, Craig...you're right !

We're working ourselves to a frazzle and repeating things.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

Martin,

Thanks for the very good grace that you display when dealing with my challenges.

While disparities exist between SMEBE and Medstat, the general orders of magnitude are reassuringly similar. The difference that matters in the context of our discussion is that Medstats is insistent on giving proper account for the composition of the figures for missing ; differentiating between those who were confirmed POW and the rest who could not be accounted for and almost certainly shared the fate of those posted as killed.

For F&F, the Medstats gives what I reckon to be the most authorattive reckoning for 1914-18 :

381,261 killed ; 151,356 died of wounds ; 144,898 missing ; 174,926 prisoners. Wounded ( less died of wounds) : 1,837,613.

The figure for wounded includes cases of gas poisoning, as does the figure for died of wounds.

The extrapolation I make is that this indicates an actual figure of 526 ,159 killed ( 381,261 + 144, 898 ) and 1,993,969 wounded ( 1,837,613 + 151,356). The arithmetic here gives a ratio of roughly 3.75 wounded for every one killed.

The same source for 1914 tabulates :

13,009 killed ; 3,657 died of wounds ; 6,596 missing ; 19,915 prisoners. Wounded ( less died of wounds) : 55,689.

Using the same method for extrapolation this produces :

Killed ; 19, 605 ( 13,009 + 6,596 ) and 59,346 wounded ( 55,689 + 3,657). This gives a ratio of just over three wounded for every one killed - a very significant indicator of how the 1914 fighting was significantly more fatal in terms of killed to wounded ratio than the following years.

I can't help noticing how the number killed in 1914 is almost identical to the number taken prisoner.

Phil (PJA)

I take it these are all arms?

I think we have established that the regular PBI were on to a 1:2 hiding?

[Guest]

I take it these are all arms?

I think we have established that the regular PBI were on to a 1:2 hiding?

No. My assumption that the MIA were subsequently recognised as KIA was wrong. At least 61% were POW. Adjusting for this gives the regular infantry a ratio of 1 : 2.45 for the duration of the war. The implications for the main body cohort of the 2nd Bn Royal Sussex and their 224 killed during the war (rather than died of wounds or died) is that there would have been approximately 549 wounded cases - i.e we would expect 773 of the 1,019 men to be either killed or wounded - some 76%.

Using the relative ratios from the tables it might be possible to estimate the ratios for 1914 for the regular infantry. In every case the 1914 ratios are markedly different from aggregate ratios for the whole war. In Mike's post above the ratios for the whole Army for the whole war are 3:45, but for 1914 is 3.03 i.e 13% lower. If this was applied to the 2.45 figure for the regular infantry to generate a theoretical figure for 1914, it implies a ratio of 2.15....so not far off.

This is, I think, how we can resolve the compelling evidence from Mike's arguments of higher overall ratios with the lower ratios for the regular infantry. For me this is the key to understanding the infantry's war. The infantry's experience was significantly different from the rest of the Army's. The big data mostly relates to the Army as a whole and I think is potentially misleading if applied to the infantry, particularly the regular infantry. MG

[Muerrisch]

Thank you: my "problem" is that, professionally, I invariably was faced with making quick decisions on inadequate evidence, having to use crude approximations and estimates.

Also [except for surface air pressure, which is measured to 1/10,000 part], the variables were usually "thrown to the odd".

That is, whereas 2.5 becomes 3, 2.4 becomes 2. And of course 4.5 becomes 5 .................

simples.

In my role as simplifier and summariser:

regular infantry 1914-1918 2.45 men wounded for every one KIA, we do not have a good figure for DOW, and we do not have very good grasp of "recycling" of wounded or sick to original battalion [or indeed regiment]

ditto 1914 only estimate 2.15

I wonder if our Silver War badge experts might throw some light on those who most certainly did not make it back [ultimately]. I know that there is a problem in that SWB enlistment is the original enlistment, thus often not entry into regiment or corps.

[Guest]

While Medstats was the most recent source of data (published 1931), the GARBA 1913-19 data (published in 1921) specifically identifies the number of POWs by Arm who had been returned. Given 93% of the Missing (including POW) were for the Western Front and the British Army was in Germany in 1921, it seems unlikely that many POWs in Germany were unaccounted. If this is accepted, then the adjustments for the MIA less POW can be done by Arm. The table below shows that GARBA data from table 15 on pages 71 and 72. For clarity I have only shown the data for France. and have excluded the other theatres.

My calculations adjusting for the known released POWs is highlighted in green. Any number of ratios can be generated from this data but the message is consistent. Any mistakes are mine. MG

Edit. It is worth noting that the infantry accounted for 91% of the Missing (including POW). The margin of error for the adjustments will be small given the dominance of the Infantry in this section of the data

Edit2: It is worth noting that the ratios for 'Other ARms' is in fact lower than the Infantry's. This point is made in Medstats.

Data source: General Annual Report of the British Army 1913-1919 published 10th March 1921. HMSO. Crown Copyright.

[phil andrade]

Grumpy

As a ballpark figure, a two to one ratio of wounded to deaths is pretty valid : the trouble is, that " deaths" figure is from all causes ; the KIA component of deaths might be no more than three quarters of the total death roll, allowing for died of wounds, illness and accidents.

A simplistic example : 1,000 killed in action, 3,500 wounded. Of the wounded, 250 die ; in addition, 100 die from illness and 50 come to grief in fatal accidents...total deaths, 1,400 as against 3,250 surviving wounded : a ratio of about 2.33 to one. The thing that troubled me was the inference that the wounded outnumbered the killed in action by a pretty consistent two to one.....it was more likely to be nearly double that, although there were dreadful circumstances in the most notorious battles where the number killed outright did indeed nearly rival the number wounded. The very high British casualties of the Hundred Days Offensive, on the other hand, were to a degree mitigated by a relatively low proportion of killed.

Incidentally, I am astonished to learn from a French medical return for the Great War that, of 3.1 million wound cases treated in hospital, half a million were cases of accident - what the British Medstats refer to as " injuries". Even without enemy fire, the day to day life of the soldier was hazardous, and young men are very accident prone.

Phil (PJA)

[ss002d6252]

Those figures are still out of the CWGC figures for some reason (assuming my figures are correct etc etc - I've used a quick re-work of the earlier table)

I don't believe that this many are missing from the CWGC for F&F so the death figure quoted in the GARBA has to have to have missing men added back in to their death total but what about the residual 19,500 men ?

EDIT:

If we were to consider men evacuated and then DOW the CWGC figure would clearly be higher and this 'may' tie it in. Anyone know how many men DOW in the UK (SDGW ?) to get an idea ?.

Craig

[Guest]

Those figures are still out of the CWGC figures for some reason (assuming my figures are correct etc etc - I've used a quick re-work of the earlier table)

Capture.JPG

I don't believe that this many are missing from the CWGC for F&F so the death figure quoted in the GARBA has to have to have missing men added back in to their death total but what about the residual 19,500 men ?

EDIT:

If we were to consider men evacuated and then DOW the CWGC figure would clearly be higher and this 'may' tie it in. Anyone know how many men DOW in the UK (SDGW ?) to get an idea ?.

Craig

Craig - the data on the spreadsheet is to the 30th Sep 1919 rather than 11 Nov 1918, so a small adjustment is needed.

19,000 on a base of 603,000 is only a 3% discrepancy. POW still in hospitals, RND and civilians working for the military might account for some of the overall differences. My sense is that this is pretty close. From memory the CWGC casts a very wide net and includes some who allegedly died many years later from the effects of service during the war. MG

[ss002d6252]

Craig - the data on the spreadsheet is to the 30th Sep 1919 rather than 11 Nov 1918, so a small adjustment is needed.

That adjusts the figure down to 11,669 fro 19,440.

I'm still cautious though of figures without being able to tie down discrepancies although the GARBA figures may be the best yet.

Craig

[Guest]

That adjusts the figure down to 11,669 fro 19,440.

I'm still cautious though of figures without being able to tie down discrepancies although the GARBA figures may be the best yet.

Craig

Possibly men who died after being discharged?