Gallipoli - what if?

[Tim Birch]

Was there ever a realistic chance that the Gallipoli campaign would have succeeded? It is apparent that the strength of the Turkish resistance was underestimated from the outrset. Was any attempt made to obtain reliable Intelligence on the strength and disposition of the Turkish Army, and its logistical support structure, prior to the landings? Were there troop ships with fresh troops to be committed to follow up a breakthrough waiting behind the landing ships?

Did the British and French have sufficient logistical support to carry out a successful campaign right up to Constantinople without capturing the Asiatic side of the Dardenelles at the same time? If the Sulva Bay landings (or even a further landing near Bulair) had been successful in driving a wedge across the peninsular behind the Turkish defenders, would the Allies have had sufficient strength to keep the corridor open bearing in mind that they would have had to fight on two flanks? The trapped Turkish Army would not really have been trapped without the capture of the Dardenelles, and it would have been resupplied or evacuated via Chanak.

The more I look at this campaign, the more it seems to have been cobbled together without much forward planning. WW2 with all it's advances in materials and weapons, particularly airpower, showed just how difficult seaborn landings are to sustain, and just how much planning is needed in advance. Given this it seems amazing that the Allies managed to hold onto their beach heads in Gallipoli for so long.

Tim

[Jonathan Saunders]

As I understand it, if de Robeck had continued to try and force the Dardanelles on the 19th March then the Turkish shore batteries had little ammunition to continue their resistance. Also the sea was much calmer than the preceeding day, when the current was instrumental in forcing the ships close inshore at the narrowest points to where the mines (that had not been successfully swept) lay.

If "we" had forced the Dardanelles then this would have put a far different perspective on the campaign.

As regards the landing: the Turks and the terrain were both underestimated as was the competence and ability of the Turkish and German commanders. Added to this, "our" intelligence was very poor. It was not Kitchener's finest hour. I agree, it is amazing we obtained a foothold at all.

Trust you and Margaret are both well as it has been some time since we last met on the Forum.

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

FWIIW, my view is that Gallipoli could not suceed. There were efforts to gain intelligence on the Ottoman Army but this proved exceedingly difficult throughout the war. Yigal Sheffy's book 'British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918' (ISBN 0 71464677 6) gives a very good account of the problems. Even with more accurate intelligence, I do not think that the campaign would have been altered significantly.

The biggest problem facing the British was the nature of warfare in 1915. To some extent, the specifics of Gallipoli can be seen as a secondary issue. Even as late as 1918, fighting infantry advances (as opposed to following up a defeated enemy in full retreat) could not be sustained for any distance. The defender could always create a secondary defensive line if such did not exist. The terrain features of the pennisula made this even easier. Exhaustion and problems maintaining supplies would quickly halt an advance that had not hit upon a serious defensive position, even leaving aside the problems of getting supplies to Gallipoli.

IMHO, to win on Gallipoli the allies had to wear down the Ottoman Army. This meant a long protracted campaign, as per other theatres. As it was, the Ottoman propensity to counter-attack caused them major losses until common-sense reigned. The high losses in the early months had eased off somewhat. If the campaign had carried on unchanged, then the Ottoman Army would have run into major manpower difficulties. I don't think this would have been the case but it is quite possible - Enva Pasha remained determined to force the allies off the peninsula from what I understand.

The extended lines of supply were a hindrance to the allies but there were fundamental problems with a relative lack of artillery and ammunition for example (although Travers makes a good case that the ammunition shortage was not as critical as was subsequently made out). It was not possible to supply that which was not available.

Then there were the problems with the technologies of the time. Aerial recon and artillery support was limited - captive balloons worked well for the Cape Helles area but not elsewhere. Naval gunfire support was only useful in very specific circumstances. While the Ottoman Army was able to take delivery of heavy artillery, it is doubtful this would have enabled them to force the allies off the peninsula (had they been determined to stay) though it would have helped win some local counter-attacks.

Even if the Kum Kale front had been retained, the basic problems would not have overcome. It too would have been contained by the Ottoman Army.

The allies were expecting a decisive and rapid victory (not just at Gallipoli). This did not eventuate for all the reasons that it did not eventuate in most other theatres (exceptions being the overrunning of Serbia at the second? attempt and most of Romania). When it was possible to accept that decisive victory was not possible, the alternative strategy of attrition was not considered.

Robert

[Tim Birch]

Thanks for the imput guys, and for your good wishes Jon. I have emailed you off forum.

Tim

[Malcolm]

In my opinion the Naval one could have worked if it had been continued as Jon has said. The Turkish Forts only had a few shells left after the first engagement.

As Clauswitz states ' the object of any campaign is the enemy's capital '

In the land campaign that was decided on, not a hope, doomed from the start as Robert states..

Aye

Malcolm

[Robert Dunlop]

Travers suggests that the Turkish forts were not short of shells, based on evidence from the Ottoman Army.

Robert

[MartinWills]

Other Turkish sources have suggested that the ability to defend the forts was weak.

None the less maintaining the Dardanelles open to allied shipping would not have been straightforward.

As Malcolm says, pointing to Clausewitz, the capital was the objective. The climate was such that the appearance of an allied fleet of Constantinople would probably have resulted in panic and the withdrawl of the Turkish powers far to the east. You can draw your own conclusions as to whether this would have secured eastern Turkey for the allies.

The Turks were highly reliant upon shipping to supply the Dardanelles campaign. The submarine offensives in the Marmora had a noticeable effect on supply lines and a major breakthrough by allied naval ships into the Marmora would have made supply lines even more difficult to support.

I don't suppose that this answers the question, but it gives more for us to consider.

Isn't hindsight a puzzling thing!!!!

[Malcolm]

General Hans Kannengeiser, German commander at the forts, gives the imformation that the forts had few shells left and he was preparing to ' fire off his last shells and march his men away ' if the Navy had come back on the next day. There were some shells with the Goeben and Breslau but no way to get them to the forts. The mines that stopped the Allies were for the most part Russian having been floated down the Bosphorus and been fished out by the Turks and redeployed in the straits. Moorehead also points that a Naval breakthrough would have been a success.

North gives Gallipoli as the biggest ' what if ' in history which it probably was.

Hindsight is indeed a puzzling thing!!

Aye

Malcolm